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5Foreword 
Europe is confronted with a rapidly evolving drug market. The increased potency and purity 
of illicit drugs, the record numbers of seizures and increased production in the EU, all 
indicate that the availability of illicit substances is growing. We also see a dramatic increase 
in the number of new, and often highly potent, synthetic substances present on the market. 
Moreover, organised crime benefits significantly from the drug trade but, more worryingly, 
these criminals have shown determination and ruthlessness in trying to grow their market 
share. The direct impact of these developments is to be found in the number of fatal drug 
overdoses, of which there were 8 238 in the EU in 2017, and individuals seeking help from 
treatment providers or emergency services. 
The increasingly global reach of organised crime groups involved in drug production and 
trafficking also represents a major cross-border security threat. They are forward-looking 
and quick to innovate in order to counter threats to their business model, but also quick 
to take advantage of new opportunities. Indeed, the drug market has become increasingly 
digitally enabled. Drugs purchased online can be transported across Europe and delivered 
to consumers by post and parcel services. This creates new challenges for law enforcement.
The report also highlights the way drug market-related activities complicate and make 
other security and health threats worse. It shows that the drug market is one of the major 
sources of income for organised crime and how it is linked to other areas of criminality. The 
drug market is also an important driver for the recruitment of young people into criminal 
organisations and gangs, as well as the exploitation and trafficking of vulnerable individuals. 
The negative impact of drugs and drug use in Europe must also be measured in terms of 
its societal consequences. Violent crime in producer and transit countries leads to reduced 
social development, failing institutions, ecological damage and blighted communities.
The evidence provided in this third European Drug Markets Report and the links to 
organised crime that it highlights are a major contribution to informing policymakers. 
Confronted with such a growing threat, the European Union must be innovative and 
forward-looking; it must step up its effort to fight the criminal activities, while keeping drugs 
policy anchored in a balanced and evidence-based approach.
Paraskevi Michou 
Director-General Migration and Home Affairs 
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7Introduction 
It is with great pleasure that we present this new joint report by the European Monitoring 
Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA) and the European Union Agency for 
Law Enforcement Cooperation (Europol). The report focuses on the drug supply chain, 
the associated criminal activities and actors, and the policy, strategic and operational 
responses to these. It highlights the importance of the drug market as a key source of 
revenue for organised crime, its links to terrorism and wider criminal activity, and the 
negative impact it has on the legal economy and society more generally, demonstrating how 
the drug trade and its wider ramifications affect all aspects of the European security agenda 
and why tackling them is essential to the European Union’s fight against serious and 
organised crime. It describes, for example, the links between drugs and trafficking in human 
beings, the increasing levels of violence and corruption associated with the drug trade, and 
the environmental harms from drug production — all of which are now increasingly visible 
within Europe. 
The analysis underpinning this report is strengthened by the complementary perspectives 
our two organisations bring to this topic. The synthesis of the operational intelligence 
provided by Europol, with research data and the information available from the ongoing 
monitoring undertaken by EMCDDA has produced a report and accompanying online 
materials that provide a contemporary strategic and action-oriented analysis of Europe’s 
drug markets. This will be a valuable source of evidence to inform policies and actions and 
a strategic understanding of how criminal enterprises operate to assist the targeting of 
operational activities.  
This is the third EU Drug Markets Report – it builds upon the analysis provided in the 2013 
and 2016 editions and many of the conclusions and recommendations of the previous 
reports remain relevant today. However, this new report is able to paint a richer picture 
and provides additional insights. For example, it highlights the way in which many of the 
harms more traditionally associated with drug production and trafficking outside Europe 
are becoming a growing threat within the EU. It also shows how the EU is increasingly 
important as both a drug producing and transit region, while EU-based organised crime 
groups are adapting their modi operandi and extending their reach, resulting in both 
increased harms and new challenges for enforcement.
The increasingly globalised and digitally-enabled nature of drug markets illustrated in 
the report means that the law enforcement activities countering these are becoming 
more complex and resource intensive. This underlines the need to ensure the adequate 
resourcing and prioritisation of supply reduction activities, including not only law 
enforcement interventions and investigations, but also importantly activities to enhance 
international cooperation, at both the national and EU level. The continued development of 
joint programmes, networks, partnerships and capacity building in relation to drug supply 
reduction among key regional partners, such as the Western Balkan and other neighbouring 
countries as well as those in the drug producing regions of Latin America and Central Asia, 
therefore needs to remain a high priority. 
This report also illustrates the importance of continued investment in research, monitoring 
and analysis, which is necessary to underpin the flexible and dynamic responses that 
Europe requires to tackle the problems generated by drug markets. Having a reliable and 
comprehensive picture of the drug market and its wider impacts available is essential for 
decision-makers at both the national and EU Level as well as to law enforcement authorities 
in planning resource allocation and deciding on investigative focus areas. The EU Drug 
Markets Report helps to address these needs by providing an indispensable reference point 
8for audiences ranging from policy-makers with responsibility for both security and public 
health to investigators, analysts and managers working on activities in the area of criminal 
investigations and drug supply reduction.
The breadth of topics covered in this report means that it inevitably synthesises and 
summarises a large amount of detailed information. We take this opportunity to thank not 
only our own staff but also all the experts, both in Europe and internationally, who have 
provided input and comments that have been essential to ensuring the quality the analysis 
found here. We also thank the EU and national institutions and bodies, and especially our 
colleagues in the European Commission, who have contributed so generously with their 
time to provide comments on this report; these insights have been invaluable. 
Finally, we must acknowledge that the hidden and criminal nature of the drug market makes 
it challenging for research and monitoring, and inevitably there are knowledge and data 
gaps in many areas, which can hamper the development of evidence-based responses. Our 
analyses are necessarily based on triangulation between diverse, partial and sometimes 
contradictory information sources. While putting these together helps provide a more 
complete picture, uncertainty still exists and critical information gaps remain. Therefore, 
throughout this report we give attention to the issue of ‘what we don’t know, but need to 
know’ about the European drug market. Nevertheless, we are confident that this report 
provides a state-of-the-art review of the data currently available in this area. It also draws 
out key learning and action points that provide a strong platform for developing future 
policies and actions, to enhance our understanding not only of the rapidly changing drug 
markets but also of what we need to do in Europe if we are to take effective measures to 
tackle them.
Alexis Goosdeel      Catherine De Bolle
Director, EMCDDA     Executive Director, Europol
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Explanatory note on data
This report utilises data from multiple sources. Primarily it includes data and information 
reported to the EMCDDA and Europol. The EMCDDA data presented in this report are 
based on annual data collection using standardised reporting tools by the EMCDDA via its 
network of 30 national focal points across the 28 EU Member States (as of August 2019), 
Norway and Turkey. Unless otherwise stated, data presented in this report relate to the 28 
EU Member States and 2017 data year. EU+2 denotes data for the EU Member States, 
Norway and Turkey. Where lists of countries are not in alphabetical order, they are in order 
of importance. The analyses presented here are also informed by open source information, 
including an EMCDDA database of reports of individual seizures identified through an 
ongoing monitoring programme. There are sometimes inconsistencies between the data 
from different sources and, in addition, data supplied by Member States to the EMCDDA, 
such as seizures, may themselves be collated from a large number of different data sources 
and in some countries the total values supplied may represent minimum estimates.
Estimates of the total size of the retail drug market in the European Union (EU) in 2017 
for cannabis, heroin, cocaine, amphetamines and MDMA have been constructed using a 
demand-side approach. These estimates are likely to underestimate the size of the market 
due to gaps and underestimations in the currently available data, on which they are based. 
Nevertheless, the process has proved valuable in identifying key gaps in our knowledge. 
Some key principles underpinning the approach taken are: 
  European estimates were obtained by summing individual country estimates;
  wherever possible, the data used came from routine EMCDDA data collection; 
  where imputation of missing data was essential to produce a national estimate, this 
was based on related country-specific data, if possible, or else the average across those 
EU countries for which data were available was used;
  all imputations and assumptions made within the estimation process are noted, so that 
the limitations are clear.
However, in areas where data on which to base assumptions are lacking or are of 
insufficient quality, no imputations have been made. This includes, for example, the extent 
of underestimation and undercoverage in the general population survey data underpinning 
the estimates. Therefore, the retail market value reported here is a minimum estimate. 
In addition, it only reflects the amount consumers spend on illicit drugs and provides no 
information on other aspects of the drug market, such as the profits and losses for criminal 
groups at different stages of the supply chain.
Global data are sourced from the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and 
the International Narcotics Control Board (INCB).
Currency conversions to euros throughout the report are based on European Central Bank 
exchange rates for the year corresponding to the data used (European Central Bank, n.d.).
I
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Executive summary
This report provides a strategic and action-oriented analysis of the information available on 
Europe’s drug market. It uses a broad definition of the illicit drug market, encompassing the 
illicit production, trafficking, wholesale distribution and sale of controlled substances to the 
end user. The drug market has wide-ranging impacts on both security and public health, 
and therefore such a holistic and systemic perspective is important for the effective delivery 
and monitoring of drug control policy and supply reduction activities.
Impacts and drivers of drug markets
The drug market is a major source of income for organised crime groups (OCGs) in the 
EU, with minimum estimated retail value of EUR 30 billion per year. In addition to the 
economic impact, drug-related deaths and other harms to public health, there are broader 
consequences of drug markets, such as links with wider criminal activities and terrorism; the 
negative impact on the legal economy; violence in communities; damage to the environment; 
and the increasingly important issue of how the drug market can fuel corruption and 
undermine governance.
Analysis of OCG activities highlights the importance of the drug market and that strong links 
exist with other areas of serious crime. More than one third of the 5 000 OCGs identified 
in the EU’s Serious and Organised Crime Threat Assessment (SOCTA) 2017 were directly 
involved in the drug market and, overall, illicit drugs represent the most valuable market 
for criminal organisations operating in the EU. About two thirds of those engaged in the 
drug trade are also involved in other criminal activities. There are also signs of increasing 
competition between groups leading to escalating violence within the EU drug market. All 
data indicate that overall drug availability within Europe, for both natural and synthetic drugs, 
remains very high. The European drug market is increasingly characterised by consumers 
having access to a wide variety of high-purity and high-potency products that, in real terms, 
are usually equivalent in price or cheaper than they have been over the past decade.
This reflects high levels of production globally and within the EU. Cocaine production in South 
America and heroin production in Afghanistan are estimated to be at historically high levels. 
Europe is also a major producer of cannabis and synthetic drugs for the EU market and to 
some extent is a global supplier of MDMA and amphetamine. Developments in the area of 
precursors have been an important driver of the expansion of drug production.
The drug market is becoming more globally connected and technologically enabled. The 
main drivers of change behind the developments and new threats detailed in this report 
stem from the ability of OCGs to exploit the opportunities arising from the existence of global 
commercial markets and the associated logistical developments and digitalisation.
Globalised commercial markets require the transportation of goods across borders as rapidly 
and simply as possible. There has been a rapid growth in the volume of trade using both 
intermodal transportation networks for large-volume shipments, often involving containers, 
and rapid parcel and postal delivery services for smaller volumes. These are increasingly 
exploited by OCGs for drug-trafficking activities. OCGs are becoming more internationally 
connected and exploit the gaps and differences that exist in regulatory and drug control 
environments.
The drug market is increasingly digitally enabled. Both the surface web and darknet 
markets are used for online drug sales, as are social media and mobile communication 
apps. Encryption and anonymised services are also increasingly used by OCGs for secure 
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communication in the trafficking and sale of illicit drugs. This can disrupt existing markets 
by lowering the barriers for market entry, reducing the need for some of the capacities and 
infrastructure traditionally needed for drug trafficking and distribution, and creating new 
challenges for law enforcement and public health.
The drug market in the EU needs to be viewed from both global and regional perspectives. 
There are specific challenges associated with different regions. Developments in drug 
production in South America and Afghanistan have a clear impact on the EU drug market. 
China is also important as a source country for drug precursors and new psychoactive 
substances. In some neighbouring countries, such as Morocco, Turkey and the Western 
Balkans, there are OCGs that are closely linked to ethnically-based groups residing in the 
EU, which is changing the dynamics of drug supply. Africa is also important because of its 
growing role as a trafficking and transit area, with the potential for this to be a destabilising 
influence and have a negative impact on security and governance, and increasing drug 
problems within the region.
Key themes and implications for action
The overarching themes emerging from the analysis have important implications 
for action. In addition to those elaborated in the individual chapters of the report, 
the following broad areas need to be addressed for an effective response to the 
challenges identified in the European drug market. 
Strengthening efforts to target top-level OCGs active in the global drug market
The threat posed by the changing OCG business models and their growing ability to 
exploit new opportunities requires continuing investment to strengthen information 
sharing, analysis and cooperative actions at the operational, strategic and policy 
levels. This is necessary to tackle major OCGs across different drug types and areas of 
criminal enterprise.
Reducing vulnerabilities at external borders
Reducing the opportunities for wholesale trafficking of drugs through key entry points 
into the EU requires continued investment in risk analysis and profiling, intelligence 
sharing and implementation of proven approaches to strengthen the external 
borders of the EU. Effective cooperation within and across borders between police, 
customs, border control, other law enforcement agencies, and across the EU between 
judiciaries, is a critical requirement for success.
Focusing on key geographical locations for trafficking and production
Areas in which drug market activities are concentrated are identified in this report. 
Targeting these key locations with special measures while remaining vigilant to the 
potential for the displacement of activities, should be a strategic priority.
Investing in forensic and toxicological capacity
Innovations in drug production and trafficking methods for all drugs, the growing 
importance of highly potent synthetic substances, and the introduction of new 
psychoactive substances and precursor chemicals has meant that forensic and 
toxicological analysis is becoming increasingly important. However, overall capacity 
is limited, potentially impeding the development of effective policies and actions. 
Investment is required both at the European and Member States’ level.
EU DRUG MARKETS REPORT
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Cannabis
Europe’s biggest drug market is for cannabis and significant production of the drug takes 
place within the EU. With around 25 million annual users, the retail market for cannabis was 
estimated to be worth at least EUR 11.6 billion in 2017. Around one in seven young adults 
in the EU reports having used cannabis in the past year, with prevalence rates generally 
stable but with early signs of possible increases in some countries. Herbal cannabis is more 
commonly used than cannabis resin in the EU. The cannabis market is rapidly becoming 
more diverse and complex, complicating and putting a strain on current regulatory, law 
enforcement and monitoring approaches to this drug. Resin and herbal cannabis, now of 
higher potency, still dominate but other products are appearing. These range from  
high-potency cannabis oils to a wide range of commercial medical and wellness products 
with low levels of tetrahydrocannabinol (THC).
Addressing the links with other important security threats
It is increasingly recognised that there are some links between illicit drug markets and 
other criminal activities, such as trafficking in human beings and terrorism. Such links 
require further study and may be challenging to address. Tackling them effectively 
involves the strengthening of multiagency partnerships in order to step up action in 
the areas of prevention, prosecution of perpetrators as well as protection of victims.
Recognising the costs of drug-related violence and corruption
Historically drug-related violence and corruption were most commonly associated 
with production and trafficking activities outside Europe. This report identifies 
a growing threat that the European drug market is becoming a driver for increasing 
violence and corrupt practices within the EU. Combating this threat is a major 
challenge that requires concerted actions across a number of policy areas.
Responding to digitally enabled drug markets
A proactive analysis of the threats posed by the introduction of new technologies 
is needed. The success of law enforcement actions against digitally enabled drug 
markets will increasingly rely on the ability to identify and employ new tools and 
technologies — to anticipate and respond to the emerging threats. This requires the 
harnessing of specialist skills, for example in forensic science, financial investigations, 
and information and communications technology.
Acting at a global level
Engagement with international organisations and third countries is a crucial element 
in responding to a globalised drug market. Understanding developments in drug 
production, trafficking and use in non-EU countries is therefore becoming increasingly 
important to responding more effectively to the drug market in Europe. Working with 
countries neighbouring the EU or on the main trafficking routes to the EU is essential. 
This is particularly relevant in those countries where, for historical reasons, OCGs exist 
with links to ethnically-based groups residing in the EU.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
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Herbal cannabis is extensively produced within the EU, with estimates indicating that at 
least 20 000 cultivation sites are dismantled each year, and is a major source of income 
for the criminal economy. Despite efforts to counter production, the Western Balkans, 
and Albania in particular, appear to remain an important source of origin for seized 
herbal cannabis. In the case of cannabis resin, cooperation between European nationals 
engaged in cannabis production and Moroccan producers has led to the introduction 
of new cannabis strains and production methods in Morocco. These changes may have 
exacerbated the environmental impacts of production, such as soil erosion, deforestation 
and water security issues. In the EU, indoor production is also linked to environmental 
and health and safety risks. There appears to be diversification in OCG involvement in 
the cannabis market in the EU, with the competition leading to higher levels of intergroup 
violence. However, OCGs of Moroccan origin still play a major role in cannabis resin 
trafficking, and groups of Dutch, but also of Vietnamese, origin are important for large-scale 
production of herbal cannabis. 
Spain remains the main entry point for cannabis resin into the EU, although Libya has 
emerged as a major transit hub alongside diffusion of trafficking activities throughout 
the Mediterranean region. The Netherlands and Spain remain the major trafficking hubs 
for intra-EU cannabis trafficking and are commonly identified as the sources of origin of 
seizures made by EU countries. While the scale is currently small compared with traditional 
offline supply, online sales of cannabis appear to be increasing and have the potential to 
expand further.
Heroin and other opioids
The use of heroin and other opioids still accounts for the largest share of drug-related 
harms. The retail value of the heroin market in 2017 was estimated to be at least 
EUR 7.4 billion. There are indications that heroin availability in the EU may increase: 
recent opium production estimates from Afghanistan, levels of seizures in Turkey and 
intelligence assessments of activity along the main trafficking routes to Europe are all high, 
and large consignments of heroin have been detected within the EU. Therefore, vigilance 
is required to identify any increases in heroin use. Synthetic opioids such as methadone, 
buprenorphine, tramadol and fentanyl derivatives are also available on the drug market. 
They appear to be growing in importance and pose additional challenges from regulatory, 
law enforcement and health perspectives.
Generally, Turkish OCGs maintain overall control over the wholesale importation of heroin 
into Europe. However, other OCGs, such as Balkan, British, Dutch, Iranian and Pakistani 
groups, are also important in different parts of Europe. Overlaps have been identified 
between OCGs involved in heroin supply and those involved in the trafficking of other 
drugs, precursors, weapons and other illicit commodities. The main heroin precursor, acetic 
anhydride, is far cheaper to source in the EU than in areas nearer to opium-producing 
countries, and there is evidence of increasing diversion and trafficking of the precursor 
from the EU along the Balkan route to heroin production areas. This appears to be linked 
to diffusion of heroin production outside Afghanistan to other places, including the EU. 
The Balkan route still remains the key corridor for heroin entry into the EU and therefore 
Turkey remains of central importance for actions to disrupt the trafficking of heroin to the 
EU market. While activities on the Northern route decline, there appears to be an increase 
in the trafficking of heroin on the Southern route, in particular through the Suez Canal. 
This is taking place against a backdrop of growing domestic opioid problems in some 
African countries.
EU DRUG MARKETS REPORT
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For synthetic opioids, sources are diverse, including conventional trafficking approaches, 
diversion from medical use, online purchase and, although uncommon, production within 
the EU. High-potency synthetic opioids pose particular challenges for law enforcement and 
increased risks to health. They are increasingly traded online and dispatched by post, and 
small-volume packages can contain a large number of potential consumer doses.
Cocaine
The cocaine market is the second largest illicit drug market in the EU, with an estimated 
minimum retail value in 2017 of EUR 9.1 billion. Surveys estimate that about 4 million 
people in the EU will have used cocaine in the past year. Use is still concentrated in 
the west and south of Europe but appears to be becoming more common elsewhere. 
Production estimates in the three main producing countries and seizures in Europe were at 
record levels in 2017. Cocaine-manufacturing processes also appear to be becoming more 
efficient, and the EU is a potential source of precursor chemicals; attempted diversion of 
large amounts of the precursor, potassium permanganate, and significant seizures of other 
chemicals used in cocaine production have been reported in Europe.
While Colombian and Italian OCGs have historically played a central role in the trafficking 
and distribution of cocaine, increasingly other groups are becoming more significant, 
including Albanian-speaking, British, Dutch, French, Irish, Moroccan, Serbian, Spanish 
and Turkish OCGs. At the same time some European OCGs have established a presence 
in Latin American countries, developing a new ‘end-to-end’ business model for managing 
the supply chain, with large quantities of cocaine purchased near production areas at 
lower costs. This may be driving competition and conflict within the cocaine market and 
leading to increasing cocaine market-related violence and corruption within the EU. The 
use of containers for cocaine smuggling means that seizures of large volumes of the drug 
at ports are now common and the cocaine seized at the wholesale level in Europe is of high 
purity, often above 85 %. Belgium, the Netherlands and Spain remain main entry points 
and distribution hubs for cocaine in the EU. North Africa appears to be emerging as a more 
significant transit point for both air and maritime shipments of cocaine destined for the 
European and possibly other markets. The global market for cocaine appears to be growing 
and a knock-on effect of this is that the EU appears to be increasingly used as a transit 
area for cocaine destined for other markets such as Australia, New Zealand, Russia, Turkey 
and countries in the Middle East and Asia. The cocaine market is increasingly enabled by 
digital technology, including darknet markets and the use of the surface web, social media 
and mobile phone apps to advertise and facilitate the delivery of cocaine to consumers. 
Innovation seen in the supply chain at the consumer level is suggestive of both high 
availability and attempts by OCGs to increase market share.
Synthetic drugs: amphetamine, MDMA and methamphetamine
Europe’s synthetic drugs market, particularly in respect to stimulants like amphetamine, 
MDMA and methamphetamine, is evolving rapidly. Within the stimulant market, these 
drugs compete for market share alongside cocaine and a number of new psychoactive 
substances. Of the two closely related stimulants, amphetamine continues to be more 
commonly used than methamphetamine in most EU countries, though there are growing 
signs of a gradual diffusion of methamphetamine use. The value of the EU retail market for 
amphetamines (amphetamine and methamphetamine combined) in 2017 is estimated to 
be at least EUR 1 billion, and for MDMA EUR 0.5 billion.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
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Most production takes place in the EU, and a variety of developments in production 
methods and source materials have made lower costs and higher profits achievable from 
production. Another knock-on impact of these developments is the potential increase in 
the strength or purity of synthetic drugs; for example, the MDMA content of ecstasy tablets 
has risen dramatically in recent years. Large-scale production of MDMA and amphetamine 
remains concentrated in the Netherlands, and to a lesser extent Belgium, with Dutch-based 
OCGs playing a major role. Methamphetamine production mostly occurs in central Europe, 
particularly in and around Czechia. Recently, however, methamphetamine production 
has also been detected in the Netherlands, with the possible involvement of Vietnamese 
OCGs formerly operating in Czechia. An additional development of some concern is 
the discovery in the Netherlands and Belgium, in the first half of 2019, of three large-
scale methamphetamine production facilities, where Mexicans were working with local 
criminal groups. The dumping of waste products from synthetic drug production results in 
environmental damage, health risks and high clean-up costs. The use of novel chemicals for 
producing precursors has exacerbated this issue.
In synthetic drug distribution, changes in OCG practices and greater interaction between 
groups involved in other areas of the drug market are observable. These include Dutch 
OCGs working with criminals of Turkish origin to supply synthetic drugs to Turkey and 
beyond, and a trend for outlaw motorcycle gangs who are involved in synthetic drug 
distribution to become more involved in production. In addition, darknet markets facilitate 
mid-level suppliers and distributors to access synthetic drugs, such as MDMA, which can 
be purchased in batches of thousands of tablets and then be repackaged and sold on. 
OCGs in the EU increasingly play a key role in the global market for amphetamine and 
methamphetamine, as well as MDMA. Some amphetamine produced in the EU is trafficked 
to the Middle East to be sold as captagon tablets, and Europeans have been involved in 
amphetamine production in the Middle East. In addition, methamphetamine produced in 
Africa and the Middle East, and more recently Mexico, transits through Europe, usually with 
a final destination in Asia or Oceania.
New psychoactive substances
Policies relating to new psychoactive substances (NPS) appear to be having some impact, 
especially those aimed at reducing open trade in the EU as well as measures taken in 
source countries, such as China. There has been a slow-down in the number of first 
detections of NPS in Europe. Currently around 50 new substances are reported annually, 
giving a total of over 730 that have been reported to the EU Early Warning System. Despite 
this, NPS continue to represent a serious cross-border threat to health due to the number 
of potent opioids, synthetic cannabinoids and benzodiazepines appearing on the market 
and the associated reports of health emergencies and deaths. Problems attributable to 
synthetic cannabinoids appear to be growing, as their relatively low cost, easy availability 
and high potency are factors in increased use among marginalised groups, including the 
homeless and prison populations. In addition, new synthetic opioids are a growing cause 
for concern, with a rapid increase seen in the number of fentanyl derivatives, substances 
particularly associated with health problems, including fatal poisoning.
The main source countries, where NPS are sold openly by chemical and pharmaceutical 
companies, are China and, to a lesser extent but particularly for those sold as medicines, 
India. However, a small number of illicit laboratories have also been detected in EU 
countries, such as the Netherlands and Poland, usually producing synthetic cathinones. 
Interactions between the NPS market and the market in established controlled drugs have 
become stronger, with NPS increasingly sold alongside illicit substances or in mixtures 
with them. Overlaps also exist with the market for fake medicines. For example, new 
EU DRUG MARKETS REPORT
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benzodiazepines, often sold at very low prices and having the appearance of licensed 
medicines, have appeared on illicit drug markets in some countries and have been 
associated with harm, including an increased risk of overdose. Another group of NPS, 
the synthetic cathinones, has been associated with HIV outbreaks linked to their injection, 
and also with increased sexual risk-taking behaviours.
Policies and actions
A number of themes that have important implications for EU policies and actions recur 
across the analysis presented in this report. The contemporary drug market is increasingly 
complex, adaptive and dynamic; it is also more global in nature and more interlinked than 
in the past. EU policies and responses need to be equally agile, adaptive and joined-up 
if they are to effectively address current and future challenges in this area. In addition 
to operational activities, it is important that full use is made of the range of policy tools 
available: these include coordination mechanisms and strategies, bilateral engagement 
with third countries and industry, and the use of legislative and financial instruments.
The identification, disruption and dismantling of serious organised crime groups involved 
in drug trafficking, money laundering and corruption remains a high priority. However, an 
important message emerging from this analysis is that, in addition to the direct impact on 
health and security, the drug market has indirect and wide-raging negative consequences 
in other important policy areas. These include violence and community safety, economic 
development and governance, and the environment. A better understanding of these links 
is needed to inform the further development of more integrated and stronger multi-sectoral 
responses.
Finally, the human and societal costs associated with the drug market remain considerable. 
The reduction of the harm associated with the drug market should remain a priority. 
This requires actions to be articulated across a broad range of policy domains at both EU 
and Member State level, and is consistent with Europe’s commitment to a balanced and 
evidence-based approach to responding to challenges in this area.
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PART I 
Impacts and drivers of drug markets
This report uses a very broad definition of the illicit drug 
market, encompassing the illicit production, trafficking, 
wholesale distribution and sale of controlled substances 
to the end user. The rationale for this is that, despite being 
one of the priority areas for drug control policy and supply 
reduction activities, the drug market is rarely considered 
holistically or systemically and yet such a perspective is 
likely to be critically important to both the formulation and 
the evaluation of activities in this area.
This part of the report introduces the latest findings on 
the impacts and consequences of the markets for illicit 
drugs in the EU and the key driving factors influencing their 
operation. The first chapter presents a revised estimate of 
the retail market size for the main illicit drugs before going 
on to examine the interlinkages between the illicit drug 
trade and other criminal activities and how the trade affects 
communities and society at large. The second chapter 
covers the key drivers and facilitators of drug markets. 
We examine their influence on today’s drug markets and 
related trends, with a view towards the future.
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Key points from Part I
Understanding the impact of the European drug market
 The drug market represents a major source of income for 
OCGs. The EU drug market was conservatively estimated to 
be worth about EUR 30 billion in 2017. Cannabis accounts 
for about two fifths of this total (39 %), cocaine (31 %), 
heroin (25 %) and amphetamines and MDMA (5 %).
 Illicit drug markets have both direct and indirect impacts 
on society that go far beyond the harms caused by the 
use of drugs themselves. These include the links that exist 
with wider criminal activities and terrorism; the negative 
impact on the legal economy and communities; and the 
increasingly important issue of how the drug market can 
fuel corruption and undermine governance. 
 Globally, involvement in drug production and trafficking, 
either directly or indirectly, is an important source of funds 
for terrorist activities, although only one of many sources. In 
Europe, currently there appear to be no strong, systematic 
links between drug markets and terrorism beyond those 
arising from shared underlying factors or situations. 
Links to jihadist terrorism in the EU usually result from 
individuals’ previous involvement in the lower levels of the 
drug market or in using drugs, which may then continue 
after their radicalisation. In contrast, some long-established 
paramilitary groups active in Europe have been observed to 
be involved in drug markets, and their operations appear to 
be closer to organised criminality.
 Trafficking in human beings and migrant smuggling 
may both have links with the drug trade when they are 
conducted by the same OCGs, although these links appear 
quite limited. More importantly, trafficking in human 
beings and exploitation may also be linked to drugs when 
individuals are enticed, or coerced, into becoming involved 
in low-level and expendable roles within the drug trade, 
for example as workers in cannabis farms or transporters 
of drugs, or when drugs are used to facilitate sexual 
exploitation. These uses of coercion and exploitation may 
not always be recognised.
 Trade in various other illicit commodities may also 
be carried out alongside drug trafficking. In particular, 
concerns are growing about the trafficking and use of 
weapons by OCGs involved in the drug trade, although at 
present this still seems limited and often more for their own 
use. The trade in falsified, counterfeit, substandard and 
unauthorised medicines is highly lucrative and represents 
a serious and growing public health problem. There is 
some involvement of OCGs, although the relationship 
between these groups and the drug market remains poorly 
understood.
 Drug market-related violence and intimidation is 
a growing concern in the EU. Some new models of 
supply have emerged that are associated with high 
levels of violence and exploitation. There is no systematic 
assessment of violent crime associated with the operation 
of the drug market. However, new data on drug-related 
homicides suggest it is a significant phenomenon in some 
countries and more likely to involve the use of firearms 
than other types of homicide. The violence and intimidation 
associated with the drug markets spills over and affects 
families and neighbourhoods as well as the individuals 
directly involved.
 Drug production, both within the EU and in other 
countries to produce drugs sold on the EU market, results 
in health and safety risks and environmental damage. The 
EU is a significant production area for synthetic drugs and 
cannabis, resulting in damage to the environment through 
the dumping of chemical waste and creating risks both to 
those involved and to the communities where production is 
located.
 The large amounts of cash generated by the drug 
trade have wide-ranging negative impacts on the legal 
economy. They need to be legitimised in some way, as 
well as often needing to be sent overseas to pay the costs 
along the different stages of the supply chain. The range 
of methods used to transfer money is increasing, and 
money-laundering services may be provided by syndicates 
providing this ‘crime as a service’ to other OCGs. The 
acquisition of businesses and high-value assets in order 
to ‘launder’ or transfer cash distorts markets and pushes 
out legitimate businesses, who are at a competitive 
disadvantage.
 Drug market-related activities also impose direct costs 
on businesses. For example, companies that produce 
chemicals used in drug production may suffer theft and 
diversion of these substances, while having to bear the 
financial burden of complying with legal controls and 
reporting. Seaport and airport operators must pay to 
provide additional security and facilitate detection of 
smuggled drugs. Some of these costs may be passed on to 
other businesses.
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 Drug markets are one of the most corruptive influences 
in the EU and have a serious impact on governance in 
producer and transit countries. Corruption may be used 
by organised crime to obtain information, to facilitate the 
transit of illicit drugs and/or the diversion of chemicals to 
illicit markets, and to obstruct investigations. Despite this, 
the extent of this problem remains both poorly understood 
and poorly monitored.
 A substantial amount of government expenditure in the 
EU that would otherwise be available for other purposes 
is used in tackling drug markets and responding to the 
problems associated with them. In production and transit 
regions, many of which are in less economically developed 
countries, these costs and the associated corruption and 
violence can undermine social and economic development. 
This can also further destabilise these countries, leaving 
them vulnerable to increased exploitation and poor 
governance.
Globalisation and digitalisation driving 
innovation and facilitating change
 The drug market is rapidly becoming more globally 
connected and technologically enabled, reflecting wider 
societal changes. OCGs are quick to exploit the expansion 
of global trade, which provides more opportunities for 
transporting and concealing drug shipments. For example, 
they have adopted new methods for drug trafficking, such 
as using intermodal transportation networks and general 
aviation, as well as exploiting rapid parcel and postal 
delivery services for drug delivery.
 Globalisation also supports criminal cooperation 
internationally, leading to efficiency gains, facilitated by 
online communication opportunities. OCGs seek out 
and exploit the gaps and differences between different 
regulatory and drug control environments. This cross-
border criminal interaction complicates law enforcement 
responses, increasing the need for international 
cooperation and coordination and technical sophistication.
 The drug market is increasingly digitally enabled. Both 
the surface web and hidden darknet markets as well as 
social media networks are increasingly used for online 
drug sales. The use of these technologies can significantly 
lower the barriers to entry into the market, be disruptive to 
established business models and create new challenges 
for law enforcement and public health.
 The use of encryption and anonymised services 
by OCGs to facilitate secure communication both 
facilitates global cooperation and poses challenges to 
law enforcement. High-end encrypted smartphones have 
become important criminal tools, used as their primary 
means of communication to reduce the visibility of their 
activities to law enforcement.
 Firearms and fraudulent documents are also 
increasingly important tools of OCGs engaged in the 
drug trade. The criminal use of firearms by OCGs involved 
in drug markets appears to be increasing. In addition 
to firearms, including automatic weapons, the use of 
hand grenades and explosives in the context of drug-
related violence appears to be increasing. Many types of 
fraudulent documents are used for a variety of purposes, 
including the transport of illicit drugs, money laundering 
and cross-border transfer of cash.
Implications for action to address 
current threats and increase 
preparedness
Improvements in information gathering, data sharing and 
analysis are needed to address important information gaps 
that inhibit both strategic analysis of the current and future 
threats arising from the drug market and the targeting of 
operational activities. This will require:
  investment in information sharing and analysis to 
support a more holistic and dynamic understanding 
of the activities of OCGs across drugs, including 
interactions with other types of serious crime and 
terrorism, with particular attention given to identifying 
new operational models, market entrants and 
alliances;
  an improved understanding of the role of the drug 
market in violence, including drug-related homicide; 
gang involvement; money laundering; and corrupt 
practices;
  improved monitoring of the price, purity and content 
of drugs at different points in the supply chain, which 
should include drugs purchased from online sources;
  continued efforts to monitor developments in online 
drug sale, as well as the role of new technologies and 
social media in enabling drug markets;
PART I
26
  a better understanding of the trends, developments 
and variability in the operation of the retail drug 
markets in Europe and the implications for drug-related 
harms and responses.
Effective partnerships and interagency working are 
necessary to improve responses. In particular, there is 
a need to:
  promote greater collaboration and information sharing 
between intelligence services, law enforcement and 
other relevant agencies to facilitate a more integrated 
response, for example establishing a mechanism for 
cooperation between drug and cybercrime units;
  continue to support cooperation and information 
exchange between container ports in Europe and 
elsewhere;
  invest more in identifying and agreeing priorities for 
cross-border collaboration with EU and key external 
partners;
  develop a threat assessment and engagement strategy 
for industries whose services are used to enable 
or facilitate the drug market (e.g. financial services, 
telecommunication providers, technology companies, 
delivery and transportation businesses).
It is essential that responses keep pace with developments 
occurring in the drug market. To achieve this, there is a 
need to:
  strengthen operational and regulatory responses 
to drug distribution using parcel and post delivery 
services. This will require the development of 
a framework for risk analysis, and cross-sectoral 
cooperation. Consideration also needs to be given to 
parcel-forwarding services and anonymous pick-up 
and drop-off networks;
  continue to support the implementation of tools 
such as the Passenger Name Record database to 
enable resources to be more effectively targeted 
(e.g. continuing effort by Member States to improve 
the acquisition of passenger data submitted by air 
carriers);
  continue to support the development of 
a comprehensive suite of best practice tools for 
identifying and targeting criminal finances and money 
flows;
  raise awareness about the environmental impact and 
costs related to drug production and processing in 
Europe to support the development of appropriate 
responses.
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The size of the illicit drug market
The illicit drug trade is a major global industry, encompassing 
production, trafficking and retailing. The hidden nature of 
the illicit drug business makes it difficult to estimate the 
amount of money it generates, and published estimates are 
variable, covering different parts of the market and different 
geographical areas and involving many assumptions and 
associated uncertainties. One recent report on global 
transnational crime (Channing May, 2017) estimated the 
value of the global market for the main illicit drugs (cannabis, 
cocaine, opiates and amphetamine-type stimulants) to be 
between USD 426 billion and USD 652 billion in 2014. The 
large size of the market makes it attractive to criminals, and 
the drug market contributed over a quarter of the total value 
of the 11 major transnational crimes the report studied. 
However, it is important to note that, as with legal markets, 
the value of sales is not the same as profit; costs and losses 
occur at all stages along the supply chain.
In the EU, the total value of the retail market for illicit drugs 
in 2017 was estimated at EUR 30 billion — this figure 
must be viewed as a minimum estimate for a number 
of methodological reasons (see page 30).  The cannabis 
market is the largest, accounting for about 39 % of the 
total, followed by cocaine (including crack cocaine) (31 %) 
and heroin (25 %) (Figure 1.1). These new estimates build 
on the initial estimates produced for the last EU Drug 
Markets Report (EMCDDA and Europol, 2016), but make 
use of new sources of data that have been developed in 
the interim. They are therefore not directly comparable 
with the previous estimates and cannot be used to assess 
trends. There are also still many gaps in the available data 
underpinning these calculations and they therefore remain 
minimum estimates that require ongoing work to improve 
them (see box ‘The challenge of estimating the size of 
the illicit drug market’). Nevertheless, they illustrate the 
importance of the markets for different drugs and the large 
money flows associated with them.
To put the size of the illicit drug market into the context of 
the wider economy in the EU, it has been estimated that illicit 
drug production and trafficking in the 10 Member States 
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Assessing the value of seized drugs
The value of the drugs seized may be an important 
component for assessing the impact of drug supply 
reduction. Despite being a fairly crude metric, it is one 
that most people can relate to. Because commonly 
available data relate to retail prices, the value is 
sometimes expressed in terms of the potential value 
at retail level. However, a more appropriate measure 
is to calculate the financial loss that the OCG would 
record on its balance sheet (Reuter and Greenfield, 
2001).
This is best illustrated by an example. Consider 
a shipment of 100 kg of cocaine seized on entry to 
Europe. The estimated street value could be reported 
as EUR 6 000 000 (100 000 × retail price per gram 
in Europe, say EUR 60), making no adjustment for 
purity. However, the investment lost by the OCG, 
in this example, would be the much lower value of 
EUR 250 000 (100 × cost per kilogram of cocaine 
at the origin, say EUR 2 500). In addition, the OCG 
would also have incurred other costs, such as those 
relating to transport, which they would not be able to 
recoup. Estimating the value in terms of the loss may 
be a more transparent and realistic way to measure 
the impact of drug supply reduction interventions. 
However, this will require the collection of more data 
about a range of variables, such as price and purity, 
along the supply chain.
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for which data are available (1) ranged between 0.02 % 
(Luxembourg) and 0.6 % (Italy and Sweden) of the national 
gross domestic product (GDP) in the period 2004-15, and 
was 0.4 % or above in half of the countries (Eurostat, 2018a). 
This is broadly comparable with available global figures, 
showing retail drug sales in the US in 2010 being equivalent 
to 0.7 % of GDP and across 21 EU countries (2) in 2015 being 
equivalent to 0.32 % of the GDP (UNODC, 2017). Although 
all EU countries produce data on the contribution of illicit 
activities to GDP as part of their national accounts, often they 
are not disaggregated to allow identification of drug-related 
figures. Furthermore, where available, published studies 
vary widely in the period covered — from 2004 (Denmark) to 
2013 (Luxembourg) (Eurostat, 2018a).
Beyond estimates of the retail market size, there 
remains a need to develop our understanding of the 
(1) Czechia, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, 
Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom.
(2) Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czechia, Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, 
Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Portugal, 
Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom.
economics of other aspects of the drug market, such as 
production and wholesale supply activities and the costs 
of responses to drug markets. Some progress has been 
made in improving the data in these areas, for example 
commencing the collection of wholesale price and purity 
data, and developing estimates of the cost of the clean-up 
of waste from synthetic drug laboratories. Both of these 
topics are discussed in this report. Other institutions and 
organisations are also working in this area. For example, 
Tops et al. (2018) sought to estimate the potential value of 
synthetic drugs produced in the Netherlands for the global 
market, suggesting that it was at least EUR 18.9 billion at 
retail prices and that Dutch producers and traffickers may 
receive about EUR 3 billion to EUR 5 billion as revenue. 
Estimates are also often made of the value of seized 
shipments of drugs (see box ‘Assessing the value of seized 
drugs’), but all these estimates are based on limited data 
and broad assumptions, so they need to be viewed with 
caution.
Figure 1.1 
Estimated retail value of the illicit market for the main drugs in the EU
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The challenge of estimating the size of the illicit drug market
The illicit nature of drug supply means that the market 
is hidden, and collecting data on the nature and extent 
of the phenomenon is very difficult; for this reason 
there are important gaps in our knowledge of key 
aspects. This hampers any estimation of the size of 
the market and its economic consequences. Any such 
estimates have a number of important limitations 
and often vary considerably as a result of variations 
in scope, the use of different data sources and the 
assumptions made to fill in gaps.
For this report our approach has been the same 
as in the previous EU Drug Markets Report, but 
using improved data sources. Our aim has been 
to use, wherever possible, routinely collected data 
sources that are reported to the EMCDDA by most 
EU countries to enhance consistency and facilitate 
ongoing development. Details of the estimation 
procedures, which take a demand-side approach, 
and the assumptions used can be found in the 
accompanying technical report (EMCDDA, 2019a). 
The estimation process essentially involves taking 
estimates of the number of people who use each 
drug in a year for each country in the EU and then 
multiplying these by an estimate of the average 
amount used in a year and the average retail price in 
each country. The national estimates are then summed 
to provide a European total.
A number of key limitations must be borne in mind 
when considering the estimates presented here.
  Undercoverage. General population surveys have 
formed the basis of most of the estimates of 
numbers of people using drugs, but it is known 
that some groups, particularly some marginalised 
groups, may be under-represented in these 
surveys. Although we have used estimates of 
high-risk drug use and treatment data to identify 
use by some of these groups, gaps in coverage 
remain likely.
  Under-reporting of use. Many of the data used 
in these estimates, e.g. on the number of people 
who use drugs, frequency of use and amounts 
consumed, are based on self-reports. It is known 
that, particularly with respect to stigmatised 
behaviours, people will often underestimate 
or under-report use. We have not made any 
adjustment for this in our core estimate because 
we currently have no robust data on which to base 
such an adjustment. However, the technical report 
includes some analyses of the potential impact of 
different levels of underestimation on the overall 
estimate.
  Knowledge gaps. In our previous report we 
highlighted a number of important knowledge 
gaps hampering the estimation process. In the 
intervening period we have increased the number 
of countries for which we have data on amounts 
of drugs used by different groups of users, the use 
of different forms of drugs (e.g. cannabis resin 
versus herb, or MDMA powder versus tablets) and 
the quantities consumed in different countries. 
However, significant knowledge gaps remain.
These types of limitations are common to most 
estimates of economic aspects of drug markets. 
The knowledge gaps around other aspects, such 
as profits and losses at different stages of supply 
activities and the costs of responses to drug markets, 
may be even greater. In the light of these limitations 
and others described in the accompanying technical 
report, it is clear that the estimates presented in 
this report and elsewhere must be interpreted with 
caution. Our estimates, because we have chosen 
not to make adjustments where information is not 
generally available, must be seen as minimum 
estimates. There is a need to continue work to improve 
the basic data on which such estimates are based, 
in order to improve future estimates and to enhance 
our understanding of other economic aspects of the 
illicit drug trade. Interpreting estimates of retail market 
size is also challenging; it is necessary to take into 
consideration issues such as the fact that changes 
in content may not be reflected in retail price data 
but may have an impact on quantity consumed. For 
example, in the case of MDMA/ecstasy, the average 
MDMA content of tablets has markedly increased in 
recent years but the price has remained stable. In such 
circumstances the value of the market may decrease 
even if use has remained stable or increased, since 
fewer tablets may be needed to get the same effect.
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The ramifications of the illicit market extend beyond its 
financial value, inflicting a wide range of harms and thus 
a heavy burden on societies (Figure 1.2). In the previous 
edition of this report (EMCDDA and Europol, 2016) these 
were grouped into four broad categories: links to terrorism 
and wider criminal activity; the impact on the legal 
economy; strain on government institutions; and the impact 
on society more generally through harms to individuals, 
families and neighbourhoods (EMCDDA and Europol, 
2016).
Within these categories the report identified a number 
of data and knowledge gaps that hampered the analysis 
and quantification of the impacts. These included 
the need for monitoring and analysis of possible dual 
involvement of individuals in both drug-related organised 
crime and terrorist activity; the need to establish suitable 
data collection methodologies for the monitoring of 
the relationship between drugs and violence; and the 
need to systematically implement data collection on the 
environmental damage caused by dumping waste from 
synthetic drug production sites in Europe. In the three years 
since the last report, we have addressed a number of these 
knowledge gaps, with a focus on selected priority policy 
areas: terrorism, trafficking in human beings, trade in other 
illicit goods, drug-related crime, violence and intimidation, 
and environmental impacts. In the following sections, the 
findings from this additional work and other new sources 
of evidence are used to update our analysis of the broader 
impacts of the drug market, based on the latest evidence 
available.
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Key impacts and consequences of drug markets
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Links to terrorism and wider 
criminal activity
The previous EU Drug Markets Report (EMCDDA and 
Europol, 2016) highlighted the different ways in which 
drug markets may be linked to other criminal activities and 
terrorism, based on the limited evidence available at that 
time. It described how the links are often opportunistic, 
for example where shared trafficking routes encourage 
the trafficking of other commodities. Other links are more 
instrumental, for example when terrorists, both individuals 
and groups, use drug dealing or trafficking to fund their 
terrorist activities, or when drug traffickers exploit trafficked 
individuals in drug production or drug dealing. In this report 
we update the earlier findings, incorporating additional 
studies that have been undertaken in the intervening 
period.
Terrorism
There is considerable concern about the links between 
the illicit drug trade and terrorism, both in Europe and 
globally (e.g. US Senate Hearing, 2012; Coats, 2017). 
The European Agenda on Security of April 2015 (European 
Commission, 2015) highlights the need to tackle the nexus 
between terrorism and organised crime, pointing to the way 
organised crime may feed terrorism through a variety of 
channels, including supplying weapons, financing terrorist 
activities through drug distribution and infiltrating financial 
markets.
The data available on this topic are limited and much of the 
research relates to concerns about the role of drug markets 
in funding terrorist groups active outside Europe. Only limited 
information is available on the situation in Europe, where the 
nature of terrorist activities is very different. Nevertheless, a 
richer intelligence picture is emerging (Europol, 2019f) and 
more research has been undertaken recently, including that 
described in the background paper ‘A new high? Terrorists 
and drugs in Europe’ (Basra, 2019) commissioned for this 
report. The main findings are highlighted below, but there 
remain significant knowledge gaps.
Overall, the new research confirms the picture described 
in the previous EU Drug Markets Report, that the links 
between terrorism and drug markets are opportunistic and 
not systematic. Globally, terrorists use participation in drug 
markets as an important source of funds for their activities, 
but it is one source among many. In Europe the involvement 
of the perpetrators of terrorism in drugs and drug dealing is 
generally part of a wider picture of, mostly petty, criminality.
The global picture
The drug trade as a funding source for terrorist groups — 
one among many
The involvement of terrorist organisations in the drug trade 
as a source of funding for their terrorist activities has been 
recognised for some time. For example, since the 1980s, 
the involvement of insurgents and terrorist groups in the 
cultivation, manufacture and trafficking of drugs has been 
observed in Latin America and the Middle East (Felbab-
Brown, 2005; Piazza, 2011). This may generate funds 
directly through active participation in the drug production 
and supply chain, or indirectly through the levying of ‘taxes’ 
on producers or traffickers passing through territories under 
a group’s control. These connections between drug markets 
and terrorism have also been noted elsewhere in the world, 
for example in Central Asia (Omelicheva and Markowitz, 
2018).
However, drug trafficking is not the only source of funding 
for such terrorist groups. Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, 
for example, is reported to have profited from a variety 
of crimes, including drug trafficking, in North and West 
Africa (del Cid Gómez, 2010) as has the Taliban in Central 
Asia (Omelicheva and Markowitz, 2018). Therefore, the 
relative importance of drug trafficking compared with other 
sources of income has been questioned (Tupman, 2014). 
Nevertheless, in Central Asia, drug trafficking has been 
reported as top of the list of illegal money-making activities 
of terrorist groups (Reyes and Dinar, 2015). More recently, 
based on best estimates from a range of sources (official 
reports, academic assessments and criminal intelligence), 
it has been estimated that drug-related income makes 
up more than a quarter of the finances of seven major 
terrorist/insurgent groups (Table 1.1).
Terrorists, insurgents or criminals: a diverse picture
Some of the terrorist organisations that are heavily involved 
in the drug trade have been found to resemble organised 
criminal groups in the nature of their operations and how 
they shift and conceal their finances. However, there is 
considerable variability between groups. How terrorists 
meet their financial needs depends on a range of factors, 
in particular the size of the organisation, the scale and 
geographical location of its operations and the availability 
of external support. For example, small groups have 
been found to require only modest resources to carry out 
relatively low-tech attacks (Keatinge et al., 2018).
It has been suggested that the ideological and operational 
divide between criminal and terrorist organisations would 
prevent their collaboration (e.g. Wang, 2010), but on the 
other hand there are reports of increasing networking and 
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convergence of terrorism and transnational crime due 
to globalisation and related geopolitical changes (Reyes 
and Dinar, 2015). Internationally, there is good evidence 
that interlinkages do occur. For example, at the end of 
fiscal year 2015, a quarter (10) of the US Department of 
Justice’s Consolidated Priority Organisation Targets list 
of key drug trafficking and criminal organisations were 
reported to have links to designated terrorist organisations 
(US Department of Justice, 2017). A recent study of the 
effect of drug trafficking on terrorism in drug transit states 
in Central Asia also provides evidence that the drug trade 
facilitates terrorism to some extent, but it also illustrates 
how the relationship between drugs and terrorism is 
variable and may have much broader impacts (Omelicheva 
and Markowitz, 2018). It highlights how drug trafficking not 
only funds terrorist activities, but also how groups engaged 
in the drug trade may use political violence against the 
state to protect their interests or otherwise undermine 
or destabilise governments through their drug-related 
activities. However, it also shows the complexity of these 
relationships; for example, state actors potentially also 
engage in drug-trafficking activities, and OCGs and terrorist 
groups may forge strategic alliances to further their illicit 
activities.
A focus on Europe
European drug markets: links to global terrorist financing 
and recruitment
Terrorist activity in Europe currently is of a different nature 
to that described above. As a result, the links between the 
drug market and terrorism are also likely to differ, although 
the consumption of heroin and cocaine in Europe will help 
to fund terrorist groups such as the Taliban and FARC, 
as well as the organised crime groups with which they 
cooperate (see Case study 12, page 52), and European-
based OCGs may also provide support to terrorist 
organisations operating outside Europe. For example, the 
Spanish authorities recently reported the dismantling of 
an OCG involved in the trafficking of illicit goods, including 
drugs, the exchange of cannabis resin for weapons, 
terrorism financing and jihadist propaganda (Ministerio del 
Interior, 2018).
Furthermore, the proceeds of criminal activity are reported 
to be among the key sources of terrorist recruitment 
financing (FATF, 2018) and in several cases law 
enforcement investigations have found drug trafficking 
activity to be the main source of funds used for recruitment 
for terrorist purposes (see Case study 1).
While some connections between terrorism and drugs have 
been identified in Europe, there is little solid, systematic 
and up-to-date evidence and analysis of how terrorists 
in Europe interact with drugs — as producers, dealers or 
users — and the dynamics and principles that guide those 
interactions. The lack of evidence has often resulted in 
speculative and, at times, sensational reporting that has 
raised policy concerns. However, to date there appears to 
be little evidence of systematic links between the criminal 
groups engaged in the local drug markets in Europe and 
terrorist activities. Nevertheless, within Europe, drug 
markets and terrorism appear to be linked to some extent, 
in that criminals and terrorists recruit from the same pool of 
people with shared vulnerabilities (Basra et al., 2016).
Throughout Europe there is evidence of some merging 
of criminal, including drug-related, and jihadist (3) social 
networks, environments and milieus, with many jihadists 
and foreign fighters having a criminal past. For example, in 
Germany, two thirds of the country’s 778 foreign fighters 
who went to Syria and Iraq were known to the police prior 
(3) The terms ‘jihadism’ and ‘jihadist’ have been contentious ever since 
they entered common usage during the late 1990s. One of the most 
frequent complaints is that they unfairly associate the religious concept 
of ‘jihad’ with acts of terrorism and extreme violence. This study, therefore, 
distinguishes between ‘jihadism’, a modern revolutionary ideology, and 
‘jihad’, an Islamic concept that means ‘struggle’ and can refer to all kinds 
of religiously inspired effort, be it spiritual, personal, political or military. 
For more, see Esposito (2002, pp. 26-28), Hegghammer (2009) and 
Maher (2016). 
Table 1.1 
Sources of income for selected armed (terrorist and 
insurgent) groups
Source Income in 
millions of 
EUR (USD)
%
Drugs 297 (330) 28
Oil and gas 207 (230) 20
Illegal mining 183 (203) 17
Taxation and extortion (not drug-related) 177 (197) 17
Confiscation and looting 89 (99) 9
External funding and donations 32 (36) 3
Kidnapping for ransom 32 (36) 3
Antiquities 14 (15) 1
Charcoal 14 (15) 1
Source: Nellemann et al. (2018, p. 135).
Note: Groups included are al-Shabaab, Boko Haram, the Revolutionary Armed 
Forces of Colombia (FARC), Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), Jama’a Nusrat ul-
Islam wa al-Muslimin (JNIM), Islamic State and the Taliban plus some groups 
in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
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to their departure (BKA et al., 2016), and in France over 
40 % of jihadists convicted between 2004 and 2017 had 
criminal records (Hecker, 2018). Recent figures indicate 
that, of 125 foreign fighters linked to Italy, 55 (44 %) had 
a criminal record before departing for an area of conflict 
(Iraq, Libya or Syria), including an unspecified number 
relating to the production and selling of drugs (Marone and 
Vidino, 2019). Community workers have observed similar 
overlaps in Molenbeek, a Brussels neighbourhood that has 
been home to jihadist networks (Le Soir, 2017).
The importance of drug-related activities, and particularly 
drug market-related activities, relative to other criminality 
is less clear. A project entitled From Criminals to Terrorists 
and Back examined data on terrorism convicts from the 
11 EU Member States with the highest number of arrests 
for terrorism offences (Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, France, 
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, 
United Kingdom), identifying 116 crimes committed by 
56 individuals before 2015 (GLOBSEC, 2018). A third 
(38 out of 116) of the recorded crimes were of a relatively 
minor nature, such as drug possession or dealing, theft, 
burglary, speeding or affray. This is in line with previous 
research (e.g. Basra et al., 2016; Hecker, 2018) that 
suggests an association between petty criminality and 
terrorism in Europe. At the same time, there were other 
major categories of more serious crime, amounting to 67 % 
of all known crimes, including money laundering, violent 
robbery, assault, murder, and acts involving weapons and 
explosives. However, whether or not these more serious 
offences were linked to drug markets was not examined. 
In addition, although past events in Europe have shown 
that terrorist acts can be carried out with limited financial 
means, it has been argued that funding through crime, 
including drug-related crime, has the potential to become 
more significant in the future (Basra and Neumann, 2016).
A paper prepared as background for this report (Basra, 
2019), looked at the nature and extent of the relationships 
between drug-related and terrorism-related activities based 
on information concerning more than 300 individuals or 
CASE STUDY 1
Low-level terrorist financing
The report by the Financial Action Task 
Force on financing and recruitment 
for terrorist purposes (FATF, 2018) 
includes a range of examples globally, 
including the following, which relate to 
the EU.
a. Drug trafficking and terrorist 
recruitment activities
‘Several individuals were arrested on 
charges of terrorist-indoctrinating 
activities in Ceuta and Melilla, the 
Spanish autonomous regions in North 
Africa, in 2015. A large number of 
these individuals had criminal records 
in relation to drug trafficking. At the 
time of their arrest, materials related 
to Islamic State recruitment activities 
and to their criminal activities, as 
well as arms and drugs, were seized. 
Almost all the arrested individuals 
were unemployed and had no legal 
sources of income at the time. 
Nevertheless, they had high standards 
of living, including cars and houses. 
They organised meetings at which they 
would watch violent extremist videos 
and would set up personal defence 
and physical training sessions. 
The proceeds of their petty crimes 
financed all of these activities.’
b. Recruitment of first wave of Belgian 
foreign terrorist fighters
‘In 2010, Person A founded 
Organisation X, an informal Antwerp-
based network responsible for the 
recruitment of the first wave of Belgian 
foreign terrorist fighters in 2012 and 
2013. Organisation X was dissolved 
in September 2012. Two years later, 
in September 2014, the judicial 
process started against 45 members 
of Organisation X, only seven of 
whom were present in court. The core 
members were sentenced to up to 
12 years’ imprisonment and a fine 
of EUR 30 000 in January 2016. All 
others were judged, in absentia, during 
February 2015. A large number of the 
accused had already departed to fight 
in Syria. Its leader, Person A, was also 
convicted of drug trafficking in 2008 
and 2014. He was involved in the 
import of over 5 tonnes of cannabis 
from Morocco. The Belgian Financial 
Investigation Unit received suspicious 
activity reports on large cash deposits 
on the account of Person A. The origin 
of the cash was unclear but Person 
A’s involvement in the drug trade led 
to suspicions that he was using the 
proceeds from the drug trade to fund 
part of the activities of Organisation X.’
Source: FATF (2018), p. 17.
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incidents (4) in Europe, gathered between 2012 and 2017 
from open sources (newspaper articles, court documents, 
and government or law enforcement reports), in which 
there was evidence of both these types of activity. The 
analysis separately considered two broad categories: 
jihadists, and ethno-nationalist and separatist terrorist 
groups (mainly republican and loyalist paramilitaries in 
Northern Ireland, but also other groups, including the 
Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan, PKK, or Kurdistan Workers’ 
Party).
Jihadists’ links to the drug trade: generally indirect and 
low level
Based on records relating to at least 148 individuals with 
jihadist links (Basra, 2019), it appears that jihadists may 
interact with the illicit drug trade in three broad ways.
The first is involvement in drugs prior to radicalisation. 
They are found to often have a history of consuming and/
or dealing illicit drugs, which can have an ancillary, indirect 
role in their radicalisation process.
For a third of the sample, drug use was historical behaviour, 
often occurring many months or even years prior to 
their radicalisation, whereas for the remainder it directly 
preceded or overlapped with it. However, judging whether 
or not drugs played a role in a person’s radicalisation is 
difficult. In general, it appears that drugs formed part of 
the overall personal circumstances, experiences and other 
factors that influenced the trajectory towards extremism 
and political violence, rather than a deciding factor in any 
individual’s decision to engage in jihadism. Other factors 
were manifestly more influential, such as socialisation 
among extremists, the jihadist worldview and ideology, or 
perceived personal and political grievances. If anything, it 
appears that drugs may play an indirect role, having been 
the reason an individual was in prison, which in turn was 
the place that facilitated their radicalisation (Case study 2).
The second way is involvement in drugs after radicalisation. 
Jihadists’ involvement with drugs can continue long after 
their initial engagement with extremism.
Drug dealing and/or use, long after an individual’s 
radicalisation, was seen repeatedly in the dataset, contrary 
to stereotypes of religious observance. Those involved in 
drug dealing may envisage the crime itself to be a form 
of jihad (Basra et al., 2016; Basra and Neumann, 2017). 
While jihadists in Europe have mostly used legal means 
to finance their plots — such as salaries, welfare benefits, 
(4) These figures represent a minimum number of individuals or events, as 
sources would often state that multiple members of a group had engaged 
in both terrorism-related and drug-related activity, without specifying how 
many members this applied to. In such cases, to err on the side of caution, 
only a single entry was included in the dataset.
sale of property and loans — robberies, theft, fraud and 
to a lesser extent drug dealing have been used as means 
of financing jihadist activity (Nesser et al., 2016; Oftedal, 
2015). However, large-scale drug dealing is rarely seen; 
most post-radicalisation drug dealing is relatively small in 
scale and ambition. For example, in February 2015, NL, 
a drug user with a history of domestic violence who was 
homeless at time of his arrest, was arrested for dealing 
heroin in Ravenna, Italy: he had 3 g in his possession. 
He was planning to use the proceeds to fund his travel to 
Syria, yet he had saved only EUR 40. There is not always 
such a clear connection, however, between someone’s 
post-radicalisation drug dealing and their jihadist activities.
Finally, some take drugs preceding an attack. Jihadists 
have consumed drugs directly before carrying out a terrorist 
attack, thereby contradicting the stereotype of their uniform 
piety and religious observance.
Just as drug use can continue after an individual’s 
radicalisation, it can also continue up to the point of 
carrying out an attack. In a handful of cases, there is 
evidence that jihadists have taken drugs in the days 
— or possibly hours — before carrying out a terrorist attack, 
although there is little sign that their drug taking influenced 
their decision to act. In general, drug use appears to have 
been a continuation of habitual use, and it does not appear 
to explain why they carried out their attacks.
Overall, among jihadists there appear to be no formal, 
structural or inherent links to the drug trade. Many have 
a background in either dealing or using drugs, which can 
continue long after their process of radicalisation and 
their engagement with extremist ideas and networks. This 
post-radicalisation behaviour generally mirrors their pre-
radicalisation involvement. Many appear to fit the profile 
of volatile lone-actor terrorists in which ‘radicalization is 
primarily characterized by inconsistency, brief interludes of 
intense political or religious engagement before reverting 
to patterns of hedonistic behaviour, including habitual drug 
consumption and, often, violent crime’ (Lindekilde et al., 
2017, p. 5). Understanding jihadists’ profiles, patterns of 
radicalisation and how they may prepare for and undertake 
terrorist activities has implications for those seeking to 
identify those likely to participate in terrorism and either 
prevent or detect their activities.
Ethno-nationalist and separatist terrorist groups: varied 
involvement in the European drug trade
As well as the jihadist scene, some overlaps with the 
drug market have been observed among some ethno-
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nationalist and separatist terrorist groups (5) (Basra, 2019). 
For example, long-standing overlaps have been noted in 
Northern Ireland, where both republican (Europol, 2019f) 
and loyalist groups have sought to either accommodate 
or eradicate the drug trade. In contrast to the jihadists in 
Europe described above, the operations of these groups, 
which include controlling or ‘taxing’ the drug trade, are 
much more akin to those of terrorist organisations such as 
the Taliban, or to organised criminality, with some groups 
existing as what might be described as ‘hybrid criminal 
terrorist groups’ and others having completely transformed 
into OCGs (Makarenko, 2012). The impact of these activities 
includes conflict between criminals and paramilitaries and 
internal tensions within paramilitary groups, both of which 
lead to violence, which in turn may lead to alienation of the 
very communities these groups claim to represent.
The 2015 Stormont Agreement A Fresh Start included 
commitments to ‘challenge all paramilitary activity and 
associated criminality’, and — recognising the cross-border 
nature of organised criminal activity — to establish a Joint 
Agency Task Force, led by officers from the Police Service 
of Northern Ireland, An Garda Síochána, the Revenue 
Commissioners, and HM Revenue and Customs (Northern 
Ireland Executive, 2015, p. 15). Similarly, the Paramilitary 
Crime Task Force was also established in October 2017 and 
(5) Ethno-nationalist and separatist terrorist groups are motivated by 
nationalism, ethnicity and/or religion. Separatist groups seek to carve out 
a state for themselves from a larger country or annex territory from one 
country to that of another. Left- or right-wing ideological elements are not 
uncommon in these types of groups. The Irish Republican Army (IRA), the 
Basque Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) and the Kurdish PKK fall into this 
category.
includes the Police Service of Northern Ireland, HM Revenue 
and Customs, and the United Kingdom’s National Crime 
Agency. Over the 2017/18 financial year, the Task Force 
seized an estimated EUR 67 000 (GBP 58 000) worth of 
drugs (OCTF, 2018, p. 68), although it is unknown how 
much of this was directly related to paramilitary activity, 
or what the quantities or types of drugs were.
The Northern Ireland Executive has similarly acknowledged 
the convergence between paramilitaries and organised 
crime. Its 2016 Executive Action Plan followed on from 
the Fresh Start Agreement. The plan stated that tackling 
organised crime should be an ‘integral part’ of the fight 
against ‘Northern Ireland related terrorism’ (Northern 
Ireland Executive, 2016, p. 18).
The PKK, a paramilitary group based in the Middle East — 
primarily in south-eastern Turkey, northern Syria and northern 
Iraq — has been reported to be involved in organised crime 
(Europol, 2019f; Roth and Sever, 2007), with few examples of 
its engagement in the drug trade in the EU (Basra, 2019).
The limited and patchy information available on the 
interaction between terrorism and drug markets in the 
EU makes it challenging to obtain a clear understanding 
of the importance and nature of the threat. In addition, 
most attention has been paid to links to jihadist groups 
and activities, which may lead to the activities of other 
groups being overlooked. For example, several countries 
in Europe are experiencing a resurgence of the far right 
and an increase in associated violence and terrorism 
(Europol, 2019f). Most of this appears to be perpetrated by 
CASE STUDY 2
Imprisonment for drug dealing leading to radicalisation
MM was sentenced for drug offences 
in October 2013 after being arrested 
in Lille. Police discovered EUR 1 500 
in small denominations on his person, 
and in his room found 1 563 g of 
cannabis, EUR 5 595 in cash and 
weighing scales. MM claimed he was 
dealing drugs to pay off his debts: ‘I’m 
under threat, I have to pay off debts 
because I was robbed, and the thieves 
took away a lot of cannabis and 
money’ (La Voix du Nord, 2013). It was 
his 12th conviction.
While in Sequedin prison in 2015, MM 
met CB, who had been convicted of 
using fraudulent documents, and the 
pair formed a friendship after sharing 
the same cell for 2 months. It was 
inside prison that MM was radicalised, 
in part mentored by CB, a convert to 
Islam who had been involved with 
radical networks since 2007. Their 
commitment to jihadism continued 
after their release, culminating in 
a plan to carry out an attack in France. 
It was disrupted in March 2017, a week 
before the French presidential election. 
In a Marseille apartment used by the 
pair, police discovered an Uzi sub-
machine gun, 3 kg of the homemade 
explosive triacetone triperoxide (TATP) 
drying in a cupboard, a homemade 
grenade, a GoPro camera and an 
Islamic State flag. Even in such cases 
of prison radicalisation, the key point 
is not necessarily the criminal offence 
behind the conviction — be it for drugs 
or not — but the circumstances within 
prison that led them to engage with 
extremist ideas and networks.
Source: Basra (2019).
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individuals, but there is some evidence of organised activity. 
For example, in Germany, in 2017, guns, ammunition and 
illicit drugs were seized at a paramilitary training camp for 
far-right extremists. According to newspaper reports, at 
least 13 known suspects were involved, including some 
from an internationally active group (Dearden, 2017).
In general it appears that currently there are no strong, 
systematic links between these activities beyond those 
arising from shared underlying factors or situations, as 
noted in the previous report. However, many EU Member 
States maintain a functional separation between their 
anti-drug agencies and their counter-terrorism agencies, 
which can potentially lead to crossovers being overlooked. 
The variability in the extent and nature of the interactions 
between drug markets and terrorism is also a challenge 
and there is a need to better understand the different 
profiles of those involved. It is an area that requires more 
research, but it would build on emerging findings from 
a recent project called PRIME (Preventing, Interdicting 
and Mitigating Extremism), which was funded by the 
European Commission. This project, which ended in March 
2019, aimed to provide an improved understanding of 
lone-actor terrorism to inform the design of social and 
physical counter-measures for the prevention of lone-actor 
radicalisation, the disruption of lone-actor terrorist plots, 
and the mitigation of terrorist attacks carried out by lone 
extremists.
In addition, there is a need to develop statistics on terrorist 
financing in order to measure trends and assess risks 
better. Terrorist financing has been identified as a key 
threat at the EU level, and concerted efforts are being made 
to monitor and improve the situation. Such efforts include 
the adoption of the Commission Staff Working Document 
(European Commission, 2017a) and the accompanying 
Commission report on the assessment of the risk of money 
laundering and terrorist financing affecting the internal 
market and relating to cross-border activities (European 
Commission, 2017b).
Trafficking in human beings and migrant 
smuggling
There are differences between trafficking in human beings 
and migrant smuggling and the terms should not be used 
interchangeably as the legal consequences are different 
(European Commission, 2018c). Trafficking in human 
beings is a crime against the person which involves using 
threats, force and coercion to exploit vulnerable people in 
order to make financial profit. The exploited individuals may 
be traded by OCGs as commodities, sometimes, but not 
necessarily, internationally. Migrant smuggling refers to the 
illegal movement of persons across international borders or 
the facilitation of irregular stay in a country. It differs from 
trafficking in human beings in that the migrants are willing 
participants. However, smuggled migrants are vulnerable 
to coercion and exploitation, for example because of their 
illegal status in the destination country or because they 
become indebted to the smugglers.
Trafficking in human beings
Trafficking in human beings encompasses sexual 
exploitation, forced labour or services, including begging 
and practices similar to slavery, forced criminality, and 
the removal of organs. It is often committed within the 
framework of organised crime, generating high profits. 
The connections between drugs and trafficking in human 
beings are yet to be fully understood, but it is clear that 
some exist, although they may be quite limited and 
opportunistic in nature. Drugs and trafficking in human 
beings may be interlinked in three broad, sometimes 
overlapping, ways:
  when drug trafficking and human trafficking are 
conducted by the same OCGs;
  when trafficked individuals are coerced into playing 
a role in the drug trade;
  when drugs play a part in the human-trafficking 
process, facilitating and maintaining the exploitation of 
vulnerable individuals.
Lack of access to reliable data still hampers analysis 
and the development of a fuller understanding of the 
multifaceted nature of the relationship. However, since 
2016 there has been increased recognition of the potential 
links between trafficking in human beings and drugs, and 
new data sources and case examples have emerged that 
shed more light on these interactions.
OCGs involved in both drugs and trafficking in human 
beings
A recent analysis focusing on the Balkans, a key crossroads 
for crime, illustrates the links between drugs and human 
trafficking that arise when both activities are carried out 
by the same OCGs (Kemp, 2017). The area provides 
many opportunities for such linkages. It has a history of 
conflict and associated instability, is situated on the main 
heroin-trafficking route from Afghanistan to Europe, the 
Balkan route (see Chapter 4), and is a transit corridor and 
destination region for trafficked individuals.
Among the OCGs active in this area, Albanian-speaking 
groups are prominent. After the Kosovo war at the end 
of the 20th century, some Albanian nationals took the 
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opportunity to obtain refugee status by claiming to be 
Kosovar, which then allowed them to move outside their 
territories, creating a new diaspora all over Europe. Within 
these communities, criminal elements have been able 
to operate. The term ‘Albanian-speaking’ is important, 
as it encompasses a range of different nationalities that 
share the same language and ethnic background, mainly 
Albanian nationals, but also Albanian speakers originally 
from Kosovo (6), Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, 
North Macedonia and various satellite communities within 
Europe. It should be noted that borders and nationality are 
not relevant to the operations of these complex networks 
of Albanian-speaking criminals. The main activities of 
Albanian-speaking OCGs in the EU extend to organised 
property crime, facilitation of irregular migration, trafficking 
of a range of drugs, money laundering, trafficking in human 
beings and document fraud. Albanian-speaking OCGs are 
involved in cocaine trafficking, are highly active in cannabis 
distribution (and more recently production) and play roles 
in support of long-established Turkish heroin activity (see 
Chapter 4). They are also showing signs of lower-level 
independent wholesale supply in established markets for 
cannabis and cocaine. A high level of ruthlessness and a 
reputation for violence are reported to be features in their 
operating model (Saggers, 2019).
Cases of transcontinental ties between drug-related 
organised crime groups for the transport of Nigerians to 
Europe for exploitation have also been reported. A report 
published by the Cambridge Centre for Applied Research 
in Human Trafficking identifies a Nigerian criminal network 
named Black Axe operating in Palermo in Italy — a centre 
of activity for the Cosa Nostra, Sicily’s own Mafia — and 
across the EU. The report indicates that this Nigerian 
criminal network is involved in drug dealing, prostitution 
and the fraudulent transfer of money between Europe 
(6) This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line 
with UNSCR 1244/99 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of 
independence.
and Nigeria. Authorities in Palermo have noted that ‘Cosa 
Nostra tolerates the Nigerian Mafia in Palermo. Cosa Nostra 
allowed the Nigerians to organise a subordinate structure. 
They were tolerated as long as they didn’t come outside 
their perimeter’ (Pemberton Ford, 2017, p. 48).
Involvement of coerced individuals in drug production and 
trafficking
The use of labour exploitation at cannabis cultivation sites 
is a well-known phenomenon and remains an issue in some 
Member States. OCGs exploit vulnerable victims, in most 
cases male irregular migrants, to work at indoor cultivation 
sites. The victims are typically kept at the cultivation site, 
often in very poor conditions, to look after the cannabis 
plants. The victims are often held in debt bondage and 
forced to pay off debts of thousands of euros incurred for 
facilitation services in the context of irregular migration. 
EU nationals are also exploited at cannabis cultivation sites 
with little or no pay. Some OCGs rely on teams composed 
of victims of trafficking in human beings to harvest large-
scale cultivation sites.
Vietnamese OCGs continue to exploit irregular migrants 
of Vietnamese origin by forcing them to work at indoor 
cannabis cultivation sites in various Member States. 
Chinese OCGs are increasingly involved in the cultivation 
of herbal cannabis in the EU and also frequently rely on the 
exploitation of Chinese or Vietnamese migrants. Albanian 
nationals are also exploited at indoor cannabis cultivation 
sites operated by Albanian OCGs.
A striking feature of human exploitation is the involvement 
of children, estimated to make up more than 30 % of 
all migrants in Europe (UNHCR, 2016; UNICEF, 2016). 
The trafficking of Vietnamese children to work at indoor 
cannabis cultivation sites was discussed in the 2016 EU 
Drug Markets Report (EMCDDA and Europol, 2016), and 
cases continue to be reported. However, the increasing 
numbers of asylum seekers and migrants arriving in 
the EU in recent years has given rise to other examples 
CASE STUDY 3
Child exploitation by OCGs in Sweden
In some cities in Sweden (Stockholm, 
Gothenburg and Uppsala), criminal 
gangs have been recruiting 
unaccompanied asylum-seeking 
children or children whose asylum 
applications have been rejected 
— in particular young Afghan 
males — to sell drugs. Criminal gangs 
usually force them to join by using 
threats and violence. Many of such 
children involved in drug dealing live 
on the streets, making them even 
more vulnerable and exposed to 
recruitment.
Source: FRA (2019).
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(Case study 3). Given the very limited income-generating 
options available to them, they have been found to engage 
in illegal activities to pay smugglers, including drug 
dealing and theft. A recent analysis of sexual exploitation 
of migrant children in Greece highlighted a cascade of 
socio-psychological consequences evidenced by affected 
children, including both drug use and dealing (Digidiki and 
Bhabha, 2017). The report documents the trajectories of 
these children whereby sexual exploitation leads them 
to take up an active role in the drug trade, an ‘important 
qualitative change of scope’ (Digidiki and Bhabha, 2017, 
p. 25). Furthermore, as a result of this kind of exploitation, 
vulnerable children may engage in coping behaviours, such 
as drug use.
OCGs exploit victims of trafficking as drug couriers on 
commercial flights, buses or trains travelling both to and 
within the EU. In most cases these victims are female. 
Victims exploited as drug couriers are both EU and non-EU 
nationals. Victims originating from West Africa, particularly 
Nigerian nationals, and North Africa are most frequently 
encountered.
Other examples involve trafficking and coercion associated 
with the drug trade at the national level. For example, 
the ‘county lines’ model of drug supply has become 
widespread in the United Kingdom. Involving drug supply 
from a central base to one or more supply areas using 
dedicated mobile phone lines to take orders, it makes 
extensive use of the exploitation of vulnerable people 
(NCA, 2019). These include recruiting vulnerable children, 
for example in the care of social services or excluded 
from school, and adults. The vulnerable adults are often 
people dependent on drugs, who may allow the use of their 
accommodation for drug dealing (known as ‘cuckooing’) 
in exchange for drugs or to pay off drug debts but then 
are forced to continue engaging in drug dealing. This 
exploitative business model allows criminal groups to 
expand to new areas at low cost and minimal risk, as they 
do not have to pay the vulnerable individuals whom they 
exploit, who are also the most exposed to the risk of arrest.
The previous report raised the issue of trafficked individuals 
being prosecuted for their involvement in the illicit drug 
trade despite the coercive nature of their involvement 
(EMCDDA and Europol, 2016). It noted that attempts 
have been made to address this in EU Directive 2011/36 
on preventing and combating trafficking of human 
beings, which came into force in 2013. This includes 
a non-punishment principle stating that victims should 
not be punished for crimes they committed as a direct 
consequence of trafficking, which is intended to safeguard 
the human rights of victims and to encourage them to 
act as witnesses in criminal proceedings against the 
perpetrators. Nevertheless, the recent review of action in 
this area found that many countries still highlighted this 
as a challenging area (European Commission, 2018a). 
Among the factors that make it difficult to identify victims 
correctly and provide appropriate support are that victims 
and perpetrators may come from similar ethnic groups, 
specialist drugs teams may not be aware of the potential 
for links to trafficking in human beings, and exploited 
individuals may fear prosecution because they were initially 
illegal migrants or are drug users with a criminal record. 
Although data that would allow assessment of progress 
in this area are not generally collected (see, for example, 
Anti-Trafficking Monitoring Group, 2018), the scale of the 
issue is illustrated by a report in The Times (Swerling, 2018) 
that between 2012 and 2017 more than 1 133 Vietnamese 
children were arrested in the United Kingdom for offences, 
including drug-related ones.
Drugs as a means of controlling trafficked individuals
Illicit drugs may also be used in a number of different 
ways by OCGs involved in trafficking in human beings 
and exploitation (Shelley, 2012). They are used to recruit 
victims for sexual exploitation. In addition, addictive drugs, 
such as cocaine, heroin and benzodiazepines, are also 
used to maintain victims’ dependence on their exploiters. 
However, drugs may also be used in other forms of human 
exploitation; for example, stimulants may be used in forced 
labour to enable victims to work for longer hours.
Migrant smuggling
‘Migrant smuggling’ refers to the illegal movement of 
persons across international borders for financial gain. It 
differs from trafficking in human beings in that the migrants 
are willing participants who are paying to be smuggled. 
However, since smuggled migrants are vulnerable to 
coercion and exploitation, for example because of their 
illegal status in the destination country or because they 
become indebted to the smugglers, the smuggling of 
migrants may lead to trafficking and exploitation. In these 
cases drugs may be involved, such as when the migrant is 
coerced into smuggling drugs while en route to their final 
destination (Ventrella, 2017).
Many of the routes along which migrants are smuggled into 
the EU are also known drug-trafficking corridors. However, 
there do not appear to be any structural, sustained or 
widespread links between drug trafficking and migrant 
smuggling. Although these criminal activities coincide in 
individual cases, these are not part of an emerging pattern 
or trend. Some maritime vessels that were used by migrant 
smugglers were previously recorded as suspect vessels 
in drug-trafficking investigations. However, their use for 
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migrant smuggling does not typically coincide with drug 
trafficking.
There are, however, some opportunistic links arising 
from the geographical proximity of the activities as well 
as shared logistical and other needs (see Case study 4). 
For example, both make use of ‘facilitators’ who provide 
false documentation, act as guides and scouts, provide 
transport, accommodation and tickets, and bribe border 
guards. According to data provided by Europol, many such 
facilitators engage in polycriminality, including trafficking in 
human beings (20 %), trafficking drugs (15 %) and property 
crime (23 %).
Trade in other illicit goods
The possible links and interaction between the trade 
in drugs and other illicit goods have been noted in the 
previous edition of the report (EMCDDA and Europol, 
2016), based on the similarities of criminal ‘business 
models’, supporting expertise and infrastructures in these 
areas. The 2016 report, however, highlighted a knowledge 
gap. Since the last edition, evidence has been gathered 
that begins to address this gap, and polycriminality among 
OCGs highlighted (Europol, 2019b).
Firearms trafficking
Links between the illicit trade in firearms and drug markets 
take two main forms. The first is when OCGs are engaged in 
the supply of both commodities, reviewed below. Secondly, 
firearms may be used by OCGs as part of their drug market-
related activities — this is covered in Chapter 2. However, 
the distinction between these two forms is not always clear; 
OCGs that traffic both firearms and drugs are also likely to 
use firearms in the course of their drug-trafficking activities 
(Case study 5).
At the global level, the importance of reducing illicit 
arms flows is also acknowledged in the 2030 Agenda 
for Sustainable Development, Goal 16 (United Nations, 
2015), and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 
(UNODC) has begun gathering data on firearms trafficking, 
its trends and its modi operandi, including combined 
trafficking with illicit drugs (UNODC Working Group on 
Firearms, 2018). However, no systematic monitoring of 
firearms and links to drugs exists at present in Europe. 
Nevertheless, open source information monitoring can 
provide some information. Between April 2017 and 
March 2018, 12 seizures were identified, where firearms 
were being trafficked with heroin, and 19 with cocaine 
(see Chapter 9 for full methodology). As an example, 
CASE STUDY 4
Smuggling of migrants and cannabis across the Mediterranean Sea
An OCG from Morocco used jet skis 
to smuggle migrants and cannabis 
across the Mediterranean Sea to 
Spain. The group was dismantled 
in a joint action day by the Spanish 
National Police and the Civil Guard, 
with Europol supporting them on 
the spot with a mobile office and 
a Universal Forensic Extraction 
Device — a stand-alone mobile 
forensic kit that can extract data from 
mobile phones. In total, 19 people 
were detained and 11.6 kg of drugs 
and over EUR 15 000 in cash were 
seized.
The OCG was made up of Moroccan 
citizens who were residing in various 
EU countries, mainly France, Italy and 
Spain. They transported and sheltered 
migrants who had been smuggled with 
falsified documents from the Spanish 
autonomous city of Ceuta, on the north 
coast of Africa, to mainland Spain, 
crossing the Strait of Gibraltar, which 
separates Europe and Africa by only 
14.3 km. The criminals charged the 
migrants EUR 4 000 and an additional 
EUR 500 if they wanted to be housed 
in Spain.
The criminal organisation used the 
same modus operandi for trafficking 
cannabis from Morocco to Spain. 
According to an intelligence report 
issued by the European Border 
and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex), 
smuggling migrants on jet skis is 
a modus operandi specific to the 
Strait of Gibraltar and used exclusively 
by Moroccans, mainly to transport 
Moroccan males, most of whom 
have relatives in the EU who pay 
for their transfer. Although in terms 
of migratory impact the number of 
migrants being transferred with this 
type of asset is relatively low (one to 
three migrants, plus one skipper per jet 
ski), the number of incidents involving 
jet skis has sharply increased in the 
past few years.
The criminal intelligence development 
of this case was carried out in 
the framework of Europol’s Joint 
Operational Team Mare, a specialised 
team of experts, hosted at Europol’s 
headquarters.
Source: Europol (2018b).
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in September 2018, two Polish men were intercepted at 
Dover in the United Kingdom in an attempt to smuggle 
20 handguns, 1 000 rounds of ammunition and a variety 
of drugs (approximately 300 kg methamphetamine, 50 kg 
ketamine, 50 kg cocaine and 10 kg heroin) into the country 
concealed within the stated cargo of photocopier paper 
(NCA, 2018a).
The trafficking of firearms is often a supplementary source 
of income for OCGs that are primarily involved in other 
criminal activities, and the drug trade appears to be 
a significant factor in the proliferation of illicit firearms in 
the EU. Within the EU there are a number of OCGs known 
to be engaged in both drugs and firearms trafficking.
  Dutch OCGs have been known to supply both firearms 
and wholesale quantities of various types of drugs to 
OCGs based in other Member States.
  Seizures of drug shipments destined for the United 
Kingdom repeatedly also involve the seizure of 
firearms.
  Outlaw motorcycle gangs, present in almost all EU 
countries, are known to use existing criminal routes to 
traffic firearms and drugs, and are also heavily involved 
in the trafficking of firearms to and within the EU. 
The firearms trafficked by outlaw motorcycle gangs 
are primarily intended for distribution to their own 
subsidiaries rather than to supply other OCGs.
  There is some overlap between OCGs involved in the 
trafficking of firearms and of drugs via the Western 
Balkans — a region that remains a significant source 
of affordable, illegal firearms and also a key transit 
region for heroin and cannabis smuggled to the EU and 
elsewhere in the region. In some cases, illegal firearms 
are exchanged for drugs in the region.
Transnational organised crime networks involved in the 
large-scale trafficking of cannabis across the Mediterranean 
Sea are thought to be also involved in firearms trafficking. 
Vessels involved in the trafficking of drugs from North Africa 
to the EU are believed to be also involved in the trafficking 
of firearms and explosives to conflict regions, such as Syria 
and Libya. The OCGs involved in this activity are likely to be 
highly polycriminal and involved in trafficking various illegal 
commodities.
The trafficking of firearms is also linked to drug trafficking 
from South America to the EU. Firearms are trafficked to 
South America from Europe by OCGs originating from the 
Western Balkans region, which are heavily involved in drug 
trafficking and have established a permanent presence 
in key locations in South America to facilitate this activity. 
The price of firearms in some parts of South America 
exceeds the price in the Western Balkans by up to 10 
times and makes the trafficking of firearms from Europe 
to countries such as Brazil a highly profitable opportunity. 
International operations such as the one described below 
CASE STUDY 5
Operation Escalade: illicit firearms, anti-surveillance and violence
In December 2017 nine men pleaded 
guilty to a variety of charges linked to 
a sophisticated OCG mainly engaged 
in the importation of large quantities 
of cocaine and the trafficking of illegal 
firearms to the United Kingdom. 
A cache of firearms, seized in a raid at 
a garage in Glasgow, was estimated 
to have a resale value of EUR 45 000 
(GBP 40 000).
Their activities were recorded over 
a 4-year period and were believed 
to extend overseas. The group 
used ingenious techniques to hide 
guns, ranging from handguns to 
sub-machine guns, in concealed 
compartments in a fleet of cars. 
The gang used a vast array of anti-
surveillance technology to keep ahead 
of the police. Officers recovered 
listening devices and mobile phone 
jammers of the type normally used by 
only the police and security services. 
The group also worked from a network 
of rented premises, often industrial 
units in out-of-the-way locations. In 
all cases, the premises were rented 
using false documents. The group set 
aside dedicated phones at several 
of the premises to be used as ‘fake 
tenant’ phones. The gang also used 
sophisticated methods, painstakingly 
engineered to evade detection, to 
conceal and export large amounts 
of cash tightly wrapped in tape and 
hidden in bundles.
The violence used by the group to 
maintain their operation eventually led 
to their downfall. A gun recovered by 
police was linked back to an abduction 
and beating committed by the group. 
The group used weapons to enforce 
their own drug trade interests, while 
also supplying firearms to other crime 
gangs.
Source: BBC News (2018a).
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(Case study 6) are another example of the complex ways 
in which criminal organisations may link to other groups 
outside Europe in mutually beneficial relationships that 
facilitate their different operations.
Falsified, counterfeit, substandard and 
unauthorised medicines
Globally, the sale of falsified, counterfeit, substandard and 
unauthorised medicines is big business and a serious and 
growing public health problem, which has been fuelled 
by globalisation. The combination of modern transport 
networks, the internet, low labour costs, and the rapid 
growth of the chemical and pharmaceutical industries, 
particularly in China and India, has facilitated the 
development of this large market. The potential for huge 
profits has also led to the involvement of OCGs, although 
the relationship between these groups and the drug market 
remains poorly understood.
Alongside the risks to health posed by using such 
medicines, consumers also face the risk of being victims 
of fraud by buying from this market. This risk may be 
compounded by the poor security of many online shops, 
which could lead to consumers having their personal 
and financial information stolen or exposed. Although 
information on the extent of these problems is limited, 
there are signs of both increasing misuse and greater 
availability of these substances on the illicit drug market.
Medicines that are traded illicitly may enter the supply 
chain and reach the consumer in different ways:
  they may be diverted from licit use, as is the case when 
people who are prescribed opioids or benzodiazepines 
sell a proportion of their prescription;
  they may be stolen from the legitimate supply chain, 
including manufacturers, wholesalers, pharmacies or 
prescribers;
  they may be obtained fraudulently through corrupt 
healthcare professionals or using forged prescriptions;
  they may be purchased from online pharmacies that do 
not insist on a prescription;
  they may be produced specifically for the illicit market;
  they may be manufactured by OCGs utilising their own 
clandestine laboratories and production lines;
  counterfeit medicines may be imported by OCGs from 
outside the EU, then repacked and distributed within 
the EU;
  some OCGs sell their own brands of pharmaceuticals, 
posing as reputable companies selling legitimate 
medicines.
Although strict regulations and enforcement in EU 
Member States mean that counterfeit medicines are not 
as common as in some other parts of the world, there has 
been a considerable growth in the trade in counterfeit 
medicinal products in recent years. The number of seizures 
of counterfeit medicines and other products by EU customs 
authorities increased from 1 554 in 2015 to 1 835 in 2017, 
although the number of items seized actually decreased 
from 895 324 to 568 122 (Europol and EUIPO, 2019). 
CASE STUDY 6
Exchange of cocaine for weapons
In November 2018, the US Drug 
Enforcement Administration (DEA) 
in cooperation with Croatian law 
enforcement authorities disrupted 
an OCG proposing to trade cocaine 
for surface-to-air missiles and other 
advanced military-grade weapons. The 
Colombian broker was heavily involved 
in the trafficking of cocaine to the EU 
via West Africa and allegedly intended 
to pass on the weapons to the terrorist 
group Ansar al-Dine. This group is 
linked to al-Qaeda and promised the 
broker the use of smuggling routes 
passing through territory controlled 
by the group in the Sahara Desert 
for his drug-smuggling business. 
The exchange of cocaine for the 
weapons was to take place in Croatia. 
A sample of 1 kg of cocaine was seized 
in the operation in Zagreb.
West Africa is a known transit region 
for cocaine trafficked from South 
America to the EU. Various terrorist 
and extremist groups control territory 
along the land route from West Africa 
to Europe, and South American cartels 
are known to have previously made 
arrangements with these groups to 
ensure protection for their shipments 
transported along these routes. The 
cartels make payment to these groups 
in money, drugs or weapons.
Source: Petrušić and Dešković (2018).
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This reflects the growing emphasis on trade in counterfeit 
medicines using parcel and postal services.
Most illicit drug monitoring systems were not designed to 
identify signals of misuse of medicines, so the available 
data are patchy. Nevertheless, data are available from 
the EU Early Warning System, and recent developments 
in EMCDDA annual data collections mean that some 
substances are now included. In particular, there is now 
more evidence concerning opioid medications, such as 
tramadol, which is presented in Chapter 4. The diversion 
of methadone and buprenorphine from opioid substitution 
treatment is reported to be a significant problem in some 
countries, accounting for a non-trivial proportion of overall 
drug-related harms. Data from both individual studies 
and routine monitoring suggest that, besides the opioid 
analgesics, the other main types of medicines misused in 
Europe are benzodiazepines (for example alprazolam or 
Xanax) and ‘Z-drugs’ (hypnotic drugs such as zolpidem 
and zopiclone). Users of benzodiazepines may develop 
dependence on them, and their use together with alcohol 
and opioids increases the risk of drug-related death.
Not only are benzodiazepines increasingly being sold on 
illicit markets, but in a number of EU countries concerns 
have recently been raised that the availability of extremely 
cheap illicit benzodiazepines, often counterfeit, on the 
internet may be leading to the increased use of these drugs 
by vulnerable teenagers, often in combination with alcohol 
(Byrne, 2018). This pattern of use is reported to be linked to 
behavioural problems, as well as posing a risk of overdose, 
particularly when using counterfeit versions, which may 
be of variable dosages and may contain contaminants. 
Of particular concern is that some contain highly potent 
fentanyl derivatives.
There are different modi operandi when it comes to the 
production of counterfeit medicines. In some cases, 
the medicines and packages are produced in the same 
clandestine laboratory, while in other cases the production 
is done at separate sites or even by separate OCGs. In one 
case, an OCG was found to send samples of branding to 
China, where stickers can be produced on a large scale 
and sent back to be placed on the packaging. Finally, 
there are also filler sites, where medicines and packaging 
manufactured elsewhere are put together.
One of the trends observed in this area is the importation 
of raw materials for local production. In recent years there 
have been regular seizures of pill presses, mixers, blister 
machines, bottles and labels. Raw materials are illegally 
brought into the EU from countries such as India and 
China, usually under a fictitious brand and with forged 
documentation. Illicit medicines are then manufactured in 
suitably equipped laboratories. In some cases, counterfeit 
medicines are produced by OCGs that are also involved in 
the manufacturing and trade of synthetic drugs, such as 
MDMA, LSD and ketamine.
There is a continuous expansion of unauthorised and 
unregulated online pharmacies, selling a range of 
counterfeit, illicit and substandard pharmaceutical 
products. Such online pharmacies capitalise on 
increasing self-medication and consumer demand for 
cheap medicines including performance and image-
enhancing drugs. Some of these online shops advertise 
with the slogan ‘original preparation at low prices’, and 
are operated by criminal groups. In recent years, law 
enforcement authorities have also detected a growing 
number of counterfeit medicines in postal packages, often 
ordered through social media platforms or other online 
marketplaces (see Case study 7). There are also indications 
that counterfeit medicines are being traded using mobile 
instant messaging platforms.
Different approaches are needed to tackle these diverse 
phenomena. Some of them focus on reducing demand 
by increasing the awareness of potential problems and 
by improving prescribing practice to prevent dependence 
developing or the need for topping up. Similarly, good 
practice in medical waste disposal can reduce the risk 
of the diversion of used fentanyl patches. However, 
partnerships with industry, the development of regulatory 
controls, and customs and policing activity are all likely 
to be appropriate responses to the involvement of 
OCGs, which are more likely to divert larger quantities of 
medicines by infiltrating the supply chain or importing 
falsified, counterfeit and unauthorised medicines from 
outside the EU.
The EMCDDA and the European Medicines Agency 
routinely exchange information on the misuse of medicines 
through the EU Early Warning System. The EMCDDA also 
collects information on psychoactive medicines through 
its ongoing drug-monitoring activities. Nonetheless, the 
limitations of current monitoring systems mean that 
some potentially important developments in this area are 
difficult to observe; for example, the misuse of tramadol, 
gabapentin and pregabalin appears to be increasing, 
but this is difficult to detect in the routine data sources 
available (Griffiths et al., 2014).
Alcohol and cigarettes
Within the EU there are large markets for alcohol and 
cigarettes, which OCGs can exploit for profit. Alcohol and 
cigarettes are subject to excise duty upon production 
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in, or import to, the EU. Avoiding such duties provides 
OCGs with one such opportunity for profit (excise fraud). 
Another is through the sale of counterfeit goods. OCGs use 
various modi operandi to avoid excise duties and generate 
significant profits, selling both genuine and counterfeit 
excise goods at lower prices than their licit equivalents. 
Excise fraud deprives the Member States and the EU 
directly of significant revenue, which could be invested 
in infrastructure projects, regional development or other 
ventures benefiting EU citizens and businesses. Counterfeit 
goods, which may contain dangerous substances, on the 
other hand can expose consumers to serious harms.
Counterfeiting is identified in a number of European 
countries as a type of serious organised crime — one that 
includes violence, illegal immigrant labourers and children 
who are forced into it (see Local Government Association, 
2015; Scottish Government, 2016, p. 8). Often counterfeiting 
schemes are initiated using money invested by criminal 
entrepreneurs, including drug traffickers, in the counterfeit 
alcohol or cigarette business, as risks are comparatively low 
(Antonopoulos et al., 2018). Since OCGs involved in drug 
trafficking often launder money through businesses such 
as nightclubs, bars and restaurants — venues that could 
provide opportunities for benefiting from illicit supplies 
of alcohol and tobacco — some links might be expected. 
However, at present the evidence for this is limited.
There are examples of OCGs involved in drug trafficking 
across the EU engaging in the smuggling of illicit tobacco 
products and alcohol as well as wholesale quantities of 
cannabis resin and cocaine. In addition to these smuggling 
activities, these OCGs also move criminal proceeds across 
Europe and to destinations in South America. Originating 
primarily from eastern European countries, these OCGs are 
present in established distribution hubs in Member States 
such as Belgium, the Netherlands, Spain and the United 
Kingdom, and maintain links to the main production regions 
outside the EU.
Harms to individuals, families and 
neighbourhoods
Illicit drug markets have wide-ranging impacts on society 
and can scar neighbourhoods and the people who live 
in them. The illegal nature of the drug market means 
that those who use drugs expose themselves to a broad 
range of harms, but the harms extend beyond the people 
who use drugs. Violence stemming from the drug trade, 
including homicide, contributes to feelings of insecurity 
within neighbourhoods, as does the operation of open 
drug markets. This was identified as a key issue in the 
previous report (EMCDDA and Europol, 2016) and may 
include gang-related violence and intimidation, which 
may extend to people who use drugs and to their families 
and friends. A further issue is the environmental impact 
of the drug trade, in particular that related to drug 
production. Production within Europe may directly harm the 
environment through the dumping of waste materials. In 
addition, drug production in other regions of the world may 
cause environmental degradation through, for example, 
deforestation and erosion, and these harms have an 
indirect impact in the EU through migration, destabilisation 
and climate change.
CASE STUDY 7
Operation Pangea XI: illicit medicines sold online
During an international week of 
action (9-16 October 2018) in 
Operation Pangea XI, coordinated 
and supported jointly by Interpol and 
Europol, police, customs and health 
regulatory authorities from 116 
countries targeted the illicit online sale 
of medicines and medical products, 
resulting in 859 arrests worldwide 
and the seizure of EUR 12.3 million 
(USD 14 million) worth of potentially 
dangerous pharmaceuticals.
Almost 1 million packages were 
inspected, with 500 tonnes of illicit 
pharmaceuticals seized worldwide, 
including anti-inflammatory 
medication, painkillers, erectile 
dysfunction pills, hypnotic and 
sedative agents, anabolic steroids, 
slimming pills and medicines for 
treating HIV, Parkinson’s disease and 
diabetes. More than 110 000 medical 
devices were also seized.
Source: Europol and EUIPO (2019).
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Drug-related homicide
The extent and nature of drug-related homicide
One of the major manifestations of drug markets is serious 
violence and homicide, which, like drug-related crime more 
generally, may be psychopharmacological (committed 
while under the influence), economic-compulsive (to gain 
money or goods to obtain drugs) or systemic (part of 
the operation of the drug market) (Goldstein, 1985). The 
extent and nature of drug-related violence and homicide, 
in particular systemic violence, are likely to vary between 
countries and over time in response to differences in 
the way drug markets operate. Homicide cases range 
from those conducted as a ‘crime as a service’ (as in 
Case study 8) to ones that may be incidental to low-level 
dealing (as illustrated by Case study 9). However, although 
homicides are well recorded internationally, there is very 
little information on the extent and nature of the link 
between homicide and the involvement of organised crime 
in the supply and distribution of illicit drugs, and there is 
currently no systematic collection of data on the topic. 
This was identified as an important gap in available data 
and knowledge in the previous EU Drug Markets Report 
(EMCDDA and Europol, 2016).
Addressing drug-related homicide is important given the 
severity of such an event, affecting individuals, families and 
communities. Understanding the extent and nature of the 
issue is essential for this to be done effectively. Homicide 
is an extreme expression of violence and the most likely to 
be reported to the police and to be thoroughly investigated. 
It can also be an indicator of wider drug-related violent 
crime. Comparing homicide statistics between countries 
can help identify trends and new threats in order to plan 
and implement proportionate responses. However, there 
are considerable inconsistencies in the data available on 
drug-related homicide in Europe. For example, just 10 of the 
28 EU Member States, Norway and Turkey systematically 
prepare data on this topic. This hampers efforts to tackle 
the issue, as this information is necessary for designing 
prevention efforts and monitoring their impact.
Since the importance of this information was highlighted 
in the previous EU Drug Markets Report (EMCDDA and 
Europol, 2016), a programme of work has been undertaken 
to explore how information on drug-related homicides can 
be improved at the European level and more complete 
and comparable data in this area generated. The initial 
findings already offer an improved understanding of the 
Potential mechanisms underpinning the drug-
violence nexus
Psychopharmacological — Direct relationship 
between drugs and violence where the violent crime 
involves drug use by those involved.
Economic-compulsive — Indirect relationship 
between drugs and violence: some drug users 
engage in economically oriented violent crime in 
order to support costly drug use.
Systemic — Refers to the aggressive patterns of 
interaction within the system of drug markets.
Source: Goldstein (1985).
CASE STUDY 8
Murder as a service: Stockholm’s Death Patrol
About 20 members of a Swedish 
OCG known as the Death Patrol 
(Dödspatrullen), specialising in 
contract killings on behalf of drug-
trafficking organisations, were arrested 
in coordinated operations in Sweden 
and Spain between December 2018 
and February 2019. The arrestees 
are all young Swedish nationals aged 
between 20 and 30 years. According to 
the media reports, the gang originates 
from a poor immigrant suburb of 
southern Stockholm. It is suspected 
of being responsible for torturing and 
killing at least 15 people in Sweden 
and Spain since 2016. Many of its 
victims were drug traffickers murdered 
by order of rival OCGs, including 
Colombian cocaine cartels. In addition 
to providing murder as a service, the 
Swedish OCG also trafficked drugs 
such as cocaine, cannabis resin and 
amphetamine in Sweden, Spain 
and Morocco. Charges against the 
gang members also include money 
laundering and document fraud.
Sources: García Rey and Palmkwist (2018); 
Madueño (2019); Ortega Dolz and Sánchez (2018).
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ramifications of the drugs phenomenon and also highlight 
opportunities for improving future monitoring in this area 
(de Bont et al., 2018; EMCDDA, 2018a).
In collaboration with the European Homicide Monitor, 
which gathers data from Finland, the Netherlands and 
Sweden (Denmark, Estonia, Italy, Norway and Switzerland 
are in the process of joining), a pilot study was conducted 
aimed at collecting some standardised comparable data 
on homicide. Crucially, a set of drug-related variables 
were added to the monitor, allowing a re-assessment of 
homicide cases and an initial analysis of the relationship 
between drugs and homicide events in selected countries 
(for fuller details of the pilot study, methodology and 
findings, see EMCDDA, 2019a).
The pilot study found that a similar proportion (about 
50 %) of the homicides committed across the Netherlands 
(2012-16), Finland (2014-15) and Sweden (2013-14) for 
which sufficient information was available were drug related 
(Table 1.2). However, there were differences in the types 
of drug-related homicides between the countries. While 
psychopharmacological cases predominated in Finland 
(100 %) and Sweden (89 %), in the Netherlands these made 
up only 24 % of the cases; in contrast, systemic homicides 
were more frequently found in the Netherlands (63 %) than 
in Finland (13 %) and Sweden (30 %) (see Case study 9).
In general, homicides are committed by a single 
perpetrator, but this study found that, in all three countries, 
drug-related homicides were more likely to involve more 
than one perpetrator than other homicides; about one 
in four drug-related homicides involved more than one 
perpetrator per case compared with about one in 10 for 
non drug-related homicides.
There was also a difference in the settings in which drug-
related homicides and other homicides took place. Drug-
related homicides were slightly more likely to take place in 
an urban area in all three countries. In the Netherlands and 
Sweden, drug-related homicides also took place in public 
settings such as parks, public roads, bars, restaurants and 
hotels more often than other homicides (64 % versus 42 % 
respectively in the Netherlands and 47 % versus 24 % in 
Sweden). In all three countries, the victims of drug-related 
homicides were more often male (84 % versus 65 % in 
Finland; 82 % versus 55 % in the Netherlands; and 88 % 
versus 65 % in Sweden) and typically younger (about two 
thirds in all three countries were under the age of 45) 
compared with non drug-related homicide victims (the 
majority of whom were 45 years and over in Finland and 
Sweden or 35 years and over in the Netherlands).
Factors associated with drug-related homicide
In an exploratory study of contract killings in the 
Netherlands, carried out by van Gestel and Verhoeven 
(2017), drug market control and money emerged as key 
themes. Killings were identified as serving as instruments 
for ‘compensation’ for failure to pay for or deliver drugs; 
for punishment, intimidation and for asserting one’s 
position within the drug market; as a precaution in order 
to avoid becoming a target; or to silence witnesses. 
Although no increase in contract killings was noted, the 
phenomenon appeared to be changing, involving processes 
of specialisation and professionalisation. Crucially, an 
increased number of people were available to commit the 
crime in return for cash, there was increased use of heavy 
automatic firearms (noted to have become the standard for 
contract killing), and perpetrators were more likely to cover 
up or avoid leaving evidence.
Analysis of global homicide trends has shown that in 
2003/04 rates began falling (Eisner, 2008). However, 
between 2014 and 2016, a number of countries, including 
Table 1.2 
Drug-related homicide in Finland, the Netherlands and Sweden
Type Country (years studied)
Finland (2014-15) Netherlands (2012-16) Sweden (2013-14)
Psychopharmacological, N (% of drug-related cases) 83 (100) 44 (24) 66 (89)
Economic-compulsive, N (% of drug-related cases) 2 (2) 13 (7) 10 (14)
Systemic, N (% of drug-related cases) 11 (13) 116 (63) 22 (30)
Drug-related homicides, N (% of total) 83 (49) 186 (51) 74 (49)
Non drug-related homicides, N (% of total) 87 (51) 181 (49) 78 (51)
Total 170 367 152
Drug involvement unknown 0 277 16
Note: Because categories of drug-related homicides are not mutually exclusive, percentages do not add up to 100 %. These figures need to be read also in context 
of the population size of the three countries.
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Canada, Germany, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the 
US, recorded increases ranging between 3 % and 22 % 
(Home Office, 2018). Although further observations are 
necessary before an upward trend can be confirmed, it 
has been suggested that these recent changes may be at 
least partly due to drug markets. Important market shifts 
that have been suggested as possibly contributing to the 
rise in serious violence include an increase in synthetic 
cannabinoids, linked to serious violence in prison and 
homeless communities (Ralphs et al., 2017); a rise in coca 
cultivation in Colombia, the main supplier of cocaine for 
Europe; and higher (crack) cocaine purity. Another market 
development is the phenomenon of county lines, in which 
drug-selling gangs from the capital city, possibly driven by 
excess supply, seek new markets in provincial areas. The 
2017 National Crime Agency threat assessment on county 
lines showed that nearly every police force in England and 
Wales has been affected to some degree. The involvement 
of vulnerable people and, generally, the more violent nature 
of county lines drug-selling gangs than local drug dealers 
have been noted (Coomber and Moyle, 2018; NCA, 2017).
The pilot study demonstrated that the European Homicide 
Monitor can capture the role of drugs in European 
homicides in a reliable way, although it also highlighted 
some challenges. The main limitations identified 
concerned the lack of readily available data sources, 
missing data and intercountry variations in data quality. 
Future research is needed to identify new sources of more 
detailed information about drug-related homicides, such 
as incorporating tactical intelligence (e.g. blood tests) 
available at the police level, and reports on the use of 
alcohol and drugs at the time of offending.
Extending the number of countries monitoring drug-related 
homicides, and incorporating this into analysis of drug 
markets, would be valuable for identifying changes in 
the level and nature of the use of extreme violence. For 
example, anecdotal evidence suggests that Dutch systemic 
homicide in particular, and Dutch organised crime in 
general, has become more brutal over the years. Recent 
observations indicate that this dynamic could be explained 
by highly fragmented, occasional criminal networks 
(rather than the classic hierarchical criminal network 
structure) involving less-experienced young men (rather 
than ‘professional’ hitmen) as perpetrators (Stoker and 
Thijssen, 2018; Voskuil, 2018). What further characterises 
these cases is the use of highly lethal automatic weapons, 
and the relatively reckless way in which homicides are 
committed — resulting in bystanders being killed, children 
witnessing their parents’ homicide and several cases of 
mistaken identity.
Finally, there should be an exploration of ways to apply 
a similar data collection model to other crime areas to 
better understand the role of drugs. Ultimately such 
developments could provide a solid, data-driven basis to 
inform adequate drug-related policy responses in Europe.
CASE STUDY 9
Systemic homicide in Europe
A drugs war broke out in 2012 between 
Moroccan gangs, which brought a new 
level of gangland violence to Europe. 
It started when a Dutch gang known 
as the Turtles stole cocaine worth 
EUR 15.6 million (GBP 14 million), 
part of a larger shipment — much of it 
destined for the British market.
The torso of a 23-year-old Moroccan, 
Nabil Amzieb, was discovered in 
a burning car, and his head was found 
on a busy street in Amsterdam early 
one morning. This was seen as a clear 
message to authorities and rival 
gangsters that this was a gang war of 
greater severity than usual in Europe 
and closer to the level of violence seen 
in countries such as Mexico. Since 
then, the feud has resulted in at least 
16 killings in Belgium, the Netherlands 
and Spain. In response there has been 
an unprecedented level of cooperation 
between police forces across Europe in 
order to identify and bring to justice the 
key people responsible for the violence.
Richard Eduardo Riquelme Vega was 
arrested in a Santiago hotel in October 
2017 after flying into Chile’s capital 
from Dubai. He is believed to be at the 
top of the gang responsible for the 
beheading of Nabil Amzieb and to be 
the right-hand man of Naoufal Fassih, 
who was arrested in Dublin in 2016 in 
a safe house operated by the Kinahan 
gang, key players in the drug trade. 
Vega and his Moroccan associates in 
the Netherlands had become closely 
involved with the Kinahan gang, 
illustrating the global interactions 
between OCGs in the drug trade, the 
international impact of the market 
and the importance of cross-border 
collaboration by law enforcement 
agencies.
Sources: Gangsterism Out (2017); Henley (2016); 
Pieters (2016); Tallant (2017).
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Gangs, violence and intimidation
An important area of impact on communities arises from 
drug dealing at the local level and the fear arising from 
the violence and intimidation often used by the different 
groups involved in the trade. They may range from loosely 
organised local groups of young people to offshoots 
of national or international OCGs, with national and 
international connections.
There is a growing body of research that looks at drug 
supply from the perspective of gang (or group) processes, 
which can inform drug enforcement practice and policy. 
Research in Scotland illustrates that early offenders in 
young street gangs are typically involved in social supply 
and only rarely involved in retail-level drug supply. Over 
time these groups may move beyond social supply and 
mature into young crime gangs that can penetrate higher 
levels of the illicit drug market. Those gangs that are able 
to avoid law enforcement action and grow may eventually 
move on to wholesale buying. If sustained, wholesale 
activity and increased market share create the potential 
for development into serious organised crime, including 
the adoption of business-like principles. McLean and 
colleagues noted that gangs have evolved not necessarily 
to control drug markets but to participate in them and 
benefit from territorial control (McLean, 2017; McLean et 
al., 2018, 2019).
Spread of gang influence and related violence
In parallel with the traditional model of drug supply, where 
local dealers from provincial towns source their drug 
supply from a nearby city, a new phenomenon of drug 
supply groups has emerged in some parts of Europe. This 
has been extensively documented in the United Kingdom 
(Coomber and Moyle, 2018; NCA, 2017, 2019) but 
a targeted data collection exercise in 2018 (EMCDDA and 
Europol; 60 % response rate) identified evidence of similar 
phenomena in Belgium, Estonia, Greece, Ireland and 
Sweden. These are groups based in major cities, expanding 
their selling operations to provincial towns and almost 
exclusively supplying heroin and crack cocaine. Thus, end 
users located in these provincial areas are buying directly 
from dealing networks from the big cities. The provincial 
towns are considered attractive thanks to the direct access 
to local users and potentially new customers and the 
comparatively weak competition from local drug dealers. 
The phenomenon critically challenges the established 
understanding of drug markets in that the export of illicit 
drugs from big cities to one or more provincial towns blurs 
the boundaries between national wholesale and local street 
dealing (Coomber and Moyle, 2018).
It has been argued that the cause of this phenomenon, 
especially in the case of heroin, is the saturation of markets 
in major cities. This would appear a relatively credible 
explanation given recent trends of an ageing heroin-using 
population and marginalised inner-city youths increasingly 
associating themselves with gang culture, of which drug 
dealing is a component in some countries. The new supply 
model typically consists of more established ‘elders’ 
recruiting younger (often teenage) associates and sending 
them to provincial areas to act as dealers, while a dedicated 
phone line is established in the city (Spicer, 2018). Users in 
the provincial areas call this line to place orders, which are 
then relayed to the dealers residing in the provincial town. 
This ensures that the provincially based dealers remain 
dependent on the city-based ‘elders’.
The phenomenon has become associated with a range of 
harms, such as violence and the exploitation of vulnerable 
populations, including children. They are discussed in 
the section on human trafficking and exploitation above. 
The city-based drug-dealing groups seek to establish 
themselves and assert a dominant presence in new 
localities through aggression and intimidation. Another 
manifestation of the phenomenon is seen in the increasing 
overlap between drug markets and sexual exploitation, 
as highlighted in an analysis of the nature of violence in 
the Stockholm drug scene (Stallwitz, 2018) and recent 
assessments of the impact of organised crime in local 
communities in the United Kingdom (Crocker et al., 2017).
It is important to note that markets with apparently similar 
structures manifest themselves differently in terms of 
operation in different geographical locations, particularly 
regarding violence and intimidation. Responses to 
drug market-related violence are discussed in detail in 
Chapter 9.
Intimidation
Intimidation carried out by those involved in the 
distribution of drugs can manifest itself as disciplinary 
intimidation, used to enforce social norms within the drug 
distribution hierarchy, to discourage or punish informants, 
or as a means to reclaim drug debt, and successional 
intimidation, used to recruit new members or gain control 
over networks or territory. Disciplinary intimidation, much 
of it related to drug debt, has escalated in certain areas, 
related to the particular way in which drug markets operate.
EU DRUG MARKETS REPORT
49
Notably, in Ireland many communities have been severely 
affected, with major impacts on the health and wellbeing of 
individuals, families and communities and the functioning 
of local services and agencies (Murphy et al., 2017). This 
is reflected at policy level. The current strategy recognises 
the problem and stresses the importance of appropriate 
responses in the community (Department of Health, 2017).
The drug distribution networks in Ireland appear to be 
structured as a three-tier hierarchy, which has some 
parallels with the gang model mentioned above in 
Scotland: (1) a lower tier of highly disadvantaged young 
people generally involved in bullying, assaulting, stealing, 
vandalising and spreading fear on behalf of the network; 
(2) a middle tier of young people typically engaged in 
high-risk, low-reward activities, such as transporting, 
holding or dealing drugs, carrying guns, and conducting 
shootings, beatings and serious intimidation; and 
(3) a higher tier of serious players, often formed around 
a kinship core, which controls the other tiers (Murphy et 
al., 2017). The framework underlies a number of responses 
(see Chapter 9). The issue was also recently highlighted in 
an assessment commissioned by the Scottish Government 
of the experiences of serious organised crime in Scotland 
(Fraser et al., 2018).
The use of intimidation tactics and violence by Belgian 
and Dutch criminal organisations against each other and 
against accomplices working at the port of Antwerp has 
been increasing. Between 2016 and 2017, 20 violent 
incidents suspected to be retaliations related to the 
cocaine trade were registered in Antwerp. Intimidation, 
violence and corruption are increasingly affecting the 
port area itself as well as surrounding areas. The risks are 
high, but corrupt workers at Belgium’s port of Antwerp 
can earn between EUR 75 000 and EUR 125 000 for 
each drug shipment they help move safely (Stoker and 
Thijssen, 2018). According to European port authorities, 
OCGs approach port workers in Antwerp and offer up to 
EUR 5 000 just for their availability to ‘have a conversation’. 
The port workers are easily identifiable by their uniforms. 
Once a worker has cooperated with the drug-trafficking 
OCG, they do not have the option of ceasing their 
facilitating work lest they and their families become subject 
to intimidation.
Environmental damage
The illicit production of plant-based and synthetic drugs 
entails a range of environmental harms where it takes 
place. Synthetic drugs can be produced using a number 
of different production techniques, involving a range of 
different chemical precursor substances. Several methods 
can be used to produce the different synthetic drugs, and 
may involve the use of additional chemicals and processes 
that are inherently dangerous. Furthermore, the waste 
generated by the production process (which takes place 
on a fairly large scale in the EU, particularly in Belgium and 
the Netherlands) is often dumped, causing environmental 
harm, and risk to public health and safety. The dumping of 
waste was highlighted as a growing problem in the 2016 
edition of this report, and further work has shed more light 
on this issue.
Indoor cannabis cultivation may generate a number of 
health, safety and environmental risks, such as booby traps, 
unsafe electric wiring (leading to possible electrocutions 
and/or fire), toxic atmospheres, toxic liquids (such as 
pesticides and fertilisers) in the grow rooms, growing lights 
emitting harmful ultraviolet radiation, mould and structural 
damage to the buildings used for cultivation (Tytgat et 
al., 2017). Furthermore, the used materials from indoor 
cultivation, such as used compost, containers and plant 
waste, are sometimes dumped or abandoned in remote 
places (see Chapter 3).
The production of 1 kg of MDMA, amphetamine or 
methamphetamine is estimated to result in many more 
kilograms of waste: 6-10 kg for MDMA and 20-30 kg for 
amphetamine or methamphetamine. Containers of the 
waste product may be dumped in a forest or field, left in 
abandoned premises, loaded in stolen vehicles or buried 
underground. There are also reports of synthetic drug 
production waste being mixed with industrial waste and 
disposed of at sea. Recent estimates by the Dutch Police 
Academy (Tops et al., 2018) indicate that synthetic drug 
production — and by implication the amount of associated 
waste — in the Netherlands is much higher than had 
been previously assumed. The dismantling and cleaning 
up of synthetic drug production and waste dump sites 
require considerable resources, financial as well as human 
(Claessens et al., 2019) (see Chapter 6).
When waste is discharged into the sewers, water treatment 
plants are affected and the drinking water of nearby 
residents is contaminated (Boerman et al., 2017; Boles and 
Wells, 2010; Schoenmakers et al., 2016). The sewage system 
may be blocked by clogging, and the acidity of the waste can 
disturb the working process of the water treatment plant 
(Schoenmakers et al., 2016; see also Case study 10).
In other drug-producing regions of the world a range of 
other harms are associated with the cultivation of cannabis, 
coca and opium poppies. In addition to the dumping 
of waste materials from production, threatening fragile 
ecosystems, the extensive cultivation of these crops leads 
to a range of harms, including deforestation and erosion. 
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These harms, although they affect countries outside 
Europe, may nevertheless have an indirect impact in the EU 
through migration, destabilisation and climate change.
Impact on the legal economy
The pernicious effect of drug-related organised crime on 
society includes the penetration of the legitimate economy. 
The illicit drug trade is an international business requiring 
large amounts of money to be transferred around the world. 
It also generates large profits that need to be laundered, that 
is, made to appear legal, before they can be used further.
These illegal financial flows have impacts on the legal 
economy in many ways, such as when businesses and 
high-value assets are acquired to launder cash. These 
‘investments’ distort the true economy, leaving legitimate 
businesses and consumers at a competitive disadvantage. 
A further issue identified is that the activities of criminals 
engaged in the drug market may also have a direct impact 
on legitimate businesses, such as exposing companies 
to the risk of being associated with trade-based money-
laundering schemes, the theft of electricity or damage to 
rental properties used for drug production.
Money laundering
The laundering of profits from the drug trade often 
requires the involvement of specialists and professional 
intermediaries from the legal and financial sectors, 
although the degree to which they are criminally complicit 
may vary; some will be fully aware of the illegal source 
of the money involved, whereas some will be indifferent 
and others simply negligent or incompetent in applying 
anti-money laundering (AML) measures. The role of the 
professions in facilitating the objectives of organised 
crime is multifaceted and includes the concealment of 
the proceeds of crime, obscuring the beneficial ownership 
of assets (the person who actually benefits from property 
that is owned in another person’s name) and evading AML 
regimes (Europol, 2017a). The global nature of organised 
crime is reflected in the area of money laundering: the 
systems and services can be complex, involving a number 
of countries and employing a range of enablers to ensure 
continuity to their criminal activity. Countries that have not 
implemented appropriate AML regulations represent an 
unregulated ‘back door’ into the global financial system 
(FATF and Egmont Group, 2018).
Overall, despite robust legislation, the global AML 
framework has a poor success rate in identifying and 
seizing illegal funds generated by criminal organisations, 
as it is implemented now. Europol estimates that 
authorities in the EU confiscate as little as 1 % of all 
criminal proceeds, including money from the trade in illicit 
drugs. In many cases, investigations into drug-trafficking 
activity are not complemented by money-laundering or 
criminal asset investigations. However, efforts to investigate 
money laundering and dismantle money-laundering 
syndicates are being strengthened and, for the majority 
of Member States, money laundering is now a national 
priority. Dedicated money-laundering investigations, better 
implementation of AML strategies and more efficient 
collection of financial data are expected to enhance the 
ability of law enforcement authorities to identify illegal 
funds and increase the number of investigations initiated 
(see Addressing money laundering, page 213).
CASE STUDY 10
Dumping leads to closure of municipal waste treatment plant
It has been determined that the 
malfunctioning of a small wastewater 
treatment plant in the Netherlands was 
caused by the discharge of chemical 
waste from a drug production site 
into the sewage system. Further 
analysis revealed the process used 
for manufacturing the drugs involved. 
The study confirmed that the chemical 
waste profile found in the sewage 
system from the illicit production of 
synthetic drugs can contain useful 
information for law enforcement 
purposes. The early identification 
of such waste profiles may be used 
to identify ongoing drug production 
processes in the wastewater 
catchment area (Emke et al., 2018). Photo: Europol
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Well-publicised money-laundering investigations over 
recent years such as those into the Panama Papers, 
Paradise Papers, Offshore Leaks, Swiss Leaks and 
Bahamas Leaks have highlighted the global nature 
of money-laundering activities and increased public 
awareness of the extent of this phenomenon (see Case 
study 11).
Establishing a link between suspicious funds and a specific 
predicate offence (the offence whose proceeds are to be 
laundered) remains a key challenge for law enforcement 
authorities. Drug offences account for 15 % of all predicate 
offences in the EU, according to a survey of the Member 
States conducted by Europol — ahead of cybercrime 
(6 %), corruption/bribery (4 %), counterfeiting (3 %) and 
trafficking in human beings (2 %) (Europol, 2017a).
Drug-related organised criminals use a range of techniques 
and mechanisms to obscure their ownership and control 
of illicitly obtained assets, in particular through schemes 
that exploit otherwise legal arrangements and structures. 
Tools that are designed to encourage business growth 
and development, such as trusts, foundations and other 
corporate vehicles can be used to facilitate money 
laundering. The globalisation of trade and communications 
has only increased this threat, and countries now face 
the challenge of enforcing national laws in a borderless 
commercial environment (Lord et al., 2018).
Some OCGs and criminals still launder their criminal 
profits themselves. However, using the services of 
money-laundering facilitators is increasingly common for 
OCGs (see Case study 12). The facilitators rely on simple 
money-laundering techniques, which mostly involve 
the smuggling of cash, trade in gold and other precious 
metals, investment in real estate and trade-based money-
laundering schemes. Money service businesses, alternative 
banking systems and remittance services such as hawala 
provide currency exchange and transfer services. These 
services are frequently used to move money and legitimise 
profits.
Money-laundering syndicates
Money laundering in itself has become a profitable criminal 
business for some criminals who provide money-laundering 
services to other OCGs. Money-laundering syndicates 
launder illicit proceeds in exchange for a percentage of the 
laundered funds as commission. These ‘superfacilitators’ 
operate highly professional money-laundering enterprises, 
which may involve the conclusion of contracts with OCGs 
CASE STUDY 11
Panama Papers and PANA Committee report
As of April 2016, the International 
Consortium of Investigative 
Journalists, together with reporting 
partners from around the world, 
started revealing more than 214 000 
offshore entities connected to people 
in more than 200 countries and 
territories, including EU Member 
States. Following these revelations, 
commonly known as the Panama 
Papers, the European Parliament set 
up a special committee of inquiry to 
investigate alleged contraventions and 
maladministration in the application of 
EU law in relation to money laundering, 
tax avoidance and tax evasion, known 
as the PANA Committee.
Regarding the practical effect of AML 
regulation in those EU countries that 
have applied it to the professions, the 
evidence has been inconclusive. The 
PANA Committee highlighted how 
a range of intermediaries, including 
banks, lawyers, accountants and 
consultants, play a prominent role in 
‘designing offshore structures and 
networks for their clients’, which 
have the effect of facilitating money 
laundering, tax avoidance and tax 
evasion (European Parliament, 2017, 
p. 27). The committee recognised 
a continuum of culpability, from 
tacit knowledge of the criminality, 
through suspicion, to unknowing 
participation in it (Smith, 2013). The 
report highlighted the weaknesses 
in current systems of regulation of 
these intermediaries. For example, 
highlighting how self-regulation of 
the legal profession in many states 
had failed in the prevention of money 
laundering. According to the report, 
lawyers (and other self-regulated 
professions) in the EU were generally 
found to have filed a low number 
of suspicious transaction reports, 
often in a reactive fashion, following 
media reports. This was compounded 
by insufficient supervision by their 
professional associations and a low 
risk of debarring — to the extent that 
there was no effective AML regulation 
of lawyers.
Source: European Parliament (2017).
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that detail remuneration rates and payment guarantees. 
They offer their services at scale and operate highly complex 
money-laundering schemes exploiting gaps in the financial 
system or accessing the financial system in ‘cash-friendlier’ 
jurisdictions, where the level of regulation allows easier 
integration.
Money-laundering syndicates use a variety of money-
laundering schemes, including cash transfers as well 
as trade-based money laundering, and rely on complex 
networks of legal business structures within and outside 
the EU. Organised networks of ‘collectors’ physically 
gather and transport criminal proceeds in the form of cash, 
precious metals and jewellery. The use of professional 
enablers such as solicitors, accountants and consultants 
provides money-laundering syndicates with the skills and 
knowledge to operate highly complex schemes. Money-
laundering syndicates launder large amounts of money and 
have a considerable impact on the ability of other OCGs 
to disguise and invest criminal proceeds. It is common for 
a money-laundering network to work with several OCGs.
The money-laundering activities of Asian criminal groups, 
particularly Chinese criminal groups, present a growing threat 
to Europe. In recent years, the number of money-laundering 
investigations against Chinese criminal groups has been 
steadily increasing in the EU. So have cash seizures and 
suspicious transaction reports involving Chinese nationals or 
China as a country of destination/origin. Law enforcement 
inquiries show that Chinese OCGs are extremely flexible 
(showing a tendency to move where opportunities for crime 
flourish) and polycriminal (involved in different predicate 
offences across Europe, from which they gain substantial 
proceeds). Because of the large-scale Chinese cargo trade, 
they operate and exploit legal structures and extensive trade-
based money-laundering techniques. Chinese OCGs merge 
their expertise and resources in order to be able to exploit 
vulnerabilities and loopholes in specific local environments, 
legislations and systems. Money-laundering activities are, 
thus, conducted at international level through complex and 
well-organised schemes.
Money transfer systems
Cash and liquid assets
The money-laundering threat related to cash couriers 
(the physical transporting of criminally obtained cash) 
continues to be significant and has features in common 
with terrorist-financing threats (European Commission, 
2017b). For instance, both types of groups make use of 
cash couriers for reasons related to the ease of access, 
low level of expertise required, low cost, and little or no 
planning involved. This modus operandi is attractive for 
organised crime, since it offers an alternative to the use of 
the formal financial sector to move funds while allowing full 
anonymity.
Proceeds generated by the distribution of drugs 
are collected from street distributors by designated 
CASE STUDY 12
Money-laundering ‘superfacilitators’: Operation Cedar
On 24 January 2016, law enforcement 
and judicial authorities from France, 
the US, Germany, Belgium, Italy, the 
Netherlands and Spain, supported 
by Europol and the EU Judicial 
Cooperation Unit (Eurojust), took 
action against a prominent OCG 
responsible for the laundering of 
profits from cocaine sales throughout 
Europe. The OCG’s modus operandi 
involved the use of cash couriers 
travelling across Europe by car 
to collect the proceeds of crime, 
followed by the purchase of expensive 
cars, luxury watches and jewellery. 
These high-value goods were then 
exported to Lebanon, where they 
were sold and the proceeds placed 
into the financial system for onward 
transfer to cartels in South America. 
Financial investigations revealed 
that in 2014 alone the group spent 
EUR 26 million in cash to purchase 
luxury watches, without triggering any 
suspicious activity reports. The sums 
involved in 2015 are thought to have 
been even higher, by which time the 
group was laundering an estimated 
EUR 1 million per week.
The targeted OCG was mainly 
composed of Lebanese nationals 
also suspected of being involved 
in financing terrorism through 
Hezbollah’s ‘military wing’. In 
the wake of coordinated days of 
action, one of the main suspects 
of Operation Cedar was placed on 
the Specially Designated Nationals 
and Blocked Persons list by the US 
Office for Foreign Asset Control for 
his involvement in the financing of 
terrorist activities.
Source: Europol (2017a).
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collectors. OCGs then use money brokers, most often 
based outside the EU, who rely on money-laundering 
networks composed of contacts in different countries to 
move the cash. Cash couriers typically smuggle larger 
amounts of money using large denomination banknotes 
such as EUR 500 and EUR 200 banknotes. These high-
denomination banknotes are used by criminals both to 
store value and for transportation. The EUR 500 banknote is 
no longer being issued, but remains legal tender.
A recently published study of cash and drug seizures 
at selected airports and postal centres illustrates the 
magnitude of cash smuggling in the EU (Groupe Pompidou 
and RILO WE, 2019). In 2018, a total of EUR 64.3 million 
was seized in 1 688 separate incidents at airports in 17 EU 
Member States. Spain seized the largest amount (almost 
EUR 19 million), followed by the Netherlands (almost 
EUR 16 million) and Italy (EUR 14 million).
Cash profits from criminal activities are also often 
converted to gold or jewellery. To address this issue, 
new EU-level regulatory measures now include other 
instruments or liquid commodities, such as cheques, 
traveller’s cheques, prepaid cards and gold, within the 
definition of cash. In addition, criminal cash may be 
converted into goods in high demand in non-EU markets. 
Vehicles are one of the most common commodities bought 
with criminal cash and exported to North Africa and the 
Middle East, along with luxury watches, gold and jewellery. 
Machinery is exported to Iraq and Kuwait.
EUR 500 banknotes have also been used in money-
laundering schemes that make use of bitcoin automated 
teller machines (ATMs). These ATMs accept cash and 
convert it to virtual currencies, and fall outside clear 
regulatory statutes. For instance, an increasing number 
of bitcoin ATMs in Colombia are being used to convert 
EUR 500 banknotes, which have been smuggled from the 
EU to South America, into bitcoin.
Virtual currencies and crypto cards
An increasing number of investigations have focused on 
the use of virtual currencies in money-laundering schemes, 
including money-laundering related to the trade in illicit 
drugs. Techniques used in the laundering of proceeds 
from the sale of cocaine by Colombian OCGs provide two 
examples that illustrate the shift from using electronic 
means to transfer money internationally to the use of virtual 
currencies.
In one approach, the OCGs use ‘money mules’, based in 
key destination markets such as the EU, to deposit illicit 
proceeds in their bank accounts. The mules then request 
bank cards for these accounts, which are sent to countries 
of origin such as Colombia, where the cash is withdrawn.
The second method also involves the depositing of 
proceeds in bank accounts by money mules, but, rather 
than being withdrawn in cash, the proceeds are exchanged 
into virtual currencies. The virtual currency is then sold to 
buyers in Colombia, who transfer the value to accounts 
held by the OCG.
Currently over 1 500 virtual currencies exist 
(WorldCoinIndex, n.d.). Although bitcoin remains the most 
popular for criminal-to-criminal transactions (EMCDDA and 
Europol, 2017), some Member States highlight a small shift 
towards more privacy-oriented currencies such as monero 
or zcash (see Case study 13).
Virtual money laundering maintains anonymity and hides 
the illicit origins of funds. Instead of adopting traditional 
money-laundering approaches, for instance purchasing 
expensive items such as gold bars, cars, jewellery or real 
estate, and then reselling them, in the virtual world this 
involves moving money into the cryptocurrency system 
and moving it around by using mixers, tumblers and 
chain hopping, services designed to obscure the origin of 
the currency by mixing it with funds from other sources. 
The more dirty crypto money that goes into the systems 
and the more it moves around, the harder it becomes 
for investigators to see through the web of action and 
trace a path back to the source. In addition, the pseudo-
anonymous nature of virtual currencies makes it more 
difficult to trace these funds than cash.
The next step towards clean money is integration of the 
funds into the mainstream financial system. There is 
a risk at this stage of triggering suspicious activity reports, 
which flag high-risk transactions. However, once the funds 
are legitimised, the criminals have multiple options for 
recouping them from the financial system.
There are a number of money-laundering services available 
for virtual currencies, variously called mixers, tumblers, 
foggers and laundries. They take in funds from multiple 
customers, mix those funds together and then output the 
mixed funds. As in traditional money laundering, criminals 
generally lose a percentage of the funds in the process, 
but in the end the funds appear legitimate, making the 
loss worthwhile. They typically charge between 1 % and 
3 % per transaction for their services. They are, however, 
increasingly being taken down by regulatory enforcement.
Informal value transfer systems
EU-level AML policies have made it more difficult to 
integrate large quantities of criminal cash into the financial 
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system, especially the banking system. However, regulation 
is less effective when money launderers rely on informal 
value transfer systems.
The term ‘hawala’ is often used to describe a number 
of different systems. These mechanisms or networks 
are primarily used for remittance payments by diaspora 
communities based in the EU and elsewhere to transfer 
funds to countries of origin. Transfers carried out through 
hawala take place outside the regulated banking system 
and are not subject to AML regulations or due diligence 
practices. Hawala providers, known as hawaladars, often 
run parallel businesses such as currency exchanges, travel 
agencies or telephone shops.
Hawala is frequently used by OCGs involved in the drug 
trade to transfer criminal proceeds. Moroccan OCGs and 
South American cartels are known to use the services 
of hawaladars as bankers and brokers. In some cases, 
hawaladars also manage cash deposits and transfer cash 
using cash couriers.
Impact on businesses
The drug trade has both direct and indirect impacts on 
legitimate businesses. For example, the indoor cultivation 
of cannabis requires large amounts of electricity, which 
may be stolen, reducing revenues and tax payments, 
and potentially increasing costs to legitimate customers 
(Dadgari, 2018). A recent analysis of Office for National 
Statistics data (for the financial years ending 2016 and 
2017) related to seizures of illicit drugs, a freedom-of-
information request to police forces and insurance claims 
data in England and Wales revealed that since the start 
of 2016 there had been 4 225 investigations by police 
into electricity theft, with 31 % of cases relating to the 
cultivation of illicit drugs (mainly cannabis) (Direct Line for 
Business, 2018). According to the same report, the volume 
of insurance claims made by landlords for malicious 
damage related to cannabis cultivation nearly doubled 
between 2015 and 2017; the average value of a claim 
where cannabis was a contributing factor was 40 % higher 
than the average claim. In 2018, the Dutch electricity 
provider Netbeheer Nederland estimated that around 
1 billion kilowatt hours of electricity was stolen each year to 
power the growth operations across the country’s 30 000 
illicit cannabis cultivation sites (see Chapter 3).
CASE STUDY 13
Operation Tulipan Blanca
Coordinated by Europol and 
conducted by the Spanish Guardia 
Civil with the support of the Finnish 
authorities and the US Homeland 
Security Investigations, the operation 
resulted in 11 arrests and 137 
investigations of individuals. Members 
of a crime ring used credit cards and 
virtual currencies to launder money 
that other OCGs made by selling 
drugs.
The criminals based in Spain picked up 
the illicit proceeds in cash, which was 
then split into small quantities to be 
deposited into hundreds of third-party 
bank accounts (a criminal method 
known as smurfing). As the cash was 
already circulating in the financial 
system, the ring just needed to transfer 
the criminal money back to the drug 
dealers in Colombia. The investigation 
revealed that the criminals acquired 
credit cards linked to the bank 
accounts in which criminal proceeds 
were deposited. Certain criminals 
then travelled to Colombia with 
credit cards and made several cash 
withdrawals from the bank accounts. 
Once the criminals realised that cash 
withdrawals and bank operations 
were easy to track, they changed their 
laundering methods and turned to 
virtual currencies, mainly bitcoin. The 
criminals used a bitcoin exchange 
based in Finland to convert their illicit 
proceeds into bitcoin, then change it 
into Colombian pesos and deposit it 
in Colombian bank accounts on the 
same day. The authorities in Finland 
gathered all the information on the 
suspects held by the cryptocurrency 
exchange. As a result of the operation 
the Spanish Guardia Civil carried out 
eight searches and seized several 
computers, devices and the equipment 
used to commit the crimes, such 
as money bags or money-counting 
machines. The suspects had deposited 
more than EUR 8 million in cash using 
174 bank accounts.
Source: Europol (2018c).
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There are impacts on companies that produce drugs that 
have both legitimate pharmaceutical and illicit uses, and 
on those that produce chemicals that can be used as drug 
precursors. There is a financial burden of compliance with 
legal controls and reporting. They can also suffer theft and 
diversion of these substances. Counterfeit versions of their 
products sold on the black market can lead to reputational 
damage. Similarly, there are considerable costs for banks 
in applying AML procedures, for example the costs for staff 
and systems for suspicious transaction reporting. There 
have also been some high-profile cases in which major 
banks have been implicated in money laundering, resulting 
in considerable reputational damage and significant fines 
(see, for example, Reuters, 2019).
Port operators are affected in several ways, such as costs 
associated with dealing with corrupt employees, providing 
security for goods passing through and facilitating the 
detection of smuggled drugs, and some of these costs may 
be passed on to other businesses. The operators of ports 
impose charges on shipping companies to provide security. 
Any rise in port charges or any infrastructure surcharge 
levied by port authorities will have an impact on the cost 
of doing business. The security charge is applied to port 
users to recover the costs of installing security systems 
and any ongoing security measures the port operator 
provides. There are no specific data on investments related 
to increasing security at ports.
The drug trade can also have a more general and 
insidious impact on the economy of a whole area (see 
Case study 14), distorting property markets and putting 
legitimate businesses at a competitive disadvantage.
Corruption and strain on public 
institutions
Drug markets may place particular strain on governments 
and public institutions in three main ways (EMCDDA and 
Europol, 2016), which are discussed further in this section.
  The corruption of public officials in law enforcement 
and the judiciary, as well as those operating at the 
political level, facilitates the operation of the illicit drug 
market and exerts a corrosive effect, undermining the 
authority of governments and the rule of law.
  Law enforcement places a strain on the public purse. 
The resources required for drug supply reduction 
activities account for the largest share of drug-related 
expenditure in most EU countries. These activities are 
financed from budgets for public order and safety, 
which are under increasing pressure.
  The drug trade has adverse effects on the development 
and stability of transitional and developing countries 
where drugs are produced or through which they are 
transported. Criminals often target them because of 
their weak governance structures. In such countries, 
where there may be few alternative options for 
legitimate income generation, drug policies need 
to be integrated with international development 
programmes.
Corruption of public officials
OCGs use corruption to infiltrate both public and private 
sector organisations, relying on bribery, conflicts of interest, 
trading in influence and collusion in order to facilitate their 
criminal activities. Over the past two decades, the issue of 
CASE STUDY 14
The criminal phenomenon of ‘undermining’ (ondermijning) in the Netherlands
In the past few years the Netherlands 
has been facing the problem of 
criminal organisations involved 
in drug production and trafficking 
‘undermining’ the legal economy. The 
Dutch police describe undermining as 
the intermingling of the underworld 
with legitimate society, the insidious 
threat to the integrity of public 
administration, civil servants and the 
business world, the extortion and 
blackmailing of administrators, the 
infiltration of criminal phenomena into 
urban life or the emergence of ‘free-
zones’ (Politie, 2019).
Many regions in the Netherlands 
have established task forces against 
undermining, following the principle 
indicated by the national government: 
the phenomenon cannot be simply 
approached as a crime problem, but 
needs to be understood as a wider 
social problem that requires more 
than repression. This phenomenon 
depends on the combination of access 
to extensive illicit assets, threats of 
serious violence and the ability to 
exert pressure on society (Tops and 
Schilders, 2016).
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corruption has rapidly entered the agenda of international 
organisations and the EU. It was noted in the 2016 edition 
of this report that drug markets have been identified as one 
of the most corruptive influences in the EU. Although most 
Member States have legislation to address corruption, data 
are not routinely collected.
Corruption perceptions have been repeatedly found to 
differ between government sectors and also between 
countries (e.g. Gemperle, 2018). Customs authorities 
are, however, often viewed as one of the most corrupt 
government institutions in many countries (Chêne, 
2018). There are a number of specificities that make 
border activities particularly vulnerable to corruption, 
notably pressure from organised crime. Corruption 
mechanisms related to organised crime may involve the 
selling of information to criminal groups, facilitating the 
transit of illicit drugs and/or the diversion of chemicals 
to illegal markets and obstructing investigations 
(see Case study 15). In Europe, 31 % of the respondents 
to the European Barometer think that the giving and taking 
of bribes and the misuse of power are widespread among 
customs officials and the police (European Commission, 
2017c).
Government expenditure
A substantial amount of government expenditure that 
would otherwise be available for other purposes is used 
in tackling drug markets and responding to the problems 
associated with them. A challenge in estimating drug-
related expenditure, which is particularly relevant to supply-
related activity, is that much drug-related activity occurs 
as part of general day-to-day work, so it is not separately 
identified in budgets or accounts (indirect or unlabelled 
expenditure). Only funding for specialised activity, such as 
drug squads or drug treatment services, is usually identified 
as drug-related (direct or labelled expenditure). Changes 
in the way in which policing is organised may occur in 
response to a range of factors, including new challenges 
and priorities or resource constraints, and they may have an 
impact on the amount of drug-related expenditure that is 
readily identifiable as such. For example, a survey of police 
forces in 2015, a follow-up to a similar survey in 2013, 
suggested that the number of countries with specialised 
drug squads had reduced (EMCDDA, 2017a). A shift to 
having more drug-related activities carried out as part of 
the general work of police or border forces might therefore 
have an impact on measures of drug-related expenditure.
A growing number of EU Member States have in the last 
decade attempted to produce estimates of the amount of 
drug-related public expenditure (EMCDDA and Pompidou 
Group, 2017). Currently, 19 EU Member States have 
produced estimates of drug-related expenditure for years 
that range from 2006 to 2017. Within these estimates 
the share of drug-related expenditure relating to supply 
reduction activities ranged from 8 to 80 %, with expenditure 
in nine out of the 19 countries split fairly evenly between 
supply and demand interventions; that is, the proportion 
of spending on supply-related activities was within the 
range of 40-60 %. Of the remaining countries, five reported 
spending less than 40 % of their drug-related expenditure 
on supply-related activities and five reported spending over 
60 % (EMCDDA, 2019b).
Estimating the total social costs of licit and illicit drugs in 
Belgium, Lievens and colleagues (2017) found that law 
enforcement expenditure accounted for about a third 
of all direct costs and was mainly attributable to illicit 
drugs (EUR 549 million, 54 %, 2012 prices) and alcohol 
(EUR 363 million, 42 %, 2012 prices).
CASE STUDY 15
Corruption of law enforcement officials
In April 2018, law enforcement 
authorities in Algeciras, Spain, 
arrested an officer of the Guardia Civil 
suspected of being involved in the 
importation of a container containing 
8 740 kg of cocaine concealed within 
banana crates. The seizure of almost 
9 tonnes of cocaine was one of the 
biggest ever in Spain. The officer who 
was under suspicion was closely 
cooperating with members of the 
OCG thought to be orchestrating 
the cocaine trafficking. The officer 
facilitated the removal of the container 
from port facilities without inspection. 
Outside the port, the crates of bananas 
concealing cocaine were removed 
and replaced, and the container was 
resealed. Then the container was 
returned to the port for inspection.
Source: Morcillo (2018).
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Impact on development and governance
Illicit drug markets, and the organised crime associated 
with them, are increasingly seen as a development 
issue (Reitano and Hunter, 2018). The EU drug market 
is inextricably linked to production and transit regions, 
many of which are in developing countries. The associated 
corruption and violence can undermine both social and 
economic development. Trafficking groups are attracted 
to areas of the world where governance and judicial 
structures are weak. In these countries, for the poorest 
sections of society, participation in the drug trade may be 
the only viable source of income, while for elite groups 
the large profits available from the trade may provide 
access to power. The dominance of the illicit economy 
also encourages other forms of criminality, decreasing 
tax revenues and reducing respect for the law and state 
institutions in a vicious circle that increases vulnerability 
to further exploitation and destabilisation. In addition, 
a frequent spill-over from the drug trade is an increasing 
problem of drug use and addiction within these producer 
and transit countries (Channing May, 2017; Shaw, 2017).
There is growing international recognition that tackling 
the drug trade in developing countries cannot focus solely 
on eradication and interdiction but should also promote 
economic and social development (see Chapter 8), in 
line with the Sustainable Development Goals (7). In some 
communities, the drug trade represents one of the few 
(7) See United Nations System Task Team on the Post-2015 United Nations 
Development Agenda (2012), which categorises the Millennium 
Development Goals along four dimensions: inclusive social development; 
inclusive economic development; environmental sustainability; and peace 
and security.
available sources of income. Tackling the drug trade 
without providing alternative economic opportunities for its 
participants will at best result in short-term disruption. 
One approach focuses on substituting licit cash crops 
for illicit crops. Although there has been debate and 
concerns about the effectiveness of these interventions, 
innovative new initiatives are being evaluated. There has 
been renewed interest in Colombia, following the 2016-17 
ceasefire in the long-running civil war. In the region of 
La Macarena, an innovative approach to replacing illicit 
crops is based on dialogue with the communities affected 
and expert knowledge about linking prosperity and rural 
development. It has produced promising early results 
(Ceron et al., 2018). However, expanding coverage and 
ensuring they reach and are viable in the more remote 
and disadvantaged areas remains a challenge for such 
programmes.
There remains a need for more comprehensive evidence 
gathering and evaluation. Similarly, in the policy arena, 
it is important that drug policies are integrated with 
international development policies and programmes to 
maximise their impact. The EU and Member States make 
significant investments in both drug control measures 
and development support to countries in Asia, Africa and 
the Americas where drugs are produced and transported, 
so ensuring coherence and seeking synergies between 
these areas is important.
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The drug market is globally complex, highly adaptable 
and innovative. The growing transport infrastructure and 
mobility of people are reflected in increasingly globally 
integrated drug production and trafficking networks. 
In addition, the use of the internet and the effect of 
information technology on all segments of society 
have meant new transformational opportunities for 
organised crime in a number of essential areas, including 
logistics, criminal cooperation and financial flows. The 
use of encryption — a small subset of the impact of the 
internet — makes it easier to engage in illicit activities, 
a trend exacerbated by both the cross-border nature 
of internet activities and the challenge of enforcing 
constraints on online behaviour (Figure 2.1).
Globalisation
Globalisation is the process by which organisations 
become globally interconnected through networks of 
communication, trade and transportation of goods and 
people. This process has a significant effect on illicit drug 
markets, as the actors involved in them seek to harness 
these developments and achieve similar benefits to those 
in the legal economy.
Transportation and logistics
Infrastructure development and transportation technology 
are fundamentally important factors that continue to 
have a significant impact on illicit drug markets and their 
wider ramifications. Innovation in transportation and 
logistics enables cheaper, more efficient and safer (thanks 
to decreasing inspections) organised crime operation 
and movement of large quantities of illicit drugs without 
disruption.
CHAPTER 2
Drivers and facilitators  
of drug markets
Figure 2.1 
Key drivers and facilitators of drug markets
Online markets
Social 
networks and 
smartphone apps
New techniques in 
production and 
smuggling
Firearms and 
other weapons
Fraudulent 
documentation
Encrypted 
communication
deivces
Transportation
and logistics
Criminal
cooperation
 
Globalisation
Technology 
and 
innovation
Criminal tools
EU DRUG MARKETS REPORT
61
The transportation methods used are diverse and evolving, 
and are influenced by a range of factors, including the 
geographical locations of producer, destination and transit 
countries, and historical ties and cultural links between 
them. Some modes of transport, such as container ships, 
are able to transport large quantities at a time, while 
others focus on the movement of large numbers of small 
quantities, as when couriers are used to smuggle drugs on 
commercial flights.
Our understanding of the relative importance of different 
routes and modes of transport is largely obtained from drug 
seizures and so is inevitably skewed. However, based on 
open sources (73 heroin and 239 cocaine global seizures 
for the European market, identified between March 2017 
and April 2018; see Chapter 9), the majority (78 %) of the 
heroin shipments seized appeared to have travelled by 
land, while just under half (44 %) of the cocaine shipments 
were intercepted on maritime routes (Figure 2.2).
The exploitation of maritime routes constitutes a growing 
threat. More than 750 million 20-foot equivalent units (8) 
are transported by sea every year, accounting for 90 % 
of the global cargo trade. Fewer than 2 % of shipping 
containers globally are ever screened (UNRIC, 2018). 
Ninety per cent of the EU’s external trade and 40 % 
of its internal trade is transported by sea (European 
Council, 2018). Large container ports in Europe and 
other continents are being increasingly exploited by drug 
traffickers for bulk transportation. For example, in 2017, 
the port of Antwerp, the busiest in Europe after Rotterdam, 
saw incoming traffic of up to 3.5 million maritime shipping 
containers, of which only around 1 % were inspected 
(Schneider, 2018). Except for a brief fall in 2009-10, at 
a time of financial crisis in large parts of the world, the 
number of containers moving through these two ports has 
generally been increasing for the last decade (Figure 2.3).
Recent years have seen diversification in the methods 
for maritime drug trafficking, as shown in Figure 2.4. 
New methods have been developed that allow larger 
quantities of drugs to be transported in individual 
consignments. The choice of method by drug-trafficking 
OCGs would typically involve an element of risk 
management and mitigation (Boerman et al., 2017).
(8) A 20-foot equivalent unit represents the cargo capacity of a standard 
multimodal container. 
Another aspect of globalisation is the digitalisation of 
international logistics planning. The key role played by 
information technology in controlling and managing traffic 
flows at air and sea ports has increased the importance 
to criminals of having access to automated systems. They 
may obtain such access either through the cooperation 
of staff or by hacking into relevant computer networks. 
Furthermore, looking forward, it is conceivable that entire 
logistical chains can be automated and thus vulnerable to 
exploitation.
Figure 2.2 
Mode of transport for global trafficking of heroin and 
cocaine for the European market: number of seizures 
for each mode, March 2017 to April 2018
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Source: EMCDDA open source information database.
Figure 2.3 
Container traffic at five major European ports, 2007-17
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Note: The number of containers is based on a 20-foot equivalent unit, the 
most common international standardised container type, including incoming, 
outgoing and empty containers handled.
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Figure 2.4 
Maritime trafficking: diversification of modi operandi
Loading the drugs in the port of departure and recovering them in the 
port of destination, typically without the sender or the recipient of the 
legal cargo being aware their container is being used for drug-trafficking 
activities. Typically requires corruption in both ports.
Rip-on/rip-off
Within legitimate goods
Commercial vessels and drop-off
Drugs can be transported by a range of commercial vessels such 
as cargo ships, fishing vessels, tankers and tugboats. 
Close to the destination, drugs can also be dropped off in the sea 
for collection. 
Pleasure vessels
Pleasure vessels such as yachts are frequently use,
as checks on them are typically less stringent. 
Inflatable and speed boats
Small vessels adapted or custom-made and powered with multiple outboard motors are 
used for the transportation of drug shipments over short to medium distances. Drugs are 
loaded and unloaded in remote areas. The vessels are fast enough to avoid detection or 
capture. They are extensively used in the Mediterranean Sea and Atlantic coastal waters. 
Switch
A variant of rip-on/rip-off, increasingly used in the EU. In the port of origin the drugs are 
placed in an easily accessible place in the container. At the EU destination port, before the 
container is inspected, corrupt dock workers retrieve the drugs and transfer them to a 
different container — either one that has already been cleared by customs or one that 
doesn’t require inspection (e.g. intra-European transit). This requires involvement of port 
employees and either the transporter or receiver of the new container.
Drugs are disguised as or incorporated into the legitimate 
goods. Typically this requires the involvement of the owners of 
the legal cargo, but can also involve a corrupt dock worker or 
others involved in the handling of the goods.  
In container structure
Drugs are concealed in areas of the container such as cooling 
compartments, insulation materials within the walls and floorings or 
in the exterior beams. This method requires the involvement of 
corrupt port employees to place and retrieve the drugs.
Underwater attachments and semi-submersibles
Drugs are transported in missile-shaped containers attached to the hull of the 
vessels below the water. This method requires the use of specialised divers at both 
the origin and destination ports. Semi-submersible and submarine-type vessels are 
typically human-piloted, although unmanned crafts may be seen in future. 
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The misuse of general aviation for drug trafficking 
in and to the EU
In addition to maritime transport, air transport is also used 
for drug trafficking in and to the EU. There are two main 
categories of civil aviation that can be used: scheduled air 
transport, including passenger and cargo flights operating 
on regularly scheduled routes, and general aviation, 
which includes all other commercial and private civil 
flights. General aviation, when used for criminal purposes, 
involves a wide variety of aircraft, ranging from business 
jets to smaller aircraft, such as light and ultralight aircraft, 
helicopters and most recently unmanned aerial vehicles 
(UAVs), such as drones. This includes privately owned 
aircraft, rented aircraft owned by an aero or flying club and 
aircraft owned by general aviation companies, which may 
be booked.
General aviation possesses some inherent vulnerabilities. 
It is a flexible and fast mode of transportation, making it 
more difficult to monitor than other means of transport. 
Monitoring is also made more difficult by the large number 
of airports, airfields and small airstrips in the EU. Small 
international airports and general aviation airfields are 
particularly attractive for OCGs, as they may be more 
susceptible to criminal infiltration, allowing traffickers to 
cross borders without passing through regular custom 
checks or border controls. Moreover, some general aviation 
aircraft can land almost anywhere or do not even need to 
land to deliver their illicit cargo.
Compared with other transport means, the number of 
cases reported to Europol involving general aviation 
is low, although it has increased during recent years. 
Under-reporting by the EU Member States and a lack of 
awareness and effective controls mean there are probably 
a large number of unrecorded events. The real scale of the 
threat is therefore almost certainly higher than reported.
Trafficking of illicit drugs is the most common criminal 
use of general aviation (56 % of reported cases). Cocaine 
trafficking is the most frequently reported activity related 
to the criminal use of general aviation (28 % of all cases 
and 49 % of the reported drug cases). Cannabis resin and, 
to a lesser degree, herbal cannabis, are also trafficked 
by means of general aviation (20 % of the reported drug 
cases). Cases involving the transportation of heroin, 
amphetamine and MDMA are rare and mostly occur in the 
context of polydrug trafficking.
General aviation is mostly used for the secondary 
distribution of small shipments of illicit drugs within the 
EU, mainly cocaine and cannabis. However, it is sometimes 
used for trafficking drugs to the EU, and in these cases 
the typical volume of individual shipments is considerably 
higher than on intra-EU flights. For example, the quantities 
of cocaine transported on transatlantic general aviation 
flights ranges from 500 kg to 1 200 kg.
General aviation is also used to facilitate the movements 
of fugitives and OCG members. For instance, UAVs are 
used for the surveillance of law enforcement activities and 
border patrols, to inspect the security of unloading sites, or 
for the remote surveillance of cannabis cultivation sites.
Figure 2.5 shows the different routes and types of general 
aviation used for trafficking drugs. Cocaine is directly 
trafficked into the EU using business jets suitable for 
long-haul flights. The airports of departure are located 
in the Caribbean, mainland South America, or even the 
Andean region. The countries of destination are mostly 
located in western Europe. General aviation flights for the 
trafficking of cannabis resin depart from the south of the 
Iberian Peninsula to return from Morocco carrying cannabis 
resin. These flights, organised by OCGs based in Spain 
in cooperation with Moroccan OCGs, are clandestine, 
carried out at very low altitude to avoid being detected by 
conventional radar, relying on only very basic navigation 
systems and visual references of the terrain. Helicopters are 
most commonly used for this activity and can transport up 
to 900 kg of cannabis per trip. OCGs also use light aircraft. 
For example, drug trafficking occurs between Albania and 
Italy, with flights departing from Italian aero clubs or remote 
airstrips, flying at low altitude under the cover of a pleasure 
trip. They cross the Adriatic Sea and land in remote areas in 
Albania.
Criminal flights may be operated in four different ways:
  ‘white’ flights, properly operated in accordance with 
general aviation regulations;
  ‘grey’ flights, apparently conducted in accordance with 
general aviation rules, but deviating at some point 
(abuses of reporting, unscheduled stops/touch-and-go 
and drop-off);
  ‘black’ flights, fully clandestine flights, unreported, 
operated at very low altitude, on radio silence, 
transponder off and relying on external visual 
references;
  unmanned flights using UAVs.
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The OCGs using general aviation are highly diverse. 
They range from loose networks of criminal entrepreneurs, 
mostly pilots collaborating in ad hoc projects, to highly 
developed and hierarchically structured groups. The pilots 
involved in the use of general aviation for criminal purposes 
are typically EU nationals, well experienced, with strong 
knowledge of general aviation and advanced piloting skills. 
This is necessary because of some of these flights take 
place in difficult conditions.
The use of post and parcel services for drug 
trafficking
Over the last few years the use of post and parcel services 
to transport drugs has expanded rapidly. Although the 
quantity shipped through these means is still limited 
compared with other forms of transportation, their use 
has been increasing. As a consequence, law enforcement 
authorities in EU Member States, customs in particular, 
have had to increase their controls of postal hubs.
The increasing trend for shopping online in Europe is 
associated with an increase in parcel deliveries, which 
are predicted to increase by 69 % between 2017 and 
2021 (Graham, 2017). This increase in delivery volumes 
makes systematic controls of all parcels challenging. This 
presents an opportunity for drug traffickers to expand their 
use of this medium for delivering drugs too (Figure 2.6). 
In particular, there has been a growth in online drug 
purchases through social media, the surface web and 
darknet markets, in which the postal system is exploited 
(Council of the European Union, 2017).
The trafficking of drugs using post and parcel services 
affects all Member States, and a number of countries 
are seeing considerable increases in letters and parcels 
containing drugs. The specific routing of parcels can 
Figure 2.5 
General aviation and drug trafficking: routes and types of aircraft employed
Western Balkan
Western Mediterranean
West Africa
Central and 
South America, 
the Caribbean
Business jet
Light aircraft
Helicopter
Ultralight aircraft
Drone/unmanned 
aircraft
Cocaine
Cannabis
Heroin
Types of aircraftRoutes
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vary widely, including direct routes from the source to 
destination or via EU transit hubs and non-EU locations. 
In 2018, the amount of cocaine seized in postal parcels 
sent to Europe decreased notably from 2017, and only the 
Netherlands seized more than 100 kg that year. Parcels 
containing cannabis mostly departed from the United 
States, Canada and Spain. Heroin arrives in the EU from 
Pakistan, often via Africa. The Netherlands continued to 
be the main source of MDMA seized in postal parcels in 
2018, mostly destined for South America, the United States 
and Asia. While NPS continued to be shipped mainly from 
China and Hong Kong, in 2018 few seizures of fentanyl 
derivatives in postal parcels occurred in Europe (Groupe 
Pompidou and RILO WE, 2019).
Dutch-based OCGs send postal packages and parcels from 
Belgium, France, Germany or the Netherlands to customers 
worldwide. For example, a Europe-based darknet drug-
trafficking organisation called ItalianMafiaBrussels was 
dismantled in a joint US-European enforcement action in 
which two members of the organisation were extradited 
from Romania to the US on charges of money laundering 
and MDMA trafficking, primarily to US and Canadian 
customers through the now defunct markets Silk Road and 
Silk Road 2.0, using regular postal services to send the 
drugs from Belgium to the US. Germany, as well as Belgium, 
is increasingly used as a transit hub for the trafficking of 
amphetamine and MDMA, NPS, cocaine or cannabis using 
post and parcel services (Case study 16). Large EU parcel 
hubs are located in Germany (Frankfurt and Leipzig) and 
Belgium (Liège). The amount of ecstasy and amphetamine 
found in the post more than tripled from 137 kg in 2016 
to 460 kg in 2018, according to information from customs 
authorities in the Netherlands — and these numbers are 
regarded as a small fraction of the bigger picture (Boffey, 
2019a). Intermediaries in Germany appear to be frequently 
used for the dispatch by mail of illicit drugs produced in the 
Netherlands and purchased on the darknet. Since August 
2016, about 8 500 postal items containing illicit drugs have 
been identified at international airports across Germany, 
amounting to a total of 404 kg of illicit drugs (287 kg 
amphetamine and 111 kg MDMA, as well as cocaine and 
cannabis) and 307 250 MDMA/ecstasy tablets.
There are notable challenges in identifying postal items 
containing drugs. For example, the total volume handled 
every day by a major postal centre such as the Mail Centre 
Vienna amounts to 4 million items. Furthermore, there 
is currently no mechanism in place for the reporting of 
suspicious parcels akin, for example, to the existing one 
for reporting suspicious financial transactions. Although 
systems are in place for service providers to remove 
and destroy suspicious parcels, they do not have a legal 
obligation to inform police authorities.
Figure 2.6 
Illicit drugs seized in postal traffic
Photo: Federal Police, Belgium
CASE STUDY 16
International drug-trafficking network disrupted
National investigations into an OCG 
composed of 13 members, including 
some of Afghan and Dutch origin, 
began in September 2018. The 
suspects in the Netherlands prepared 
parcels or envelopes with drugs, 
which were mailed to Germany. The 
perpetrators in Germany used various 
mailboxes and post offices to ship 
the packages on to recipients around 
the world. The orders were made 
online through the darknet, using 
cryptocurrency, such as bitcoin and 
paysafecards. Members of the OCG 
were also suspected of being involved 
in money-laundering activities related 
to their profits. Amphetamines, MDMA, 
cocaine and heroin, with a total street 
value of more than EUR 400 000, were 
seized. Ten private residences and 
business premises were searched 
at the German-Dutch border. 
Large amounts of drugs, including 
40 kg of amphetamine and 1 kg of 
ecstasy tablets, as well as mobile 
phones, computers, documents and 
EUR 10 000 in cash, were seized. 
Twelve suspects were arrested, four 
under European Arrest Warrants.
Source: Europol (2019a).
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In practical terms, targeted screening could aid identification 
of postal items with illicit content, especially in cases when 
express postal services are employed. Such measures could 
have a significant impact in disrupting illicit drug distribution 
by this modus operandi and limiting related harm. They 
can also help protect postal service staff from coming into 
contact with potentially lethal substances.
Europol analysis indicates that smaller EU-based secondary 
distributors also trade several types of illicit drugs and 
subsequently distribute them through their national post and 
parcel services. Some criminals simply rely on innocuous 
packaging shipped by post, parcel and express parcel 
services. Some suppliers ship vacuum-packed parcels. In 
some cases, the higher-level OCGs are largely uninvolved 
in the trafficking of the illicit drugs, relying on intermediaries 
who receive or dispatch the products using fictional identities 
and addresses.
More generally, the origin and content of parcels is often 
concealed by making false declarations and using fraudulent 
documents to circumvent risk indicators used to identify 
parcels for checks. The identification of the suppliers is to 
some degree also hampered by the nature of the non-EU 
postal systems and the use of parcel-forwarding services.
Individual criminals and OCGs use parcel-forwarding services 
to facilitate the trafficking of illicit commodities. Postal 
companies provide their clients with addresses in other 
jurisdictions, repack the parcels and ensure international 
shipment. This creates opportunities for criminals intending 
to conceal the origin, final destination and nature of illicit 
shipments. Since these companies usually do not open 
the packages, the nature of the shipments can easily be 
concealed by sending a false customs declaration.
Criminal cooperation
Globalisation facilitates drug supply by providing new 
opportunities for criminal cooperation and integration along 
the supply chain, thus improving the efficiency of operations. 
Currently important features of the operations of many OCGs 
in Europe are polycriminality and online cooperation.
Polycriminality
Polycriminality remains a feature of many of the OCGs active 
in the EU. According to the most recent data, 45 % of the 
OCGs reported for the SOCTA are involved in more than one 
criminal activity, a marked increase compared with 2013 
(Europol, 2017b).
OCGs often engage in more than one criminal activity to 
mitigate risks, reduce operational costs, increase profit 
margins, or finance or facilitate other criminal activities. For 
instance, an OCG may finance the maintenance of several 
legal business structures to launder incomes from drug 
trafficking by engaging in organised property crime.
Many OCGs are highly flexible and able to shift from one 
criminal activity to another or to add new criminal activities 
to their crime portfolio. In many cases, OCGs operate on 
an on-demand basis and become active only once new 
profit opportunities emerge. The increasing availability of 
knowledge, tools and expertise provided to OCGs through 
‘crime as a service’, in which criminals use the services of 
other specialised criminals, has enabled a greater number of 
OCGs to engage in multiple criminal activities despite lacking 
specific expertise or experience. As a result of an increasingly 
complex and interconnected criminal world, there are more 
and more OCGs specialising in offering a wider range of highly 
specialised services to different OCGs, both offline and online.
The OCGs involved in the trafficking of illicit drugs are the 
most polycriminal groups in the EU. They traffic different 
types of illicit drugs, with polydrug trafficking continuing 
to be a common feature among mid-level suppliers and 
distributors, and increasingly for top-level OCGs. Polycriminal 
OCGs most frequently combine the trafficking of cannabis 
and cocaine. There is also some overlap in the activities of 
OCGs involved in the trafficking of illicit drugs and illegal 
firearms. In some cases, OCGs involved in drug trafficking 
also engage in migrant smuggling, organised property crime 
or different types of fraud.
Online cooperation
Online technologies are used extensively by OCGs for 
communication, and the internet and new technologies 
facilitate the formation and operation of new models of 
criminal groups. As some have put it, ‘knowing the right 
people’ (the concept of social capital) may have transformed 
into knowing one’s way on the internet (Leukfeldt, 2017). 
An example can be seen in the fentanyl market. Anecdotal 
evidence suggests that vendor networks, particularly for 
the supply of fentanyl derivatives via darknet markets, form 
and exist online only, regardless of physical world location, 
sometimes across continents.
UK investigation and prosecution of several fentanyl vendors 
has confirmed that some prolific UK-based vendors actively 
seek to ‘recruit’ re-seller vendors in other countries where 
they enjoy large customer bases. The UK vendors supply 
wholesale amounts to their network of re-sellers so that 
customers in those countries can receive expedited delivery 
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from their ‘local’ reseller. In one UK case a prolific fentanyl 
vendor arrested in April 2017 was supplying wholesale 
amounts of its fentanyl preparations to three separate 
US-based re-seller vendors, which enabled more timely 
deliveries to satisfy escalating demand from US customers. 
There is also some evidence that vendor brands are being 
serviced by a networked collective of individuals based in 
several different countries, which enables these brands 
to offer prompt local deliveries in the countries in which 
their constituent members reside. It is likely these mutual 
arrangements also assist such a collective vendor brand 
in becoming more resilient to law enforcement detection, 
as a greater proportion of their transactions would be 
undertaken within local national postal systems rather than 
passing through the more stringent border checks imposed 
on international postal traffic (S. Welsh, National Crime 
Agency, personal communication).
Technology and innovation
The impact of the rapidly evolving technological world 
extends to drug markets. In 2017, 87 % of EU households 
had internet access and 57 % of individuals aged 16-74 had 
bought goods or services over the internet (Eurostat, 2018b). 
Drug dealers have capitalised on this pool of potential buyers 
and the technological opportunities.
Online markets
Surface web
The surface web is an important medium for the sale of NPS 
and misused medicines. To a limited extent, it is also used for 
the sale of traditional illicit drugs, as illustrated in Figure 2.7. 
Legislative measures removing NPS from the legal market 
have resulted, for example in the United Kingdom, in the 
restriction of the role of the surface web in their distribution 
(Wadsworth et al., 2018). UK-registered online shops were 
found to close down or move domain location, but it is 
unknown whether the UK retailers have ceased selling NPS 
or have been relocated to darknet markets. Further research 
is also required to understand how long-lasting this effect 
will be. The trading of illicit drugs typically involves more 
clandestine approaches.
Darknet drug markets
The combination of digital technologies, namely of anonymity 
technology (e.g. Tor; Dingledine et al., 2004) and pseudo-
anonymous (Nakamoto, 2009) or anonymous (Ben-Sasson 
et al., 2014; van Saberhagen, 2013) payment systems, has 
led to the emergence of darknet markets in which sellers and 
buyers can conduct transactions online with a high level of 
anonymity. It is estimated that about two thirds of the offers 
on darknet markets are drug-related, with the remainder 
related to a range of other illicit goods and services 
(EMCDDA and Europol, 2017). Darknet markets are most 
often global and operate in English, although some cater to 
a particular country or language group.
The darknet markets ecosystem is dynamic and resilient, 
with markets emerging and disappearing because of law 
enforcement activities, exit scams or voluntary closure, 
and with different markets dominating at different times 
(see Figure 2.8 and Case study 17). At the time of writing, 
there appear to be 10 active and operational marketplaces: 
T•chka, OW Market, The Majestic Garden, Berlusconi 
Market, Cannazon, Rapture Market, Empire Market, Apollon, 
Serpent Market and Nightmare Market.
Figure 2.7 
Surface web ‘pharmacy’ offering MDMA
CHAPTER 2 I Drivers and facilitators of drug markets 
68
F
ig
u
re
 2
.8
 
D
ar
kn
et
 m
ar
ke
ts
 e
co
sy
st
em
: l
if
et
im
e 
an
d
 r
ea
so
n
s 
fo
r 
cl
os
u
re
 o
f 
ov
er
 1
0
0
 d
ar
kn
et
 m
ar
ke
ts
 o
ff
er
in
g
 d
ru
g
s,
 s
or
te
d
 b
y 
d
at
e
R
a
id
ed
R
a
id
ed
R
a
id
ed
R
a
id
ed
R
a
id
ed
R
a
id
ed
R
a
id
ed
R
a
id
ed
R
a
id
ed
H
a
ck
ed
H
a
ck
ed
H
a
ck
ed
H
a
ck
ed
H
a
ck
ed
R
a
id
ed
H
a
ck
ed
V
ol
u
n
ta
ry
H
a
ck
ed
H
a
ck
ed
S
ca
m
S
ca
m S
ca
m
S
ca
m
S
ca
m S
ca
m
S
ca
m
S
ca
m
S
ca
m
S
ca
m
S
ca
m
S
ca
m
S
ca
m
V
ol
u
n
ta
ry
S
ca
m
S
ca
m
V
ol
u
n
ta
ry
V
ol
u
n
ta
ry
V
ol
u
n
ta
ry
V
ol
u
n
ta
ry
V
ol
u
n
ta
ry
V
ol
u
n
ta
ry
S
ca
m
 o
r 
h
a
ck
ed
V
ol
u
n
ta
ry
V
ol
u
n
ta
ry
V
ol
u
n
ta
ry
V
ol
u
n
ta
ry
V
ol
u
n
ta
ry
V
ol
u
n
ta
ry
R
a
id
ed
H
a
ck
ed
V
ol
u
n
ta
ry
S
ilk
 R
oa
d
B
la
ck
 M
ar
ke
t 
R
el
oa
d
ed
Th
e 
Fa
rm
er
’s
 M
ar
ke
t
S
h
ee
p
 M
ar
ke
tp
la
ce
A
tl
an
ti
s
B
u
yI
tN
ow
D
ee
p
b
ay B
u
d
st
er
P
ro
je
ct
 B
la
ck
 F
la
g
P
an
d
or
a
S
ilk
 R
oa
d
 2
.0
To
rM
ar
ke
t
B
la
ck
B
ox
 M
ar
ke
t
D
re
am
 M
ar
ke
t
Th
e 
M
ar
ke
tp
la
ce
P
ira
te
 M
ar
ke
t
F
lo
M
ar
ke
t
B
la
ck
 M
ar
ke
t
F
re
eB
ay
B
lu
e 
S
ky
A
go
ra
To
rt
u
ga
O
u
tl
aw
 M
ar
ke
t
To
rB
ay
W
h
it
e 
R
ab
b
it
G
re
yR
oa
d
D
ru
gL
is
t
E
vo
lu
ti
on
D
og
e 
R
oa
d
C
an
ti
n
a
To
r 
B
az
aa
r
D
ar
kB
ay
B
re
ak
in
g 
B
ad
To
rE
sc
ro
w
B
la
ck
 G
ob
lin
 M
ar
ke
t
C
an
n
ab
is
 R
oa
d
U
to
p
ia
B
la
ck
B
an
k 
M
ar
ke
t
C
lo
u
d
 9
D
ar
kn
et
 N
at
io
n
S
an
it
ar
iu
m
 M
ar
ke
t
H
an
sa
 M
ar
ke
tp
la
ce
R
ed
 S
u
n
 M
ar
ke
tp
la
ce
E
X
X
TA
C
Y
To
p
ix
H
yd
ra
C
an
n
ab
is
 R
oa
d
 2
M
r 
N
ic
e 
G
u
y
A
n
d
ro
m
ed
a
S
ilk
 S
tr
ee
t
U
n
d
er
gr
ou
n
d
 M
ar
ke
t
S
ta
rt
 d
at
e
In
vi
ta
ti
on
-o
nl
y 
m
ar
ke
tp
la
ce
s 
in
 b
ol
d
R
ea
so
ns
 fo
r 
cl
os
ur
e
R
ai
d
ed
H
ac
ke
d
E
xi
t 
sc
am
V
ol
u
n
ta
ry
 
ex
it
S
ca
m
 o
r 
h
ac
ke
d
U
n
kn
ow
n
E
n
d
 d
at
e
S
ti
ll 
op
en
2
0
1
1
2
0
1
0
2
0
1
2
2
0
1
3
2
0
1
4
2
0
1
5
2
0
1
7
O
n
e 
of
 t
h
e 
fir
st
 a
n
d
 b
es
t-
kn
ow
n
 d
ar
kn
et
 
m
ar
ke
tp
la
ce
s 
w
as
 S
ilk
 R
oa
d
, w
h
ic
h
 
op
en
ed
 a
t 
th
e 
en
d
 o
f 
Ja
n
u
ar
y 
2
0
1
1
.
A
t 
th
e 
ti
m
e 
of
 c
lo
su
re
 o
f 
S
ilk
 R
oa
d
, t
h
er
e 
w
er
e 
fo
u
r 
ac
ti
ve
 d
ar
kn
et
 
m
ar
ke
ts
: B
la
ck
 M
ar
ke
t 
R
el
oa
d
ed
, S
h
ee
p
 M
ar
ke
tp
la
ce
, D
ee
p
b
ay
 a
n
d
 
B
u
yI
tN
ow
. S
h
or
tl
y 
af
te
r, 
a 
p
ro
lif
er
at
io
n
 o
f 
m
ar
ke
ts
 c
am
e 
in
to
 
ex
is
te
n
ce
.
3
5
 d
ay
s 
af
te
r 
S
ilk
 R
oa
d
 w
as
 c
lo
se
d
, S
ilk
 
R
oa
d
 2
.0
 w
as
 la
u
n
ch
ed
.
O
p
er
at
io
n
 O
n
ym
ou
s 
re
su
lt
ed
 in
 t
h
e 
cl
os
u
re
 o
f 
a 
n
u
m
b
er
 o
f 
d
ar
kn
et
 m
ar
ke
ts
: 
P
an
d
or
a,
 S
ilk
 R
oa
d
 2
.0
, B
la
ck
 M
ar
ke
t, 
B
lu
e 
S
ky
, T
or
 B
az
aa
r, 
To
p
ix
, H
yd
ra
, C
lo
u
d
 
9
 a
n
d
 A
lp
ac
a.
O
n
 a
ve
ra
ge
, t
h
e 
d
ar
kn
et
 
m
ar
ke
tp
la
ce
s 
ob
se
rv
ed
 
re
m
ai
n
ed
 a
ct
iv
e 
fo
r 
ju
st
 o
ve
r 
ei
gh
t 
m
on
th
s.
2
0
1
6
2
0
1
8
2
0
1
9
2
0
2
0
EU DRUG MARKETS REPORT
69
N
o
te
s:
 A
 to
ta
l o
f 1
1
2
 d
ar
kn
et
 m
ar
ke
ts
 w
er
e 
id
en
tifi
ed
 a
lo
n
g 
w
ith
 k
ey
 fe
at
u
re
s.
 S
ta
rt
 a
n
d
 e
n
d
 d
at
es
 —
 th
e 
d
at
es
 o
f t
h
e 
fir
st
 a
n
d
 la
st
 k
n
o
w
n
 s
al
es
/w
ith
d
ra
w
al
s.
 C
lo
su
re
 ty
p
e 
—
 th
e 
re
as
o
n
 fo
r 
a 
m
ar
ke
t s
h
u
t-
d
o
w
n
. M
ar
ke
t s
ta
tu
s 
la
st
 
ch
ec
ke
d
 o
n
 1
6
 M
ay
 2
0
1
9
. 
S
o
u
rc
es
: E
M
C
D
D
A
 (
2
0
1
6
a)
, D
ar
kN
et
 S
ta
ts
 (
2
0
1
9
), 
D
ar
kW
eb
N
ew
s 
(2
0
1
9
), 
G
w
er
n
 A
rc
h
iv
es
 (
2
0
1
9
).
R
a
id
ed
R
a
id
ed
H
a
ck
ed
H
a
ck
ed
S
ca
m
S
ca
m
S
ca
m
U
n
kn
ow
n
U
n
kn
ow
n
U
n
kn
ow
n
U
n
kn
ow
n
 (
d
a
te
 u
n
kn
ow
n
)
H
a
ck
ed
 (
d
a
te
 u
n
kn
ow
n
)
U
n
kn
ow
n
U
n
kn
ow
n
U
n
kn
ow
n
U
n
kn
ow
n
U
n
kn
ow
n
U
n
kn
ow
n -s
ta
rt
 d
a
te
 u
n
kn
ow
n
-s
ta
rt
 d
a
te
 u
n
kn
ow
n
U
n
kn
ow
n
S
ca
m
S
ca
m
S
ca
m
S
ca
m
S
ca
m
S
ca
m
S
ca
m
S
ca
m
S
ca
m
S
ca
m
S
ca
m
S
ca
m
S
ca
m
S
ca
m
S
ca
m
 o
r 
h
a
ck
ed
V
ol
u
n
ta
ry
V
ol
u
n
ta
ry
V
ol
u
n
ta
ry
V
ol
u
n
ta
ry
V
ol
u
n
ta
ry
V
ol
u
n
ta
ry
V
ol
u
n
ta
ry V
ol
u
n
ta
ry
V
ol
u
n
ta
ry
H
a
ck
ed
S
ca
m
S
ca
m
V
ol
u
n
ta
ry
V
ol
u
n
ta
ry
R
a
id
ed
R
a
id
ed
R
a
id
ed
P
ig
eo
n
 M
ar
ke
t
A
lp
ac
a 
To
rt
u
ga
 2
D
ee
p
zo
n
O
n
io
n
sh
op
A
re
a5
1
M
id
d
le
 E
ar
th
 M
ar
ke
tp
la
ce
F
re
ed
om
 M
ar
ke
t
C
an
n
ab
is
 R
oa
d
 3
D
ia
b
ol
u
s/
S
R
3
N
u
cl
eu
s 
M
ar
ke
tp
la
ce
P
an
ac
ea
S
ilk
 R
oa
d
 3
.1
A
b
ra
xa
s
A
lp
h
aB
ay
K
is
s
S
ilk
 R
oa
d
 R
el
oa
d
ed
F
re
e 
M
ar
ke
t
T
•c
h
ka
C
ry
p
to
 M
ar
ke
t
M
r 
N
ic
e 
G
u
y 
2
Ir
on
cl
ad
Th
eR
ea
lD
ea
l
H
av
an
a/
A
b
so
le
m
O
xy
ge
n
E
as
t 
In
d
ia
 C
om
p
an
y
H
av
en
Z
an
zi
b
ar
 S
p
ic
e
A
n
ar
ch
ia
To
rn
ad
o
H
or
iz
on
 M
ar
ke
t
D
ar
kn
et
 H
er
oe
s 
Le
ag
ue
A
ga
p
e
P
os
ei
d
on
A
m
az
on
 D
ar
k
S
im
p
ly
 B
ea
r
H
an
sa
 A
cr
op
ol
is
A
p
p
le
 M
ar
ke
t
H
ou
se
 o
f L
io
ns
 M
ar
ke
t M
in
er
va
Tr
ad
eR
ou
te
R
ap
tu
re
 M
ar
ke
t
B
er
lu
sc
on
i M
ar
ke
t
E
m
p
ir
e 
M
ar
ke
t
O
ly
m
p
u
s 
M
ar
ke
t
A
p
ol
lo
n
Th
e 
M
aj
es
ti
c 
G
ar
de
n
C
an
n
az
on
W
al
l S
tr
ee
t 
M
ar
ke
t
R
S
C
lu
b
 M
ar
ke
t
Z
io
n
 M
ar
ke
t
In
fin
it
e 
M
ar
ke
t
P
la
ce
m
ar
ke
t
N
ig
h
tm
ar
e 
M
ar
ke
t
C
G
M
C S
er
p
en
t 
M
ar
ke
t
O
W
 M
ar
ke
t
T
O
M
1
7
7
6
V
al
ha
lla
N
in
e 
m
ar
ke
tp
la
ce
s 
h
av
e 
m
ad
e 
it
 fo
r 
a 
p
er
io
d
 o
f 
b
et
w
ee
n
 
tw
o 
an
d
 t
h
re
e 
ye
ar
s:
 S
ilk
 R
oa
d
, A
lp
h
aB
ay
, S
ilk
 R
oa
d
 3
.1
, 
B
la
ck
M
ar
ke
t 
R
el
oa
d
ed
, W
al
l S
tr
ee
t 
M
ar
ke
t, 
D
ia
b
ol
u
s/
S
R
3
, 
Th
e 
Fa
rm
er
’s
 M
ar
ke
t, 
D
ar
kn
et
 H
er
oe
s 
Le
ag
u
e 
an
d
 C
ry
p
to
 
M
ar
ke
t.
1
3
 m
ar
ke
tp
la
ce
s 
op
er
at
ed
 b
et
w
ee
n
 o
n
e 
an
d
 t
w
o 
ye
ar
s:
 H
an
sa
, A
go
ra
, N
u
cl
eu
s 
M
ar
ke
tp
la
ce
, 
Th
eR
ea
lD
ea
l, 
A
cr
op
ol
is
, M
id
d
le
 E
ar
th
 M
ar
ke
tp
la
ce
, 
A
p
p
le
 M
ar
ke
t, 
B
la
ck
B
an
k 
M
ar
ke
t, 
H
ou
se
 o
f 
Li
on
s 
M
ar
ke
t, 
E
vo
lu
ti
on
, S
ilk
 R
oa
d
 R
el
oa
d
ed
, 
S
ilk
 R
oa
d
 2
.0
 a
n
d
 A
n
ar
ch
ia
.
3
5
 d
ay
s 
af
te
r 
S
ilk
 R
oa
d
 2
.0
 w
as
 c
lo
se
d
, S
ilk
 
R
oa
d
 3
.1
 w
as
 la
u
n
ch
ed
.
M
aj
or
 in
te
rn
at
io
n
al
 la
w
 
en
fo
rc
em
en
t 
op
er
at
io
n
s 
B
ay
on
et
 
an
d
 G
ra
ve
S
ac
 s
h
u
t 
d
ow
n
 
A
lp
h
aB
ay
 a
n
d
 H
an
sa
.
A
t 
th
e 
ti
m
e 
of
 w
ri
ti
n
g 
th
er
e 
ar
e 
1
0
 m
ar
ke
tp
la
ce
s 
th
at
 a
p
p
ea
r 
to
 b
e 
ac
ti
ve
 
an
d
 o
p
er
at
io
n
al
: T
•c
h
ka
, O
W
 M
ar
ke
t, 
R
ap
tu
re
 M
ar
ke
t, 
Th
e 
M
aj
es
ti
c 
G
ar
d
en
, 
B
er
lu
sc
on
i M
ar
ke
t, 
C
an
n
az
on
, E
m
p
ir
e 
M
ar
ke
t, 
A
p
ol
on
, S
er
p
en
t 
M
ar
ke
t 
an
d
 
N
ig
h
tm
ar
e 
M
ar
ke
t.
Th
e 
m
aj
or
it
y 
of
 m
ar
ke
tp
la
ce
s 
d
id
 n
ot
 
m
ak
e 
it
 b
ey
on
d
 a
 y
ea
r.
Th
e 
m
os
t 
en
d
u
ri
n
g 
m
ar
ke
tp
la
ce
s 
op
er
at
e 
b
et
w
ee
n
 t
h
re
e 
an
d
 fi
ve
 y
ea
rs
: V
al
h
al
la
, 
D
re
am
 M
ar
ke
t, 
O
u
tl
aw
 M
ar
ke
t 
an
d
 T
•c
h
ka
.
2
0
1
1
2
0
1
0
2
0
1
2
2
0
1
3
2
0
1
4
2
0
1
5
2
0
1
7
2
0
1
6
2
0
1
9
2
0
2
0
2
0
1
8
CHAPTER 2 I Drivers and facilitators of drug markets 
70
Several Member States suggest that another consequence 
of these market closures, is the growth in both the number 
of vendor shops (shops run by a single vendor) and 
secondary markets, i.e. non-English language markets 
(Europol, 2018d, p. 47).
Well-established vendors with high trust levels and 
reputation are more likely to set up their own hidden service 
platforms. Some of these vendors can continue doing 
business solely with clientele established on the now-
defunct markets, especially in relation to sales of products 
that are purchased repetitively, such as drugs.
Within the next five years, we can expect to see continued 
fragmentation of the darknet market scene. While a number 
of larger, multi-vendor, multi-commodity markets may 
survive, there will be an increasing number of vendor 
shops and smaller secondary markets catering to specific 
nationalities or language groups. These smaller markets will 
be less likely to attract the coordinated international law 
enforcement response that larger markets invite.
Some vendors will abandon web shops altogether and 
migrate their business to encrypted communications apps, 
running their shops within private channels/groups and 
automating the trade process using smart contracts and 
bots. Industry and media already report a trend in the abuse 
of apps like Telegram or Discord, despite the provider’s 
efforts to curtail such activity (Europol, 2018d).
To obtain more information about darknet drug markets and 
in particular on the role of European suppliers within them, 
the EMCDDA commissioned a study, which collected regular 
snapshots from four major global darknet markets (Dream 
Market, Berlusconi Market, Valhalla and TradeRoute) during 
the period 15 July 2017 to 22 August 2018 (9). Based on 
an extrapolation of data from buyer feedback reports it was 
possible to estimate the volumes and values of drugs traded 
over time. Although not exhaustive, this approach does allow 
an audit of the target marketplaces over the study period 
and an assessment of the impact of the combined AlphaBay 
(9) It should be noted that the period November 2017 to March 2018 was 
excluded because of unreliable data. 
CASE STUDY 17
Double blow to darknet markets
In April 2019, the German Federal 
Criminal Police shut down the Wall 
Street Market, under the authority of 
the German Public Prosecutor’s office. 
They were supported by the Dutch 
national police, Europol, Eurojust and 
various US government agencies. 
Another marketplace, Silkkitie (also 
known as Valhalla) was seized by the 
Finnish customs service in cooperation 
with the French national police and 
Europol.
Wall Street Market was the world’s 
second largest darknet market, 
enabling the trade in drugs (including 
cocaine, heroin, cannabis and 
amphetamines), stolen data, fake 
documents and malicious software. 
More than 1 150 000 customer 
accounts were registered on the online 
marketplace, and over 63 000 offers 
had been made by the 5 400-plus 
vendors. For payment, buyers used the 
cryptocurrencies bitcoin and monero. 
The alleged marketplace operators 
are said to have received commission 
payments of between 2 % to 6 % of the 
sales value for the settlement of illegal 
sales of the platform.
The operation led by the German 
authorities saw the arrest of three 
suspects and, as a result of the house 
searches carried out, police officers 
seized over EUR 550 000 in cash, as 
well as bitcoin and monero in 6-digit 
amounts, several vehicles and other 
evidence, such as computers and 
data storage. In the US, during the 
investigation by the Attorney General 
in Los Angeles, two of the highest-
selling suppliers of narcotics were 
arrested.
Silkkitie has been operating on the 
Tor network for the Finnish market 
since 2013. It expanded operations 
internationally (under the name 
Valhalla) in late 2015. Silkkitie is 
one of the oldest and internationally 
best-known Tor trade sites. Based on 
the findings of the investigation, the 
Finnish customs service also made 
a significant bitcoin seizure. After the 
Silkkitie site was shut down by the 
authorities, some of the Finnish drugs 
traders moved their activities to other 
sites in the Tor network, such as Wall 
Street Market.
Source: Europol (2019e).
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and Hansa take-downs on the darknet ecosystem (for fuller 
technical details see Christin and Thomas, 2019).
The analysis of the development of sales between 2017 
and 2018 revealed three distinct trends.
1. Revenue on Dream Market and TradeRoute experienced 
a strong increase starting in July 2017. This corresponds 
to the take-downs of AlphaBay and Hansa.
2. The overall revenue of these four markets reached 
approximately EUR 800 000 per day on average. 
This is comparable to AlphaBay’s daily revenue at its 
peak (EMCDDA and Europol, 2017). This suggests 
that the AlphaBay and Hansa take-downs did not 
have a significant impact on the overall revenue of 
the ecosystem. This resilience of the darknet markets 
ecosystem was also observed after the Silk Road take-
down and Operation Onymous.
3. Dream Market was by far the largest market by sales. 
TradeRoute was of significant size up to October 2017, 
when it closed in an apparent exit scam.
A comparison of sales of drugs originating from the EU 
with those originating from other countries showed that EU 
countries represented roughly 44 % of global drug revenue, 
and 37 % of the weight sold during the period studied.
The data collected also showed that the vast majority of 
sales originating from the EU were from three countries: 
the United Kingdom, with EUR 28.2 million in total 
sales; Germany, with about EUR 18.8 million; and the 
Netherlands, with just over EUR 10.3 million (Figure 2.9). 
Sales of much lower values originated from France 
(EUR 3.8 million), Spain (EUR 1.1 million) and Belgium 
(EUR 1.0 million), while vendors purporting to ship 
from multiple possible locations were also prominent 
(EUR 4.0 million). In the top three countries, the highest 
revenue-generating substances were cannabis, cocaine 
and other stimulants. Vendors in the Netherlands 
generated a significantly lower proportion of their revenue 
from cannabis than those in Germany or the United 
Kingdom.
The general trends observed with respect to financial 
revenue also apply to the quantities of drugs traded by 
European darknet vendors: Germany (3 153 kg overall), 
the United Kingdom (2 825 kg overall) and the Netherlands 
(1 174 kg overall) dominate the ecosystem. In all other 
countries together, the total weight of products shipped 
was less than 1 tonne (1 000 kg). Vendors in the United 
Kingdom generated higher revenue than those in Germany 
yet sold a lower overall weight. This may reflect factors such 
as variations in price, as well as differences in the types of 
drugs offered by vendors in different countries.
Figure 2.9 
Breakdown of sales revenues originating from the EU, Norway and Turkey by country, 2017-18
Cannabis Cocaine Dissociatives Hallucinogens NPS Opioids Non-cocaine stimulants
Breakdown by revenue (major countries)
United
Kingdom
NetherlandsGermany
5
10
0
20
25
15
30
Fr
an
ce
S
pa
in
B
el
gi
um
Au
st
ria
C
ze
ch
ia
D
en
m
ar
k
N
or
w
ay
Po
la
nd
Fi
nl
an
d
Lu
xe
m
bo
ur
g
Ita
ly
Po
rt
ug
al
Es
to
ni
a
Ire
la
nd
S
lo
ve
ni
a
S
w
ed
en
S
lo
va
ki
a
Li
th
ua
ni
a
Tu
rk
ey
B
ul
ga
ria
La
tv
ia
M
ul
tip
le
0
1
2
3
4
Million EURMillion EUR
Breakdown by revenue (other countries)
Notes: For readability, the three major countries (Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom) are represented on a different scale from the other countries. 
‘Multiple’ denotes that several EU countries are mentioned as country of origin. Cannabis: a range of forms. Cocaine: a range of forms. Dissociatives: ketamine, 
gamma-hydroxybutyrate (GHB), gamma-butyrolactone (GBL). Hallucinogens: LSD, PCP (excluding psychedelics). Non-cocaine stimulants: amphetamine, 
methamphetamine, MDMA, MDA. Opioids: heroin, opium, analgesics.
CHAPTER 2 I Drivers and facilitators of drug markets 
72
The dynamic nature of online markets, their ability to evolve 
to counter threats and exploit new opportunities, and the 
introduction or adoption of new technologies mean that 
enhanced monitoring capacity in this area is crucial to 
ensure that responses keep pace with developments and to 
reduce the health and security threats that developments 
in this area now present.
Social networks and smartphone apps
While attention is often focused on the use of the darknet 
for drug trafficking, the use of mainstream applications may 
be equally important and more readily accessible. In 2018, 
75 % of people aged 16-74 in the EU used a smartphone 
for private purposes (Eurostat, 2019b). According to 
a social media report, the social networking platform 
Facebook has more than 1.6 billion registered users; the 
video-sharing site YouTube has more than 1 billion active 
users; and the social streaming site Twitter has more than 
500 million registered users worldwide (Nielsen, 2016).
Following the development and diffusion of social 
platforms such as Facebook, YouTube and Twitter among 
young people, these platforms are being increasingly used 
by drug suppliers and dealers (Coomber and Moyle, 2018; 
Miliano et al., 2018; Moyle et al., 2019). The use of online 
social networks and smartphone applications, or ‘apps’, 
in the drug trade effectively negates the need for specific 
expertise (as with Tor-based darknet markets) but still 
provides a level of hidden or encrypted communication 
that is not provided by public listings on the surface web. 
Messenger services such as Wickr or WhatsApp can also 
be harnessed to provide dealers with end-to-end encrypted 
communication to work out transaction details at all levels 
of the drug market.
At the retail level, media reports have demonstrated how 
easy it may be to obtain a range of illicit drugs via social 
media platforms such as Instagram, Snapchat, Tinder and 
Facebook (Dooley, 2017). Journalistic reports must be 
viewed with caution (Coomber et al., 2000); however, they 
do illustrate some important aspects of technology-based 
distribution. On social media sites, the use of hashtags 
(user-generated labels that enable the identification 
of content on a particular topic) and emoticons (small 
digital images or icons used to express an idea) provides 
the gateway to advertisements for sale of a range of 
substances (Ferguson, 2016).
While drug sales and advertising on social platforms and 
messenger services appear to be acquiring prominence, 
there is relatively little research exploring the place of these 
technologies in drug markets. To systematically address 
the empirical research gap characterising drug distribution 
through social networks, the EMCDDA commissioned 
a background report on the role of these networks in 
selected European countries (Denmark, Finland, Iceland, 
Norway and Sweden) (Demant and Bakken, 2019).
Denmark, Iceland and Sweden have active open social 
media drug markets, especially within Facebook groups 
and on Instagram. These markets are characterised by 
high accessibility, facilitating dealing between strangers. 
In contrast, private digital markets predominate in Finland 
and Norway, with drug dealing facilitated through closed, 
peer-to-peer-only messaging applications such as Wickr, 
Snapchat and Facebook Messenger. Accessing the markets 
then demands a higher level of previous knowledge to be 
able to contact a seller (whom and how to contact), which 
is often achieved by friends acting as intermediaries. 
Depending on the app in use, sellers sometimes send 
group messages (e.g. by Wickr) or public stories (e.g. by 
Snapchat) giving information about newly arrived drugs 
or special deals. In Norway, if Facebook is used to sell 
and buy drugs, it is only through private messages or 
groups strictly exclusive to Facebook friends. In Finland, 
a large public digital market operates on a forum, placed 
as a hidden service on the darknet and available only with 
a Tor browser. This darknet forum functions very much like 
the groups on Facebook observed in Denmark, Iceland 
and Sweden. The main characteristic of these markets is 
that sellers publicly post their drug offers, including their 
contact information, and encourage further communication 
on private channels such as Wickr. Despite the variations 
between countries, the overall process is similar: parties 
first meet online, where price and amount are discussed, 
and then meet physically to exchange cash and drugs.
A closer examination of drug dealing on Facebook 
revealed 113 Facebook groups where illicit drugs were 
sold: 26 in Denmark, 30 in Iceland and 57 in Sweden. 
Of them, 63 indicated a specific geographical coverage: 
34 nationwide, 20 citywide, six covering large regions 
(often including whole counties or more than one city), 
two concerning small regions (i.e. a city and surrounding 
areas) and, finally, one market focused on a specific area 
within a city. Despite these data, an estimation of market 
demographics is challenging because almost half of the 
markets (50) did not inform members of their geographical 
reach (no specific instructions in the group summary). There 
are clear differences between countries. Denmark has 
national markets for the most part, which fit the geography 
of the country: every part is easy to reach in little time, and 
it is densely populated. Sweden, on the other hand, has 
a significant number of citywide groups. In Iceland, the 
majority of groups do not specify geographical reach, which 
may suggest they are open to nationwide sales.
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New techniques in production and 
smuggling
Some cannabis resin producers based in Morocco have 
adapted their production techniques in order to improve 
the quality of their product, mainly through the introduction 
of crop varieties with higher yields (EMCDDA and Europol, 
2016). Such agronomic techniques may be applied to other 
illicit crops relevant to drugs, for example opium poppies 
grown in Afghanistan, coca plants grown in Latin America 
or ephedra plants grown in China. Over the last few years, 
the production outputs of Afghanistan and Colombia have 
been very high and the output of illicit methamphetamine 
laboratories in south-east Asia also seems to have been 
boosted in recent times (UNODC, 2018a). Although there 
will be many factors contributing to the increases in each 
case, the adoption of new techniques play a part. This 
has been reflected in an apparent oversupply of cocaine 
and heroin in the global supply chain, with undesirable 
consequences for Europe. A number of other developments 
have also been taking place that are providing opportunities 
to increase drug production and supply.
Precursor innovation and chemically masking 
drugs
As well as the innovation in plant-based drug production, 
synthetic drug production has also been undergoing an 
era of transformational development. Much like hackers 
find vulnerabilities in computer systems to facilitate their 
work, chemical techniques are applied to drug precursors, 
modifying them in order to circumvent international control 
systems and facilitate the production of synthetic drugs.
Whereas in previous years synthetic drug production relied 
on the acquisition of highly regulated chemical precursors, 
the current practice in Europe is to use non-regulated 
chemicals that can be easily converted to those precursor 
chemicals, or even more novel ones that can be directly 
transformed into a synthetic drug (EMCDDA, 2019f). As 
well as confirming that drug producers are becoming more 
adept at borrowing techniques from the pharmaceutical 
industry and applying them to the drug trade in order to 
evade detection, these developments present a challenge 
to the international precursor control regime (see Chapter 6 
for more details).
Traditional methods to avoid detection of smuggling attempts 
during the inspection of goods typically involve hiding 
drugs in some way or another. More recently, increasingly 
complex chemical methods have been observed, signalling 
an emerging new type of technological innovation in the 
drug trade. This technique involves modifying the drug into 
a new substance, which is undetectable by those conducting 
inspections even using advanced detection equipment. 
An example was found in 2017 when law enforcement 
officers in Spain found cocaine in a shipment of ion exchange 
resin, a polymer substance used for separating molecules. 
The cocaine was modified in order to chemically bond it to 
the resin, so the cocaine was not readily identifiable. Once 
the resin was smuggled, the cocaine could be recovered 
from the resin by the simple application of an acidic solution. 
Another example of a technique that makes the smuggled 
cocaine undetectable to customs inspection is the chemical 
combination of cocaine into a polymer such as polythene 
or polymethylmethacrylate (also known as Plexiglas or 
Perspex). This technique results in a plastic or rubber 
substance that incorporates the cocaine within the structure 
of the polymer. Extraction of the cocaine at the destination 
requires the specialist knowledge of illicit chemists who know 
the processes used at the place of origin. Typically, chemists 
from Latin America would be used to perform this recovery 
stage.
These developments indicate that maintaining a competitive 
advantage by improving drug production processes, 
minimising the risk of prosecution and avoiding detection is 
high on the agenda of international groups involved in the 
drug business. Aside from these innovations, recognising 
how drug production has become more globally complex, 
and how those who produce and traffic drugs are quick 
to exploit developments in the infrastructure supporting 
international trade and in information technology, is 
becoming ever more important. These developments 
have the potential to have a rapid impact on the kinds of 
problems we are likely to face in the future. Consequently, 
improving our monitoring and analytical capacity will remain 
a critical requirement for being better prepared to respond 
effectively to such future threats.
Criminal tools
There are indications that drug-trafficking OCGs have 
become more competent at using a range of items and 
techniques as crime tools or, in some cases, more adept 
at collaborating with people with such abilities. Here we 
highlight a few examples of material things that are being 
used to further the drug trade and related criminal activity.
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Firearms and other weapons
The damage caused by criminal use of firearms by OCGs 
involved in drug markets is direct and indirect. Direct 
impact includes the number of killings and injuries, which 
may for example occur in disputes between rival gangs 
over territories, while indirect impact results from the use 
of firearms to intimidate and coerce their victims (UNODC, 
2012a). The use of firearms by organised crime groups, 
particularly in high-profile incidents of violence between 
members of rival groups, attracts considerable public 
interest and can undermine community confidence and 
wellbeing (Crocker et al., 2017).
Changes in drug markets may affect firearms use. In 
the United Kingdom some provincial police forces have 
highlighted concerns about increasing firearms use related 
to the phenomenon of county lines: the supply of primarily 
heroin and (crack) cocaine from the capital and big cities 
to provincial towns, often associated with the exploitation 
of vulnerable people as discussed above, but also with 
intimidation and violence (see the section on harms to 
individuals, families and neighbourhoods in Chapter 1). 
For example, a recent report on the phenomenon indicated 
that 118 of these lines had been identified as having links 
to firearms (NCA, 2019).
This is one illustration of the strong connection between 
drug supply and firearms use, and how firearms may be 
used to protect and enable other criminal interests. When 
automatic weapons are recovered in the United Kingdom, 
for example, they are usually linked to drug supply 
(NCA, 2018b, p. 52).
The EMCDDA-commissioned pilot study of drug-related 
homicide in Finland, the Netherlands and Sweden shows 
that firearms were used in 54 % of the Dutch drug-related 
cases, compared with 19 % in Finland and 39 % in Sweden. 
Firearms featured in drug-related homicides twice as often 
as in non drug-related events. In general, drug-related 
homicides involved a firearm more often than non-drug-
related homicides (EMCDDA, 2019c).
Recently there appears to have been an increase in the 
use of hand grenades in the context of drug markets (Barry 
and Anderson, 2018; Dalton, 2018). In Sweden increasing 
numbers of seizures of grenades linked to cases of illicit 
drug trade-related extortion and victimisation have been 
reported. According to police national figures, 43 hand 
grenades were seized in the country in 2017, of which 21 
had been detonated. In 2016, 55 were seized, of which 
35 had been detonated, whereas only 10 detonated 
grenades were seized in 2015 (Roden, 2018). A similar 
trend and related incidents of drug-related violence 
involving explosives have been reported in the Netherlands 
too. Former conflict zones, e.g. the Western Balkans, are 
a significant source of illegal firearms and explosives, 
including grenades (Hustad, 2018; Triebel, 2016).
Encrypted communication devices
Encrypted communication devices have become important 
criminal tools, making use of technological advances 
as highlighted above. High-end encrypted smartphones 
continue to be preferred by OCGs to reduce the visibility 
of their activities to law enforcement. OCGs use encrypted 
communication devices and apps as their primary means 
of communication, owing to the content protection features 
available on these devices and applications (see Case 
study 18).
A recent study on technology and organised crime in 
the smart city indicated that, just as mobile telephones 
revolutionised drug dealing back in the early 1990s, drug 
dealers have made extensive use of developments in 
mobile phones and other communication technologies 
and have a sophisticated understanding of their uses and 
potential vulnerabilities to law enforcement investigation 
(Berry, 2018).
With data encryption playing an increasingly important role 
in data protection, like other technological developments it 
provides opportunities for criminals and challenges for law 
enforcement. For example, the entry into effect of the EU 
General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) means that all 
personal information on registrants of domain names has 
been redacted from the publicly available WHOIS database. 
Consequently, all public institutions whose task it is to 
combat fraud and protect consumers, to investigate and 
prosecute online crime and to protect network information 
systems (computer emergency response teams) have lost 
direct access to an essential source of information for their 
online investigations: domain name registration information 
(WHOIS data). The end of direct access to WHOIS data 
represents a threat to investigations, including those of 
terrorism, serious organised crime, child sexual abuse and 
cybercrime. EU Member States are reporting to Europol 
a steadily increasing number of investigations hampered 
and delayed by the lack of access to WHOIS data.
While data encryption is an important tool to provide 
protection and privacy to GDPR-mandated data, it should 
be stressed that increased availability and ongoing 
advancement in this area will probably continue to 
provide drug traffickers with a diverse range of resources 
to conduct their activity and impede law enforcement 
investigations.
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Fraudulent documents 
Fraudulent documents are a significant issue, as they 
enable a range of crimes, including drug trafficking, human 
trafficking and terrorism. Drug-trafficking OCGs use 
fraudulent documents for various purposes. For example, 
fraudulent personal identity documents may be used by 
truck drivers transporting illicit drugs; work contracts may 
be obtained to pretend that companies conduct actual 
businesses with employees or to provide cover to criminals 
who are falsely declared to be company employees; or 
fraudulent transportation and customs bills may be used 
to facilitate the cross-border transfer of cash, justified as 
payments (Savona and Riccardi, 2018).
A number of darknet markets provide access to such 
documents, some of which come with bills or bank 
statements as proof of identity. Based on open source 
information from darknet markets, in 2018 there were 
425 listings of fraudulent papers that said they would be 
shipped from European countries.
As highlighted by Europol in its latest SOCTA, the use 
of fraudulent documents in the EU has significantly 
increased and is expected to emerge as one of the 
fastest-growing criminal markets over the coming years 
(Europol, 2017b, p. 20). In response, the Council of the 
EU in May 2017 identified document fraud as one of the 
10 crime priorities to be addressed between 2018 and 
2021 (see Chapter 8).
CASE STUDY 18
Encrypted phones for criminal purposes
In 2017 Dutch police arrested 
the owner of a company that sold 
encrypted mobile phones. Although 
the manufacture and sale of such 
phones are legal, Dutch investigators 
maintained that their primary purpose 
was to facilitate drug trafficking and 
other crime. The phones sold for 
around EUR 1 200 and were preloaded 
with additional encryption software.
Details emerged during the 
investigation of an assassination, 
when forensics were able to decrypt 
messages that were located on 
BlackBerry phones encrypted with 
Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) containing 
the communications between the 
perpetrators and the man who ordered 
the hit. All BlackBerry devices were 
provided by a single company; were 
paid for in cash; and lacked a camera 
and a microphone, able only to send 
out encrypted text messages. The 
objective for investigators was not only 
to prove that the company was acting 
as a crime facilitator but also to locate 
the Blackberry Enterprise Server 
(BES). Consequently, the director 
and managers of the company were 
arrested and financial assets were 
confiscated along with illegal firearms.
During the investigations, detectives 
found that communications between 
the criminals in the Netherlands were 
routed through a BES in Canada. In 
collaboration with police in Canada 
they were also able to secure 
several terabytes of encrypted data 
from the BES server. The (meta)
data contained information on drug 
prices and the specific areas of 
crime in which a number of groups 
were active. Notably, detail was 
unveiled about the activity of the 
Mocro-Mafia, a group that received 
shipments of cocaine in Antwerp 
and ultimately was responsible for 
a number of assassinations across the 
Netherlands. Cases like this prompt 
a discussion on future procedures for 
law enforcement agencies in terms of 
questions around privacy/security.
Sources: Cox (2017); Egberts (2017).
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Increasing preparedness through a future-oriented approach
A central message that comes through in this report is that the drug market 
is increasingly dynamic, with OCGs quick to innovate and take advantage of 
opportunities presented by the global and digital economies. This is in many ways no 
different from the situation observed across areas of legitimate commercial activity, 
in which successful business models are increasingly ones that are future-oriented 
and highly adaptive to changing circumstances. Drug policies and accompanying 
law enforcement responses, on the other hand, are usually reactive. An example can 
be seen around the emergence of NPS over the last decade, a phenomenon that has 
posed a serious challenge to existing policy and response models.
There is a growing body of knowledge of how taking a future-oriented approach can 
increase preparedness to respond to potential future challenges, helping to create 
institutional resilience and fostering more agile policy approaches. There are various 
approaches to future-oriented planning and analysis. Scenario planning is likely to be 
particularly useful for increasing Europe’s preparedness to future challenges linked 
to a more dynamic and innovative drug market. This technique involves forecasting 
a range of different possible future developments and considering their implications 
for harms and appropriate response models. 
There are a number of linked areas where this approach could prove valuable. These 
are all areas in which an impact on the drug market can already be seen but in which 
it can also be predicted that the future implications will potentially be even more 
profound.
Globalisation and developments in infrastructure to support trade. OCGs have been 
quick to recognise the opportunities provided by the creation of a global marketplace 
and to exploit these to circumvent existing control measures. Looking to the future, 
there are a number of areas in which new opportunities for OCG activities may arise. 
China’s Belt and Road initiative, creating a ‘new Silk Road’, could have a profound 
impact on the flow of commercial goods both by road and by maritime routes. 
Rapid developments in virtual currencies and anonymised payment systems, which 
increasingly facilitate the online drug trade and allow OCG groups to reduce risks, are 
likely to continue. A number of other developments are likely to have an impact on the 
final stages of drug distribution models, such as the use of drone technology and the 
expansion in more anonymised ‘pick-up and drop-off’ networks, which are increasingly 
offering 24/7 options for deliveries.
Digitally enabled drug markets and cybercrime. The need to move large quantities 
of goods rapidly to consumers creates a parallel need to manage large amounts of 
information and underpins the moves towards digitalisation and automation in both 
the areas of intermodal transportation (containerisation) and of parcel and post 
technology. More generally, both the darknet and surface web and the use of social 
media applications are growing in importance for drug distribution, while the use of 
encryption, anonymised or semi-anonymised networks, and virtual currencies is also 
likely to become increasingly important and challenging for law enforcement. These 
digital and online developments bring with them new cybercrime risks but, at the same 
time, also potential opportunities for regulation and law enforcement, such as the 
development of artificial intelligence systems.
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Exploitation of regulatory gaps and differences. The development of global 
e-commerce services has provided OCGs with the ability to exploit regulatory 
differences across geographical space, as illustrated in recent developments in the 
NPS area and in precursors for drug production. Potential opportunities for exploitation 
include regulatory differences in areas such as medicines, lifestyle and other products 
that may contain psychoactive chemicals or be converted into them, and also the 
existence of a regulated cannabis market in some parts of the world and the parallel 
rapid innovation in the products and forms of the drug available.
Disruption to existing market models. Many of the new developments described in 
this report lower the barrier to new entrants into the drug market. An obvious example 
of this is the way ‘entrepreneurs’ can sell synthetic opioids purchased online and thus 
compete with heroin suppliers, who require a complex infrastructure to transport and 
protect their product. They also create the conditions for OCGs to operate in new 
ways and diversify their interests across illicit products. Overall, these developments 
create the conditions for disruptive criminal business models, greater competition 
and associated conflict, with the potential for an increase in harms, including violence, 
associated with the drug market as highlighted, in this report.
Impact of the growth of new drug markets in less economically developed countries. 
Historically, drug problems were often viewed through a lens that focused on drugs 
produced in the developing world and consumed in the developed world. However, as 
noted in this report, the EU is increasingly both a source and a transit point for drugs 
consumed elsewhere. Moreover, demographic and social changes mean that the drug 
problems of the future will increasingly be manifest in less economically developed 
countries. This can be seen today in the growth in opioid problems in some African 
countries or in cocaine markets growing among more affluent populations in Asia. 
These changes often occur where capacity to monitor them is weak and where drug 
problems have the potential to exacerbate other health and security threats. The direct 
and indirect implications of these changes, both locally and on the EU, may potentially 
be profound.
Impact of conflict, political instability and climate change. The lowering of barriers to 
entry into the drug market already noted, combined with the considerable profits that 
involvement can deliver, especially when other means of income generation become 
difficult or when governance structures are weakened, mean that conflict and social 
instability is a strong pull factor for drug market involvement, both in the EU and 
elsewhere. Moreover, those affected by conflict and social instability also become 
more vulnerable to recruitment or exploitation by OCGs involved in the drug trade. 
A vicious circle can develop, as the income generated by the illicit trade adds further to 
instability by undermining governance, and alliances develop between OCGs involved 
in drug trafficking and other groups that pose a threat to security. Looking to the future, 
existing conflicts will continue to pose a multifaceted security threat to the EU, and 
drugs are likely to be an element in this that could be overlooked. Climate change 
will increasingly add to these pressures, while also potentially leading to a shift in the 
places in which drug production is possible.
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Key points
Cannabis in Europe
 Cannabis is the biggest drug market in the EU and 
a major source of income for the criminal economy. 
With around 25 million people reporting having used 
the drug in the past year, the retail market for cannabis 
is conservatively estimated to be worth at least 
EUR 11.6 billion.
 Europe is a major cannabis producer; it is estimated that 
at least 20 000 cannabis cultivation sites are dismantled in 
the EU each year, although the number of sites producing 
cannabis at any given time is likely to be much higher.
 Diversity in OCG involvement and levels of intergroup 
violence appear to be increasing. OCGs of Moroccan origin 
still play a major role in cannabis resin trafficking, and 
groups of Dutch origin especially, but also of Vietnamese 
origin, are important for large-scale production. However, 
more generally, involvement in the cannabis market can 
be an important cash generator for both established and 
emerging OCGs, leading to increased intergroup violence.
 The cannabis market is becoming more diverse and 
complex. Illicitly produced herbal cannabis and cannabis 
resin continue to be the most commonly used forms of 
cannabis and tend to be much more potent than in the 
past. The market now also includes high-potency cannabis 
oils, synthetic cannabinoids, cannabis and cannabinoid 
products and preparations intended for medical use, and 
an increasing number of cannabidiol (CBD) or low-THC 
products being sold in a range of forms. The regulatory 
status of these varies considerably, posing new challenges 
for law enforcement, regulation and monitoring.
 Consumption estimates generally appear stable, with 
around one in seven young adults (aged 15-34) in the EU 
reporting having used cannabis in the last year, although 
there are recent signs of increases in younger age cohorts 
in some countries.
Developments in production and 
trafficking
 Production near to, or by, consumers creates additional 
challenges for law enforcement. A large proportion of the 
herbal cannabis consumed in the EU is grown there, closer 
to its place of consumption, rather than being imported 
from outside the EU, reducing the need to traffic the drug 
across external borders and lowering the risk of interdiction. 
This and how to address small-scale production, which 
is tolerated in some Member States, creates a more 
challenging landscape for law enforcement actions.
 Morocco’s Rif Mountains are the region of origin of 
most of the cannabis resin available in Europe. Increased 
cooperation with European cannabis producers appears 
to explain the spread of high-yield, high-potency varieties 
of cannabis in this region and therefore the increase in the 
potency of cannabis resin observed in Europe over the last 
10 years.
 Cannabis production causes a range of environmental 
harms. In Morocco it has been associated with soil 
erosion, deforestation and water security issues, probably 
exacerbated by the introduction of new plant strains. In the 
EU, production is also linked to environmental, and health 
and safety risks.
 Diffusion is evident in cannabis resin trafficking routes. 
While Spain remains the main entry point into the EU, the 
CHAPTER 3
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trafficking of resin produced in Morocco and Lebanon now 
affects the Mediterranean Sea region as a whole, following 
the emergence of Libya as a major storage and transit hub 
for the drug.
 The Netherlands and Spain are commonly identified as 
the source of origin of seizures made by EU countries. In 
addition, despite efforts to counter production, the Western 
Balkans, and Albania in particular, appears to remain an 
important source of origin for herbal cannabis seizures.
 The frequency of small-volume online cannabis sales is 
increasing. Although the scale is currently small compared 
with traditional retail markets, it has considerable potential 
to grow.
Implications for action to address 
current threats and increase 
preparedness
To identify and respond to new threats related to the 
cannabis market there is a need to take the following 
actions.
  Give high priority to sharing information and best 
practice on law enforcement strategies to detect 
significant cannabis production sites in the EU, 
including models for cooperation with relevant utility 
services, and strengthen the standardised reporting of 
interdiction activities in this area.
  Improve the monitoring and assess the impact of 
trends in cannabis products available on the EU 
markets. This requires better forensic evidence on the 
content and sources of cannabis seizures as well as 
the identification of any new higher-potency forms of 
cannabis appearing on the market.
  Invest greater efforts in monitoring, analysis and 
information sharing to understand the dynamics 
of cannabis trafficking and production in countries 
bordering the EU. Crop-monitoring programmes in 
close cooperation with important countries such as 
Albania and Morocco would contribute to this.
  Strengthen EU interagency cooperation and develop 
targeted enforcement actions to identify and respond 
to any threats resulting from Libya’s emerging role as 
a significant storage and transit country.
  Follow closely and assess the implications for 
the cannabis market, and the potential risks, of 
commercial, medical and regulatory developments 
occurring internationally and within EU Member States. 
Strengthen coordination of activities at EU level to 
ensure that the roles and responsibilities of various 
partners, including law enforcement and regulatory 
bodies, are well articulated.
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Introduction
The market for cannabis products is the largest drug market 
in Europe, since cannabis is the most commonly used 
illicit drug both in Europe and worldwide (UNODC, 2019a). 
It is estimated that 91.2 million adults in the EU (aged 
15-64), or 27.4 % of this age group, have tried cannabis 
during their lives and 7.4 % have used cannabis in the last 
year. Use among young adults is even more common, with 
an estimated 14.4 % of people aged between 15 and 34 
having used cannabis in the last year.
In most countries, recent survey results show either stable 
or increasing last year cannabis use among young adults. 
Of the countries that have produced surveys since 2016 
and reported confidence intervals, six reported higher 
estimates than in the previous comparable survey, five 
were stable and one reported a decrease. In 11 of these 
countries, an increase in use among 15- to 24-year-olds has 
been reported in the most recent survey (EMCDDA, 2019b).
The illicit cultivation of cannabis mainly yields two distinct 
cannabis products: herbal cannabis (marijuana) and 
cannabis resin (hashish). Other cannabis products available 
in the EU include cannabis oil and hash oil. In the last few 
years a variety of other high-potency extracts of cannabis, 
collectively known as ‘concentrates’ (e.g. rosin, crumble and 
wax), have been seen on the European market, although 
reliable information about these products is rather limited 
(see Figure 3.1).
These products all differ in terms of their ‘potency’. In 
pharmacology, ‘potency’ is often related to the amount 
(dose) of the drug required to produce an effect. Therefore, 
using ‘potency’ to describe the concentration of THC 
in cannabis products is not technically correct. A more 
accurate term would be ‘strength’, which is the amount of 
THC in a defined unit of the product. For consistency with 
previous publications and reports, however, we use the term 
‘potency’ throughout this report (see box ‘THC and CBD’).
THC and CBD
The cannabis plant synthesises at least 144 unique 
compounds known as cannabinoids. The most 
abundant of these is delta-9-tetrahydrocannabinol 
(THC), which produces effects such as feeling ‘high’, 
relaxation and altered perception, effects that people 
who use cannabis (recreationally) usually pursue 
from the drug.
Cannabidiol (CBD) is the second most abundant 
cannabinoid that is typically produced by the 
cannabis plant. CBD has been found to offset 
some of the possible harmful effects of THC (such 
as memory impairment and paranoia) without 
influencing the ‘high’ that users seek.
THC and CBD are both synthesised in the cannabis 
plant in the glandular trichomes, which are 
resinous and sticky, helping to defend the plant 
against herbivores and environmental stresses. 
The production of THC and CBD is genetically 
determined, with plants producing high levels of 
THC, high levels of CBD or a mixture of the two. In 
the cannabis plant, THC and CBD are synthesised 
from the same precursor, which means that CBD 
production limits the amount of THC synthesised and 
vice versa (EMCDDA, 2019d).
In the EU, it is legal to cultivate and supply cannabis 
plants for hemp fibre if they have low levels of 
THC. The granting of payments under the common 
agricultural policy is conditional upon the use of 
certified seeds of specified hemp varieties; only 
varieties with a THC content not exceeding 0.2 % 
may be used (EU Regulation 1307/2013) (EMCDDA, 
2018f). However, this report focuses on the illicit 
production and distribution of cannabis products with 
a higher THC content.
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Global overview
Cannabis is the most commonly used illicit drug in the 
world and is reported to be produced in almost all countries 
in the world, both indoors and outdoors. The extensive and 
diverse nature of cannabis production makes it impossible 
to produce reliable estimates of global production. 
However, based on expert opinion and information from 
105 countries, the UNODC reports that global cannabis 
cultivation is likely to have increased between 2010 and 
2017 (UNODC, 2019a).
In 2017, some 1 161 tonnes of cannabis resin was seized 
worldwide, about 30 % less than in 2016. After peaking at 
6 800 tonnes in 2004, worldwide herbal cannabis seizures 
declined to 4 682 tonnes in 2016, but then rose to 5 109 
tonnes in 2017 (UNODC, 2019a).
In addition to the legal production of hemp (see box ‘THC 
and CBD’), legislative changes in parts of the world have 
led to the juxtaposition of regulated cannabis markets, 
in which products for medicinal and recreational use are 
produced and distributed by legal companies, and the illicit 
Figure 3.1 
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cannabis market, in which cannabis is either produced, 
trafficked and distributed by organised crime groups 
or cultivated for personal use or for sharing with other 
people but still operates outside the legal framework. 
These changes have led to a diversification of products 
as well as complicating the context within which policy 
and operational responses are conducted. In 2019, 
the rescheduling of cannabis in the UN drug control 
conventions was recommended by the World Health 
Organization (see box ‘WHO recommendations related to 
cannabis and cannabis-related subustances’).
Production
Cultivation processes
The quality of the plant and of all the products derived from 
it depends on many factors. It is essential to have sufficient 
light exposure (natural or artificial) and have access to 
good-quality seeds, cuttings or clones. Further, the method 
of cultivation, the number of plants per square metre, 
water supply and soil acidity or alkalinity (which affects 
the availability of nutrients) may influence the yield of the 
cultivation site.
WHO recommendations related to cannabis and cannabis-related substances
In November 2018, the WHO Expert Committee on 
Drug Dependence (ECDD) critically reviewed cannabis 
and cannabis-related substances. In January 2019, 
the ECDD recommendations were submitted by the 
WHO to the Secretary-General of the United Nations as 
follows.
  Cannabis and cannabis resin to be deleted from 
Schedule IV of the Single Convention on Narcotic 
drugs (1961). The ECDD considered that the 
abuse and ill-effects associated with cannabis 
and cannabis resin were similar to drugs in 
Schedule I and were not commensurate with the 
other substances in Schedule IV. The Committee 
acknowledged there is now evidence that cannabis 
preparations have therapeutic advantages.
  Dronabinol (delta-9-tetrahydrocannabinol) to be 
added to Schedule I of the 1961 Convention and 
deleted from Schedule II of the Convention on 
Psychotropic Substances (1971). The criterion 
for recommending that dronabinol be included in 
Schedule I was the criterion of similarity in liability 
to abuse and to produce ill-effects to cannabis and 
preparations of cannabis. This follows a similar 
approach applied to coca leaf, where the plant and 
the drug that is included in the plant (cocaine) are 
controlled within the same schedule.
  Tetrahydrocannabinol (the isomers of delta-9-
tetrahydrocannabinol) to be added to Schedule 
I of 1961 Convention and deleted from Schedule 
I of the 1971 Convention, subject to the adoption 
of the recommendation on dronabinol above. The 
isomers of THC, including the isomer dronabinol, 
comprise a varied group of substances for none 
of which there is convincing evidence that would 
satisfy the criteria for inclusion in Schedule I of the 
1971 Convention.
  Extracts and tinctures of cannabis to be deleted 
from Schedule I of 1961 Convention. There are 
three main types of illicit products derived from the 
cannabis plant: extracts, tinctures and products 
derived by application of heat or pressure. Under 
the 1961 Convention, ‘preparation’ is a general 
term covering mixtures, solids or liquids containing 
a substance. The ECDD therefore concluded that 
by relying on control of preparations of cannabis 
there is greater certainty of the control measure.
  Cannabidiol (CBD) preparations – a footnote to 
be added to the entry for cannabis and cannabis 
resin in Schedule I of the 1961 Convention 
that ‘preparations containing predominantly 
cannabidiol and not more than 0.2 % delta-9-
tetrahydrocannabinol are not under international 
control’. It is noted that while CBD does not satisfy 
the criteria for control under the 1961 or 1971 
Conventions, Member States can regulate its 
availability using their own national legislation.
  Recommendation on pharmaceutical preparations 
of cannabis and delta-9-tetrahydrocannabinol 
(dronabinol) to be added to Schedule III of the 
1961 Convention. Preparations of controlled 
drugs included in Schedule III are exempted from 
some of the requirements for control of these 
drugs under Schedule I or II. However, they are still 
subject to a significant level of control.
Source: WHO (2019) and letter of the WHO Director General to the UN 
Secretary General.
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Outdoor cultivation varies in scale and can produce up to 
three harvests per year depending upon the weather, the 
amount of light and the strain of cannabis used (EMCDDA 
and Europol, 2016). Indoor cultivation sites range from 
small-scale home-grown operations with fewer than 20 
plants to professional ones of many hundreds of plants 
run by criminal networks that are often located in houses 
or apartments taken over for the sole purpose of growing, 
or in industrial warehouses or large sheds. The control 
that can be exercised over growing conditions (light, heat, 
water, plant density, pest control, etc.) allows continuous 
cultivation throughout the year and can result in four to 
six full harvests per annum (Vanhove et al., 2012). The 
benefits of indoor cultivation include lower risk of detection 
and generally higher yields of higher-potency strains and 
less chance of spoilage due to adverse weather or pest 
infestation.
The production of cannabis resin, or hashish, involves 
dislodging the glandular trichomes (small hairs that contain 
the resinous secretions; Figure 3.2) that form mostly on 
flowers (buds). The result is a fine powder that is high in 
THC, which is then compressed to form hashish. Traditional 
methods of resin production include rubbing and sieving 
(Figure 3.3). Leaves removed from the plants, and often 
discarded as waste from herbal cannabis, may be used for 
resin production by sieving, but using the flowers produces 
a higher-potency product. In addition to traditional methods 
of resin production, commercially available alternatives, 
often called pollinators, are also used. By reducing the 
temperature, using ice water or dry ice, these improve 
the efficiency of the process, as the trichomes are more 
easily removed, increasing the potency of the final product 
(EMCDDA, 2019d).
In addition to resin production, there are several alternative 
methods for extracting cannabinoids from cannabis 
plants. The physical removal of resinous secretions 
from the trichomes can be performed more efficiently 
through the use of solvents or gases. These methods can 
achieve significantly higher potencies. Some of these 
processes, especially those using flammable gases, are 
known to be hazardous and have led to a number of 
accidental explosions in several Member States. One 
method of extraction uses liquefied butane gas to produce 
concentrated extracts ranging from 70 % to 80 % THC, 
known as ‘butane hash oil’ or BHO. In order to produce 
butane hash oil, ground cannabis flower may be packed 
into a sealed tube with a fine mesh covering the base. 
Butane is added from a compressed canister fitted to the 
top of the tube and the result is collected in a tray under the 
base. The solution is then evaporated through heating to 
produce the final product (this is sometimes referred to as 
purging). Depending on the solvent used and the method 
of purging, the finished product can vary in consistency. 
For example, ‘shatter’ is hard and brittle, ‘wax’ resembles 
a soft wax and ‘crumble’ is soft and flaky. ‘Rosin’ is a similar 
product made by heating and pressure, but it does not 
require any solvent.
Figure 3.2 
Glandular trichomes on the surface of a cannabis 
flower bud
Photo: David Potter 
Figure 3.3 
The production of cannabis resin through the ‘sieving’ 
method using a mesh screen
Photos: David Potter 
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Herbal cannabis
Production outside the EU
Albania has for several years been a major non-EU 
producer of herbal cannabis destined for the European 
market. In response to the large-scale outdoor cultivation 
of herbal cannabis, Albanian authorities have intensified 
eradication actions in cooperation with the Italian Guardia 
di Finanza law enforcement organisation, which conducted 
aerial surveillance to locate cannabis cultivation sites in 
remote and difficult-to-access areas. Overall, Albanian 
authorities dismantled 5 205 cannabis cultivation sites in 
2016, 500 in 2017 and 379 in 2018 (Albanian State Police, 
2019), suggesting that eradication efforts are having an 
effect on outdoor cultivation (Figure 3.4). Notwithstanding 
the law enforcement efforts and apparent scaling down of 
outdoor production, many countries in Europe reported an 
increase in seizures of Albanian herbal cannabis in 2017 
(Austria, Croatia, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Romania, Sweden, 
Turkey and the United Kingdom). Furthermore, Albania 
seized over 30 tonnes of herbal cannabis in 2016 and 
more than 78 tonnes in 2017; of the EMCDDA reporting 
countries, only Turkey (92 tonnes) and Italy (90 tonnes) 
seized more herbal cannabis than Albania that year 
(EMCDDA, 2019b). The observed reduction in outdoor 
cultivation sites coupled with the apparently continuous 
flow of cannabis from the region to the EU could imply that 
stockpiles are held in the region, or that some cultivation 
may have moved indoors or to areas with restricted 
possibilities for aerial surveillance, or to neighbouring areas 
in Western Balkan countries. This suggests a need for 
further investigation and monitoring.
According to information reported to Europol, the 
production of herbal cannabis in some other Western 
Balkan states is also increasing and is intended in part for 
the EU market. Herbal cannabis produced in the Western 
Balkans is increasingly trafficked to the EU by vessels 
crossing the Adriatic Sea to Italy and by land on the 
Balkan route. The number of detected indoor cultivation 
sites in the region has also been increasing over the last 
few years.
Apart from the Western Balkans, herbal cannabis is 
cultivated in other regions of the world for the European 
drug market. For example, multi-tonne seizures of herbal 
cannabis originating from West Africa, south-west Asia 
and the Caribbean are discussed later in the section on 
trafficking.
Production in the EU
In the EU, herbal cannabis appears to be mainly produced 
for sale on domestic markets and in neighbouring countries 
rather than for export outside the region, although 
data on the phenomenon are lacking. A tool has been 
developed by the EMCDDA and Europol for collecting 
data on the number and scale of the cannabis cultivation 
sites dismantled by law enforcement agencies in Europe 
(European Reporting on Illicit Cannabis Production, ERICP). 
Plant seizure data, national expertise and ad hoc data 
provided by law enforcement agencies and national focal 
points from the EU Member States are therefore used to 
illustrate important developments in cannabis cultivation in 
the EU.
Seizures of cannabis plants may be regarded as an 
indicator of the production of the drug within a country. 
However, differences between countries, in law 
enforcement priorities, resources and reporting practices, 
warrant caution in the interpretation of these data 
(e.g. Figure 3.5). Recent changes to data collection tools 
have facilitated the reporting of seizures of cannabis 
seeds. National control is not obligatory for cannabis 
seeds, although they are specified as subject to the drug 
control laws in Cyprus and Portugal. In other countries, 
supply of cannabis seeds for cultivation is often covered 
by a more general offence of ‘facilitating drug production’ 
or something similar (EMCDDA, 2018f). Although the data 
coverage is partial for now, it will improve with time. Seven 
countries (Belgium, Greece, Spain, Luxembourg, Malta, 
Portugal and Norway) reported a total of 1 483 seizures 
amounting to almost 50 kg and more than 18 000 packets 
of cannabis seeds in 2017.
In 2016-17 the number of plants reported by the 
Netherlands decreased while the number of plants 
Figure 3.4 
Albanian police eradicating an outdoor cannabis plantation
Photo: State Police Albania 
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reported by Spain increased (Figure 3.5). The cultivation 
of herbal cannabis has been noted to have significantly 
increased in Spain over the last few years. Several factors 
seem to be influencing the situation in Spain. Hundreds of 
cannabis social clubs exist in Spain, which are supposed 
to produce cannabis for non-profit distribution to their 
members. In addition, there is an expanding network of 
so-called grow shops, which sell equipment, chemicals and 
literature that promote and facilitate cannabis cultivation. 
Both the clubs and the shops are vulnerable to the 
penetration of criminals seeking to develop large 
plantations and profitable businesses. These groups are 
interested in trading and profiting from their crops, often 
by exporting their products (Alvarez-Roldan et al., 2016). 
It should also be noted that law enforcement intelligence 
confirms that some large growing operations in Spain 
are established as collaborations between Dutch and 
Spanish criminal groups. In addition, there are reports 
that producers of cannabis extracts (including high-
quality resin) linked to these clubs are established in the 
Rif region of Morocco (see section below on cannabis 
resin). Cannabis clubs and grow shops may exist in other 
European countries, although it appears not to the same 
extent. Cannabis social clubs have been established in 
Belgium, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Slovenia, Spain, 
Switzerland and the United Kingdom. However, it is unclear 
if clubs still exist in all of these countries, and if they 
engage in production and distribution among members as 
in the Spanish model (Decorte and Pardal, 2017; Pardal, 
2018).
Historically, the Netherlands has been an important source 
of herbal cannabis supply within Europe. Each year the 
Dutch police have dismantled more than 5 000 cannabis 
cultivation sites, the majority of them indoors, although 
the numbers have declined in recent years (Dutch Police, 
2019). A major study conducted by Belgian and Dutch 
researchers has highlighted important details about how 
these operate. The multimethod study, entitled ‘Dismark’, 
used a varied range of data sources, including a review 
of public prosecutors’ files and the collection of data 
from law enforcement personnel and convicted prisoners 
to investigate illicit markets for different substances 
(De Middeleer et al., 2018). In relation to cannabis, it was 
found that Dutch OCGs have established a business model 
that guarantees a continued supply of herbal cannabis 
to the Dutch domestic market, including the cannabis 
coffeeshops, or for further distribution to other European 
countries. The model involves the transfer of know-how and 
provision of professional growing equipment to ‘caretaker-
growers’ in return for all or a portion of the harvests 
generated by the growing operations. 
This business model has been extended to other EU 
Member States, first Belgium and Germany and more 
recently France and Spain. In Belgium, in addition to 
satisfying some of the national demand for herbal 
cannabis, large-scale production is distributed on various 
EU markets via the Netherlands using this model. Over 
time, Belgian OCGs have adopted the know-how and have 
expanded the domestic market. According to the study, 
in addition to Dutch and Belgian criminal cooperation, 
law enforcement agencies indicated cooperation 
among North African OCGs, Turkish and Bulgarian 
OCGs, Albanian-speaking OCGs, and South East Asian 
(Vietnamese or Chinese) OCGs and outlaw motorcycle 
gangs (De Middeleer et al., 2018). In addition, some reports 
suggest that individuals linked to Dutch coffeeshops have 
become established in the Rif region of Morocco, where 
they produce a range of extracts, including high-quality 
cannabis resin (Chouvy and Macfarlane, 2018; see also the 
section below on cannabis resin).
The high numbers of cannabis plants reported by Italy and 
the United Kingdom suggest that significant amounts of 
herbal cannabis are produced there (Figure 3.5). In the 
United Kingdom, domestic production is widespread, 
with British and South-East Asian OCGs controlling these 
operations. More recent information suggests that an 
increasing number of Albanian-speaking OCGs are also 
engaged in this activity. The majority of these growing 
operations produce a perceived lower-quality product; 
Figure 3.5 
EU Member States that reported seizing the most 
cannabis plants, 2013-17
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the demand for ‘branded’ or high-quality herbal cannabis 
remains high, and it is usually imported from Belgium 
and the Netherlands and commands a premium price, 
compared with the domestically produced herbal cannabis.
The involvement of Vietnamese OCGs in cannabis 
cultivation in EU Member States is not a new phenomenon 
as they have been active in this area in the United Kingdom, 
Ireland and Czechia as well as Norway and Sweden for 
a number of years. More recently this has also been 
reported by Denmark, Slovakia and Greece. In recent 
years, Czechia has observed a reduction in cannabis 
cultivation associated with Vietnamese OCGs, probably as 
a result of their moving into methamphetamine production 
(see Chapter 6). Meanwhile, Czechia reports that Serbian 
criminal groups have stepped in, establishing indoor 
cannabis cultivation sites intended for the local market 
and for export. Europol information also suggests that 
the Bosnian, Croatian and Serbian OCGs are increasingly 
involved in the indoor cultivation and trafficking of herbal 
cannabis within the EU.
This diversification of OCGs involved in large-scale 
cannabis cultivation in the EU is likely to be the result of 
a combination of several factors, including high demand, 
increasing prices and lower penalties than for the 
trafficking of other illicit drugs. These groups increasingly 
rely on the support of specialists in cultivation, which allows 
groups without specific expertise to set up larger and more 
complex operations. This probably explains why almost 
all countries reporting to the EMCDDA have mentioned 
continued professionalisation and up-scaling of cannabis 
production.
Estimating the extent of cannabis production in 
Europe
Estimating the total production of cannabis in Europe 
remains a difficult exercise. There is currently little 
systematic monitoring of cannabis cultivation and 
production, not only in Europe, but also worldwide 
(EMCDDA, 2019b; UNODC, 2018a). Furthermore, the 
existing studies on yield determination (Toonen et al., 2006; 
Vanhove et al., 2014) are limited to fixed sets of growing 
conditions, which makes the calculation of yield in sites 
operating under different conditions problematic (Vanhove 
et al., 2017). To extrapolate these calculations to a national 
production estimate requires further data that are currently 
unavailable (van der Giessen et al., 2016). In spite of such 
limitations, it may be important for policy-making purposes 
to provide rough estimates of how much cannabis is 
produced in key countries (see box ‘Estimating herbal 
cannabis production in the Netherlands’).
Environmental impact and hazards of cannabis 
cultivation
The indoor cultivation of herbal cannabis requires 
significant amounts of water and electricity, and often 
entails the use of chemicals, which may be discharged to 
land or aquatic environments and harm these ecosystems. 
The methods that are used in illicit cannabis cultivation 
are driven by the need to maintain profit margins and 
secrecy, rather than minimising environmental damage. 
Furthermore, to ensure high temperatures in indoor 
cultivation sites and appropriate lighting conditions, 
an average indoor cannabis cultivation site has been 
estimated to produce 4 600 kg of CO
2 
emissions per 
kilogram of finished product (Jenkins, 2019). While some 
EU Member States report the dumping of used materials 
from cannabis cultivation, such as contaminated soil, filters 
and empty chemical containers, the environmental impact 
of cannabis-growing operations largely continues to be 
Estimating herbal cannabis production in the 
Netherlands
Based on relatively recent research, we believe it 
is possible, even with the limitations of scientific 
studies on the subject, to arrive at a useful estimate 
of a harvest expressed in yield per square metre of 
cultivation surface. Vanhove et al. (2014), in their 
attempt to estimate cannabis production yields, 
arrived at an average of 575 g of herbal cannabis per 
cultivated square metre. When applying the average 
number of 16 plants per square metre in a modal 
cultivation site to the total number of plants seized in 
the Netherlands in 2017 (722 618), this would result 
in a tentative yield estimate for annual cannabis 
production in the Netherlands of 520 tonnes. This 
calculation is based on an average of four growing 
cycles per year and an estimated dismantling rate of 
20 % (CBS, 2018).
In 2018, the Dutch electricity provider (Netbeheer 
Nederland) was able to detect energy theft that could 
be related to 2 600 cannabis cultivation sites. People 
running these growing operations stole a total of 
95 million kilowatt hours in 2018, costing the provider 
a total of EUR 60 million and the government about 
EUR 135 million in tax revenues. Based on police 
estimates of about 30 000 illicit cannabis cultivation 
sites in the Netherlands, these would consume 
and possibly steal about 1 billion kilowatt hours of 
electricity, equivalent to the annual consumption of 
all households in the city of Rotterdam, which has 
650 000 inhabitants (Netbeheer Nederland, 2019).
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a knowledge gap in need of more research (Ashworth and 
Vizuete, 2017).
Illicit cultivation sites do not comply with health and safety 
standards, so they present potential hazards not only to the 
public, but also to law enforcement and other professionals. 
These can be physical, electrical, chemical or biological 
hazards (Vanhove et al., 2018).
  Physical: booby traps may be installed to protect the 
crop from theft or destruction. Structural modifications 
made to the premises, e.g. holes made in walls to 
accommodate wiring, pipework and flexible ducting, 
may lead to instability and possible collapse of the 
building.
  Electrical: improper wiring may lead to electrocution, or 
to short circuits that may cause fires.
  Chemical: fertilisers, pesticides and other chemicals 
may cause dermatological or respiratory problems for 
those entering the premises.
  Biological: cannabis plantations are ideal environments 
for mould development, presenting a risk of inhalation 
of mould spores.
Although only rarely encountered, carbon dioxide 
generators may be used in sophisticated indoor cultivation 
sites to increase the rate of plant growth. In such cases, 
the resulting oxygen-deficient atmosphere is hazardous 
to personnel entering such sites. Sufficient training, 
equipment and expertise should be available to assess 
these risks.
Cannabis resin
Production outside the EU
Historically, for cannabis resin, Europe has relied 
heavily upon sources of production outside the region, 
predominantly Morocco. Afghanistan, Albania and Lebanon 
are mentioned as marginal sources by a limited number 
of countries. However, in the United Kingdom Afghanistan 
is mentioned as a major source, alongside Morocco, and 
Malta seized 11 tonnes of resin en route from Lebanon 
in September 2018, suggesting that Lebanese resin may 
be becoming more available in Europe (Malta Customs 
Department, 2018).
Data from Morocco indicate that both the area under 
cannabis cultivation (47 000 hectares) and the 
estimated quantities of cannabis resin produced in the 
country (between 700 and 760 tonnes) have remained 
constant since 2010 (UNODC, 2012b, 2018a). However, 
these figures do not take into account potential recent 
developments that affect cannabis resin production in 
Morocco and have an impact on the European market. 
More detailed evidence has emerged concerning the 
modernisation of the cannabis industry in Morocco 
mentioned in the previous edition of the EU Drug Markets 
Report. This strongly suggests that European producers 
established in the Rif Mountains have introduced cannabis 
hybrids of various origins that allow much higher resin 
yields and THC contents, replacing traditional varieties 
(Chouvy and Macfarlane, 2018). These European nationals 
are reported to have connections with cannabis social 
clubs in Spain and coffeeshops in the Netherlands, and are 
reported to produce cannabis resin and extracts with high 
potency. Although many traditional Moroccan producers 
seem to have adopted the modern high-yielding varieties of 
cannabis plants introduced by these European producers, 
most of them are still growing cannabis and producing 
resin in a traditional fashion (Chouvy and Macfarlane, 
2018). These changes in Morocco are a major contributor 
to the dramatic increase in the potency of cannabis resin 
seized in many European countries since 2012.
Production in the EU
Some cannabis resin is produced in the EU using ‘modern’ 
methods, such as ice-cooling or ‘pollinating’ (see section on 
cultivation processes above). This appears to be at a small 
scale so far, although data on the origin of the cannabis 
resin available in the EU are limited. Production of cannabis 
resin has been documented in several Member States. 
In the Netherlands, annual monitoring studies in Dutch 
coffeeshops show that a number of shops sell a cannabis 
resin variety called ‘Nederhasj’, referring to the fact that 
the resin has been made in the Netherlands with domestic 
herbal cannabis (Niesink, 2000). However, there are no 
indications of large-scale production; only a minority of the 
coffeeshops in the research sample have locally produced 
resin available. In 2017, the potency of this locally produced 
resin was on average 35 % THC, and there were samples 
containing over 60 %, compared with an average of 21 % 
for imported resins (Rigter and Niesink, 2018).
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In recent years, a number of cannabis cultivation sites, 
specially equipped to produce resin and more potent 
extracts (such as butane hash oil), have been dismantled 
in Europe. For example, a cannabis cultivation site with 
specialised equipment for producing extracts, including 
resin, was dismantled in 2018 by the Hellenic Police, 
leading to the arrest of Dutch, Georgian, Greek and 
Vietnamese nationals. Given the widespread availability 
and apparent ease of purchase, for instance online, of 
resin-producing equipment, and the existence across 
Europe of extensive production of cannabis plants, 
this phenomenon has the potential to become more 
widespread. This is an area that will require monitoring.
Trafficking and supply
Since 2009, the number of seizures of herbal cannabis 
in the EU has exceeded that of cannabis resin, with 
relatively stable trends in both resin and herbal cannabis 
seizures since 2012 (Figure 3.6). In 2017, there were over 
440 000 seizures of herbal cannabis and over 311 000 
seizures of cannabis resin in the EU. In contrast, the 
quantity of cannabis resin seized is currently more than 
double that of herbal cannabis (466 versus 209 tonnes in 
2017), partly as a consequence of cannabis resin being 
more frequently trafficked across borders and in large 
shipments. Because of their strategic location on major 
cannabis resin-trafficking routes and/or their comparatively 
large consumer markets, some countries are particularly 
important when it comes to quantities seized. Spain, for 
example, the major entry point for cannabis resin produced 
in Morocco, reported about three quarters (72 %) of the 
total quantity seized in the EU in 2017 (Figure 3.6).
Over the last few years, Turkey has been seizing large 
amounts of herbal cannabis, and a further recent increase 
in the overall quantity of herbal cannabis seized in the EU 
is mainly due to increases reported in Italy, Spain, Greece, 
France and Hungary.
Figure 3.6 
Number of cannabis seizures and quantity seized in 
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Herbal cannabis
Trafficking from outside the EU
As already discussed, Albania is likely to be the largest 
producer of herbal cannabis trafficked to the EU. During 
2017 and 2018, the large-scale trafficking of herbal cannabis 
from Albania into the EU continued. Italian seizures of 
herbal cannabis increased from nearly 42 tonnes in 2016 
to more than 90 tonnes in 2017, reflecting the intensified 
trafficking activity across the Adriatic Sea. In response to 
the increasing pressure exerted by Italian law enforcement 
authorities, Albanian-speaking OCGs, often in cooperation 
with Italian mafia-style OCGs, now target locations further 
north along the Italian coast as drop-off points. The Greek 
coast guard reports regular movements of small high-speed 
boats from Albania and Italy towards the Aegean and Ionian 
seas, with the intention of smuggling Albanian herbal 
cannabis to Turkey. Albanian-speaking OCGs cooperate with 
other OCGs in several EU Member States: Austria, Croatia, 
Greece, Hungary, Italy, Romania, Sweden, Turkey and the 
United Kingdom report increased seizures of herbal cannabis 
reported to be of Albanian origin. Albanian OCGs involved 
in herbal cannabis also use cash couriers, who typically 
smuggle cash to Albania from the EU by car. In Albania, 
the cash is used to invest in real estate, construction and 
tourism.
Other recent seizures of herbal cannabis produced outside 
the EU are reported by Belgium, Ireland and the United 
Kingdom. Some origin countries have been reported to 
include Ghana, Nigeria, Thailand and the Caribbean. The 
market for these exotic herbal cannabis products is not well 
understood, but such varieties can be found on offer in Dutch 
coffeeshops. It is also probable that some of this imported 
herbal cannabis is destined for African and Caribbean 
communities present in some EU Member States.
Trafficking inside the EU
Although herbal cannabis is produced in each EU Member 
State, this may not be sufficient to satisfy local demand; 
therefore, intra-EU trafficking exists.
There has been a sharp increase in the number of Member 
States reporting Spain as the origin of herbal cannabis 
seizures. Increased domestic production and the involvement 
of Dutch OCGs may contribute to explaining why Spain 
is now exporting herbal cannabis to the rest of Europe, 
sometimes via the Netherlands. Herbal cannabis is trafficked 
from Spain directly to Ireland and the United Kingdom, and, 
after transiting through several countries, to eastern and 
northern Europe (see Cannabis overview, pages 84-85). 
Passenger vehicles and lorries are still the modes of 
transportation most often reported, but many countries also 
report that postal parcels are used for trafficking non-trivial 
amounts of herbal cannabis, sometimes in connection with 
sales on darknet markets. Data collected in postal centres 
in 19 EU countries in 2018 indicate that 874 kg of herbal 
cannabis and 299 kg of resin were seized in parcels and 
letters. Most of the herbal seizures were carried out in Spain, 
and 62 % of those were made from parcels or letters posted 
to destinations outside Spain (Groupe Pompidou and RILO 
WE, 2019).
Belgium and the Netherlands together make up a distribution 
hub for herbal cannabis in the EU (see Cannabis overview, 
pages 84-85). The importance of Czechia as a country of 
origin for herbal cannabis seems to have diminished since 
the last edition of this report, possibly because of changes 
in the crime groups involved in production, discussed 
above. Only Germany and Slovakia still mention Czechia as 
a country of origin of cannabis found on their drug markets, 
illustrating how dynamic such drug markets can be.
The wholesale prices of herbal cannabis are available for 
some EU Member States. Prices tend to be lower closer to 
source countries or large distribution hubs. This is reflected 
in the lowest prices per kilogram being reported by Spain 
(EUR 1 343), Italy (EUR 2 287) and Belgium (EUR 4 525). 
The low prices observed in Italy suggest that cultivation is 
relatively extensive, as is suggested by data on seizures of 
cannabis plants (see above), although they could also reflect 
the large amounts of imported Albanian herbal cannabis 
available in Italy.
Cannabis resin
As mentioned above, most of the cannabis resin available 
on the European drug market comes from Morocco. Spain is 
a key entry point for Moroccan resin, although there has been 
some diversification in trafficking routes and modi operandi 
to the EU in the last few years (see Cannabis overview, pages 
84-85).
The means of transport used to traffic cannabis resin to the 
EU are varied. Cannabis resin continues to be transported 
by lorries on ferries and in maritime shipping containers, as 
well as on recreational craft and fishing boats. The use of 
speedboats that can transport up to 3 tonnes has increased 
considerably over the last few years, prompting the Spanish 
government to impose restrictions on the use of such vessels 
(see Chapter 9). Small private aircraft are also used between 
Morocco and Spain, as well as for intra-EU trafficking.
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After Spain, the countries that seize the largest quantities 
of cannabis resin in Europe are France and Italy, indicating 
that these continue to be major entry points to the EU drug 
market (Figure 3.6). Turkey, which seized the fourth largest 
quantities of resin in Europe in 2017 and indicates Morocco 
as the source, may now also be a significant entry point.
This reflects the frequent use of different branches of the 
Mediterranean Sea route, and the North African land route 
from Morocco to Libya, to traffic cannabis resin, which has 
become an important focus of law enforcement activity (see 
box ‘Rose of the Winds’, page 216). The proximity of Libya 
to two large cannabis resin-producing countries, Morocco 
to the west and Lebanon to the east, and the instability 
currently being experienced in the country make Libya 
a potential weak point in the region that may be exploited 
by traffickers (Figure 3.7). In addition to the potential EU 
market, other possible large consumer markets for the 
cannabis resin shipped to Libya include Egypt and possibly 
Sudan, and countries further afield such as those of the 
Arabian Peninsula. Although investigations indicate links 
in the trafficking of cannabis resin via Libya to the EU, firm 
evidence is lacking at present. Whatever the final destination 
of the drugs, the trafficking of cannabis via Libya may 
generate funds for armed insurgent and terrorist groups 
based in Libya, which could be used to finance terrorism-
related activities outside the EU. It is worth noting that other 
North African countries may become departure points for 
cannabis resin destined for Europe, so this warrants close 
attention.
Trafficking also appears to be increasingly bidirectional. Air 
couriers departing from South America carrying cocaine may 
smuggle cannabis resin back to their region of origin, where 
the price of cannabis resin is approximately the same as the 
price of cocaine. Larger quantities of cannabis resin may 
also be smuggled to South America by sea. For example, 
three Portuguese nationals were arrested in northern Brazil 
in January 2019 for attempting to smuggle 2 tonnes of 
cannabis resin, probably of Moroccan origin, into the country 
(Lusa and Público, 2019).
As discussed in Chapter 1, migrant smugglers use similar 
routes and ships to transport irregular migrants to the EU 
from North Africa, although existing information suggests 
that structural, sustained or widespread links between 
drug trafficking and migrant smuggling are weak. OCGs 
transfer the profits from the sale of cannabis resin back to 
Morocco using cash couriers as well as trade-based money-
laundering schemes. Cash couriers travel to the collection 
points in the EU and then transport the cash in their carry-on 
luggage on commercial flights going to Spain. Malaga is 
a key location for cash couriers, who depart from there to 
the Spanish territory of Melilla, where the cash is turned 
over to the OCGs. Moroccan OCGs also use the services of 
hawaladars.
Cannabis oil and other concentrated 
extracts
Cannabis oil, a dark green or dark brown viscous liquid, is 
produced by extracting cannabis or cannabis resin using 
solvents. When produced from resin it may be called hash 
oil, although the terms are often used interchangeably. 
Depending on the method, the potency can reach 60 % 
(UNODC, 2009). Although cannabis oil has been around for 
decades, it is a niche product, rarely mentioned in national 
reports to the EMCDDA, and monitoring of seizure data 
commenced only recently, in 2014. When monitoring 
commenced, 11 countries reported seizures totalling 124 kg. 
Spain accounted for most of this, reporting 105 kg of 
cannabis oil spread over 57 seizures. It is not known whether 
these seized batches were domestically produced or 
Figure 3.7 
Different forms of cannabis resin being trafficked to Europe
Photos: Malta Police Force (left); Romanian National Police, Antidrug Unit (right).
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imported. In the subsequent years, the quantities reported 
by EU Member States have declined to fairly trivial levels. 
Turkey reported about 50 kg in each of 2016 and 2017, more 
than all EU Member States combined, and reports of 
production in nearby Albania may account for this (see box 
‘Albania: a potential source of cannabis oil for the EU 
market’).
Trafficking cannabis oil instead of herbal cannabis or resin is 
attractive to traffickers because more psychoactive material 
can be contained in a smaller quantity of product. Being 
a liquid, it may also be easier to conceal, reducing the risk of 
seizure.
Criminal cooperation and competition in 
the cannabis trade
Organised crime groups involved in the cannabis trade 
appear to be increasingly cooperative and specialised in 
specific activities useful for different stages of the supply 
chain. These include setting up sophisticated cultivation 
sites, transportation and storage, as well as cash collection 
and money-laundering services. Networks operating at 
the distribution level also increasingly cooperate to fund 
the acquisition of larger quantities of cannabis in order to 
achieve more competitive prices and share the risks.
Conversely, increased competition between OCGs has also 
resulted in higher levels of violence between rival groups 
(see box ‘Increased use of violence between OCGs involved 
in the cannabis trade’). This has included public shootings 
and other violent crimes in the context of conflicts over 
territory and access to sources of supply.
Albania: a potential source of cannabis oil for the 
EU market
Seizure data suggest that cannabis oil is available 
in countries in the south-east of the EU. Whereas 
production of cannabis oil is rarely reported in the 
EU, there is some information suggesting that it 
may take place in Albania. In 2014-15, Albanian 
authorities dismantled three cannabis oil production 
facilities (EMCDDA, 2017b). More recently, in 2017, 
the Montenegrin police seized around 17 litres of 
cannabis oil, suspected to originate in Albania, hidden 
in a passenger car at the Montenegrin-Croatian 
border (see image). Finally, data received from the 
Albanian forensic laboratory in Tirana confirmed 
the analysis of 312.5 litres of cannabis oil from five 
different cases in 2017 (Koçiraj, 2018). This amount 
is relatively large compared with the total amounts 
seized in the EU.
There is a need to adapt monitoring tools in order to 
collect data on other cannabis concentrates such as 
rosin, shatter and wax as they become more popular.
Photo: Montenegro Police Directorate, Criminal Police, Anti-drug Department
Increased use of violence between OCGs 
involved in the cannabis trade
Organised crime groups are continuously looking to 
increase their profits, and one way to do this is to try to 
gain control of different stages in the supply chain.
French intelligence reports have described how the vast 
majority of drug-related homicides (‘liquidations’) in the 
Marseille and Perpignan region of France are related to 
rivalry between crime groups. During law enforcement 
operations, automatic and semi-automatic weapons and 
even grenades have been seized (Service d’Information 
de Renseignement et d’Analyse Stratégique sur la 
Criminalité Organisée, 2018).
Furthermore, the violence is not only directed at other 
criminal groups: law enforcement agencies increasingly 
have to consider that drug traffickers and dealers will be 
armed.
Another example is from La Línea de la Concepción, 
the Spanish town bordering Gibraltar, where large 
cannabis resin shipments are reported to be brought 
to the European mainland on a daily basis. The media 
reported that Molotov cocktails were thrown at Spanish 
police vehicles by youths working for drug traffickers, in 
order to disrupt police surveillance activities (Cañas and 
Ortega Dolz, 2018). In the same town, an injured drug 
trafficker, under police custody in a hospital, escaped 
when a heavily armed group of masked men raided the 
hospital (Cañas, 2018). This example clearly shows how, 
in order to maintain their business, criminal groups in 
the EU apply guerrilla tactics normally associated with 
drug markets in regions such as Latin America.
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Retail supply and use
As indicated above, cannabis is the most widely consumed 
illicit drug in Europe. Cannabis products account for the 
largest share (39 %) of the illicit drug retail market in the 
EU, with an estimated minimum value of EUR 11.6 billion 
(likely range EUR 10.5 billion to EUR 12.8 billion) in 2017. 
The market for cannabis herb in the EU was estimated 
to be at least EUR 9.4 billion (likely range EUR 8.6 billion 
to EUR 10.2 billion), equivalent to about 1 200 tonnes. 
The cannabis resin market was estimated to be worth 
at least EUR 2.3 billion (likely range EUR 1.9 billion to 
EUR 2.6 billion), equivalent to over 300 tonnes.
The information on the amounts of the different types 
of cannabis use, used to estimate the cannabis market 
size, was obtained from the European Web Survey on 
Drugs. It collected information about patterns of use and 
purchases of the most commonly used illicit drugs from 
40 000 people who use drugs, recruited primarily through 
social media, in 15 EU Member States. It illustrates the 
variation between countries. The findings show that herbal 
cannabis was more commonly used than cannabis resin. 
However, many respondents reported using both types, 
particularly in France, Italy and the Netherlands. The use of 
cannabis resin only was reported infrequently (Figure 3.8).
The use of cannabis products other than herbal cannabis 
or cannabis resin was quite rare, which reflects the 
relatively low amount of seizures and production discovered 
in Europe. It appears that, at this stage, the use of 
concentrates such as rosin, butane hash oil and wax is 
uncommon in Europe, although there is potential for it to 
spread (EMCDDA, 2019d). It is becoming more popular 
in some regulated markets in the US (Krauss et al., 2015; 
Russell et al., 2018), so it is important that research and 
monitoring systems be alert to signals of an increase in this 
practice (Figure 3.9).
Although it is estimated that over 7 % of adults in the EU 
report having used cannabis in the last year, the majority 
of those use it only occasionally. Based on surveys of the 
general population, it is estimated that around 1 % of 
European adults are daily or almost daily cannabis users 
— that is, they have used the drug on 20 days or more in 
the last month. Data on those entering drug treatment for 
cannabis problems can provide some indication of the scale 
of high-risk cannabis use in the EU. In 2017 approximately 
152 000 people entered drug treatment in the EU for 
problems related to cannabis use; of those, about 82 000 
were entering treatment for the first time in their lives.
Although more than three quarters of a million offences 
related to cannabis supply and use are recorded in the 
Figure 3.8 
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Figure 3.9 
‘Dabbing’: users heat a needle/nail holding cannabis 
concentrate with a blowtorch and inhale through 
a modified waterpipe-like device
Photo: istockphoto
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EU each year, information on how cannabis is distributed 
within the EU Member States is not well documented. 
However, there is more detailed information available on 
some forms of retail distribution specific to cannabis: the 
coffeeshops in the Netherlands (see box ‘Coffeeshops in 
the Netherlands: the “controlled cannabis supply chain 
experiment”’) and cannabis social clubs in Spain and 
elsewhere (Decorte and Pardal, 2017).
The distribution level between wholesale and retail is 
poorly documented: these middle-level drug markets are 
less studied by researchers for various reasons. Suppliers 
higher up the distribution chain are likely to be less 
accessible to researchers. Furthermore, defining what 
this market segment covers remains a problem. Not only 
do law enforcement agencies have their own definitions, 
people involved in drug supply have their own specific 
definitions and terminology as well (Pearson and Hobbs, 
2001). In general, it is assumed that middle-market 
distribution happens between importation and retail-level 
distribution (Smet et al., 2013). As mentioned earlier, OCGs 
increasingly act and cooperate on specific distribution 
levels; some of those crime groups even try to cover the 
entire supply chain from production to retail level.
At retail level, it is possible to identify a number of different 
cannabis distribution practices. These include house 
dealers, who operate from fixed premises, either openly or 
for a restricted number of clients; mobile phone dealers, 
who can be contacted and deliver cannabis at any given 
location; and street dealers, who frequent public places to 
sell small amounts of cannabis (Korf et al., 2005). There are 
also known to be closed distribution groups, whereby an 
individual buys a larger amount of cannabis and distributes 
it among friends and friends of friends. Many users do not 
buy cannabis themselves, but receive it through ‘social 
supply’ (i.e. when a person produces or buys cannabis and 
distributes it among his or her friends) or sharing. Another 
group are those who produce cannabis for self-supply and/
or a limited number of other users (Werse and Bernard, 
2016).
Price and potency
A study undertaken for the EMCDDA shows that the average 
potency of herbal cannabis in the EU doubled from 5 % to 
10 % THC between 2007 and 2017. In addition, over the 
same period, the price of herbal cannabis increased from 
an average of EUR 9 to EUR 11 per gram (Figure 3.10) 
(EMCDDA, 2019d). The potency of cannabis resin in the EU 
has also increased substantially in recent years. The potency 
of resin remained relatively stable from 2007 to 2011 (8-10 % 
THC) before rising gradually to 18 % in 2017. At the same 
Coffeeshops in the Netherlands: the ‘controlled 
cannabis supply chain experiment’
The Dutch coffeeshop policy has long been a subject 
of public and political debate in the Netherlands and 
neighbouring countries. Coffeeshops are outlets 
where the sale of retail amounts of cannabis is 
tolerated (under strict rules) by means of prosecutor 
guidelines. The public debate is mostly centred on 
the anomaly this presents: sale and use are tolerated 
while production and supply are strictly prohibited. 
Under this policy of tolerance, sale and use are still 
criminal offences under Dutch law, but the authorities 
choose not to pursue or prosecute offenders 
(Government of the Netherlands, 2019). However, law 
enforcement agencies may act upon those supplying 
the shops, but also the shop owners.
In early 2019, to address this legal anomaly, the 
Dutch government opted to try a new approach called 
the ‘controlled cannabis supply chain experiment’. 
The aim is for this to be conducted in six to ten 
large and medium-sized municipalities, involving an 
organisation to be selected by the government to 
cultivate cannabis and supply it to the coffeeshops.
Low-THC/high-CBD products
Since 2017, ‘low-THC’ herbal cannabis and ‘CBD oil’ 
have been offered for open sale in health food shops 
or specialist shops in several EU countries. Sales have 
been based on the claim that these products have little 
or no intoxicating effect and therefore are not controlled 
under drug laws; for high-CBD products, sales may 
be based on the associated health benefits, although 
currently the evidence for their effectiveness is weak.
Member States’ responses to the open sale of such 
products have ranged from hard-line to tolerant. 
National limits for quantity of THC exist but may 
come with conditions, such as ‘originating from 
an authorised variety of cannabis’, ‘if not viable for 
narcotic purposes’, ‘if not misused’. Other applicable 
laws may include (EU standardised) regulations on 
medicines, food and food supplements, cosmetics, 
general product safety, etc. The legality of marketing 
a product for its CBD content may therefore depend 
on the source of the CBD, the format of the product or 
how the product is presented.
Source: EMCDDA (2018f).
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time, cannabis resin prices increased, like those of herbal 
cannabis, from approximately EUR 9 to EUR 11 per gram.
These contrasting changes in potency and price appear 
to have altered the relative value of these products: when 
combining information on potency and price, the quantity 
of THC for every euro spent on herbal cannabis or ‘price-
adjusted dose’ was similar in 2007 and 2017, at 13 mg 
THC per euro. For cannabis resin, the price-adjusted 
dose was similar from 2007 to 2011 (remaining stable 
at 10 mg THC per euro) before increasing to 19 mg THC 
per euro in 2016. As discussed earlier in this report, the 
introduction of new cannabis strains in Morocco enabled 
producers to create a more potent resin product in a cost-
effective manner. As a result, cannabis resin may have 
become a more attractive product to some consumers in 
the EU.
In parallel with these developments is the emergence of 
low-THC/high-CBD products in the EU (see box ‘Low-THC/
high-CBD products’). It is important to note the distinction 
between these products and cannabis oil.
Figure 3.10 
Potency and price of herbal cannabis and cannabis resin in the EU, 2007-17
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Little is known about the adulteration of cannabis resin. 
However, a recent analysis of street vendor resin samples 
has concluded that most samples were adulterated and 
unsuitable for human consumption (Pérez-Moreno et al., 
2019).
Monitoring patterns of use of cannabis consumption using 
the technique of wastewater analysis is not feasible at 
present. This is because THC-COOH, the main metabolite 
of THC, is the only biomarker found to be suitable so far, 
but its excretion percentage is low. Given the importance 
of the cannabis market, it will be important to try to develop 
alternative biomarkers so that wastewater monitoring 
becomes possible.
Online distribution
Overall, the scale of the online trade in cannabis remains 
small compared with traditional offline supply and 
distribution in the EU. Nonetheless, cannabis is increasingly 
sold online in high-frequency low-volume transactions and 
the online trade in cannabis and other drugs is expected to 
continue to expand.
Based on 2018 data from several major darknet 
markets (10), a total of 7 378 listings (sale offers) that 
could be attributed to vendors that said they would ship 
cannabis from an EU country were detected. These offers 
were distributed across five marketplaces: Dream Market 
(6 479), Olympus Market (699), Berlusconi Market (159), 
Valhalla (21) and Wall Street (20). The available data 
suggest that the majority of EU sale offers during 2018 
originated primarily from four countries: the Netherlands 
(26 %), the United Kingdom (23 %), Germany (21 %) and 
(10) For more information on the data source and its limitations see the 
section on darknet monitoring in Chapter 8. 
Spain (17 %). Other reported EU origin countries included 
Belgium and Czechia (1 % each). An additional 11 % of 
cannabis listings offered shipping from another EU country 
(1 %) or from multiple EU countries (10 %) (Figure 3.11).
Caution is needed in interpreting these data in respect of 
gauging the number of individual sellers offering cannabis 
on these marketplaces or the number of transactions — 
neither of which can be extrapolated from the number of 
listings alone. Nonetheless the number of listings provides 
a useful indicator of the scope of activity on darknet markets.
Figure 3.11 
Proportion of cannabis listings on major darknet 
markets by EU Member State, 2018
United 
Kingdom
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Note: Multiple denotes where several EU countries are mentioned as country 
of origin.
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Key points
Europe’s opioid problem
 Opioid use still accounts for the largest proportion of 
the harms associated with illicit drug consumption in the 
EU, including high rates of morbidity and mortality. It is 
estimated that there are about 1.3 million problem users 
of opioids, mainly heroin, in the EU. The retail value of the 
heroin market was estimated to be at least EUR 7.4 billion 
per year in 2017.
 There is evidence of a potential threat from increased 
heroin availability in Europe. Opium production estimates 
in Afghanistan are at historically high levels, seizures are 
increasing in Turkey, some large consignments have been 
detected within the EU and intelligence assessments 
suggest increased activity levels along major trafficking 
routes into Europe. Taken together, these indicate 
a potential for increased heroin availability.
 Vigilance is required to identify any availability-driven 
increases in heroin use. Currently, demand indicators still 
point to an overall stable and ageing population of heroin 
users, and the volume of heroin seizures in the EU is 
relatively stable but small in relation to both consumption 
and production estimates. However, monitoring systems 
may be relatively insensitive to new recruitment into heroin 
use. It is important, therefore, to be alert for other signs of 
increased availability.
 Synthetic opioids, such as methadone, buprenorphine, 
tramadol and fentanyl derivatives, are also available on 
the drug market in the EU and represent a growing threat. 
They now account for around one in five new opioid-related 
treatment demands. Because of the ways in which they 
are produced, sourced and used, synthetic opioids pose 
additional challenges from regulatory, law enforcement and 
health perspectives.
 Turkish OCGs continue to maintain control over the 
wholesale importation of heroin into Europe. This is 
because of their long-standing presence and capacities 
in key production and trafficking areas. In addition, other 
OCGs, including Dutch, British, Western Balkan, Iranian and 
Pakistani groups, are also major players in different parts of 
Europe. An overlap often exists between OCGs involved in 
heroin supply and those involved in the trafficking of other 
drugs, precursors, weapons and other illicit commodities.
Developments in production and 
trafficking
 There are signs of production spreading to new 
countries, including some in the EU. This is suggested by 
morphine seizures outside Afghanistan and the recent 
detection of heroin production in some EU countries. In 
part, this development appears driven by differences in 
precursor costs and availability.
 Attempts to divert acetic anhydride, the main heroin 
precursor, appear to be increasing within the EU. It is 
far cheaper to source in the EU than in areas nearer to 
opium-producing countries and there is evidence of it being 
trafficked from the EU, mostly by land but sometimes also 
by maritime container, along the Balkan route to heroin 
production areas.
 Sources of synthetic opioids are diverse. Conventional 
trafficking approaches, diversion from medical use and 
online purchase are all important for synthetic opioids. 
The last is especially relevant to non-controlled opioids 
appearing as NPS. Although uncommon, some production 
in the EU has also been detected.
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 The Balkan route still remains the key corridor for heroin 
entry into the EU. This means that, in terms of organised 
crime activities and anti-trafficking measures, Turkey 
remains of central importance for actions to disrupt the 
trafficking of heroin to the EU market.
 Evidence suggests that heroin trafficking on the 
Southern route to the EU may be increasing while activities 
on the Northern route decline. Important changes appear 
to be taking place on the Southern route, particularly 
in relation to trafficking through the Suez Canal. This is 
occurring against a background of a growth in domestic 
heroin problems in some African countries.
 Recently seizures of very large heroin consignments, 
both by land and particularly at sea, have been made 
along trafficking routes towards the EU. Iran is reported as 
a departure country for many of these.
 High-potency synthetic opioids pose challenges for law 
enforcement and health. Synthetic opioids are increasingly 
traded online and dispatched by post. For some synthetic 
opioids this means that small-volume packages can 
account for a large number of potential consumer 
doses. Not only does this increase the challenges for 
law enforcement but the high potency of some synthetic 
opioids also results in an increased risk to both consumers 
and others, who may be accidentally exposed to these 
substances.
Implications for action to address 
current threats and increase 
preparedness
In order to respond effectively to current and emerging 
threats in the area, there is a need to take the following 
actions.
  Build on the lessons learnt from successful cocaine 
interdiction strategies at major ports. To address the 
relative rarity of large heroin seizures at EU borders, 
Member States need support to develop further 
risk analysis and profiling capacity at land border-
crossing points and at smaller European ports located 
on potential heroin-trafficking routes into the EU, 
particularly on the Balkan route.
  In particular, respond to the growing threat resulting 
from the trafficking of large quantities of heroin and 
acetic anhydride by means of container shipping. 
This requires investment in monitoring, investigating 
and targeting of OCGs active in this area, and 
strengthening of screening programmes for both 
inward- and outward-bound containers and vehicles.
  Improve the understanding of the dynamics of heroin 
trafficking within, and to, the EU through better 
monitoring of, sharing information about and forensic 
analysis of heroin production sites, as well as the 
origins of large seizures of heroin, morphine and acetic 
anhydride.
  Give greater priority to the Southern route by increasing 
operational capacities and threat assessment. Efforts 
are particularly needed in affected African countries to 
strengthen the monitoring and interdiction of heroin in 
major ports and respond to any resulting displacement 
in trafficking activities.
  Raise stakeholder awareness and develop new 
regulatory and investigative tools to prevent the 
diversion of acetic anhydride. This requires better 
monitoring and back-tracking investigations by law 
enforcement agencies in close coordination with other 
relevant agencies that have a role in drug precursor 
control.
  Recognise the potential threat posed by synthetic 
opioids by scaling up information sharing about, 
analysis of and forensic profiling of seizures, internet 
sales, production sites and the diversion of opioids 
from legal or quasi-legal sources. Continuing 
engagement with producer countries such as China, 
India and Russia is also needed.
  Improve efforts and develop new tools to identify 
and provide early warnings of trends in the use of 
synthetic opioids, or new recruitment into heroin 
use, to facilitate the more rapid development and 
targeting of appropriate supply- and demand-related 
interventions.
  Raise stakeholders’ awareness that responding to 
opioid-related problems should remain a policy priority 
and that vigilance is required because a threat exists 
that a rapid change in consumption patterns of either 
established drugs, such as heroin, or newer synthetic 
opioids is possible and could result in significant for 
individuals and society.
CHAPTER 4 I Heroin and other opioids
106
Turkey
Netherlands,
Belgium
East
Africa 
Southern
Africa
West
Africa 
200
100
0
2007 2017
Global seizures of heroin and
morphine (tonnes)
750
500
250
0
2007 2017
Global estimated potential heroin
production (tonnes)
Estimated opium poppy cultivation 
(thousand hectares)
201
414
2007 2017
Wholesale price at key 
locations (EUR/kg)
Selected destination countries
Latvia**
Sweden*
Poland**
Spain*
United Kingdom**
Italy*
Afghanistan**
*Mean  **Mode  
60 000
47 245
19 059
27 500
30 850
38 000
20 202
2 575
4 180
14 457
17 172
2 558
Selected transit countries
Montenegro**
Albania**
South Africa**
13 699Kazakhstan**
Iran**
6 281Egypt*
Pakistan**
Producer countries
Estimated number using opioids in the last year aged 15-64
World
34.3 million
Heroin overview Global
EU DRUG MARKETS REPORT
107
Afghanistan
Makran 
Coast 
Arabian 
Peninsula 
Balkan route
Northern route
Southern route
Caucasus route
Indexed trends:
Price and purity
9 %
15 %
31 %
51 %
100
87
80
€15
€28
€58
€140
2007 2017
minimum maximum
interquartile
range
Retail price
(EUR/g)
Purity
(%)
25 000
20 000
15 000
10 000
5 000
0
20172007
Quantity seized (tonnes)
EU
EU+2
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
20172007
EU+2
EU
Number of seizures (thousands)
Offences 
for supply
Other Offences for 
possession/use
64 %35 %
Total
46 916
82 000
47 000
2007 2017
Drug law offences related to heroin
Drug-induced deaths
Opioids
present in 
6 581 or 85 %
of the deaths
60 000
50 000
40 000
30 000
20 000
10 000
0
2007 2017
Trends in first-time entrants for problems 
related to heroin
Treatment
Data for 23 EU Member States.
25 %
EU retail drug 
market share
Estimated number using opioids (mainly heroin) in the last year aged 15-64
1.3 million
EU
High-risk opioid users
Europe
CHAPTER 4 I Heroin and other opioids
108
Introduction
Opioid use remains a major part of the drug problem in 
Europe and a major contributor to the harms associated 
with it. Heroin is the most frequently used opioid, but other 
opioids such as methadone, buprenorphine, tramadol and 
fentanyl derivatives are also available on the illicit market. 
For definitions used in this report, see box ‘Opiates, opioids 
and heroin’.
It is estimated that there are about 1.3 million high-risk 
opioid users in the EU and the retail value of the heroin 
consumed was estimated to be at least EUR 7.4 billion 
per year (likely range EUR 6.4 billion to EUR 9.1 billion) in 
2017. Although the extent of opioid use in many countries 
in Europe has stabilised over recent years, the illicit use 
of opioids remains responsible for a disproportionately 
large share of drug-related harms. These include high 
levels of dependence, other health problems and mortality 
among people who use opioids. Primary opioid users still 
represent over a third of those entering drug treatment in 
the EU, and opioids are found in over 85 % of drug-related 
deaths. Injecting use is associated with an increased risk 
of acquiring blood-borne virus infections such as HIV and 
hepatitis. The harms associated with opioid use extend to 
users’ families and the wider community. The wider social 
costs include the impact on neighbourhoods of open drug 
scenes, the costs associated with the acquisitive crimes 
that may be committed by people with opioid dependence 
to obtain money to buy their drugs, and the government 
expenditure on health and social support services and the 
criminal justice system.
The retail market for heroin in Europe appears to be quite 
stable, having recovered from a period of ‘heroin drought’ 
in some parts of Europe around 2010. However, the high 
levels of production as well as an expansion in the range of 
opioids now available may pose additional risks to existing 
users or lead to an expansion in the market.
Global overview
It is estimated that in 2017 there were about 29 million 
users of opiates and 53 million users of opioids (opiates 
and prescription opioids) worldwide. The prevalence rates 
of opioid use appear to be highest in North America, 
Oceania, West and Central Africa, the Near and Middle 
East and south-west Asia, while rates of opiate use (mainly 
heroin and opium) are estimated to be highest in the Near 
and Middle East and south-west Asia, Central Asia and 
Transcaucasia, North America, and eastern and south-
eastern Europe (UNODC, 2019a).
The UNODC (2019a) reports that illicit opium production 
occurs in about 50 countries worldwide. Opium poppies are 
grown illegally in around 50 countries worldwide in three 
main regions:
  south-west Asia (mainly Afghanistan and to a lesser 
extent India and Pakistan), supplying Europe, Africa, 
south-west Asia, East Asia including China, the Middle 
East and Oceania;
  south-east Asia (mainly Myanmar and to a considerably 
lesser extent Laos), supplying mainly south-east Asia, 
China and Oceania; 
  the Americas (especially Mexico but also Colombia and 
Guatemala), supplying the Americas.
Illicit poppy cultivation also takes place in some small 
areas in the EU (see section below on opiate production 
in the EU). However the vast majority (about 96 %) of 
global opium production occurs in just three countries: 
Afghanistan is the largest illicit producer of opium in the 
world, with Myanmar and Mexico distant second and third 
respectively.
Opiates, opioids and heroin
Opiates are drugs that originate or are derived from 
naturally occurring alkaloids found in certain poppy 
species, especially Papaver somniferum. Opiates 
include opium, heroin, morphine and codeine.
Opioids are generally substances that bind to the 
body’s opioid receptors. As well as the opiates, they 
include synthetic drugs that produce opiate-like 
effects, such as fentanyl and methadone.
Heroin is a semi-synthetic product obtained by the 
acetylation of morphine; as such, it is also called 
diacetylmorphine or diamorphine. Morphine is found 
in opium, the dried latex obtained from poppies. 
Whereas opium has been smoked for centuries, 
heroin was first synthesised from morphine isolated 
from opium in the late 19th century. Heroin is used 
therapeutically for opiate dependence in some 
countries when other forms of treatment have not 
been effective.
Illicit heroin is a crude mixture containing other opium 
alkaloids and any added substances, such as caffeine 
and paracetamol. It usually comes as an off-white or 
brown powder that may be smoked, snorted/sniffed, 
or dissolved and injected.
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Following several years of declining seizures, in 2016 the 
quantities of opiate drugs seized worldwide increased 
sharply, surpassing the former peak from 2011. Seizures 
increased again in 2017, although not as markedly, with 
approximately 693 tonnes of opium and 189 tonnes of 
heroin and illicit morphine seized worldwide (UNODC, 
2019a). Most seizures of opiates occur in or near the 
main opium production areas, particularly in Iran (39 % of 
total seizures in 2017, expressed in heroin equivalents), 
Afghanistan (26 %) and Pakistan (14 %), with Turkey the 
next highest (7 % of total seizures) (UNODC, 2019a). 
This reflects the main routes by which these drugs have 
traditionally been trafficked from Afghanistan to western 
Europe, particularly on the Balkan route via Iran and Turkey 
but also by sea from Pakistan and Iran to countries of the 
Arabian Peninsula and along the coast of East Africa.
Production and precursors
The process by which morphine and heroin are produced 
from the opium harvested from poppies is illustrated in 
Figure 4.1.
Trends in opium production
Afghanistan has been the largest illicit producer of opium 
in the world for about 20 years. In 2017 Afghanistan, 
with a record 328 000 hectares, was estimated to have 
accounted for 78 % of the total area of 414 500 hectares 
under poppy cultivation identified in the world. However, 
in 2018, the global area under poppy cultivation was 
estimated to be 345 800 hectares, a drop that was largely 
influenced by the 20 % fall in Afghanistan to 263 000 
hectares. Despite this, the estimated cultivated area for 
2018 remained at a high level by historical standards 
(UNODC, 2019a).
Afghanistan is estimated to account for around four fifths 
of global production, accounting for on average 81 % of 
annual global opium production since 2007. Over this 
period, estimated opium production in Afghanistan has 
fluctuated, with the lowest figure being 3 300 tonnes in 
2015 and the highest being the 9 000 tonnes estimated 
in 2017 (see Figure 4.2). This variation not surprisingly 
represents a major contributor to the overall fluctuation 
in global production estimates observed over this period, 
underlining the importance of this one production location 
to the global heroin problem. A caveat here is to note that 
Afghanistan is not the primary source country for heroin 
consumed in North America.
The estimated global opium production in 2017, at 10 500 
tonnes, was the largest ever recorded (UNODC, 2018a), 
influenced by a number of factors, including agricultural 
innovation and developments that have an impact on 
opium poppy cultivation and, consequently, opium 
production (see Figure 4.3). For example, a large increase 
in the number of opium farmers using solar-powered 
tubewells has been observed in some areas of Afghanistan 
since 2013, resulting in an increase in both the surface 
under poppy cultivation and the opium yields of the crops, 
while also making it possible to harvest two crops a year 
(Mansfield and Fishstein, 2016). These developments 
may also have environmental consequences (see section 
of this chapter on environmental impact). In addition, 
improvements in morphine extraction methods have been 
reported.
Figure 4.1 
The heroin production process
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In 2018 the estimated global quantity of opium produced 
decreased to 7 790 tonnes mainly due to severe drought in 
Afghanistan affecting both the area under cultivation and 
yields in some parts of this country, but nevertheless the 
total quantity estimated produced remained among the 
highest in the past two decades.
Trends in heroin production
It is difficult to estimate the production of heroin. 
Improvements in technology and changes in methodology 
can have a big impact on these estimates. The UNODC 
stresses that its figures should be viewed as ‘best 
estimates’, giving an order of magnitude rather than precise 
measurements (UNODC, 2018a).
Uncertainties remain, due to information gaps on key 
factors such as heroin laboratory efficiency. This is true 
even in Afghanistan, the opioid producer country on which 
the most information is available. The proportion of the 
crop that is transformed into morphine and then exported 
out of the country and the fate of the opium exported to 
neighbouring countries are also poorly documented.
The UNODC estimated that in 2018, from the 7 790 tonnes 
of opium produced globally, between 1 225 and 1 525 
remained unprocessed for consumption, while the rest was 
converted into heroin, resulting in an estimated 486-736 
tonnes of heroin of export purity (UNODC, 2019a).
Most of the heroin consumed in Europe is believed to 
be manufactured from Afghan opium, but relatively little 
information is available on where this manufacturing 
takes place. Historically, Afghanistan is the country that 
has reported the most seizures of opiate laboratories. This 
indicates that large quantities of opium are processed 
into heroin in the country (UNODC, 2018a), although 
it should be noted that the last time that Afghanistan 
reported dismantling heroin production facilities was in 
2014 (41 facilities dismantled). Following a period in which 
a constant decline in morphine seizures had been seen 
since 2011, in 2016 Afghanistan seized 47 tonnes, the 
largest quantity in the world, and seizures increased again 
in 2017 to 63 tonnes. The reasons for the sudden dramatic 
increase in morphine seizures in Afghanistan (Figure 4.4) 
are unclear.
Significant seizures of opium and illicit morphine in 
countries neighbouring Afghanistan suggest that heroin 
production could also take place there (see Figure 4.4). 
Although neither Iran nor Pakistan have reported 
dismantling heroin production facilities, seizures of opium 
totalled about 2 000 tonnes in Iran and 210 tonnes in 
Pakistan between 2014 and 2017, compared with only 
about 153 tonnes in Afghanistan itself. During the same 
four years, significant quantities of morphine were also 
Figure 4.2 
Estimated global illicit opium production (tonnes) and 
proportion coming from Afghanistan, 2007-18
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Figure 4.3 
Harvesting opium in Afghanistan
Photos: David Mansfield
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seized in Iran (47 tonnes) and Pakistan (16 tonnes) 
(see Figure 4.4). This provides evidence that some of 
Afghanistan’s opium crop is not processed into heroin 
in the country, and that there are markets for opium and 
morphine outside Afghanistan. Although fairly large 
quantities of opium are consumed as opium in Pakistan 
and especially in Iran, the amounts seized could suggest 
that there may be some manufacture of heroin and other 
opiates in both countries.
Hypotheses as to the possible intended uses for the large 
amounts of opium and morphine seized in the region 
surrounding Afghanistan were discussed in the previous 
edition of this report (EMCDDA and Europol, 2016). These 
included heroin manufacturing in Pakistan and Iran, and 
probably in other countries, and illicit manufacture of 
medicinal products, including injectable morphine and 
syrups containing codeine. No new evidence has emerged 
to confirm or deny such hypotheses, and this remains an 
important question for future consideration.
Acetic anhydride, the heroin precursor
Acetic anhydride is a key precursor for processing 
morphine into heroin. It is used as an acetylation agent 
and is subject to international control because of its 
critical role in the manufacture of heroin. However, it has 
many licit uses, particularly in the pharmaceutical industry 
(e.g. to manufacture aspirin), but also for the manufacturing 
of paints, plastics, polymers, cellulose (for cigarette 
filters) and explosives. As a result, the global legitimate 
manufacture of and trade in acetic anhydride is large and 
reported to be expanding. This, combined with the fact 
that comparatively small amounts are required in heroin 
manufacture, makes preventing diversion for illicit purposes 
a challenging task (see Figure 4.5).
Estimates of annual licit global production of acetic 
anhydride vary but the most recent estimate from the INCB 
put it close to 1.5 million tonnes (INCB, 2014). Set against 
this, the INCB estimates that the requirement for illicit 
heroin manufacture is between 450 000 and 1.1 million 
litres (or approximately 486 to 1 188 tonnes) (INCB, 2018, 
2019), i.e. less than 0.1 % of global licit production.
Action to prevent the diversion of acetic anhydride for illicit 
uses includes the requirement for pre-export notification 
of shipments, which may lead to stopped or suspended 
shipments as well as seizures. The INCB undertakes global 
monitoring of both of these indicators and noted a sharp 
increase in demand for acetic anhydride during the period 
Figure 4.4 
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countries, 2014-17
Morphine Heroin
Pakistan
Iran
Turkey
Tonnes
2017
2016
2015
2014
2017
2016
2015
2014
2017
2016
2015
2014
2017
2016
2015
2014
Afghanistan
0 0 10 20 3010203050 4070 60
Source: UNODC (2019c).
Figure 4.5 
Estimating acetic anhydride requirements for heroin 
manufacture, 2017
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2016-17, as shown by an increase in suspicious supply 
requests as well as the number of seizures reported. 
Although these have since declined to some extent, in the 
year beginning 1 November 2017 globally 1 900 pre-export 
notifications were reported for a total of 611 million 
litres of acetic anhydride, of which approximately 15 % 
were objected to by the importing countries either for 
administrative reasons or for suspected diversion (INCB, 
2019). In addition, global acetic anhydride seizures in 2017 
amounted to 127 000 litres, with Afghanistan reporting the 
largest amount seized (37 700 litres), followed by Turkey 
(23 200 litres) and Iran (20 300 litres) (INCB, 2019) (11). 
This is a strong indication that demand for acetic anhydride 
for illicit purposes is high at present, which may be due 
to the increase in estimated Afghan and global opium 
production (see Figure 4.6).
However, it is known that acetic anhydride can also be used 
for the manufacturing of methamphetamine (INCB, 2018), 
and methamphetamine production seems to be increasing 
in countries traditionally connected with the production 
and trafficking of opiates. For instance, methamphetamine 
facilities are dismantled every year in Afghanistan, Iran, 
Mexico, Myanmar, and recently, according to media reports, 
Turkey (Ensonhaber.com, 2017; Haberayyildiz.com, 2017; 
Haberturk.com, 2019; Mansfield, 2019; Yenisafak.com, 
2018).
Recent seizures, stopped shipments and suspicious 
queries or orders of acetic anhydride appear to confirm that 
heroin-trafficking routes from Afghanistan to Europe are 
used to traffic acetic anhydride in the opposite direction. 
Thus, for instance, the INCB suspects that a shipment of 
almost 3 tonnes of acetic anhydride seized in Afghanistan 
in 2017 had originated in the EU, while Iran reported the 
EU and Taiwan as the sources of the more than 23 tonnes 
it seized in 2017 (INCB, 2018). In addition, Pakistan seized 
more than 15 tonnes of acetic anhydride originating from 
Poland in 2018 (INCB, 2019).
The information on seizures and stopped shipments in 
or originating from Europe confirms the picture of high 
demand for acetic anhydride for illicit purposes in recent 
years and also that the EU has become a significant source 
of acetic anhydride diverted towards the illicit production 
of heroin (and methamphetamine) in Afghanistan and 
neighbouring countries (see Case study 19).
(11) It is also worth noting that 45.4 tonnes of ammonium chloride, a non-
scheduled chemical often used in the extraction of morphine from opium, 
was seized in Afghanistan in 2016. This was the highest amount ever 
reported seized by the Afghan authorities (INCB, 2018).
In 2016, only Germany, the Netherlands and Spain reported 
seizing or stopping shipments of small amounts of acetic 
anhydride (data from European Commission; INCB, 2018). 
By contrast, in 2017 and 2018, large amounts of acetic 
anhydride were seized on the ‘reverse Balkan route’ linking 
western Europe to Turkey, although some seizures could 
be linked to heroin production within Europe (see section 
below on opiate production in Europe). Thus in 2017, more 
than 81 000 litres of acetic anhydride (about 75 tonnes) 
were seized in the EU (67 500 litres in the Netherlands, 
10 500 litres in Bulgaria, 2 000 litres in Belgium and 
1 000 litres in Poland), while Turkey seized 23 000 litres 
(data from the European Commission; INCB, 2019).
The upward trend appears to have continued in 2018: 
Turkey seized 37.5 tonnes of acetic anhydride, according to 
information at Europol — of which the INCB indicates that 
approximately 14 tonnes originated in the Netherlands — 
and Romania seized 5 tonnes in August 2018 (data from 
INCB; data from Romanian Police). Information on the 
origins of acetic anhydride diverted from legal supply in the 
EU is limited. However, a number of the seized shipments 
reported to Europol during this period appear to have 
come from Czechia, Germany, the Netherlands, Poland and 
Slovenia, although some of these may be storage or transit 
countries for acetic anhydride procured elsewhere.
In addition to seizures, there were many instances of 
suspicious activities involving acetic anhydride in Europe 
in recent years, with Belgium, Bulgaria, Czechia, France, 
Germany, Latvia, the Netherlands, Poland and Spain all 
reporting suspicious queries or orders of acetic anhydride 
in 2017. In total, more than 100 such incidents were 
detected and investigated in the EU in 2016 and 2017, 
with the alleged destination countries including Azerbaijan, 
Iran, Iraq, Kyrgyzstan, Suriname and Turkey (INCB, 2018), 
Figure 4.6 
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and stopped shipments of acetic anhydride in the EU 
totalled 324 300 litres in 2017 (data from the European 
Commission).
The most frequently used modus operandi explaining the 
increase in diversion of acetic anhydride involves setting 
up new ‘front companies’ and applying for registration as 
precursor operators using fraudulent documents in order 
to be able to purchase large quantities of acetic anhydride 
from legal suppliers. In some cases, in order to conceal 
their illicit activity, these companies attempt to source 
acetic anhydride in small amounts from different suppliers 
and in different countries to avoid purchase limits set 
by authorities. The acetic anhydride is then pooled and 
stored in secret locations. Some law enforcement agencies 
in EU Member States have suggested that background 
checks related to entities requesting registration could be 
strengthened in order prevent diversion of acetic anhydride.
Although transport by road in trucks and lorries making 
use of the reverse Balkan route represents the most often 
detected means of transport of acetic anhydride from the 
EU to heroin production regions, the use of containers 
surpasses it in terms of the quantities transported and 
seized (see Case study 20). As observed of the smuggling 
of other commodities, containers represent opportunities 
for criminals and challenges for national authorities. This 
mode of transport presents significant vulnerabilities, 
allowing the transport of huge quantities of acetic 
anhydride to the heroin production regions. The OCGs 
exploit the fact that cargo exported through EU ports is 
subject to fewer checks than imports. In addition, customs 
and other law enforcement authorities in Afghanistan and 
other destination countries have difficulty implementing 
efficient checks based on risk profiles because they lack 
equipment or have insufficient resources.
The OCGs that have been linked to acetic anhydride 
trafficking are composed of nationals of Afghanistan, Iran 
and Turkey, often supported by EU-based OCGs and OCGs 
originating from the Western Balkan region. It should be 
noted that the OCGs involved and the routes used for 
acetic anhydride trafficking are similar to those for heroin, 
which will be discussed in greater detail in the following 
section.
In spite of the efforts of regulatory authorities at the 
European and national levels, it is likely that some 
suspicious purchases of acetic anhydride may have 
escaped detection and some acetic anhydride may be 
stockpiled in Europe, which could be used in the future 
for illicit heroin production in Afghanistan, neighbouring 
CASE STUDY 19
Two-way trafficking on the Balkan route
A recent report issued by the Dutch 
Police Academy highlighted the large-
scale trade in drugs and precursors 
involving North Brabant criminals and 
Turkish OCGs, which is believed to 
have existed since the 1990s (Tops 
et al., 2018). Turkish OCGs have 
incorporated themselves into the legal 
scene in the Netherlands and own 
restaurants, bars, hotels and other 
enterprises. These OCGs coordinate 
two-way trafficking flows whereby 
heroin and morphine are transported 
to the Netherlands from Turkey while 
acetic anhydride, MDMA and other 
drugs are shipped in the opposite 
direction (Tops et al., 2018).
Recent seizures in EU Member States 
along the Balkan route, including 
large batches of heroin, hundreds 
of kilograms of morphine, millions 
of MDMA tablets and multi-tonne 
shipments of acetic anhydride, appear 
to confirm this barter trade between 
criminal gangs. For example, in August 
2018, Romanian law enforcement 
officers seized 5 000 litres of acetic 
anhydride and 20 kilograms of 
high-purity cocaine (see photos), 
concealed in a lorry that was travelling 
from Germany through Slovenia 
and Romania to its final destination 
in Turkey. The lorry was registered 
in Georgia and driven by a Turkish 
national. The investigation revealed 
that the driver had picked up the 
cocaine in Germany and loaded up the 
acetic anhydride from an illicit storage 
location in Slovenia.
Photos: Romanian National Police, Anti-drug Service
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countries and Europe (information from INCB). Law 
enforcement agencies in various EU Member States 
report encountering problems with the fight against acetic 
anhydride diversion for illicit purposes. Issues include the 
fact that, in a majority of EU countries, the authorities in 
charge of monitoring precursors do not have investigative 
powers, which limits efforts to gather evidence, while 
in some cases acetic anhydride diversion attempts are 
treated as a low-level offence punishable by only a fine. 
Some Member States also report that the additional costs 
incurred in adequately storing and destroying seized 
precursors may represent a growing challenge.
Opiate production in Europe
The general picture of the European market in opiates is 
one of large-scale production of heroin in Afghanistan 
followed by smuggling into Europe by OCGs. However, it is 
increasingly clear that the true picture is more complex.
There is growing evidence that the final step of the heroin 
production process, the manufacturing of heroin from 
morphine using acetic anhydride, takes place in several 
countries of Europe. For example, in the period 2014-17, 
21 production facilities were dismantled in Greece (18), 
Czechia (2) and Spain (1) according to UNODC reports. 
More recently, the Netherlands reported dismantling 
eight heroin production facilities in 2017 and Bulgaria 
dismantled one (data from Bulgarian Ministry of Interior, 
2018). Heroin produced in these laboratories was made 
from morphine of unknown origin. In addition, in 2017 
Czechia reported dismantling two facilities producing 
heroin from morphine extracted from tablets of medicinal 
products. In 2018, a site manufacturing heroin was 
dismantled in Germany, where about 30 kg of heroin and 
some acetic anhydride were seized (data from German 
Bundeskriminalamt), and a facility processing morphine 
into heroin was dismantled in Albania, where more than 
180 kg of heroin was seized. The morphine had come from 
Turkey via North Macedonia and Kosovo, according to 
Albanian police reports (Meers, 2018a).
Seizures of opium have also increased in several countries: 
in 2017 Belgium seized 1 133 kg of opium and Bulgaria 
seized 221 kg of morphine and 43 kg of opium. The opium 
available in Europe could be used for heroin production or 
smoked by individual consumers. Open source information 
suggests that some heroin may also be produced in Turkey. 
For example, according  to the Turkish press, a range of 
materials that indicate possible heroin production were 
found in Sakarya in July 2017 and in Van in April 2018 
(CNNTurk, 2018; Karar, 2017).
There are several potential reasons for the emergence of 
heroin laboratories in Europe, although the information 
available makes it difficult to draw definite conclusions. 
However, the apparent widespread availability of cheaper 
illicit acetic anhydride in Europe is probably a significant 
factor. Indeed, the price of acetic anhydride has increased 
dramatically in Afghanistan in recent years, peaking at an 
average of EUR 605 per litre in August 2017 (MCN and 
UNODC, 2018). In the EU, acetic anhydride reaches no 
more than EUR 50 per litre on the illicit market and between 
EUR 1 and EUR 5 on the legal market. This also makes the 
trafficking of acetic anhydride to Afghanistan very attractive 
for OCGs based in the EU, especially since penalties are 
usually low for this type of offence, and recent information 
suggests there is increasing diversion of this precursor in 
Europe (see section on acetic anhydride above).
In addition to the production of heroin from imported 
morphine and opium, production of a range of other 
opiate preparations continues in some countries. Opium 
CASE STUDY 20
Trafficking acetic anhydride from the EU to Turkey using roll-on roll-off ferries
A seizure of 14.8 tonnes of acetic 
anhydride occurred on 9 July 2018 in 
the port of Mersin, Turkey’s gateway 
to the eastern Mediterranean. The 
acetic anhydride was transported in 
a lorry aboard a Turkish vessel that 
had departed from Italy. The shipment 
was declared to be monomer, and was 
allegedly loaded in the Netherlands. It 
is likely that this eastern Mediterranean 
route is being exploited by traffickers as 
an alternative route to the land-based 
Balkan route and the maritime container 
route to Iran. This modus operandi 
fits the recent trend, noted by Turkish 
authorities, of the increased use of 
roll-on roll-off intermodal infrastructure 
between Europe and Turkey. Roll-on 
roll-off networks offer fast services 
adjusted to different types of cargoes, 
such as trailers, other rolling cargoes 
and containers, and can combine rail 
and maritime freight. Reports from 
Turkey also suggest that trains carrying 
lorries are being used to smuggle acetic 
anhydride to Turkey and Iran.
Source: Daily Sabah (2018).
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poppy crops were destroyed in Greece and Italy in 2016 
(Ekathimerini, 2018; UNODC, 2018a). Small-scale heroin 
production facilities using home-grown opium poppy 
straw or morphine extracted from medicines have also 
been dismantled. Braun, an opiate made from codeine, is 
traditionally consumed in Czechia, and kompot, a crude 
preparation of heroin produced from poppy straw and 
several chemical reagents, in Poland. Both are described 
in more detail in the previous EU Drug Markets Report 
(EMCDDA and Europol, 2016) and have continued to be 
produced.
Synthetic opioid production in Europe
A market for synthetic opioids has also been growing in 
Europe. The majority of illegally produced synthetic opioids 
distributed in the EU originate from source countries 
outside the EU. Depending on the country of destination 
and the mode of distribution, the two main source 
countries for synthetic opioids available on European drug 
markets are believed to be China and, to a lesser extent, 
Russia.
Some production of synthetic opioids does takes place 
in the EU, although currently it appears to be marginal 
compared with the manufacturing of other illicit drugs. 
There is no widespread or sustained illicit production of 
these substances. The production process for many of 
them is relatively simple and can be carried out at room 
temperature using a ‘one-pot’ method. The synthesis 
of the particularly potent derivative carfentanil is more 
complicated and several methods exist. Whatever 
production exists is thought to rely mainly on precursors 
originating from China.
A few laboratories carrying out the full production cycle 
of synthetic opioids, particularly fentanyl derivatives, have 
been dismantled over recent years (Table 4.1). Because 
fentanyl derivatives are very potent, these laboratories 
require only a small production capacity to produce 
sufficient material to satisfy national or even regional 
demand. Recently, a facility producing fentanyl was 
detected in France in November 2018 (Joany, 2018), and in 
Estonia a lab that had been active since 2014 was seized in 
August 2017. Large quantities of fentanyl precursors were 
also seized in Estonia in 2016-17.
In addition, methadone production has also been detected 
in Latvia: two large-scale illicit laboratories producing 
methadone using precursors acquired from the legal 
market in the EU, which were believed to have been active 
since 2013, were dismantled in 2017. Ukraine also reported 
dismantling an illicit large-scale methadone production 
laboratory in September 2017 (Ukraine, 2017).
Processing and packaging centres are more commonly 
detected in the EU than full-cycle laboratories. In general, 
these laboratories receive bulk shipments of synthetic 
opioids from China, use cutting agents to increase the profit 
yield of a shipment and package the substance for street or 
online distribution. For example, in April 2017, British law 
enforcement authorities dismantled a processing centre 
used to distribute fentanyl and carfentanil online. Around 
1 kg of fentanyl and carfentanil was seized on site as well 
as caffeine, the cutting agent presumably used to dilute the 
product prior to distribution (see section on new synthetic 
opioids, Chapter 7).
In Estonia fentanyl has been the main opioid consumed 
since 2001, when it displaced heroin, and Estonian law 
enforcement authorities have repeatedly discovered and 
dismantled conversion laboratories in the country since 
then. These laboratories typically convert liquid fentanyl, 
trafficked to the country from Russia, to fentanyl in powder 
form, which is then diluted with cutting agents prior to 
distribution.
Heroin adulteration
In addition to the substances, processes and skills used 
during drug production, drug purity depends on the cutting 
agents that are frequently added. Indeed, pure drugs are 
only rarely available on the market, especially at consumer 
level. These adulteration processes, also known as cutting, 
are generally adopted for reasons of profitability but may 
also increase if heroin is in short supply. They are common 
practice with all powdered drugs. Adulteration may occur 
at all stages of the supply chain. For instance, the UNODC 
estimated that Afghan heroin of ‘export quality’ was 51 % 
Table 4.1 
Synthetic opioid production sites dismantled in the 
EU, 2007-18
Year Country Type of production
2007 Germany Fentanyl — small-scale laboratory
2010 Latvia Methadone
2011 Slovakia Fentanyl — small-scale laboratory
2013 Poland Butyrfentanyl
2015 Germany Fentanyl — small-scale laboratory
2016 Sweden Fentanyl — 2 small-scale laboratories
2017 Latvia Methadone
Estonia Fentanyl — medium-scale laboratory
2018 France Fentanyl — small-scale laboratory
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pure in 2016 (UNODC, 2018a), and was found combined 
with a range of substances, some of which were harmful.
For heroin, the most commonly used cutting agents are 
paracetamol and caffeine, and premixed bags of brown 
paracetamol and caffeine powder have been seized by 
law enforcement agencies in Europe. Given the increasing 
segmentation of organised crime functions across distinct 
organisations, it is likely that some organised crime groups 
specialise in the procurement of these substances for 
subsequent resale to heroin traffickers. For example, 
law enforcement authorities in the Netherlands recently 
dismantled an illicit facility specialised in the production 
of cutting mixtures for heroin. The mixtures produced 
combined caffeine, paracetamol and a colouring agent.
Some insight into the range of adulterants that may be 
found in the opioids sold on retail markets can be obtained 
from analysis of the residue in used syringes. A study in 
six European cities in 2017-18 confirmed the widespread 
use of caffeine and paracetamol as cutting agents for 
heroin, with caffeine found in 66 % of all syringes that 
contained heroin, and paracetamol in 62 %. Less common 
adulterants included griseofulvine (4.5 % of syringes) and 
phenacetin (3.5 %) (Néfau, 2018). Furthermore, a recent 
analysis of substances bought from darknet markets and 
submitted to a drug-checking service also reported that the 
main adulterants found in heroin samples were caffeine 
and paracetamol. A range of other potentially dangerous 
adulterants were also detected. Most worryingly, almost 
a fifth of the heroin samples analysed were adulterated 
with other synthetic opioids (DoctorX et al., 2018).
Environmental impact of heroin 
production
Although not well documented in the scientific literature, 
the growing of opium poppies on the same piece of 
land year after year will have an environmental impact, 
especially on soil quality. Recent research highlighted how 
large increases in the use of solar-powered tubewells for 
opium poppy cultivation in the desert of Afghanistan since 
2013 have been accelerating the drop in the water table 
(1-2 m per year 2017 compared with 0.5-1 m in 2015) 
(Mansfield, 2018). In addition, opium poppy cultivation 
practised in an unsustainable way may contribute to even 
greater water scarcity in the arid regions of Afghanistan, 
and to soil salinisation due to inappropriate drainage 
during irrigation (Mansfield and Fishstein, 2016). Finally, 
toxic chemicals, which include acetic anhydride, solvents 
such as ethyl ether and acetone, and hydrochloric acid, 
are needed to transform opium into heroin. The waste 
resulting from heroin production is often simply spilled 
on the ground or in streams and rivers and, although 
scientific assessment of the impact of this process on 
the environment is lacking, it is probable that tonnes of 
hazardous waste from heroin production are released into 
the environment each year (UNODC, 2015).
Trafficking and supply
Most of the heroin available on the European drug markets 
is produced in Afghanistan, and many different groups are 
involved in heroin-trafficking activities along the extensive 
supply chain from production zones to consumer markets. 
What we know about both the routes and groups involved 
is fragmentary and based mostly on information gathered 
through the activities undertaken by law enforcement 
agencies in order to disrupt supply. These are inevitably, 
to some extent, a reflection of the agencies’ expertise and 
priorities but they also provide useful information about 
drug-trafficking organisations active in the EU, their modi 
operandi and the trafficking routes used.
Heroin trafficking to Europe
The main routes used to traffic heroin to the EU have 
remained essentially the same over recent years, although 
the intensity of use of particular routes appears to vary 
over time, depending on factors such as the state of 
transportation infrastructure, law enforcement activity and 
geopolitical stability. Four routes (see Heroin overview, 
pages 106-107) are generally recognised:
  the Balkan route — the main trafficking route to Europe 
from Iran to Turkey and then through Bulgaria and 
Greece or the Mediterranean Sea;
  the Southern route, through Iran and Pakistan to 
several countries in Africa and the Arabian Peninsula to 
supply local markets or for onward shipment to Europe 
locally — the branch through the Arabian Sea, Red Sea 
and Mediterranean Sea to Europe has gained some 
importance recently;
  the Southern Caucasus route, going from Iran to 
Armenia or Azerbaijan to Georgia and then through the 
Black Sea to Ukraine or EU Member States;
  the Northern route, from Afghanistan to Tajikistan and 
then through Kyrgyzstan or Uzbekistan to Kazakhstan, 
mainly destined for Belarus, Russia, Ukraine and, to 
a lesser extent, EU Member States.
Since 2013, heroin trafficking has increasingly involved 
large individual shipments in excess of 100 kg, a trend 
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that has continued in recent years, probably due to the 
increasing availability of heroin in the countries of origin. 
Large shipments are commonly transported from Iran to 
Europe, especially the Netherlands, through the Balkan 
route, and increasingly via the Suez Canal and across the 
Mediterranean Sea. Frequently these large shipments of 
heroin are transported by road hidden among legal cargo in 
lorries, as well as by sea in containers or in lorries on ferries 
(Europol, 2017b).
The Balkan route
The route from Afghanistan through Iran, Turkey and Balkan 
countries represents the shortest distance and the most 
direct land route to European consumer markets, and it 
has continued to be the key corridor for the trafficking of 
heroin to the EU and for other drugs and acetic anhydride 
in the other direction (see Case study 21). Turkey is crucial 
to the Balkan route, and Istanbul is a key location for the 
orchestration of heroin shipments to the EU. In 2017, 
Turkey seized the largest quantity of heroin in the last 
decade, following a period marked by a significant decline 
in seizures, probably caused by both external and internal 
factors.
Heroin may be shipped from Turkey to EU markets using 
three branches of the Balkan route (Figure 4.7).
  The southern branch runs through Greece, Albania 
and/or Italy, using both sea and land transportation.
  The central branch runs through Bulgaria, North 
Macedonia, Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Croatia and Slovenia, and into Italy or 
Austria, essentially by land.
  The northern branch runs from Bulgaria and Romania 
to Hungary, Austria, Czechia, Poland or Germany, 
essentially by land.
The information available suggests that heroin mainly 
enters the EU at land border-crossing points in Bulgaria 
and Greece. In some cases, heroin is temporarily stored in 
warehouses in the Balkan region before being transported 
onwards. Bulgaria and Greece appear to be increasingly 
important transhipment points along this route. Iran is 
an increasingly significant hub for the trafficking of large 
quantities of heroin from Afghanistan and Pakistan to 
the EU via Turkey along the Balkan route using road 
transportation. Iran is also more frequently used as 
a departure point for large heroin shipments smuggled 
to the EU in maritime containers, in an effort by OCGs to 
avoid more strictly controlled land routes via Turkey. The 
increasing trade in recent years between Iran and the 
EU and others may have contributed to this increase in 
trafficking activity from Iran, as the greater volume of trade 
provides more opportunities for smuggling. Iranian trucks 
driven by Iranian drivers carrying hundreds of kilograms 
of heroin have also been detected more frequently on the 
Balkan route. On this route, the trucks travel via Turkey to 
enter the EU chiefly across the Bulgarian-Turkish border. 
From there, the heroin shipments are transported to 
distribution hubs in the EU.
Although the Balkan route is considered the most active 
smuggling route for heroin, the interdiction rate is quite low 
along the portion of the Balkan route located in Europe, 
relative to the large quantities of heroin seized in Iran and 
Turkey. This suggests that heroin trafficking through the 
Balkans is well organised, but may also benefit from poor 
enforcement and even possibly corruption among law 
enforcement officials (Kemp, 2017).
The usual method of transport for heroin smuggling on 
the Balkan route continues to be concealment in buses, 
cars and especially lorries. However, a development on 
this route is the increasing use of containers for onward 
transport from Turkey using a variety of modes of transport. 
These include by ship across the Mediterranean Sea to 
ports in the EU, by lorry on ferries and by train. This allows 
the transport of large consignments of heroin (see Case 
study 21). The same modus operandi is used to smuggle 
acetic anhydride from western Europe to Turkey.
Figure 4.7 
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The Southern route
The Southern route for the trafficking of heroin to the EU 
remains of some importance (see Figure 4.8). In recent 
years large heroin consignments shipped from ports 
on the coast of Iran and Pakistan on the Gulf of Oman 
and the Persian Gulf (the Makran coast) have attracted 
international attention. Some of these shipments are 
destined for Europe. This Southern route to Europe entails 
several modes of transportation and transhipment points 
that may be combined in different ways. The heroin shipped 
on the Southern route leaves the Makran coast either 
concealed in containers or transported in traditional sailing 
vessels (dhows). Thus, heroin may be shipped to the EU 
using various branches of this route, all departing from 
ports in Iran and Pakistan.
  The first branch, which is the most relevant to Europe 
transits from the Arabian Sea and the Red Sea through 
the Suez Canal and Mediterranean Sea to reach EU or 
Turkish ports, mainly by containers.
  Another branch of this route uses transhipment 
ports in the Arabian Peninsula. From there the heroin 
is transported inland to reach countries on the 
Mediterranean Sea, or continues on the sea route to 
reach countries in East Africa.
  A third branch departs from smaller ports on the 
Makran coast to ports along the Swahili coast (Kenya, 
Tanzania and northern Mozambique), using dhows. 
From here, the heroin is smuggled onwards to the EU 
and/or other international markets.
There is evidence suggesting the route is growing in 
importance, not least because of the increasing demand 
reported for heroin and other opioids in large countries 
such as South Africa (Haysom et al., 2018), but also 
possibly because of its use as an alternative route to enable 
the transportation of large shipments of heroin to Europe 
while avoiding stricter border controls on the traditional 
Balkan route. In addition, the increasing use of multiple 
transhipment points for containers along this route makes 
it more difficult for authorities to intercept cargoes based 
on a risk analysis of their origins (Boerman et al., 2017).
Several large shipments of heroin seized in the port 
of Antwerp, primarily originating from ports in Iran 
— 4.3 tonnes in 2018 and 1.9 tonnes in the first quarter of 
2019 — confirm the increasing activity along this branch of 
the Southern route. This route may also involve transhipment 
points in Turkey, from where heroin consignments are 
transported either by land via the Balkan route or by sea via 
the Mediterranean Sea directly to ports in western Europe.
CASE STUDY 21
Use of containerised maritime transport on the Balkan route
Spanish police seized 331 kg of heroin 
in 2017 in one of the biggest ever 
heroin hauls in the country’s history. 
The largest part of the seized shipment 
comprised 263 kg of high-purity 
heroin and was found at the port of 
Barcelona, hidden inside a shipment 
of cement from Turkey. The remainder 
was seized in the residences of 
four individuals detained as part of 
a police operation. Two Dominicans, 
an Ecuadorian and a Spaniard were 
charged as a result of the operation.
Source: Deutsche Welle (2017).
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At the same time, heroin departing from the Gulf of Oman 
and the Persian Gulf in dhows is unloaded in several 
countries along the East African coast and is typically 
transported onward over land to other countries in East 
Africa or to West Africa. Although the land routes used for 
further transportation from the East African coast to other 
countries in Africa and to Europe are complex and remain 
an intelligence gap, available data relating to seizures 
made in Europe highlight Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Kenya, 
Madagascar, Morocco, Mozambique, Pakistan, Qatar, 
South Africa, Tanzania and the United Arab Emirates as 
all being potential departure or transit countries for the 
heroin seizures made in the EU. For example, in April 2019, 
the Egyptian navy seized 2 tonnes of heroin and 99 kg of 
crystal methamphetamine from a European-flagged vessel 
off the Red Sea coast. The ship’s seven crew members 
were arrested in the operation. This provides evidence that 
the Red Sea may serve as a transit point for Afghan heroin 
trafficked through Pakistani and Iranian ports into Europe 
and other destinations.
Finally, the Southern route also involves smaller amounts 
of heroin shipped by air couriers and freight, as well as 
postal parcels from India, Iran, Pakistan and Sri Lanka or 
from transit countries in Africa, especially South Africa, 
Kenya and Mozambique. Heroin seizures from couriers 
at European airports are reported to have increased 
dramatically in recent years, and a total of 486 kg was 
intercepted in 106 separate incidents in 2018. An increase 
in heroin seizures in postal parcels is also reported (Groupe 
Pompidou and RILO WE, 2019).
The Southern Caucasus route
The Southern Caucasus route continues to be used to 
smuggle large amounts of opiates from Iran to Europe via 
Armenia, Azerbaijan or Georgia. Heroin is smuggled on the 
ferries that cross the Black Sea from Georgia to Bulgaria, 
Romania and Ukraine. From Ukraine it is possible to reach 
both lucrative western European markets and the large 
Russian market by a variety of overland routes. Large heroin 
shipments were seized along the Southern Caucasus route 
mainly in 2015 and 2016. In 2016, one shipment of almost 
100 kg of heroin was seized in the port of Batumi, Georgia, 
purportedly destined for the Netherlands, while several 
other large heroin seizures totalling more than 1 tonne, 
reported to be destined for Belgium and Ukraine, were 
seized in Azerbaijan (UNODC, 2018a).
More recently, several seizures of heroin in several regions 
in Ukraine, totalling more than 700 kilograms could confirm 
the hypothesis that this route has been preferred for some 
years due to increased law enforcement activity along the 
Balkan route in the context of the migration crisis combined 
with instability in Ukraine and the Caucasus region.
The Northern route
The heroin trafficked on the Northern route is exported by 
land from Afghanistan’s northern borders and appears 
to be essentially destined for consumer markets in 
Central Asia, Belarus, Russia and Ukraine. Consignments 
cross from Afghanistan into Tajikistan and then are 
trafficked northwards through Kyrgyzstan or Uzbekistan to 
Kazakhstan before entering Russia. Less heroin is thought 
to arrive at the EU’s external border via the Northern route 
than via the other established heroin-trafficking routes. 
Nevertheless, a proportion of the heroin shipped on the 
Northern route may eventually enter the EU through Poland 
and the Baltic countries, but also from Ukraine to Hungary, 
Romania and Slovakia. Some heroin seized in Belarus, 
Romania and Ukraine in the last few years was reported 
as originating from Central Asia and intended for western 
European markets.
Heroin trafficking within the EU
Once smuggled into the EU via the trafficking routes 
described above, heroin is then distributed to consumer 
markets. The Netherlands, in particular, and to a lesser 
extent Belgium, Bulgaria, France, Greece and Spain, appear 
to be important hubs for heroin trafficking within the EU, as 
these countries are the most frequently reported as origin 
or transit points for heroin shipments seized in other EU 
Member States. The heroin supply to the Baltic and Nordic 
countries is mostly secondary distribution from the main 
distribution hubs in the EU. The Øresund Bridge connecting 
Denmark and Sweden is the main transit point for heroin en 
route to the Nordic countries.
Available data suggest that, in terms of absolute numbers 
of users, the five main heroin markets are the United 
Kingdom, France, Italy, Germany and Spain. Therefore, 
large quantities of heroin are likely to be smuggled to these 
countries in order to meet demand (estimated to be about 
115 tonnes at street-level purity in 2017). Within the EU 
there was an overall drop in both numbers of seizures 
and quantities of heroin seized around 2010 to 2012. 
Since then, seizures in the EU have largely stabilised, with 
37 000 seizures amounting to 5.4 tonnes reported in 2017 
(Figure 4.9). Heroin flows within the EU are influenced by 
factors including drug supply reduction activities and by 
changes in consumer markets.
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Estimates suggest consumer markets for heroin are 
generally stable, with only limited fluctuation in the number 
of users in the short term. However, for a number of reasons 
these estimates may not give a particularly robust indication 
of consumption totals; for example, it is difficult to estimate 
the impact on consumption of the considerable expansion 
in substitution therapy that has been seen. Other indicators 
of heroin use also suggest an ageing population with low 
levels of new recruitment and high levels of service contact 
in most countries. The drop in the number of seizures 
after 2010 is difficult to explain. A heroin drought was 
reported in many countries at this time and linked to major 
law enforcement successes in Turkey. Consequently it is 
possible that law enforcement priorities may have changed 
because of greater emphasis on migration and terrorist-
related activities. It is also possible that trafficking routes 
may have developed in ways that reduced the effectiveness 
of interdiction efforts. Seizures in Turkey and in countries 
along trafficking routes into the EU also need to be 
considered in an overall assessment of seizure dynamics as 
well as the long-term trend in heroin use in the EU.
Following a period of decline from 2009 to 2012, the 
amounts seized in the EU have remained stable at about 
5 tonnes a year, apart from a spike in 2014 linked to a few 
very large seizures that year in Greece. The total amount 
seized yearly (5.4 tonnes in 2017) is less than 5 % of 
the amount estimated to be consumed (149 tonnes in 
2017) in the EU. This ratio is much lower than for the 
other drugs considered in this report. The difference 
is difficult to explain and suggests a need to better 
understand the relative impacts of drug seizures on the 
markets for different drugs in Europe. Despite increases 
in heroin production, availability and use do not seem 
to be increasing strongly in Europe. This can be seen, 
for example, in the relative stability of price and purity 
estimates and in data from drug treatment reporting 
systems.
Organised criminal groups involved in 
heroin trafficking
Trafficking and distribution of heroin is a mainstay activity 
for some specific OCGs, which rely on well-established 
routes, contacts and infrastructure in the EU.
Overall, a two-tier structure in the heroin trade in the EU 
remains prevalent. Europol intelligence suggests that 
Turkish OCGs continue to be the main importers and 
facilitators of heroin distribution in key regions of Europe 
as they orchestrate the wholesale supply of heroin and 
maintain control over various links in the supply chain, 
including key connections to suppliers in production 
countries. They have established legal businesses in key 
locations along the trafficking routes in Bulgaria, Germany, 
Hungary, the Netherlands, Romania, the United Kingdom 
and Western Balkan countries, in order to facilitate their 
smuggling activities. Nevertheless, Turkish OCGs may also 
outsource some activities, such as the transportation of 
heroin from source countries to the EU, the laundering of 
criminal profits or the perpetration of violent crime. For 
example, Iranian OCGs manage shipping and transportation 
companies used to traffic heroin, while Turkish OCGs 
typically manage front businesses used to receive the 
heroin shipments. Turkish OCGs have also gradually 
expanded their activities to other drugs such as cocaine and 
synthetic drugs (see Case study 19, page 113).
Other OCGs are also engaged in heroin distribution in 
specific geographical areas and sometimes perform 
specific roles. They are often also engaged in trafficking of 
other drugs. As noted above, the Netherlands appears to 
be one of the hubs for heroin distribution in the EU. Dutch 
OCGs cooperate extensively with other crime groups. They 
receive shipments of heroin, and store them for further 
Figure 4.9 
Heroin seizures in the EU, 2007-17: number of 
seizures and quantity seized
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distribution to final destination markets in different parts 
of the EU. Dutch OCGs are also involved in the diversion 
of acetic anhydride and have set up heroin-processing 
laboratories in the Netherlands (see section on opioid 
production in Europe above).
For many years, Albanian-speaking OCGs have also been 
identified as being involved in the supply and distribution 
of heroin in the EU, controlling sections of the Balkan 
route. Albanian-speaking OCGs, as well as Serbian and 
Bulgarian groups, procure heroin from Turkish OCGs and 
cooperate with other EU-based crime groups. Recently 
they appear to have been expanding their involvement in 
heroin distribution in EU Member States, especially the 
United Kingdom, and becoming more involved with local 
distribution. In some cases, they have displaced other 
players, including Turkish OCGs, in wholesale heroin 
distribution (Saggers, 2019).
Pakistani, Dutch and British OCGs have also been linked to 
large-scale drug-trafficking activities in some EU countries. 
Pakistani and British OCGs appear to jointly orchestrate 
large-scale importation of heroin to the United Kingdom. 
Pakistani OCGs are also active in Spain, directing the 
importation of heroin arriving in the EU in containers, and 
they also provide money-laundering services to heroin 
traffickers (Boerman et al., 2017).
African OCGs also have some involvement in heroin 
trafficking and distribution in the EU. West African OCGs, 
especially Nigerian groups, continue to be involved in 
importing and distributing heroin in the EU, relying on 
couriers travelling from Africa to major EU airports. In 
particular, they play a role in the heroin trade in northern 
and, to a lesser extent, western Europe. It should also be 
noted that Nigerian OCGs cooperate with OCGs composed 
of nationals from Ghana, Senegal and The Gambia, as well 
as Morocco and Tunisia, in the local distribution of heroin 
in some Member States. Moroccan OCGs based in some 
EU countries are involved in the cutting and repackaging of 
heroin, as well as its retail distribution (Boerman et al., 2017).
Some of the profits obtained from the distribution of 
heroin in the EU need to be transferred to the suppliers in 
the production regions, as well as the Turkish and Iranian 
OCGs that orchestrate the importation of heroin into the 
EU. Proceeds from heroin distribution in the EU are typically 
laundered using trade-based money-laundering schemes. In 
many cases, these profits are also smuggled outside the EU 
using cash couriers or relying on the hawala system. Hawala 
is a commonly used informal value transfer system used 
in heroin source regions (see Chapter 1, section on money 
laundering). Heroin also continues to be used as means of 
payment between OCGs bartering various types of drugs. As 
part of these deals, heroin is exchanged for acetic anhydride, 
cannabis, synthetic drugs and cocaine trafficked to 
destinations outside the EU (see Case study 19, page 113).
Synthetic opioid trafficking and 
distribution
The production of synthetic opioids in the EU is uncommon. 
Most synthetic opioids distributed in the region appear to 
originate outside Europe. An important caveat here is that 
the diversion of opioids intended for therapeutic purposes 
is a known problem, but the extent of this problem is 
currently unclear (Table 4.2). The trafficking of fentanyl 
derivatives is a particular recent concern for the EU due 
to the potency of these substances and an increase in the 
number and quantity of seizures as well as an increase 
in the number of poisonings associated with these 
substances.
The distribution of illicitly produced fentanyl derivatives in 
the EU can be viewed as two separate phenomena. On the 
one hand, fentanyl derivatives originating from Russia are 
trafficked for distribution in Baltic and, to a lesser extent, 
Nordic countries. On the other hand, fentanyl derivatives 
originating from China are often purchased throughout the 
EU via online platforms on the surface web and the darknet.
The trafficking of fentanyl and derivatives from Russia 
is undertaken primarily by OCGs with ties to Russian-
speaking diaspora communities based in the destination 
countries. These substances tend to be of lower quality 
than those available through online distribution and are 
primarily intended for distribution on the Estonian market, 
Table 4.2 
Selected synthetic opioids seized in the EU, 2017
Opioid Number of 
seizures
Quantity Number of 
countries
Kilograms Litres Tablets Patches
Methadone 1 428 17.2 26.4 30 381 – 18
Buprenorphine 2 649 0.5 0.01 58 682 – 17
Tramadol 4 290 13.8 0.1 118 935 898 – 11
Fentanyl derivatives 940 14.3 1.9 10 551 2 291 13
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where fentanyl has replaced heroin as the main opioid 
consumed since 2001. In recent years, there has been 
an increase in the availability of fentanyl derivatives on 
neighbouring markets, especially Latvia and Lithuania as 
well as Sweden, where action has now been taken to tackle 
the issue (see Chapter 9).
China is a large-scale producer of synthetic opioids, 
particularly fentanyl derivatives, supplying large drug 
markets in south-east Asia and North America. China is 
also the main supplier of the synthetic opioids distributed 
in the EU via the surface web and the darknet. China has 
recently introduced some control measures, including 
some generic measures targeting fentanyl derivatives. The 
future impact of these measures on Europe will need to 
be evaluated. It is currently difficult to establish trafficking 
routes for fentanyl derivatives and identify countries of 
origin, transit and destination with any degree of certainty. 
However, it seems that fentanyl derivatives from China are 
trafficked to the EU either in bulk, and then redistributed by 
EU-based vendors in various Member States, or in smaller 
quantities directly supplied to users of online platforms. 
However, it appears that such shipments frequently come 
through key logistics hubs in the EU prior to arriving at 
their final destinations. Although the problem of synthetic 
opioids in the EU is much less severe than the opioid crisis 
in North America, the potency of fentanyl and its derivatives 
means that even relatively small-scale suppliers can have 
a significant harmful impact. This therefore remains an 
area requiring vigilance and requires some precautionary 
measures. The high potency of some of these substances 
can mean that they pose a risk, not only to those who use 
them, but also to family members, first responders or law 
enforcement or other professional groups who may come 
into contact with them.
Other opioids are also distributed within the EU, in some 
cases for use outside the region. For example, shipments 
of the synthetic opioid tramadol in transit to Africa have 
repeatedly been seized in Cyprus, Greece and Italy over 
the last few years, as reported in numerous media reports. 
Another synthetic opioid, buprenorphine, has been 
misused in Finland for many years, and the trafficking 
of this medicine via Lithuania to Finland is believed to 
have increased recently. Most of the buprenorphine 
misused in Finland is believed to originate in France. In 
December 2017 a Europol-supported operation dismantled 
a trafficking ring, which smuggled high-dose buprenorphine 
tablets (Subutex) from France to Finland in significant 
quantities.
In addition to production outside the EU or in the EU for 
the illicit market, medicinal products containing synthetic 
opioids, such as tramadol (see box ‘Tramadol’), are known 
Tramadol
Tramadol is a synthetic opioid analgesic widely used 
in human and veterinary medicine to relieve pain. 
Medicines containing tramadol are authorised in a large 
number of countries. In recent years, concerns have been 
raised both about the diversion and misuse of tramadol 
as a medicine and about its illicit production and sale as 
unlicensed and fake medicines on the drug market.
Tramadol’s main mechanism of action is as an opioid, 
but other actions are thought to contribute to its pain-
relieving effects. Overdose can cause acute opioid 
poisoning (such as respiratory depression), seizures and 
serotonin syndrome. It can also cause dependence and 
withdrawal.
Medicines containing tramadol are marketed in a range 
of formulations, such as tablets or capsules, sublingual 
drops, intranasal spray and injectable solutions. Globally, 
tablets and capsules are the most commonly used and 
easily available formulations. Oral formulations contain 
between 50 mg and 300 mg of tramadol. Alongside 
these legitimate products, a range of unlicensed and fake 
tramadol medicines, especially tablets and capsules, 
have appeared on the market in recent years. Some of 
these contain high doses, up to 500 mg of tramadol 
(WHO, 2018).
India appears to be one of the main producers of 
tramadol for use in medicines. Some of this is exported 
to other countries as finished pharmaceutical products; 
in other cases the bulk powder (hydrochloride salt) is 
exported and used to make the final products locally.
Both the licit and illicit markets for tramadol in some 
Middle Eastern and African countries appear to be large. 
A record amount of 125 tonnes of tramadol seized in 
2017 combined with several studies and estimates 
highlight the increasing misuse of this substance in some 
regions. According to the World Drug Report 2019, most 
of the tramadol available on the illicit markets in Middle 
East and Africa is believed to have been produced in 
illicit laboratories in South Asia and only a small amount 
appeared to have been diverted from the market for 
medicines. However, the situation may be changing 
rapidly. This requires active monitoring to improve our 
understanding of the market.
Although tramadol is not currently under international 
control, some countries have controlled it over concerns 
about its potential to cause harm. These include India, 
which controlled the substance in 2017 (Government of 
India, 2018).
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to be diverted from legitimate supplies and misused in 
some Member States. Synthetic opioids are key active 
ingredients in many legal pharmaceutical products 
prescribed and sold in the EU and come in a variety of 
forms, including tablets, patches, sprays or lozenges. In 
some countries, such as France, the diversion of these 
products, such as methadone or buprenorphine, is reported 
to be the main source for their illicit drug markets. Other 
Member States, including Latvia, reported an increase in 
the abuse of pharmaceutical products containing fentanyl 
in the early part of 2017. The pharmaceutical products 
containing fentanyl diverted from legal supply that are most 
commonly seized are patches, sprays and lozenges.
Many of the new synthetic opioids notified to the EU 
Early Warning System on new psychoactive substances 
are fentanyl derivatives. Occupational exposure to some 
synthetic opioids, especially fentanyl derivatives, is 
potentially dangerous for law enforcement officers. Law 
enforcement personnel could encounter synthetic opioids 
in a range of operational settings and they should be 
trained to recognise the signs of poisoning and how to 
respond to such a situation. This may include training in 
first aid, including basic life support and how to use the 
antidote naloxone.
Because of their high potency and therefore potential 
presence in very small quantities, certain synthetic opioids 
may be difficult to detect using some of the routine 
analytical methods and techniques currently used by 
forensic laboratories. Sniffer dogs can be trained to detect 
synthetic opioids, including fentanyl derivatives, and have 
been successfully used by law enforcement authorities for 
that purpose in some Member States, such as Estonia.
Retail supply and use
The consumer market for heroin
In Europe, the most common illicit opioid sold on the 
market is heroin. Most frequently, heroin is smoked, inhaled 
or injected.
Obtaining information on the number of users and the 
amount of heroin they use is challenging, firstly because 
people who use heroin are mainly dependent on the 
drug, living on the margins of society and unlikely to be 
included in surveys of the general population. Wastewater 
analysis, another source of information on drug use, 
cannot be performed for heroin because morphine, the 
most abundant metabolite of heroin, which can be used as 
a target residue to estimate heroin consumption, may also 
be an indicator of the commonly used medicines morphine 
and codeine.
Many other potential indicators of heroin use have some 
time lag. For example, the mean age of opioid users 
entering treatment for the first time in the EU is 34, while 
the mean age for first-time use is 22. Therefore, treatment 
indicators will identify opioid users only after approximately 
12 years of use, and the number of opioid users entering 
treatment could be influenced by financial priorities or 
by EU Member States modifying the laws governing this 
activity.
Nevertheless, a number of indirect methods for obtaining 
estimates of the extent of use of opioids are available. 
The prevalence of high-risk opioid use among adults 
(aged 15-64) is estimated at 0.4 % of the EU population, 
the equivalent of 1.3 million high-risk opioid users in 2017, 
of which three quarters (77 %) were reported in the five 
most populous countries in the EU (France, Germany, 
Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom). However, there is 
considerable variation between countries; prevalence 
estimates of high-risk opioid use range from less than one 
to more than eight cases per 1 000 population aged 15-64. 
Synthetic opioids now account for 22 % of all primary 
opioid clients and, in some countries, non-heroin opioids 
represent the most common form of opioid use among 
specialised treatment entrants (EMCDDA, 2019b).
In most countries, it appears that the number of people 
who use heroin is quite stable. However, as discussed 
in the introduction to this chapter, the use of heroin is 
associated with a disproportionate amount of drug-related 
harms. Although the number of people reporting use 
of the drug is quite low compared with drugs such as 
cannabis and cocaine, a large proportion of people who 
use heroin are dependent on the drug; this means that 
they use it more frequently and in larger amounts than is 
the case for other drugs. This is reflected in the estimated 
size of the market — a minimum of EUR 7.4 billion (range 
EUR 6.4 billion to EUR 9.1 billion) in the EU in 2017. In 
terms of quantity, this is equivalent to at least 149 tonnes 
of heroin at street-level purity (range 127 to 181 tonnes) 
(EMCDDA, 2019a).
Most of the people who use heroin and other opioids buy 
their drugs on the traditional illicit market rather than 
online. These offline illicit drug markets in the EU evolve 
over time, and there are some general changes in these 
markets that also apply to the heroin market. For example, 
in the United Kingdom heroin is one of the main drugs now 
supplied through the county lines highlighted in Part I of 
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the report, by which OCGs in the big cities supply drugs 
to smaller towns. People dependent on heroin as well 
as young people from disadvantaged urban centres are 
frequently exploited and coerced into participating in this 
form of supply.
In general, the retail price is viewed as a marker of 
availability relative to demand. However, in an illicit drug 
market, where there are no quality controls and many 
users are dependent on drugs, the picture may be more 
complex and the market may react in other ways to supply 
problems. For example, purity may be reduced or users 
may seek substitute drugs, which may be one driver of 
the diversification of opioids on the market reported in 
this chapter. Among those countries that consistently 
report price and purity data, indexed trends suggest that, 
following a sharp decrease between 2009 and 2011, 
when several EU countries reported heroin shortages and 
dealers appeared to react by lowering purity rather than 
changing price (EMCDDA, 2015), heroin purity increased 
rapidly before stabilising in recent years. In contrast, overall 
the retail price of heroin has been declining slightly over 
the last decade. However, price and purity vary widely, both 
within and between countries (Figure 4.10).
As indicated in the section on adulteration above, 
the cutting agents most commonly used for heroin are 
caffeine and paracetamol.
Online distribution
Heroin is also distributed across the EU via darknet 
marketplaces (see Chapter 2). The quantities offered 
are typically small, and purchases are typically delivered 
using post and parcel services. Although the online trade 
in heroin (and other drugs) remains marginal compared 
with traditional, offline supply, it is important to understand 
its scope. Based on 2018 data from several major 
darknet markets (12), we detected a total of 1 855 listings 
(sale offers) that could be attributed to vendors that said 
they would ship heroin from an EU country. These offers 
were distributed across three marketplaces: Dream Market 
(1 722), Berlusconi Market (110) and Olympus Market 
(23). The available data suggest that the majority of these 
sale offers during 2018 originated from the Netherlands 
(61 %) and Germany (24 %). Other reported EU origin 
countries included the United Kingdom (2 %) and France 
and Belgium (1 % each). An additional 11 % of heroin 
listings did not specify a country but indicated Europe as 
a shipping origin (Figure 4.11).
(12) For more information on the data source and its limitations see the 
section on darknet monitoring in Chapter 8.
Caution is needed in interpreting these data in respect of 
gauging of the number of individual sellers offering heroin 
on these marketplaces or the number of transactions — 
neither of which can be extrapolated from the number of 
listings alone. Nonetheless the number of listings has been 
used as a valid indicator of the scope of activity on darknet 
markets.
As indicated above, there is also a limited online retail 
market for opioids, mainly synthetic opioids (see also 
Chapter 7).
Figure 4.10 
Indexed trends in price and purity of heroin
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Figure 4.11 
Proportion of heroin listings on major darknet markets 
by EU Member State, 2018
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Key points
Europe’s growing cocaine problem
 Cocaine is the second most commonly consumed illicit 
drug in the EU. The estimated minimum retail value of 
the cocaine market was EUR 9.1 billion in 2017. Survey 
estimates suggest that about 4 million adults in the EU 
have used cocaine in the past year. Although cocaine 
use is concentrated in western and southern Europe, use 
elsewhere appears to be increasing.
 Seizures in the EU are at record levels, reaching 104 000 
seizures amounting to 140 tonnes in 2017. In addition, 
data indicate that cocaine seized at the wholesale level in 
Europe is of high purity, often above 85 %, suggesting that 
cocaine availability in Europe is currently high.
 Recent production estimates are similarly high. Coca 
cultivation and cocaine production in the Andean region 
have increased dramatically, the latter approaching 
2 000 tonnes in 2017. Colombia accounts for the largest 
share of this total. The knock-on impact of this has been 
intensified trafficking to Europe.
 A wider range of OCGs now appear to be involved in 
the European cocaine market. Colombian and Italian 
OCGs historically played a central role in the production, 
trafficking and distribution of cocaine, but other groups are 
becoming more significant, including Albanian-speaking, 
British, Dutch, French, Irish, Moroccan, Serbian, Spanish 
and Turkish OCGs, resulting in increased competition.
 More European OCGs have now established a presence 
in Latin American countries. This permits a new ‘end-
to-end’ business model for managing the supply chain, 
allowing the purchase of large quantities of cocaine near to 
production areas at lower costs. This could also be a factor 
driving competition and conflict within the cocaine market.
 Cocaine market-related corruption and violence 
are a growing problem within the EU. Historically, they 
were most prominent outside European countries. Now 
increased competition among OCGs appears to be driving 
higher levels of violence within the EU as well as fuelling 
corruption around some trafficking hubs, particularly in 
large European ports.
Expanding production and trafficking
 The EU is a potential source of a range of precursors and 
other chemicals for cocaine production. Attempts to divert 
the main cocaine precursor, potassium permanganate, 
from the EU have been observed recently and there have 
also been significant seizures in Europe of other chemicals 
used in cocaine production, such as sodium metabisulfite 
and calcium chloride.
 Cocaine-manufacturing processes in South America are 
becoming more efficient. Innovations in production allow  
cocaine hydrochloride to be produced in larger amounts at 
a time.
 The use of shipping containers for trafficking means 
that seizures of large quantities of cocaine at ports are 
now common. For example, large seizures are reported at 
the ports of Antwerp in Belgium and Algeciras in Spain, 
and in vessels bound for Europe at foreign ports, usually 
in Colombia and Brazil. Maritime containers continue to 
be the main mode of transport used to smuggle cocaine 
into Europe, and quantities per container appear to have 
increased. However, other trafficking methods remain 
important. 
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 The global market for cocaine appears to be growing, 
use is increasing in countries where previously it was 
uncommon, including some large developing countries. 
As a result, the EU appears to be increasingly used as 
a transit area for cocaine destined for other markets such 
as Australia, New Zealand, Russia, Turkey and countries in 
the Middle East and Asia.
 North Africa appears to be emerging as a more 
significant transit and storage hub for air and maritime 
shipments of cocaine destined for the EU and possibly 
other markets.
 The Netherlands, Belgium and Spain are the main 
entry points and distribution hubs for cocaine in the EU. 
From these locations, cocaine is distributed to other parts 
of Europe, mostly by road in lorries, although personal 
vehicles and, increasingly, post and parcel services may be 
used to move small consignments rapidly.
 Cocaine distribution at the local level in Europe is 
generally conducted by domestic OCGs. In some countries, 
Albanian-speaking, Moroccan and West African OCGs as 
well as outlaw motorcycle gangs also play a role.
 Digital technologies, including darknet markets, social 
media and mobile phone apps, are increasingly enabling 
the retail cocaine market. Innovation in the supply chain at 
the consumer level is suggestive of both high availability 
and attempts by OCGs to increase market share.
Implications for action to address 
current threats and increase 
preparedness
In order to respond more effectively to developments in the 
cocaine market there is a need to take the following actions.
  Increase capacity to perform routine forensic profiling 
of cocaine seized at key points of entry in Europe, from 
dismantled cocaine production sites, and in forms 
requiring processing within the EU. It is also necessary 
to strengthen capacity to report on existing indicators 
on cocaine availability.
  Give greater priority to assessing and countering the 
threat posed by changing OCG business models, 
including European OCGs establishing a presence in 
South American countries and non-European OCGs 
becoming active within Europe. This requires greater 
cooperation with Latin American and Caribbean 
countries, including capacity building at key port 
facilities; intelligence sharing within the EU and 
with external partners; and investment in targeted 
operations along the supply chain.
  Continue to invest in intelligence sharing and joint 
maritime initiatives and operations in the Atlantic 
Ocean and Mediterranean Sea.
  Strengthen intelligence gathering and the collection of 
data at large container ports to inform both operational 
targeting and strategic planning. Measures are also 
needed to strengthen capacity through the sharing of 
best practice and delivery of specialised training.
  Recognise the growing importance of North Africa, 
particularly Morocco, in cocaine trafficking to Europe, 
and the greater involvement of Moroccan OCGs in the 
wholesale and distribution levels of the EU market. 
This requires proactive engagement with partners in 
the region and assessment of the implications for law 
enforcement of the links between the cannabis and 
cocaine markets.
  Support awareness raising and engagement 
among stakeholders, including business, labour 
representatives and local communities, to help counter 
the corruption that is inherent in smuggling methods 
used at ports and transportation hubs.
  Develop strategies to anticipate the displacement 
of smuggling through secondary ports or smaller 
airports. This requires targeted risk assessment and the 
development of preventative measures scalable to the 
potential vulnerabilities of different locations.
  Raise awareness and develop preventative approaches 
to reducing the recruitment of vulnerable individuals in 
the drug market, for example as drug couriers.
  Better understand and document the links between 
the retail cocaine market, localised violence, gang 
membership and young people’s recruitment into 
crime, and share experiences of what measures may 
reduce these problems.
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Introduction
Cocaine is Europe’s most commonly used illicit stimulant 
drug, but its consumption is most prevalent in the south and 
west of Europe. It is estimated that 18.0 million adults in 
the EU (aged 15-64), or 5.4 % of this age group, have tried 
cocaine during their lives. Among these are about 4 million 
who have used the drug in the last year. Cocaine is used 
in two main forms (see box ‘Cocaine’). Cocaine powder is 
primarily sniffed or snorted, but is also sometimes injected, 
and the freebase form of the drug, crack cocaine, is usually 
smoked. Most use is of cocaine powder, comparatively 
infrequent — but a small proportion use it more frequently 
and may experience more serious problems. There are also 
a few countries in which there are small groups of people 
who use crack cocaine in a more harmful way, often in 
conjunction with heroin.
The minimum estimated value of the retail market for 
cocaine in the EU in 2017 was EUR 9.1 billion (range 
EUR 7.6-10.5 billion). This represents almost a third (31 %) 
of the total illicit market in drugs and makes it the second 
largest, after cannabis. This suggests that in 2017 about 
119 tonnes of cocaine was consumed, with a likely range of 
100 to 137 tonnes. 
Recently, data from a range of sources have suggested that 
cocaine use and associated harms may be increasing in 
Europe. For example, surveys in those countries that can 
provide long-term trends suggest rates of cocaine use have 
stabilised or increased (EMCDDA, 2019b). These patterns 
are also reflected in data on people entering treatment; after 
a period of decline, the number of treatment entrants for 
cocaine increased by over 35 % between 2014 and 2017.
The health harms associated with regular cocaine use 
include dependence, heart and mental health problems, 
and an increased risk of accidents. Harms may be 
exacerbated when cocaine is used in conjunction with 
alcohol. Cocaine injection and the use of crack cocaine are 
associated with the greatest health risks. There were an 
estimated 1 220 cocaine-related deaths in 2016, or one 
in seven of all drug-related deaths that year in the 28 EU 
Member States, Norway and Turkey (EMCDDA, 2018b). 
This was a significant increase from the 800 cocaine-
related deaths reported in 2013. Most of these deaths were 
attributed to drug overdose, with other substances also 
being detected in many cases, primarily opioids.
Cocaine is trafficked to Europe from the producer countries 
of South America by both air and sea using a range of 
methods and routes. The largest amounts of cocaine 
may now be smuggled into Europe hidden in cargo ships, 
especially in maritime shipping containers, departing South 
America, particularly from Brazil, Colombia, and Ecuador, 
and destined for large European ports, such as Antwerp and 
Algeciras. Another frequently used route, involving other 
forms of sea transport, appears to involve transit through 
the Caribbean or West Africa, including the islands off the 
coast of West Africa. In addition, North Africa appears to 
be emerging as a significant transit area. Cocaine enters 
Europe mainly through western and southern countries.
In 2017, the highest ever amount of cocaine, 140 tonnes, 
was seized in the EU. Belgium and Spain together were 
estimated to account for about 60 % of the total.
Global overview
In the three countries in which coca cultivation is almost 
exclusively concentrated, Bolivia, Colombia and Peru, coca 
leaves play a significant cultural role. In Bolivia and Peru, 
some growing of coca is permitted to supply licit domestic 
consumer markets for leaves and to supply de-cocainised 
flavouring agents to international manufacturers of soft 
drinks, which complicates efforts to control cocaine 
production.
The extraction of cocaine alkaloids from the coca leaves 
also takes place almost exclusively in the three coca 
Cocaine
Cocaine is a natural product extracted from the 
leaves of Erythroxylum coca and Erythroxylum 
novogranatense. These tropical shrubs are cultivated 
widely in the Andean-Amazonian region, and are the 
only known natural source of cocaine (1), which is 
produced almost exclusively in Bolivia, Colombia and 
Peru. Cocaine has been used as a central nervous 
system stimulant since the early years of the 20th 
century.
In Europe, cocaine is available in two forms. The 
more common is cocaine powder (a hydrochloride 
salt). Less commonly available is crack cocaine, 
a smokeable (freebase) form of the drug. The crack 
cocaine available in Europe is typically manufactured 
from cocaine hydrochloride near to where it is retailed 
and used. Therefore, cocaine in crack form generates 
very little cross-border or long-distance trafficking.
(1) It is possible to obtain synthetic cocaine by various methods, but 
this is rare and is less economical than the extraction of the natural 
product.
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producer countries, which also account for the majority of 
the global production of cocaine hydrochloride. However, 
some cocaine-processing laboratories have been detected 
in other South American countries and elsewhere, including 
Europe (see section on cocaine production in Europe), 
and globally about 8 000 cocaine-type laboratories were 
reported to have been dismantled in 2017 (UNODC, 2019a).
The majority of cocaine users are found in North and South 
America and western and central Europe. Global prevalence 
rates are estimated to have increased between 2012 and 
2017. Prevalence of use is particularly high in North America 
(especially in the United States), Oceania (especially 
Australia), and western and central Europe (Spain, the 
United Kingdom and the Netherlands); a potential increase 
in cocaine use is reported in West Africa and Asia in 2017 
(UNODC, 2019a).
Global seizures of cocaine reported by UNODC totalled 
1 275 tonnes in 2017, the highest quantity ever reported 
(UNODC, 2019a).
Coca and cocaine production
Recent trends in coca production
In the period 2014-17, the South American cocaine supply 
chains witnessed some changes, particularly with respect 
to the estimated areas under coca bush cultivation and the 
methods used to illicitly manufacture cocaine (Figure 5.1).
In 2017, global coca bush cultivation was estimated to 
have increased for the third consecutive year to reach 
245 400 hectares (UNODC, 2019a), its highest level ever. 
This represents an increase of 15 % compared with 2016. 
The 2017 increase in the global coca acreage was due to 
increases in each of the three Andean producer countries, 
but the largest increase (17 %) took place in Colombia. 
As a result, in 2017 Colombia accounted for about 70 % 
of estimated global coca cultivation, Peru for about 20 % 
and Bolivia for about 10 % (UNODC, 2019a). The latest 
crop monitoring information available indicates that coca 
cultivation decreased slightly in Colombia in 2018 (UNODC, 
2019d).
The increases in coca production in the three Andean 
countries are likely to be explained by the interplay of 
multiple factors. In Colombia, the main explanations are 
reported to be the suspension of eradication by means of 
aerial spraying of herbicides on coca crops; a reduction 
in alternative development programmes; the signing of 
a free trade agreement with the United States that made 
licit Colombian agricultural products less competitive; and 
an increase in new planting of coca by farmers seeking to 
benefit from compensation for stopping coca cultivation 
under the peace agreement signed between FARC and the 
government in 2016 (UNODC, 2018a).
The peace accord also had an impact on the Colombian 
criminal landscape linked to coca production. FARC had 
limited involvement in international cocaine trafficking 
but played a key role in the production of coca leaf in 
Colombia until 2017. Then the peace agreement led to the 
emergence of various FARC splinter groups and networks 
that took control of some coca cultivation regions for their 
own benefit. Some former and current insurgent groups 
thus remain involved in the cocaine trade. For instance, the 
National Liberation Army is increasingly exerting control over 
territories and cultivation operations previously dominated 
by FARC. This is reminiscent of the events following the 
demobilisation of paramilitary organisations in 2006, which 
led to the fragmentation of large paramilitary/criminal groups 
and the emergence of smaller gangs known as bandas 
criminales (‘bacrim’), which took over cocaine production and 
trafficking activities in Colombia (Schultze-Kraft, 2016).
Recent trends in cocaine production
The increase in coca cultivation has resulted in a parallel 
increase in cocaine production, which the UNODC 
estimates at 1 976 tonnes in 2017, an all-time high 
(UNODC, 2019a) (see Cocaine overview, pages 128-129). 
More recent estimates of cocaine production for 2018, 
in Colombia only, at 1 120 tonnes show a 6 % increase 
compared with 2017 (UNODC, 2019d).
Figure 5.1 
Colombian police operation against facilities 
producing coca paste, Caucasia, Antioquia, April 2019
Photo: Anti-narcotics Directorate of the Colombian Police
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Larger harvests of coca leaves have contributed to the 
dramatic increase in estimated global cocaine production. 
In addition, there is evidence of increased optimisation of 
cocaine-manufacturing processes. A recently identified 
trend is the use of ‘reoxidised base’, which involves the 
standardisation of the oxidation level of cocaine base 
produced in different locations before it is processed into 
hydrochloride (INCB, 2018). Another recent development, 
which could be linked to it, is the processing of larger batches 
of cocaine base into hydrochloride, whereas previously 
hydrochloride was produced 1 kg at a time. This latter 
development may make it more difficult, or even impossible, 
to generate strategic intelligence by comparing seized 
cocaine by means of forensic analysis (Mallette et al., 2018).
Cocaine laboratories and cocaine 
precursors
Most cocaine manufacture takes place in Bolivia, Colombia 
and Peru (see box ‘Profiling of cocaine seized in Europe’). 
Together these countries are home to the majority of 
reported dismantled cocaine laboratories. However, there 
is also evidence that some cocaine hydrochloride is refined 
elsewhere in South America, further along the trafficking 
routes, and perhaps in Europe.
Potassium permanganate is an essential chemical in the 
illicit manufacture of cocaine, mostly used as an oxidising 
agent to turn coca paste into cocaine base (see Figure 5.2). 
It is listed in Table I of the United Nations Convention against 
Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, 
1988 (United Nations, 2017). Efforts to control trafficking in 
potassium permanganate are complicated by the fact that 
it is a chemical used extensively by industries throughout 
the world, for instance in drinking water treatment. 
According to the INCB, more than 25 000 tonnes was traded 
internationally in the November 2017 to November 2018 
reporting period. Imports to the three main coca-producing 
countries accounted for 1.4 % of this (INCB, 2019).
Global seizures of illicit potassium permanganate increased 
dramatically in 2016, to a record-breaking 585 tonnes, before 
decreasing sharply to 103 tonnes in 2017 (see Figure 5.3) 
(INCB, 2018, 2019). The 2016 total is much greater than the 
estimated minimum of 319 tonnes required to manufacture 
the quantity of cocaine estimated produced globally that year. 
Colombia accounted for 99 % and 96 % of the total seizures 
in 2016 and 2017, respectively, and the major sources of 
these were diversion from domestic licit trade and illicit 
manufacture in clandestine facilities (INCB, 2018, 2019). 
Illicit manufacture of potassium permanganate using 
chemicals such as manganese dioxide and potassium 
manganate is a fairly long-standing phenomenon in 
Colombia, where, in 2016, 14 illicit potassium permanganate 
facilities were dismantled (INCB, 2018; UNODC, 2018a). 
A number of other, unscheduled, substances are used in the 
production of cocaine. These include nitric acid, a substitute 
for potassium permanganate used in the purification of coca 
paste (see Figure 5.2), and sodium hypochlorite; dozens of 
tonnes of these substances were seized in South America in 
2016 (INCB, 2018). Sodium metabisulfite, a reducing agent 
used in the process of standardising cocaine base, and 
calcium chloride, a drying agent for solvents, are also seized 
in large amounts in South America.
In Europe, seizures of potassium permanganate were very 
small in 2016 and 2017, with a total of 13.5 kg confiscated, 
Figure 5.2 
The cocaine production process
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of selected stages of a production process. It must be noted that alternative 
methods, chemicals and procedures may be used.
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almost entirely in Spain. However, there were several attempts 
at sourcing this chemical in Europe during this period, and 
Spain stopped shipments that had been requested and 
totalled a little more than 54 tonnes (data from the European 
Commission). In addition, sodium metabisulfite is also seized; 
for instance, the Netherlands seized notable amounts in 
2016 and 2017 (INCB, 2018). Seizures of calcium chloride 
also occurred in Europe recently; in 2016 an unspecified 
quantity was seized in Spain and more than 1 tonne in the 
Netherlands (INCB, 2018). These seizures suggest that some 
cocaine hydrochloride production and processing takes place 
in Europe, especially the Netherlands.
Cocaine production in Europe
Except for seizures of chemicals used in the manufacture 
of cocaine, little information is available about facilities 
potentially manufacturing cocaine hydrochloride in Europe. 
This intelligence gap is a concern, especially as some 
OCGs have started to manufacture heroin from morphine in 
Europe (see Chapter 4). Some limited information suggests 
that the last stages of the cocaine production process, 
i.e. converting base, or even base paste, into hydrochloride 
(see Figure 5.2), may be carried out in Europe. For instance, 
it is suspected that two illicit laboratories dismantled in the 
Netherlands in the first half of 2018 were converting coca 
base paste into hydrochloride. In one of those facilities, 
additional evidence was found indicating that morphine 
was also processed into heroin on site.
If cocaine is being processed in Europe, cocaine needs 
to be exported to Europe in base or paste form. The data 
currently indicate that the vast majority of the cocaine 
seized is the hydrochloride salt. Other cocaine products are 
rarely mentioned, but seizures of about 377 kg (2015) and 
86 kg (2016) of base paste were reported to the EMCDDA 
by Spain and Italy. In addition, there are occasional media 
reports of seizures of cocaine base paste in Colombia 
destined for Europe, and seizures in Europe, such as the 
210 kg seized in Barcelona and nearby towns in 2016 
(Cawley, 2014; Diariocronica.es, 2016).
The detection of base-to-hydrochloride laboratories in 
Europe could also be a consequence of the importation 
of cocaine hidden in carrier materials, such as plastic. In 
secondary extraction facilities, the cocaine is often retrieved 
in the form of base and then needs to be transformed into 
hydrochloride before being sold. Although it is known that 
using carrier materials to hide cocaine before importation 
in Europe is one of the methods employed by traffickers 
(EMCDDA and Europol, 2013, 2016), it seems that few 
‘secondary extraction’ laboratories are dismantled in 
Europe; only five countries report a total of 10 facilities since 
2014 via the ad hoc European Reporting on Illicit Cocaine 
Extraction-Conversion Sites (ERICES) tool, jointly developed 
by the EMCDDA and Europol. However, media reports 
suggest that more secondary extraction facilities are found 
than are reported through ERICES (Van Wely, 2019).
Environmental impact of cocaine 
production
Two categories of environmental harms are caused by 
cocaine production: those resulting from the agricultural 
production of the coca plant and those caused by the 
chemical extraction of the cocaine alkaloid from coca 
leaves. The first harm caused is deforestation. Removing 
the natural vegetation from a patch of land in order to grow 
a single-species crop harms biodiversity. Erosion is another 
negative consequence, especially due to the slash-and-burn 
practice frequently used in clearing land. Erosion, caused by 
wind and especially rain, leads to soil depletion. In addition, 
the drive to maximise yields of what are essentially cash 
crops, often leads to use of chemical fertilisers, herbicides 
and pesticides in order to increase production. In the 
context of drug production, this is likely to be done with little 
regard to dosage, further polluting already degraded soils 
and spreading to rivers and underground water deposits. 
In addition, aerial spraying of herbicides to eradicate coca 
plantations may pose a threat to the environment. 
Many of the chemicals used to process coca leaves into 
cocaine hydrochloride, including potassium permanganate 
and solvents such as acetone, toluene, kerosene and acids, 
to mention only a few, are toxic. The waste product resulting 
from cocaine production where these chemicals are used 
is often simply dumped on the ground or in streams and 
rivers (EMCDDA and Europol, 2016).
It is probable that the environmental harms caused by the 
cocaine industry have increased in recent years because 
of the dramatic expansion of both coca crops and cocaine 
production in the Andean region, especially Colombia.
Figure 5.3 
Global seizures of potassium permanganate, 2007-17
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Trafficking and supply
Much of our knowledge about trafficking routes results from 
law enforcement activity and intelligence. Information on 
quantities of drugs seized and on the origin and destination 
of shipments can give an indication of the main routes 
and modes of transport. However, such information is 
also affected by many factors, including law enforcement 
strategies, resources and priorities, as well as changes to 
routes and practices in response to interdiction efforts or 
new opportunities. Hence, care is needed in interpreting 
these data. While the information below highlights the 
main known trafficking routes and other significant aspects, 
these are not set in stone, and the picture is constantly 
changing in response to new markets, technological and 
political developments and law enforcement activity.
The total of 1 275 tonnes of cocaine seized worldwide 
in 2017 was the highest ever to be reported. Because 
cocaine seizures are reported at varying levels of purity, the 
global quantities seized are not comparable with global 
production estimates, which are of ‘pure cocaine’. At global 
level, a majority of the cocaine was seized at sea or at ports 
(55 % of the significant drug seizures reported to UNODC); 
the rest was intercepted on land (25 %) and at airports 
(15 %) (UNODC, 2019a). North, Central and South America 
together were estimated to have seized almost 90 % of the 
global total in 2017 (see section on trafficking routes to 
Europe, below). Western and central Europe accounted for 
about 11 % of the global total, and Belgium was the country 
that seized the largest amount (3.5 % of global total), 
followed by Spain (3.2 %) and France (1.4 %) (UNODC, 
2019a).
Taken together, seizures in western, central and south-
eastern Europe increased by 105 % between 2016 and 
2017. Although small in comparison with seizures in 
the Americas and Europe, seizures in emerging cocaine 
markets in Africa and Oceania increased, in some cases 
considerably, for the fourth consecutive year in 2017 
(UNODC, 2019a).
Trafficking routes to Europe: overview of 
recent changes
The main cocaine trafficking routes to Europe are illustrated 
on pages 128-129. 
Profiling of cocaine seized in Europe
The Cocaine Signature Program has the potential to 
provide new insights into the origin of the cocaine 
being sold in Europe. This programme, run by the US 
Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), performs 
in-depth chemical analyses on samples of cocaine 
hydrochloride obtained from bulk seizures. It is 
primarily focused on seizures made in the United 
States, but also examines a small number of samples 
seized in Europe. The analyses provide extremely 
accurate (97 % confidence level) evidence of the 
geographical origin of the coca leaf that is then 
processed into cocaine base, the starting material for 
cocaine hydrochloride (powder cocaine). The samples 
are also tested for purity.
Results pertaining to 474 samples of cocaine 
hydrochloride, submitted by 10 EU Member States 
between 2015 and 2018, have been compiled by 
the EMCDDA under the aegis of the policy cycle’s 
European Multidisciplinary Platform Against Criminal 
Threats (EMPACT) (see figure). Although the samples 
are not representative of all of Europe and are biased 
towards larger seizures, the findings demonstrate the 
valuable insights this type of analysis can provide.
In the 474 EU samples, purities varied between 
28 % and 95 %. In seven out of the 10 Member 
States, purities of 90 % or more were detected, while 
samples of less than 70 % purity were found in only 
two Member States (see figure). This suggests that, 
at the importation and wholesale levels, the cocaine 
available in Europe is of high or very high purity.
Over two thirds (68 %) of the EU samples originated 
from Colombia, and 60 % of those originated in the 
three large coca-growing regions of south-western 
Colombia, Cauca, Nariño and Putumayo. These 
regions have also been reported as the main sources 
of the cocaine available in the United States (Mallette 
et al., 2016). Colombia was the most frequent country 
of origin in eight out of the 10 EU Member States, 
as would be expected, since Colombia is by far the 
largest cocaine-producing country in the world.
Almost one fifth (19 %) of the total number of 
EU samples originated from Peru, the world’s 
second largest coca producer, and half of them 
were submitted by Belgium. The vast majority of 
the Peruvian-origin samples were found to have 
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originated from the Upper Huallaga River Valley/
Ucayali region of central Peru. This is of interest, 
since this region is estimated to be a marginal coca 
producer in Peru in the most recent crop-monitoring 
survey available (UNODC, 2018c), while Peru’s 
number one coca-growing region, the Apurímac, 
Ene and Mantaro Rivers Valley, is not identified as 
the origin of any of the EU samples. Bolivia, the third 
largest coca producer country, was identified as the 
origin of only 20 samples (4 % of the total).
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Departure points
Cocaine is shipped from Latin America to Europe mainly in 
vessels departing from Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador and other 
countries, such as Paraguay and Peru. The importance of 
Venezuela, which in the past was a major departure point, 
seems to have declined in recent years. Seizures made 
in 2017 at or en route to the port of Antwerp suggest that 
large, multi-tonne shipments departing from Colombian 
ports account for the biggest share of the cocaine entering 
the EU, followed by smaller, though more numerous 
shipments from Brazil and Ecuador (see Figure 5.6, 
page 140). These observations and the recent dramatic 
increase in cocaine production in Colombia suggest that 
Colombia is likely to remain a key departure point for 
maritime shipments of cocaine to Europe in years to come.
Transit areas
There have traditionally been two main areas through 
which maritime and air cocaine shipments transit en route 
to Europe: the Caribbean, and the West African mainland 
and neighbouring islands, Cape Verde, Madeira and the 
Canaries. While the Caribbean and West Africa and nearby 
islands remain significant transit areas today, the increase 
in the movement of cocaine hidden inside maritime 
containers and other developments seem to be fostering 
the emergence of newer important transit areas such as 
Central America and North Africa.
From the Caribbean, the cocaine is generally shipped by 
sea on pleasure craft via the Azores, or by air, either on 
direct flights or via a variety of transit points. The Dominican 
Republic, Trinidad and Tobago, and Jamaica are considered 
the main cocaine hubs of the Caribbean. In 2017 cocaine 
seizures in the Caribbean region amounted to 16.7 tonnes, 
or about 1 % of the global total (UNODC, 2018a, 2019a).
In contrast, more than seven times as much cocaine 
was seized in Central America as in the Caribbean, with 
120 tonnes captured in 2017 (10 % of the global total), 
making it the region seizing the fourth largest quantity of 
cocaine in the world. Panama’s location on Colombia’s 
northern land and sea borders together with its recently 
expanded canal, through which about 14 000 ships 
transited in 2018, make it a key storage, transit and 
distribution hub for cocaine destined for Europe, and it 
accounted for over 50 % of the 2017 seizures in Central 
America (UNODC, 2019a). Spain and the Netherlands, 
two major entry points for the drug, are the only European 
countries listed in the top 15 destinations for goods 
transiting the Panama Canal in 2018 (Panama Canal 
Authority, 2018).
The other traditional transit area is the West African 
mainland and neighbouring islands, Cape Verde, Madeira 
and the Canary Islands. The West African coast, from 
Mauritania to Nigeria, may have decreased in importance 
in recent years. In 2017, the largest amounts seized were 
reported by Nigeria (92 kg) and neighbouring Benin (45 kg) 
(UNODC, 2019a). Although the yearly totals for the region 
are generally relatively modest, occasional large shipments 
are seized. For instance, in January 2019 a huge shipment 
of about 10 tonnes of cocaine was captured in Praia, Cape 
Verde, from a ship travelling to Tangiers, Morocco (Agência 
Lusa, 2019).
From West Africa, the cocaine is transported onwards to 
Europe by air, sea or land routes. It is therefore likely that 
countries located in the Sahel/Sahara region between the 
West African coast and North Africa are transit locations 
for shipments of cocaine smuggled by land to Europe, 
although they report only tiny or no seizures of the drug.
North Africa is strategically located at a crossroads 
between Europe, a major cocaine consumer market 
and transit area, West Africa and the Middle East, both 
emerging consumer markets and transit areas for the drug. 
Transport through North Africa, often taking advantage 
of pre-existing cannabis routes, was identified as an 
issue some years ago (UNODC, 2007). However, recent 
developments suggest that the region, particularly its 
coasts on the Atlantic and the Mediterranean, is a growing 
cocaine transit and storage hub for cocaine both arriving 
by sea directly from South America and coming via West 
Africa for onward transport to Europe or elsewhere. 
Conversely, some cocaine may be smuggled from North 
Africa to West Africa, particularly by air, as was suggested 
by the arrest of a Lithuanian courier smuggling 8.5 kg 
of cocaine from Brazil to Sierra Leone via Casablanca, 
Morocco, in July 2018 (H24Info.ma, 2018a).
The main hub appears to be Morocco, which seized more 
than 1.6 tonnes of cocaine in 2016, 2.84 tonnes in 2017 
(UNODC, 2019a) and 1.6 tonnes in 2018 (Moroccan police, 
personal communication). Couriers smuggling a few 
kilograms of cocaine are frequently arrested at Casablanca 
airport, particularly on flights from São Paulo, Brazil. 
However, larger amounts have been seized elsewhere in 
the country, for example 200 kg at a cocaine and synthetic 
drug laboratory dismantled by police close to the Algerian 
border, 1.2 tonnes on a fishing vessel off Dakhla, in Western 
Sahara, 2.5 tonnes from two farms located between 
Casablanca and Rabat, in north-western Morocco, and 
another tonne reported as ‘cocaine paste’ (UNODC, 2019a) 
in the port of El Jadida, in western Morocco. Investigation 
of this last seizure led to the identification of a farm in the 
Boujdour area, in Western Sahara, where an airstrip was 
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under construction. The suspects arrested in connection 
with these seizures included nationals of Colombia, 
Morocco, Peru and Spain (Bladi.net, 2016; El Hamraoui, 
2016; Europe1.fr, 2018; H24Info.ma, 2018b,c; Luaña, 2016; 
Sidiguitiebe, 2016). It appears that cocaine traffickers 
may be particularly targeting the contested and sparsely 
populated Western Sahara with its long coastline on the 
Atlantic.
Although apparently on a much smaller scale than 
Morocco, the possible roles of Algeria and Libya as transit 
points for cocaine en route between South America and 
Europe has been highlighted recently with the seizure of 
701 kg of cocaine in a container of meat from Brazil in the 
port of Oran, in western Algeria, in May 2018 (Ben Yahia 
and Farrah, 2019). The modus operandi used in this case 
suggests that this was a well-established smuggling route. 
Similarly, several smaller cocaine seizures have been 
reported in Libya in 2018 (Micaleff, 2019).
Wholesale cocaine-trafficking activities in the region may 
lead to an increase in cocaine use in Algeria, Libya and 
Morocco.
Some large seizures of cocaine have suggested the use 
of south-eastern Europe as an entry point (EMCDDA and 
Europol, 2016). However, the data suggest that use of 
this region for cocaine smuggling seems to be sporadic 
and much less important than established primary routes. 
Thus, non-routine data reported by the European Border 
and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex) on drug seizures at 
a number of border posts between the EU and the Western 
Balkans in 2017 and the first 10 months of 2018 indicate 
that minimal amounts of cocaine enter the EU from that 
region, while similar Frontex data show large quantities of 
cocaine being seized in Spain, a known hub for cocaine 
importation into the EU (Frontex, 2018). Analysis of EU 
routine data on drug seizures appears to confirm that 
little cocaine enters the EU from the east, as the total 
amount seized in the 10 countries located on the eastern 
border of the EU during 2013-17 remains at under 2 % 
of all seizures. That said, recent seizures of large cocaine 
consignments in eastern EU countries and in countries 
bordering the EU, including about 2 tonnes seized in 
Latvia in January 2019, more than 1 tonne in the Danube 
Delta, Romania in March 2019 (see Figure 5.4) and 615 kg 
intercepted in Dürres, Albania, in February 2018, are 
warning signs of a changing situation.
It is also important to note that the EU and the Balkan region 
appear to be increasingly used as transit areas for cocaine 
destined for other markets such as Australia, Russia, Turkey, 
and countries in the Middle East and Asia. As the supply 
of cocaine meets or exceeds demand in the EU, EU-based 
and other OCGs may be exploring opportunities in other, 
less saturated and potentially more profitable, markets and 
using Europe as an export platform. For instance, members 
of the so-called ‘Kinahan cartel’, an Irish OCG, were arrested 
in Ireland and Australia in 2018 as part of an investigation 
into the smuggling of cocaine using air couriers between 
Ireland, Australia and New Zealand (Meers, 2018b).
Importation and distribution in Europe: 
record quantities seized
The 142 tonnes of cocaine seized in the EU, Norway and 
Turkey in 2017 was the highest on record. It surpassed 
the previous peak, in 2006, by more than 20 tonnes and 
represented a doubling of the amount seized in 2016 
(see Figure 5.5). Two countries, Belgium (45 tonnes) and 
Spain (41 tonnes), accounted for more than 60 % of the 
estimated European total, but large quantities were also 
seized by France (17.5 tonnes), the Netherlands (14.6 
tonnes) and Germany (8 tonnes). Although smaller than 
in previous years, multi-tonne quantities of cocaine were 
also seized in Italy (4 tonnes) and Portugal (2.7 tonnes). 
Meanwhile, new records were established in 2017 in Turkey 
(about 1.5 tonnes) and Lithuania (623 kg), although these 
countries are not usually associated with cocaine trafficking 
or consumption.
Early indications suggest that the quantities seized 
in Europe could be even larger in 2018. For instance, 
preliminary data on cocaine seizures at the port of Antwerp, 
provided by the Belgian police, indicate that 50 tonnes was 
seized in 2018, that is, more than in the entire country of 
Belgium in 2017.
Figure 5.4 
Cocaine bricks seized in the Danube Delta, Romania, 
March 2019
Photo:  Romanian National Police, Anti-drug Unit
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Most of the cocaine available in Europe continues to 
be smuggled into the largest container ports of Europe, 
located in Belgium (Antwerp), Spain (Algeciras and 
Valencia) and the Netherlands (Rotterdam). However, 
other ports, in France (Le Havre), Germany (Hamburg) and 
Italy (Gioia Tauro) for instance, have now also become 
significant cocaine entry points. In addition, larger amounts 
of cocaine are increasingly shipped from South America 
to smaller ports in the EU, where security measures may 
be less stringent, such as Malta Freeport (Malta), Montoir-
de-Bretagne (France), Vlissingen (Netherlands), Marin 
(Spain) or Tilbury (United Kingdom). Smaller quantities of 
the drug also continue to be smuggled by air by individual 
couriers, in luggage and in freight. All major European 
airports are targeted, as well as, increasingly, secondary 
ones. In addition, the transatlantic smuggling of cocaine 
using private business jets is a trend that seems to have 
accelerated in the last few years (see Chapter 2).
Cocaine importation: a more crowded and 
competitive criminal market
Historically, the wholesale supply of cocaine to the EU 
was dominated by cooperation between established 
cartels in South America and Italian OCGs, especially the 
Calabrian ‘Ndrangheta (see Case study 22), acting as 
wholesale brokers for EU-based distributors. However, the 
cocaine-producing scene in Colombia has fragmented 
and diversified, and numerous Italian traffickers have 
been arrested in Europe and Latin America in recent 
years (McDermott, 2018). The disruption caused by these 
developments seems to have given a broader range of 
EU-based OCGs easier access to cocaine producers 
in South America (EMCDDA and Europol, 2016). 
Comparatively small players are now using this direct 
access to producers and pooling funds to purchase larger 
quantities of cocaine at more favourable wholesale prices.
Thus, Albanian-speaking, British, Dutch, French, Irish, 
Moroccan, Serbian, Spanish and Turkish OCGs are 
increasingly establishing their own operations to transport 
cocaine directly from South America to Europe, or even 
directly acquiring cocaine in or near producing countries. 
For instance, French OCGs make use of connections with 
French Guiana and the French Antilles to smuggle bulk loads 
Figure 5.5 
Quantities of cocaine seized in Europe 2005-17
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CASE STUDY 22
Operation Pollino takes down ‘Ndrangheta clan
In a Eurojust-coordinated 
international operation by judicial 
and law enforcement authorities in 
early December 2018, 84 alleged 
members of a ‘Ndrangheta mafia-style 
organised criminal group from the 
Reggio region of Calabria, Italy, were 
arrested in Belgium, Germany, Italy, 
Luxembourg and the Netherlands on 
charges of criminal association, drug 
trafficking and money laundering. 
Several tonnes of cocaine, more than 
100 kg of ecstasy tablets and about 
EUR 2 million in cash were seized 
in several countries. The Calabria-
based mafia-like organisation is 
established in several European 
and South American countries 
including Colombia, but also in 
Canada and the United States. It is 
often described as one of Europe’s 
richest and most powerful criminal 
organisations, notably because of 
its role as one of the region’s largest 
wholesale importers of cocaine and 
misappropriators of EU funds.
The initial investigation that led to 
Operation Pollino was launched in 
2016 by the Dutch Fiscal Information 
and Investigation Service, acting 
on a suspicion that two restaurants 
in the southern Netherlands were 
being used to launder drug money. 
This case illustrates the value of 
‘follow the money’ approaches in the 
fight against drug-related and other 
forms of organised crime. Financial 
investigations have been made 
a cross-cutting priority for all the crime 
areas covered by the present policy 
cycle.
Sources: Anesi and Rubino (2018); BBC News 
(2018b); Meers (2018c); OCCRP et al. (2018).
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back to mainland France (see box ‘The Guianese connection’). 
Western Balkan OCGs are also very active at key staging 
posts along the main trafficking routes and are involved in 
the infiltration of, and corruption at, key South American 
and EU ports (see box ‘Balkan organised crime networks 
and cocaine trafficking’). Meanwhile, Turkish OCGs are 
increasingly involved in the transatlantic trafficking of cocaine 
to the EU and Turkey, relying on their own maritime transport 
infrastructure, which has also been used to traffic large 
quantities of cannabis resin across the Mediterranean Sea.
OCGs that were previously only marginally involved in the 
EU, such as Mexican cartels, are believed to have intensified 
their cooperation with other crime groups in order to 
orchestrate the trafficking of cocaine to the EU. Moroccan 
OCGs that used to be hired by established OCGs to retrieve 
cocaine shipments in the ports of Antwerp and Rotterdam 
are now becoming important players in their own right 
(Colman, 2018). Outlaw motorcycle gangs are also involved 
in trafficking of cocaine to the EU and distributing it in 
various EU Member States, mainly in the north of Europe. 
Outlaw motorcycle gangs are increasing their presence at 
some ports in the EU to facilitate this business.
Conversely, the relevance of West African (specifically 
Nigerian) OCGs to the trafficking of cocaine to the EU 
seems to be in relative decline, as they have been displaced 
in some European countries by criminal groups originating 
from the Western Balkans and North Africa. Nigerian OCGs 
primarily rely on the use of couriers to transport cocaine 
to the EU, often from West Africa and more recently also 
directly from South America.
South American representatives of Colombian 
organisations are established in the EU and supervise 
shipments, ensure payments and liaise with international 
money-laundering facilitators (McDermott, 2018).
Cocaine in containers: targeting the port of 
Antwerp
Cocaine traffickers make use of a wide range of trafficking 
methods, which are used flexibly and evolve over time 
in response to enforcement efforts and other factors. 
Although cocaine also enters the EU by air (see box 
‘The Guianese connection’), the main route used to 
smuggle the drug into Europe is still the maritime route 
from South America to western Europe, especially taking 
advantage of the containerised trade in goods. Maritime 
transport allows the transportation of large quantities 
at one time, and the nature of international commercial 
maritime traffic means that a vast number of routes can 
and will be used. In addition, smaller, private sailing boats 
are able to bring in large quantities of cocaine in single 
shipments, entering Europe at many points.
Large European container ports have recorded many 
seizures of large cocaine shipments in recent years. 
In addition to targeting major ports, OCGs are now 
increasingly shipping larger amounts of cocaine from 
South America to smaller ports in the EU or neighbouring 
countries, where security measures may be easier to 
circumvent.
It is important to note that corruption of port (and airport) 
employees and security officials in facilities throughout 
Europe is in most cases a key condition for the successful 
use of these facilities for cocaine importation by OCGs.
The port of Antwerp remains a key entry point for cocaine 
trafficked to the EU. Its role appears to have increased since 
the previous edition of this report (EMCDDA and Europol, 
2016). From Antwerp, cocaine is frequently transported to 
the Netherlands by road for processing and cutting prior 
to redistribution to other EU destinations. In 2016, cocaine 
seizures at Antwerp totalled 26.5 tonnes, and that rose 
to almost 42 tonnes in 2017. In 2018, some 50 tonnes of 
Balkan organised crime networks and  
cocaine trafficking
OCGs originating from the countries of the former 
Yugoslavia (sometimes collectively referred to 
as the ‘Balkan Cartel’) continue to increase their 
role in international cocaine trafficking. These 
groups are mainly composed of Serbians together 
with Montenegrins and Croatians who cooperate 
regardless of nationality. Spain, the Netherlands, 
Germany, Austria and Croatia are emerging as key 
locations for their activities. They also cooperate with 
Albanian-speaking, Italian and Moroccan OCGs. They 
increasingly apply a crowdsourcing business model 
to the wholesale acquisition of cocaine. Several 
distribution networks collectively invest in very large 
cocaine shipments from various sources of supply 
in South America. They have also increased their 
footprint in locations where they can access cocaine 
at cheaper prices, such as Colombia, the Dominican 
Republic and Ecuador. However, they appear to be 
present mainly in Peru and even more in Brazil, where 
Serbian OCGs are particularly prominent at the port 
of Santos. They are also present at key staging posts 
along the main trafficking routes. These OCGs are 
involved in infiltration and corruption at key European 
international ports, and they use mostly containers 
and pleasure vessels to traffic the cocaine into the EU.
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cocaine was seized at the port (data provided by Belgian 
police, 2019). Information from seizures outside the EU 
in 2016 indicated that, in addition to these seizures at 
Antwerp, 36 tonnes of cocaine was intercepted in Latin 
America in shipments for which Antwerp was the final 
destination. In 2017 this rose to 45 tonnes and during the 
first half of 2018 at least 16 tonnes destined for Antwerp 
was seized outside Europe.
As mentioned above, the largest quantities of cocaine 
seized at Antwerp, or seized elsewhere and destined for 
Antwerp, were shipped from Colombia. In most cases they 
were concealed within consignments of goods, especially 
fruit such as bananas. Concealment within goods was also 
the main method used for cocaine shipped from Ecuador. 
Meanwhile, the largest number of seizures involving the 
port of Antwerp were of smaller amounts of cocaine 
shipped from Brazil using mostly the rip-on/rip-off method 
(described in Figure 2.4, page 62). The largest quantity of 
cocaine shipped from Colombia was seized in Antwerp, 
while comparable quantities of cocaine shipped from Brazil 
were seized in Brazil and in Antwerp (see Figure 5.6).
There are multiple reasons why the port of Antwerp is 
a major hub for the importation of cocaine and other drugs 
in Europe. It is Europe’s second busiest container port, 
after nearby Rotterdam, and handles millions of tonnes of 
containerised goods every year. It is physically a very open 
harbour area, located within the city of Antwerp and with 
many opportunities to break and enter. Antwerp is also 
Figure 5.6 
Cocaine seized in containers in or bound for Antwerp, 2017
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the largest fruit handler in Europe, with direct cargo lines 
from Colombia, Ecuador, Guatemala and Panama, and, 
given that it is imperative that fresh produce be processed 
rapidly through the port, it may be often difficult for limited 
numbers of customs and law enforcement officers to deal 
with the drug threat alongside their many other duties. 
Antwerp is close to the Netherlands, especially Rotterdam, 
which is another key hub for cocaine importation and 
distribution, and for organised crime groups involved in 
drug supply. It should also be noted that Moroccan OCGs 
have long been key players in the port of Antwerp, and 
that they have become much more involved in cocaine 
trafficking and distribution in Europe in recent years. This, 
together with the increasing role played by Morocco as 
a transit hub for cocaine destined for the EU, probably 
helps to explain why large amounts of the drug are 
trafficked through Antwerp. In addition, Turkish, Italian and 
Dutch OCGs, as well as OCGs from the Western Balkans, 
especially Albanian-speaking ones, are also known to be 
involved in trafficking drugs, including cocaine, through the 
port of Antwerp.
Drug importation methods
Although there have been no major changes to the 
established trafficking modi operandi, all methods of 
cocaine trafficking now appear to be encountered more 
frequently than before, reflecting the fact that larger 
amounts of cocaine are now smuggled in Europe. 
Smuggling consignments in maritime containers continues 
to be the most common modus operandi associated with 
cocaine, especially relying on the rip-on/rip-off method. 
However, use of this method may be declining, as it is 
less suitable for the smuggling of very large shipments 
of cocaine and made more difficult to implement by the 
automation of container handling in ports. OCGs also 
increasingly rely on variants such as the switch method  
(see Figure 2.4, page 62). Corruption remains a key 
facilitator for the trafficking of cocaine into the EU; OCGs 
rely on it to gain access to ports and airports.
OCGs involved in cocaine trafficking now also more 
frequently employ methods of transport such as mother 
ships, pleasure craft and fishing vessels, cruise ships and 
the drop-off method (see Chapter 2). Sophisticated means 
of concealment such as placing the illicit load in metal 
cylinders attached to the ship’s hull are also encountered 
(see Figure 2.4, page 62).
The smuggling of drugs by air transportation includes the 
use of passenger commercial flights, air cargo aircraft 
and general aviation (private aircraft). Large quantities 
of cocaine, typically ranging from 500 to 1 200 kg, are 
increasingly trafficked directly from South America and the 
Caribbean to western Europe using private business jets. 
The use of general aviation for the trafficking of cocaine is 
expected to increase in future. Stricter border controls and 
more effective security checks can act as a push factor for 
OCGs to use secondary international airports and small 
general aviation airfields.
On commercial flights, cocaine is mainly concealed in 
baggage, but also swallowed, attached to the body or 
concealed in clothes, and to a lesser extent stuffed in 
body cavities. Cocaine air couriers depart from airports in 
South and Central America and the Caribbean, especially 
Colombia and Brazil, and fly to major European airports 
either directly or after stopovers in countries such as 
Morocco, Nigeria and the United Arab Emirates. An increase 
in cocaine seizures from Kenyan couriers has been 
observed at several European airports in 2018, which is 
a relatively new trend (Groupe Pompidou and RILO WE, 
2019) (see box ‘The Guianese connection’).
The Guianese connection
National overseas territories are often used as transit 
locations by OCGs in order to take advantage of both 
their inclusion in the European Single Market and 
European customs territory and their geographical 
proximity to cocaine producer countries. A recent 
illustration is the case of the cocaine connection 
between French Guiana, France’s overseas 
department in South America, and mainland France. 
Increasing amounts of cocaine have been smuggled 
on commercial flights between Cayenne, French 
Guiana’s largest city, and Orly Airport in Paris since 
2015. Arrests and seizures peaked in 2018, when 
1 349 couriers were caught carrying a total of about 
2.3 tonnes of cocaine, an average of 1.7 kg per 
courier. Most of the couriers are French nationals, 
but the cocaine is probably sourced in neighbouring 
Suriname. The vast majority of the cocaine seized in 
France from the ‘Guianese connection’ is destined 
to be sold in Paris and other French cities, but about 
11 % is exported abroad, mainly to the Netherlands.
Sources: Office central pour la répression du trafic illicite des 
stupéfiants, L’Institut national des hautes études de la sécurité et de la 
justice and Observatoire français des drogues et des toxicomanies.
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Negative consequences: violence and corruption
A serious consequence of the increase in cocaine 
importation and distribution in Europe is that corruption of 
seaport and airport employees by organised crime groups 
is likely to have become pervasive across Europe, since 
complicity in the ports is often an essential component of 
the smuggling methods used. Drug-related corruption also 
seems to be affecting larger numbers of law enforcement 
officials, especially customs officers, with cases emerging 
so far in Belgium, Spain and the Netherlands (Boerman 
et al., 2017). Some port workers, customs and other law 
enforcement officers have also been subjected to threats 
by crime groups.
Another grave concern is an increase in violence around 
cocaine importation activities. Homicides and kidnappings 
between crime groups in Europe now appear to be more 
frequent and violent than in the past. For instance, in 
March 2016 a severed head was left on the street in 
front of an Amsterdam shisha bar in an episode of a feud 
between rival Moroccan gangs involved in the cocaine 
business (Henley, 2016). An increase in homicides between 
OCGs is also affecting Antwerp (Colman, 2018), where 
harbour workers have been intimidated by crime groups. 
A war between two rival Irish gangs involved in cocaine 
importation and distribution in Ireland, the United Kingdom, 
Australia and New Zealand has led to at least 15 murders, 
many of them in public places, in Ireland and Spain since 
2015 (McDonald, 2018; Meers, 2018b).
A service industry seems to be developing in order to 
supply the European cocaine market’s demand for violence. 
For instance, the emergence of younger contract killers, 
or hitmen, has been documented in the Netherlands 
(Van Gestel and Verhoeven, 2017). Another example 
is in Spain, where the press has reported that some 
recent murders of cocaine traffickers were committed by 
Colombian sicarios, or contract killers, while observing that 
hitmen of North African origin are also active in the country. 
It apparently costs between EUR 30 000 and EUR 70 000 to 
have a person killed in Spain (Montero, 2019). In Sweden, 
a Stockholm gang known as the Death Patrol provided 
murder as a service to other OCGs, including Colombian 
cocaine cartels, before being dismantled between late 2018 
and early 2019 (see Case study 8, page 45).
Trafficking within the EU
Roads remain the preferred means of transport for 
cocaine distribution within the EU. Lorries transport 
large shipments from the main EU distribution hubs in 
Belgium, the Netherlands and Spain to regional and local 
markets. Smaller shipments continue to be trafficked 
mostly in private vehicles. Like all other illicit drugs, smaller 
consignments of cocaine are frequently sent across the EU 
using post and parcel services, sometimes in connection 
with darknet drug markets.
OCGs involved in the intra-EU trafficking of cocaine 
use various methods to manage the risk of discovery 
by law enforcement agencies. They rely on fraudulent 
documents to conceal the nature and origin of their loads, 
employ advanced technologies and use sophisticated 
means of concealment in motor vehicles. In a continuing 
trend highlighted in the previous edition of this report 
(EMCDDA and Europol, 2016), OCGs continue to 
specialise in providing services related to particular stages 
of the cocaine supply chain. For instance, Bulgarian 
and Romanian criminal groups increasingly invest in 
road transport businesses in order to facilitate intra-EU 
trafficking of cocaine and other drugs.
It is worth noting that Albanian-speaking OCGs continue 
to aggressively expand their involvement in the cocaine 
trade, becoming central players in distribution and 
retail sales in some large markets, such as the United 
Kingdom. In addition, they have extended their activities 
to comparatively smaller consumer markets in Belgium, 
Germany and the Netherlands (Saggers, 2019). Dutch, 
Spanish and British OCGs cooperate with international 
OCGs to transport or distribute cocaine in the EU. These 
OCGs are in close contact with the representatives 
of international OCGs who are based permanently or 
temporarily in the main entry points for cocaine to the EU.
Although criminal groups often compete with one another, 
cases of cooperation also exist. For instance, certain Dutch 
and Turkish OCGs are known to have been cooperating 
for some time in order to smuggle cocaine from the 
Netherlands to Turkey in exchange for heroin travelling 
in the opposite direction (Tops et al., 2018) (see Case 
study 19, page 113).
OCGs involved in the trafficking of cocaine often rely on 
cash couriers to transport large amounts of money from 
the EU to ‘cash-friendlier’ jurisdictions such as Dubai or 
Lebanon. According to a recent survey of seizures of cash 
leaving 17 EU and 5 Western Balkan airports in 2018, 
the top seven destinations in order of rank are Turkey, 
China, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Thailand and Egypt 
(Groupe Pompidou and RILO WE, 2019).
A single courier can transport up to EUR 1 million in cash. 
For instance, Lebanese money-laundering networks use 
designated couriers who travel from Lebanon to the EU. 
Cash couriers travelling from the EU to the Middle East 
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often carry gold or jewellery, which has been bought using 
criminal cash proceeds in order to justify the transfer as 
trade activity and conceal it.
Trafficking of cocaine within the EU remains concentrated 
in the west and south of Europe, where the largest 
consumer markets are. The countries of the Iberian 
Peninsula, the Netherlands and to a lesser extent Belgium 
are key cocaine distribution hubs (Figure 5.7). This is 
likely to be because they are also key importation hubs 
(EMCDDA and Europol, 2013, 2016; see also section on 
importation and distribution in Europe above). They supply 
mainly the largest consumer markets in Europe, located 
in France, Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom, as well 
as other, comparatively small, markets further afield (see 
section on the expanding European retail markets for 
cocaine, below).
The presence of Germany and France among Europe’s 
five main cocaine-trafficking hubs may be viewed as 
a relatively new and perhaps surprising trend. However, 
both countries are also relatively large cocaine importation 
points, especially because of their large container ports and 
international airports (see box ‘The Guianese connection’ 
and the section on importation and distribution in Europe, 
above). But additional factors may be at play. For instance, 
in the case of France, its geographical location between 
southern and northern Europe probably plays a role, since 
France sends and receives cocaine shipments to and from 
both Spain and Germany (see Figure 5.7). In the case of 
Germany, the presence in the country of Europe’s largest 
air freight and dispatch centre, belonging to a global 
express parcel firm, may be a factor, since public and 
private postal services are increasingly used to traffic 
drugs within Europe (see beginning of this section). It is 
also important to note that a country’s role as importer/
distributor often coincides with, and probably helps to 
explain, the presence of a large consumer market in it.
Retail, supply and use
The expanding European retail markets 
for cocaine
Several indicators suggest that the European retail 
market for cocaine is expanding in line with the increase 
in importation and distribution of high-purity cocaine. As 
a result, cocaine availability to consumers in Europe could 
be at an all-time high. Although the vast majority of cocaine 
consumers appear to remain concentrated in a limited 
number of western and southern European countries, 
there are indications that retail markets are expanding in 
northern and eastern Europe.
The purity of cocaine at retail level has been increasing 
in Europe since 2010, and in 2017 it reached its highest 
level in the last decade; however, adulteration still takes 
place (see box ‘Cutting cocaine’). Meanwhile, the retail 
price of the drug remained stable or slightly decreased 
between 2007 and 2017 (see Cocaine overview, pages 
128-129). This indicates that more cocaine is now available 
on retail markets than was previously the case, most 
probably as a direct consequence of an increase in the 
availability of high-purity cocaine at the wholesale level and 
of competition between an increasing number of OCGs 
involved in the cocaine business (see box ‘Profiling of 
cocaine seized in Europe’, page 134).
In Europe, the retail market for cocaine has historically 
been concentrated in western and southern Europe, 
which is where most of the drug is imported, and is the 
most populated and one of the wealthiest regions of 
Europe. This remains very much the case today. For several 
years, a number of general population surveys reported 
a decrease in last year use of cocaine. Recent trends 
indicate that the decline has stopped and that levels of 
use are now stable. This would imply that retail markets for 
cocaine are also stable. However, this is at odds with trends 
observable in other datasets, which are reviewed below.
Figure 5.7 
Intra-European cocaine-trafficking routes, top five 
trafficking hubs and top five consumer markets, 
2017-18
Trafficking hubs
Main EU user markets
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Data on prevalence of cocaine use expressed in estimated 
numbers of users during the last year may be viewed 
as an indicator of the location and approximate size of 
retail markets. The latest data available confirm that the 
largest retail markets are located in western and southern 
Europe. Thus, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, 
Spain and the United Kingdom, which together represent 
about 66 % of the total EU population (Eurostat, 2018c), 
account for a little over 87 % of Europe’s estimated 
4 million last year cocaine users. Two Nordic countries, 
Sweden and Denmark, follow the top six, but report much 
lower estimated numbers of users. Poland ranks ninth and 
may therefore be viewed as the largest cocaine market in 
eastern Europe.
As already mentioned, new entries to treatment for 
problems associated with cocaine use have increased in 
Europe since 2015 (see Cocaine overview, pages 128-129). 
Furthermore, analysis of wastewater information shows 
a strong increase in cocaine residues in 26 of the 
32 cities for which data were available for 2015 and 2017, 
following a relatively stable period between 2011 and 
2015. However, this cannot be readily interpreted as an 
increase in the number of cocaine users, although this 
is certainly one of the possibilities, since other factors 
could have caused this increase in metabolites. Higher 
concentrations of metabolites could mean that the same 
number of people used more cocaine, or they could simply 
reflect the increased purity of cocaine found on retail 
markets mentioned earlier. Finally, a combination of these 
three causes could also be an explanation. Whatever the 
cause, wastewater data suggest an increase in cocaine 
consumption since 2015 in many of the cities studied.
Wastewater information also provides some detail on other 
characteristics of European retail markets for cocaine. 
Thus, a multi-city study covering 73 cities in 20 European 
countries in 2018 showed that higher concentrations of 
the cocaine metabolite benzoylecgonine tended to be 
found in larger cities, and in more than 75 % of cases 
higher concentrations were found at weekends than on 
weekdays, a finding confirmed by other data, which show 
that cocaine-related hospital emergency presentations are 
much more frequent at weekends.
Cutting cocaine
Cutting drugs with cheaper materials (also known 
as adulteration; see Figure 5.2) is usually done to 
increase profit along the distribution chain but may 
also enhance or modify the effects of the drug and may 
affect the health of users. The purity of powder cocaine 
appears to be lowest at retail level, and a wide variety 
of substances can be used as cutting agents (Broséus 
et al., 2015; Villar Núñez et al., 2018). In addition to 
inert diluents such as sugars, talc, plaster and starch, 
pharmacologically active adulterants are often found 
in both powder cocaine and crack cocaine, including 
various local anaesthetics, analgesics, other licit and 
illicit stimulants, nootropic agents and anti-allergy 
drugs (Kudlacek et al., 2017).
Levamisole, a veterinary antiparasitic drug, has been 
the most common adulterant of cocaine products over 
the past decade, followed by the analgesic phenacetin; 
both were identified by forensic laboratories and 
drug-checking services in 40-70 % of cocaine samples 
analysed in recent European studies (Broséus et al., 
2015; Brunt et al., 2017; Villar Núñez et al., 2018). In 
addition, levamisole appeared in used syringes in six 
European cities, where phenacetin was also detected 
(EMCDDA, 2019e). However, EMCDDA data covering 
the first half of 2018 indicate that caffeine may now 
be used more frequently than phenacetin, although 
levamisole remains the cutting agent most frequently 
used.
Levamisole is used as a cutting agent primarily because 
it is widely available on the market and is similar in 
colour and melting point to cocaine; it is cheap and 
heavier than cocaine and gives a specific cocaine-like 
sheen to the drug, allowing further adulteration down 
the retail chain (Brunt et al., 2017). Levamisole has also 
been described as an effect enhancer (Tallarida et al., 
2014). This may be true but the main effect is probably 
related to aminorex, a metabolite of levamisole, which 
may prolong the perceived stimulating effect of cocaine 
(Solomon and Hayes, 2017).
Although cocaine has been described as the most 
adulterated illicit drug (Kudlacek et al., 2017), 
several recent studies point to a decrease in cocaine 
adulteration in Europe. For instance, an analysis of 
902 samples submitted for testing to drug-checking 
services collected in seven EU Member States between 
January and July 2018 found that 62 % contained 
cocaine and no other substance, 31 % contained 
cocaine and cutting agents and 6 % contained no 
cocaine at all.
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Information on the number of drug seizures may be viewed 
as an indirect indicator of a drug’s availability at the retail 
level, although they primarily reflect law enforcement 
activity and the factors affecting it (resource availability 
and allocation, priorities, etc.). This is because the vast 
majority of drug seizures reported in Europe are of small 
amounts of under 10 g seized mostly on retail markets. 
This is confirmed by information indicating that, of the 
75 000 cocaine seizures reported by the 18 EU Member 
States that provided a breakdown by market levels 
(wholesale, middle market, retail), 83 % were carried out at 
the retail level in 2017.
Like cocaine purity, the number of cocaine seizures 
recorded in the EU has increased recently, and more 
than 104 000 individual seizures were reported in 2017, 
the highest level in 10 years (Figure 5.8). Out of the 
29 countries that report sufficient information, only three 
(Latvia, Portugal and Slovakia) did not report an increase 
between 2015 and 2017.
The country that reported the largest number of cocaine 
seizures in 2017 (and in previous years) is Spain, followed 
by the United Kingdom, France, Italy and Denmark 
(see Figure 5.8). Four of these also rank in the top six for 
estimated numbers of cocaine users; the exception is 
Denmark, which ranks eighth. It should be noted that the 
Netherlands, one of the top six retail markets in numbers 
of cocaine users, does not report numbers of drug seizures 
and as a result is not included in this analysis.
While the largest cocaine markets of western and southern 
Europe appear to be continuing to grow, others seem to 
be emerging or expanding in eastern and northern Europe. 
The Turkish retail market is a striking illustration of this 
trend. Turkey reported 3 829 cocaine seizures in 2017, 
more than 10 times the number reported in 2007 and 
its highest number on record. This probably signals the 
emergence of a sizeable retail market for cocaine in Turkey, 
which currently ranks 14th in Europe for reported numbers 
of cocaine users while Germany ranks fifth. The increasing 
involvement of Turkish organised crime in the cocaine trade 
mentioned earlier is likely to be a significant factor here 
(see sections on cocaine importation and on trafficking in 
the EU above).
Another example of market expansion is Sweden, which 
reported a record of 3 640 seizures in 2017. Likewise, 
but to a lesser extent, other Nordic countries such as 
Finland and Norway now report many more cocaine 
seizures than they did in the mid-2000s.
As far as countries in the east of Europe are concerned, 
the numbers reported are generally lower than in the 
countries mentioned above, reaching a few hundred 
annually. However, they have increased, sometimes 
dramatically, in the 10-year period considered here. Croatia, 
Cyprus, Czechia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, 
Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia all reported more cocaine 
seizures in 2017 than in 2007. Poland, mentioned earlier as 
eastern Europe’s largest consumer market, reported only 
nine seizures of cocaine in 2017, and did not report data 
in previous years; however, data from the police are not 
available. Luxembourg and Malta, whose populations are 
quite small, reported both comparatively large numbers of 
seizures in 2017 and remarkable increases since 2007.
Retail markets for crack cocaine
In general, a broad distinction can be made between retail 
markets for cocaine hydrochloride, or powder cocaine, 
and for crack. Consumers of the former are more socially 
integrated and often sniff the drug in a recreational 
context. Crack users are mostly marginalised, and inject 
or smoke cocaine freebase, or crack, often alongside 
the use of opioids. However, it should also be noted that 
not all crack is purchased on the market, since some 
consumers manufacture cocaine freebase themselves 
for their own use. Those who smoke cocaine freebase 
usually view themselves not as crack users but as cocaine 
users. This could mean that crack use is underestimated at 
present in Europe, especially because it may be difficult for 
law enforcement officers to distinguish cocaine freebase 
from purchased crack when it is seized. The practice of 
basification for own use may be rising among cocaine 
consumers in some countries. For example, the distribution 
of crack-smoking kits by low-threshold facilities and non-
governmental organisations is increasing in many regions 
of France, although the commercial market for crack is 
largely restricted to the greater Paris area (Cadet-Taïrou et 
al., 2017).
Figure 5.8 
Number of cocaine seizures in the EU, 2007-17
2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017
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Seizures of crack cocaine are generally low, and relatively 
stable, in both numbers and quantities in the countries 
that report them. Among other factors, this is likely to be 
because crack is manufactured from cocaine hydrochloride 
within Europe, close to the consumer markets, and is not 
transported across borders, where the largest quantities of 
drugs are usually seized.
Based on the latest data reported to the EMCDDA, the 
largest crack market in Europe continues to be the United 
Kingdom, which reported the largest quantity, 70.3 kg, and 
the highest number of crack seizures, 5 903, in 2017. Then 
come France, with 8.3 kg in 2016 (France does not report 
numbers of crack seizures), and Italy, with 5.5 kg and 262 
seizures. Germany and Spain follow, reporting much lower 
quantities — in the hundreds of grams. Finally, Austria, 
Malta and Portugal report tiny amounts and numbers of 
seizures.
Turkey reported seizures of crack for the first time in 2017, 
amounting to 1.3 kg and 50 seizures. These indicate that 
Turkey could now be a significant consumer market for 
crack cocaine as well as cocaine hydrochloride (see section 
on the expanding European retail markets).
It should be noted that the crack trade is associated 
with increasing levels of violence in the United Kingdom, 
especially in connection with the county lines phenomenon 
(see next section). Meanwhile, in Paris, France, qualitative 
data suggest an expansion of crack markets outside the 
open drug scene, which is usually confined to a particular 
district and into more public areas, where it is linked to 
noticeable street violence.
How cocaine is retailed in Europe
There is less systematic information available on the 
methods used to sell cocaine directly to consumers in Europe 
than on other aspects of the market. The traditional view is 
that most sales to users are conducted in ‘the street’ or on 
open drug markets, where they exist, and in other such public 
or semi-public settings. Recent research has suggested that 
the delivery of drugs to consumers by dealers contacted by 
mobile phone may be an important additional mechanism for 
cocaine retailing in Europe (Søgaard et al., 2019). However, 
the nature of the connections between the players active 
at different levels of the market — importation, wholesale 
distribution, mid-market distribution and retail sales — is 
generally poorly documented. Until more and better data are 
systematically collected on this aspect, it will be difficult to 
paint a comprehensive picture of how retail drug markets 
operate in Europe.
That said, like the diversification of the OCGs involved in the 
importation and distribution of cocaine in Europe analysed 
above (see section on importation and distribution), some 
evidence exists to show that retail markets have seen the 
emergence of new players and are becoming more diverse, 
in both where and how they operate. A key factor likely to 
have brought about change in cocaine retail markets is the 
emergence of new technologies, especially internet-based 
platforms such as darknet markets, public social media and 
semi-private encrypted communications applications.
For instance, call centres dedicated to distributing cocaine 
by courier are reported to operate in some parts of Belgium 
but are physically located in Western Balkan countries, the 
Netherlands or in Spain (De Ruyver et al., 2018). Belgian 
consumers place an order at a central telephone number and 
then local couriers deliver the drugs to the location specified. 
Reports have suggested that a courier can sell up to 1 kg of 
cocaine per week. A similar phenomenon has been reported 
in the greater Paris area, where deliveries of cocaine to 
consumers are organised through similar call centres (Cadet-
Taïrou et al., 2017; Kauffmann, 2018).
Research projects, official reports and media articles 
indicate that social media platforms and encrypted 
communication tools are commonly used across Europe 
for retail cocaine trafficking. For example, in the Nordic 
countries, communication among vendors and buyers 
may be conducted through encrypted applications such 
as WhatsApp and Telegram. Open public social media 
applications such as Instagram, Twitter and Facebook 
are used to promote time-limited offers to a wider public 
(EMCDDA, 2018b). A different model of retailing (crack) 
cocaine has become prominent in the United Kingdom, 
where ‘county lines’ are used to supply drugs from large 
urban centres to smaller provincial towns, couriered by young 
people. The drugs are ordered through a central mobile 
phone numberm, and mobile communication devices, often 
encrypted, support the delivery of the drugs.  
Another potential form of diversification of the cocaine 
market may result from the use of new sophisticated 
technologies, such as the darknet, that allow an increasing 
number of suppliers to deliver small amounts of cocaine 
directly to consumers (see Chapter 1). Although the extent 
to which they are replacing traditional retail supply is unclear, 
cryptomarkets could alter the nature of cocaine retailing in 
Europe in future. Cocaine is one of the drugs that generate 
the highest revenues for dealers operating in anonymised 
darknet markets. For example, on AlphaBay, which was one of 
the leading cryptomarkets until law enforcement authorities 
shut it down in 2017, cocaine was the drug that generated 
the third highest revenue, with total sales estimated at 
EUR 5.81 million in the United Kingdom, EUR 2.65 million 
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in the Netherlands and EUR 1.55 million in Germany over 
the lifetime of the market (EMCDDA and Europol, 2017). 
These three countries continued to be the largest sources of 
darknet cocaine sales in Europe in 2018 (see Figure 5.9).
Cocaine is one of the most expensive drugs sold on 
European cryptomarkets, with prices per gram varying by 
geographical location and ranging from EUR 72 in Sweden 
to EUR 145 in Finland (Janetos and Tilly, 2017). These prices 
are somewhat higher than retail prices reported by the Reitox 
network to the EMCDDA, but consumers may be willing to 
pay more on cryptomarkets because they feel secure in terms 
of evading both law enforcement and direct encounters 
with potentially dangerous individuals. In addition, the rating 
systems applied to the vendors may result in a perception 
of higher drug quality. Darknet cocaine vendors are primarily 
located in a small number of highly active consumer 
countries rather than in producer countries (Dittus et al., 
2018), which seems to confirm that most cryptomarket 
vendors are local retailers who probably still rely on some of 
the same producers, importers and distributors involved in 
the conventional cocaine trade.
Online distribution
Based on 2018 data from several major darknet markets (13), 
we detected a total of 3 879 listings (sale offers) that could 
be attributed to vendors that said they would ship cocaine 
from an EU country. These offers were distributed across 
eight marketplaces: Dream Market (3 740), Olympus Market 
(50), Berlusconi Market (25), Valhalla (24), Wall Street 
(16), T•chka (12), Empire (8) and Zion (4). The available 
data suggest that the majority of sale offers during 2018 
originated from the Netherlands (47 %) and Germany (35 %). 
Other reported EU Member States of origin included the 
(13) For more information on the data source and its limitations see the 
section on darknet monitoring in Chapter 8.
United Kingdom (6 %) and Belgium (3 %). An additional 
9 % of cocaine listings were offering shipping from multiple 
countries (7 %) or other EU Member States (2 %) (Figure 5.9). 
These findings are consistent with previous research, which 
found that cocaine vendors on darknet markets shipped from 
countries known to have a sizeable cocaine consumer market 
rather than from cocaine producer countries (Dittus et al., 
2018).
Caution is needed in interpreting these data in respect of 
gauging the number of individual sellers offering cocaine on 
these marketplaces or the number of transactions — neither 
of which can be extrapolated from the number of listings 
alone. Nonetheless the number of listings provides a useful 
indicator of the scope of activity on darknet markets.
Figure 5.9 
Proportion of cocaine listings on major darknet 
markets by EU Member State, 2018
Netherlands
47 %Germany
35 %
Multiple
7 %
Other EU countries
2 %
United Kingdom
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Belgium
3 %
Note: Multiple denotes where several EU countries are mentioned as country 
of origin.
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Key points
The EU market for amphetamine, 
MDMA and methamphetamine
 The stimulant drug market continues to evolve rapidly, 
with amphetamine, MDMA and methamphetamine vying 
for market share alongside cocaine and a number of new 
psychoactive substances.
 Amphetamine continues to be more commonly used 
than methamphetamine in most, but not all, EU countries, 
but there are signs that methamphetamine production and 
use are spreading. Regional differences exist in the use 
of amphetamine and methamphetamine, which is more 
common in northern and central Europe, whereas the use 
of MDMA appears to be more generally diffused.
 All three drugs are produced in Europe. The production 
of MDMA and amphetamine is concentrated in the 
Netherlands, and to a lesser extent Belgium, under the 
control of Dutch OCGs. Methamphetamine production 
mostly occurs in central Europe, particularly in and around 
Czechia. It appears that some Vietnamese OCGs involved 
in methamphetamine production in Czechia may have 
relocated some of their operations to the Netherlands.
 Synthetic drug production in the EU, close to consumers, 
can be highly profitable. The value of the European 
retail market for amphetamine and methamphetamine 
is estimated to be at least EUR 1 billion and for MDMA 
about EUR 0.5 billion. These estimates imply that between 
51 and 81 tonnes of amphetamine and methamphetamine 
and between 50 million and 70 million MDMA tablets 
will be produced for the EU market each year. Significant 
quantities are also produced for export, although exactly 
how much is difficult to quantify.
Developments in production and 
trafficking
 Innovation is increasing production capacity and 
creates new challenges. Developments include the use 
of low-cost, non-scheduled chemicals, mainly sourced 
from China, that can be converted into drug precursors; 
custom-made and industrial-scale equipment allowing 
larger production runs; and methods borrowed from the 
pharmaceutical industry, such as automating production 
processes. In some countries OCGs have also established 
chemical companies to facilitate the supply of materials. 
Among other factors, this has led to amphetamine and 
MDMA being readily produced cheaply in large quantities 
and may have contributed to the rise in the amount of 
MDMA in ecstasy tablets seen since 2009, which increases 
the risk to consumers.
 The dumping of waste products from production results 
in environmental damage, health risks and high clean-up 
costs. A variety of methods are used to dispose of the 
tonnes of chemical waste created during synthetic drug 
production. This creates health and safety hazards, has 
negative impacts on the environment and necessitates 
costly clean-up procedures. The use of novel chemicals for 
producing precursors has exacerbated this issue.
 Changes in OCG practices and greater interaction 
between groups involved in other areas of the drug market 
are observable. These include outlaw motorcycle gangs 
now becoming involved in the production of synthetic 
drugs as well as their distribution. In addition, Dutch OCGs 
appear to be working with criminals of Turkish origin, 
resulting in two-way trafficking: MDMA and other drugs are 
sent from the Netherlands to Turkey in exchange for heroin 
and morphine.
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 Heightened awareness at border entry points to the 
main drug-producing countries has led importers to divert 
shipments of precursors and alternative chemicals to other 
EU Member States, from where they are trafficked by land 
once inside the Schengen Area.
 MDMA is exported to consumer markets globally, often 
exploiting parcel delivery services and online darknet 
marketplaces. Darknet markets facilitate access to 
EU-produced MDMA tablets by mid-level suppliers and 
distributors. MDMA may be purchased in batches of 
multiples of 1 000 tablets, which can then be repackaged, 
sold online and dispatched through post and parcel 
services or through traditional distribution networks.
 Europe also plays a role in the global market for 
amphetamine and methamphetamine. Some of the 
amphetamine produced in the EU is trafficked to the Middle 
East to be sold as captagon tablets. The dismantlement, 
in the Netherlands and Belgium in 2019, of three large 
crystal methamphetamine production facilities where 
Mexican nationals were involved suggests that Europe 
may also be emerging as a global supplier of this drug. In 
addition, methamphetamine produced in Africa and the 
Middle East, and more recently Mexico, transits through 
Europe, usually with a final destination in Asia or Oceania.
 Currently demand for amphetamine, methamphetamine 
and MDMA in the EU appears largely to be met by 
production in EU Member States. This means that most 
distribution occurs locally within the EU, limiting the 
opportunities for interdiction. A comparatively small 
number of groups are currently involved in distributing 
methamphetamine, in particular Vietnamese OCGs and 
outlaw motorcycle gangs.
Implications for action to address 
current threats and increase 
preparedness
To respond to the current and potential future threats 
posed by the synthetic drug market in Europe, the following 
actions are needed.
  Prioritise development of a comprehensive set of 
measures to respond to the growing threat posed by 
the emergence of alternative substances that can 
be easily converted to drug precursors. These would 
include:
 strengthening regulatory approaches at both EU and 
international levels;
 establishment of a European early warning system 
and database for identifying and profiling drug 
precursors, alternative chemicals and other relevant 
substances;
 engagement with China and other source countries;
 continued engagement with industry within the EU.
  Invest to improve the profiling and monitoring of the 
methods used in the production of synthetic drugs in 
Europe.
  Highlight and develop strategies to address the 
environmental impacts, hazards to health and costs to 
the public purse associated with the chemical waste 
generated by synthetic drug production.
  Give greater recognition to the implications of the EU’s 
role as a global producer and supplier of synthetic 
drugs, and the need to do more to restrict drug flows 
leaving, or transiting through, the EU.
  Strengthen cooperation with Turkey to improve the 
understanding of synthetic drugs’ availability and flows 
from and to the EU, for both operational and strategic 
purposes.
  Work with countries in the Middle East to better 
monitor amphetamine (captagon) production and 
supply. There is a need to gain information from the 
forensic analysis of seizures, locate source countries 
and identify trends in patterns of use in the consumer 
markets for this drug.
  Improve current knowledge and awareness about the 
health risks associated with synthetic drug production 
and dismantling of production sites, to inform the 
development of health and safety guidance for those at 
risk of occupational exposure.
  Assess the threats associated with Mexican OCGs that 
appear to be involved in the supply and production 
of methamphetamine in Europe, in order to develop 
responses.
  Improve the assessment of the size, nature and impact 
of the ketamine and GHB/GBL market in the EU.
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Introduction
This chapter describes the production, trafficking, 
distribution and use of amphetamine, MDMA and 
methamphetamine, the three main synthetic drugs 
available in the EU. Other, less widely used, synthetic drugs 
available on the EU drug market are worth mentioning, 
in particular ketamine, GHB and GBL, which are briefly 
discussed at the end of the chapter.
The synthetic drugs amphetamine, methamphetamine and 
MDMA (often known as ecstasy when in tablet form or MD 
in crystal form) compete with cocaine and a range of new 
psychoactive substances on the European drug market. 
They have chemical similarities (Figure 6.1) and are most 
commonly available in tablet, powder or crystal form (see 
box ‘Common forms of synthetic drugs used in Europe’), 
but they have their own distinct patterns of use and profiles 
of users.
Amphetamine is much more commonly used in most 
countries than methamphetamine. However, in some 
datasets it is not possible to distinguish between 
these two substances; in these cases, the generic term 
‘amphetamines’ is used. Methamphetamine consumption 
has historically been restricted to Czechia and Slovakia, 
although recent years have seen increases in use in other 
countries.
Figure 6.1 
Amphetamine, MDMA and methamphetamine are 
from the same chemical family
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Note: The phenethylamine scaffold comprises a six-carbon ring separated from 
a nitrogen atom (N) by a further two carbon atoms. ‘O’ represents oxygen and 
‘CH
3
’ represents a carbon bonded to three hydrogen atoms (a methyl group).
Common forms of synthetic drugs used in Europe
Amphetamine and methamphetamine are sometimes 
grouped together as ‘amphetamines’ and therefore 
can be difficult to differentiate in some datasets, 
whereas MDMA is normally reported separately. 
All three drugs exist in two chemical forms: base and 
salt. The pure bases are clear, colourless, volatile oils, 
insoluble in water, which can be readily converted 
into powders/crystals of the most common salt 
forms: amphetamine sulfate, methamphetamine 
hydrochloride and MDMA hydrochloride.
MDMA hydrochloride is a crystalline solid, soluble 
in water. It is normally found in the form of tablets 
(ecstasy), but also as crystals and powders; tablets 
are usually swallowed, while crystals and powder may 
be taken orally or snorted.
Amphetamine sulfate is a white or off-white powder 
that is soluble in water. Illicit products mostly consist 
of powders, usually mixed with other ingredients, 
such as lactose, dextrose or caffeine, but tablets 
containing amphetamine are also available and may 
carry logos similar to those seen on ecstasy tablets or 
alternatively the Captagon logo. Amphetamine sulfate 
may be ingested, snorted or, less commonly, injected. 
Unlike the hydrochloride salt of methamphetamine, 
amphetamine sulfate is insufficiently volatile to be 
smoked.
Methamphetamine hydrochloride is a crystalline solid 
that is soluble in water. In illicit methamphetamine 
powder, in the same way as amphetamine sulfate, 
finely ground crystals are usually mixed with 
other ingredients, such as lactose, dextrose or 
caffeine. Large white or translucent crystals of 
methamphetamine hydrochloride suitable for 
smoking, known as ‘ice’ or ‘crystal meth’, are also 
available, although this route of administration is not 
commonly reported during surveys of users in Europe.
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It is estimated that 12.4 million European adults (aged 
15-64), or 4 % of this age group, have tried amphetamine 
and/or methamphetamine during their lives and 1.7 million 
(0.5 %) during the last year. The available data suggest that 
use of these drugs is relatively stable.
Long-term, chronic and injecting amphetamine use has, 
historically, been most evident in northern European 
countries. For example, the estimated prevalence of high-
risk amphetamine use was 0.2 % in Germany in 2015, and 
users of amphetamines are likely to make up the majority 
of the estimated 2 234 (0.2 %) high-risk stimulant users 
reported by Latvia in 2017. In contrast, methamphetamine 
use has been most apparent in Czechia and Slovakia. In 
Czechia, high-risk methamphetamine use among adults 
(aged 15-64) was estimated at around 0.5 % in 2017.
Approximately 28 000 clients (6 %) entering specialised 
drug treatment in Europe in 2017 reported amphetamine 
or methamphetamine as their primary drug. About 
11 000 of them were first-time clients (7 % of all first-time 
clients). Considering route of administration, 14 % of all 
amphetamines clients reported oral consumption of the 
drugs, 65 % reported sniffing, 11 % reported smoking or 
inhaling and 9 % reported injecting.
It is estimated that 13.7 million European adults (aged 
15-64), or 4 % of this age group, have tried MDMA/ecstasy 
during their lives and 2.6 million (1 %) in the last year. Use 
is more common among young people, and it is estimated 
that 2 % of young adults (15-34) have used MDMA in the 
last year.
The estimated annual value of the retail market for 
amphetamines in the EU is at least EUR 1 billion, with 
a range of EUR 0.8-1.3 billion, while the estimate for MDMA 
is at least EUR 0.5 billion (range EUR 0.4-0.6 billion). 
Together they make up about 5 % of the total illicit market 
in drugs. Estimates of amounts used suggest that in 2017 
about 62 tonnes of amphetamines (likely range 51 to 
81 tonnes) and 60 million MDMA tablets (50 million to 
70 million tablets) were consumed.
Global overview
With a burgeoning market in Asia, methamphetamine 
is reported to be the most widely consumed synthetic 
stimulant in the world, whereas amphetamine and MDMA 
are more commonly used in Europe, although there are 
some indications that methamphetamine use may be 
slowly diffusing from the traditional zones of use. Europe 
is a producing region for these three drugs for the EU 
consumer market, but in addition Europe’s role as an 
international supplier of these drugs is increasingly being 
recognised. For example, huge quantities of ecstasy 
tablets are trafficked to Turkey each year, and tablets and 
crystals are internationally distributed, including smaller 
quantities distributed via darknet markets. Bulk quantities 
of EU-produced methamphetamine have been seized in 
places such as Australia and, more recently, amphetamine 
in the form of captagon tablets has been produced in 
Europe for markets in the Middle East. The EU is also an 
occasional transit area for methamphetamine produced 
in Africa, Iran or Mexico on its way to the lucrative markets 
of Asia and Oceania, and there are a few signals emerging 
to suggest that methamphetamine from Mexico and West 
Africa may be available on the drug market in some EU 
Member States.
A potentially important development has been noted 
in a particular area of Afghanistan, where some heroin 
producers have been making methamphetamine. The 
process used was initially based on the extraction of 
ephedrine from cough medicine, and then more recently 
from ephedra plants grown in other regions of Afghanistan 
(Mansfield, 2019). It will be important to monitor this 
phenomenon, given the significant traffic of heroin to the 
EU from Afghanistan.
Production
The amphetamine, MDMA and methamphetamine 
consumed in the EU are almost exclusively produced in 
the EU, although many EU Member States report no or very 
limited production of synthetic drugs on their territories 
(UNODC, 2019a). Europe has emerged as a main global 
production centre of MDMA, but the amphetamine and 
methamphetamine manufactured in Europe are primarily 
for European consumers, although some is exported, 
principally to the Middle East, East Asia and Australia.
Synthetic drug production relies on the availability of 
drug precursors. The global effort to reduce the supply of 
synthetic drugs therefore begins with the international 
drug precursor control regime, which for the last 10 years 
or so has been challenged by the emergence of alternative 
substances designed to avoid controls. Analysis of 
precursor developments suggests that producers have 
active research programmes to exploit chemical loopholes 
in the regulations. The development of this phenomenon 
is the topic of a supporting report (EMCDDA, 2019f), 
which concludes that the current regulatory approach 
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is struggling to achieve an appreciable reduction in the 
availability of amphetamine, methamphetamine or MDMA, 
and that a policy debate is needed to develop fresh ideas 
about how this problem should be tackled in the future.
The large-scale production of synthetic drugs is a complex 
operation, as can be seen from the illustration of MDMA 
supply chain logistics (Figure 6.2). It requires infrastructure 
and logistics that, to a certain extent, mirror those of many 
legitimate pharmaceutical manufacturing businesses. The 
correct combination of skills and access to drug precursors, 
other chemicals and equipment are needed, as well as 
secure locations in which to perform the various operations. 
This is the business model predominantly used in the 
Netherlands and Belgium for amphetamine and MDMA 
(and to a lesser degree methamphetamine), where large-
scale production operations are most common. There is 
a developing trend of using larger and more sophisticated 
equipment, and both custom-made and commercial 
industrial equipment are used. The most sophisticated 
illicit laboratories employ computer-controlled timers and 
complex electronic switching gear, demonstrating how 
elaborate and professional they have become (Europol, 
2019b) and making investigating them more technical.
Figure 6.2 
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Dutch OCGs continue to dominate the production of 
synthetic drugs in the Netherlands and are heavily involved 
in the production of these drugs in Belgium. Some Dutch 
and Belgian OCGs involved in the production of synthetic 
drugs are closely integrated and orchestrate the large-scale 
production of synthetic drugs together. Groups operating 
in the Netherlands are increasingly specialised in carrying 
out specific steps in the production cycle such as the 
acquisition of precursor substances, the production and 
tableting phases and distribution or trafficking. These 
groups appear to be highly flexible and adaptable.
Conversely, small amounts of synthetic drugs can be 
produced relatively easily in what are known as ‘kitchen 
labs’ using drug precursors extracted from medicinal 
products and household chemicals. This is the predominant 
method for methamphetamine production, which in the EU 
mainly occurs in Czechia and to a lesser extent in Germany, 
Poland and Slovakia.
Production methods and sites
Amphetamine
Amphetamine is most often made from the internationally 
controlled drug precursor benzyl methyl ketone (BMK), 
also known as phenyl-2-propanone (P2P), although other 
methods are documented. Rather than being imported 
as a liquid from China as was previously the case, BMK 
is now primarily produced in the EU from alternative 
chemicals (EMCDDA, 2019f), which also typically come 
from China. The conversion process, which is dangerous 
but relatively straightforward, may be done at the same 
place as the synthetic drug is produced or at a dedicated 
site (conversion lab). According to Belgian authorities, all 
amphetamine production facilities dismantled in 2017 
included conversion labs.
As well as the mid- to large-scale production operations 
found in the Netherlands and Belgium, sites linked to 
amphetamine production have been reported in other EU 
Member States, especially in central and eastern Europe 
(see Figure 6.3). Between 2015 and 2017, 366 sites related 
to amphetamine production, including laboratories, dump 
sites and storage locations, were reported in the EU, most 
notably in the Netherlands (225), Belgium (50), Poland (32), 
Germany (27) and Sweden (10), via the European Reporting 
Instrument for Sites related to Synthetic Production 
(ERISSP). Such sites are also found from time to time in 
other EU Member States (see Figure 6.3). It should be 
noted that some of the production sites perform only the 
crystallisation stage of production, making amphetamine 
sulfate from amphetamine base oil. In addition, during 
darknet market monitoring, offers of relatively small 
quantities of amphetamine oil were noted (50 ml for 
EUR 175, purporting to ship from the Netherlands). This 
implies that the crystallisation step of the production 
process will be conducted at the destination, which would 
be a novel development.
MDMA
MDMA is produced primarily from the internationally 
controlled precursor piperonyl methyl ketone (PMK), also 
known as methylenedioxyphenyl-2-propanone (MDP2P). 
Like BMK, this precursor has also been supplanted 
by alternative substances from China, which are then 
converted to PMK in Europe.
MDMA production mainly takes place in the Netherlands, 
and occasionally in Belgium with Dutch connections. 
Between 2015 and 2017, according to ERISSP, 158 sites 
related to MDMA production were dismantled in the EU, 
most notably in the Netherlands (135) and Belgium (21) 
(see Figure 6.4). These MDMA production facilities tend 
to be highly professional and with large outputs. The 
increasing sophistication of MDMA production facilities 
was reported in the last edition of this report. That situation 
continues, with more automation being a notable feature 
Figure 6.3 
Location of sites related to amphetamine production in 
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of the more advanced laboratories. There has been an 
increase in the number of sites related to MDMA production 
notified recently, with the Netherlands reporting 59 in 
2017 compared with 41 in 2016, and Belgium reporting 
10 in 2017 compared with 3 in 2016. Laboratories are 
rarely found in other EU Member States, although Poland 
reported a tableting site in 2015 and Italy reported a small 
manufacturing site in 2016.
The annual Sewage Analysis Core Group Europe (SCORE) 
wastewater-monitoring campaigns showed unusually high 
loads of MDMA and amphetamines in wastewater influents 
in the Dutch cities of Amsterdam, Eindhoven and Utrecht, 
which could not be ascribed to human consumption only 
(EMCDDA, 2018c). Further chemical analysis confirmed 
that the high levels of MDMA observed in Utrecht reflected 
direct disposal of non-consumed MDMA in the sewer 
system, suggesting drug production in that region. Studies 
show that direct disposal of substances in the sewer 
system is often related to police interventions in suspected 
drug production facilities (Emke et al., 2014).
The Wastewater analysis of traces of illicit drug-related 
chemicals for law enforcement and public health (WATCH) 
project included a 30-day synthetic drug production 
monitoring campaign in Eindhoven and Tilburg in the 
Netherlands and Turnhout in Belgium. High levels of 
MDMA were recorded during the entire monitoring period 
in one city in the Netherlands, suggesting continuous 
discharges of unconsumed MDMA from sources within the 
wastewater catchment area, thus pointing to significant 
drug production in this region (WATCH, 2018).
Methamphetamine
There are two main methamphetamine production 
phenomena observed in Europe: production of relatively 
small quantities in small to mid-scale illicit laboratories in 
Czechia, using precursors extracted from medicines; and 
the less frequently encountered large-scale production 
in the Netherlands and Belgium based on BMK. Small 
quantities of methamphetamine may also be produced in 
relatively amateur settings using recipes from the internet, 
based on precursors extracted from medicines and some 
readily available household chemicals. This is typically 
carried out by methamphetamine consumers to supply 
small circles of users, in various Member States.
Although the scale and production potential are not 
routinely reported, between 2015 and 2017 a significant 
number of laboratories manufacturing methamphetamine 
were dismantled in the EU. Data reported to the 
EMCDDA and Europol (2016-18) show that most 
illicit laboratories were dismantled in Czechia (1 252), 
Bulgaria (64), Germany (38), Slovakia (36) and Poland 
(21) (see Figure 6.5). Czechia clearly accounts for most 
of the methamphetamine production laboratories in 
Europe, and Czech authorities assess that 6.5 tonnes 
are consumed in Czechia annually. Although much of 
the small-scale production is not thought to be linked to 
organised crime groups, there is intelligence suggesting 
that Vietnamese organised crime groups are up-scaling 
methamphetamine production sites in Czechia and (to 
a lesser extent) Poland; for example, Czechia dismantled 
two large-scale methamphetamine production facilities 
in 2017. Vietnamese groups are also reported as having 
established methamphetamine production operations in 
the Netherlands, in some cases shifting their operations 
from Czechia, which may be related to the lower penalties 
for drug-related crime imposed there (EMCDDA, 2017c; 
Tops et al., 2018).
Occasionally, large-scale methamphetamine laboratories 
are discovered in the Netherlands, producing crystal 
methamphetamine using BMK, for export to Asia 
and Oceania. To make the more potent form of 
methamphetamine, a further processing step uses tartaric 
acid. This technique has been used by OCGs in Mexico 
since around 2012 to supply the large consumer markets 
in the United States (INCB, 2016). Recent information 
suggests that this know-how has now been transferred 
to Europe (see Case study 23). In February 2019, for 
example, Dutch law enforcement officers dismantled 
Figure 6.4 
Location of sites related to MDMA production in the 
EU, 2015-17
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a laboratory producing methamphetamine and arrested 
nationals of the Dominican Republic, Mexico and the 
Netherlands. The laboratory was used for the crystallisation 
stage in the production process and around 400 kg of 
methamphetamine and various chemicals were recovered. 
In addition, in June 2019, Belgian police dismantled a large 
production site where crystal methamphetamine was 
synthesised. One Belgian, two Dutch and four Mexicans 
were arrested in connection with this case (data from 
Belgian Federal Police).
Although the production of methamphetamine in the 
Netherlands is primarily for export to lucrative markets 
outside the EU, Spain and to a lesser degree Poland both 
report that some of the methamphetamine on their drug 
markets comes from the Netherlands.
Synthetic drug production: a complex 
logistical exercise
Dutch and Belgian criminal groups are the most important 
producers of synthetic drugs in the EU, possessing the 
most advanced capabilities and investing a significant 
amount of resources. The large-scale production of 
synthetic drugs appears to be linked to a small number of 
interconnected OCGs, sharing and exchanging knowledge, 
resources and expertise. Investigations have shown that 
prominent criminal groups are involved in the production 
of MDMA and amphetamine and, less frequently, 
methamphetamine. Dutch OCGs also continue to 
export their expertise in establishing synthetic drug 
laboratories and designing production processes to other 
Member States, as well as in non-EU locations (see box 
‘Captagon’, page 167). In addition, some OCGs engaged 
in synthetic drug production have also been involved in 
heroin production in the EU (see Chapter 4). OCGs have 
been active in the Belgian-Dutch border region since 
2000, setting up illicit synthetic drug laboratories. Risks 
are minimised by maintaining separation of the various 
processes involved. In the Netherlands and Belgium, 
for example, a controller arranges chemicals, equipment, 
the synthesis or ‘cooking’ step, the dumping of waste and 
tableting by specialists working independently from each 
other, to minimise the risk of exposure.
Precursors and alternative chemicals used to 
make them
To circumvent the strict controls placed on the precursors 
BMK and PMK, traffickers have introduced alternative 
chemicals, adding an extra step in the production process. 
Although not a new phenomenon, this practice seems 
Figure 6.5 
Location of sites related to methamphetamine 
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CASE STUDY 23
Methamphetamine lab found on a boat in the Netherlands
In May 2019, an illicit 
methamphetamine laboratory was 
located on an 85-metre German-
registered cargo boat moored in the 
Dutch port of Moerdijk. More than 
300 litres of methamphetamine oil 
was seized from the boat and the 
65-year-old Dutch captain and three 
Mexican men aged 23, 26 and 37 were 
arrested. A car with German licence 
plates was also seized. The forensic 
investigation of the scene had to be 
abandoned when the boat started 
taking on water, in what could have 
been an attempt to destroy evidence 
by the remote activation of a pump.
Source: Boffey (2019b).
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to have intensified in the last few years, as can be seen 
from the timeline (Figure 6.6). Perhaps because these 
alternatives are legal, they are available at a fraction of the 
cost of BMK and PMK, making production more profitable 
for the organisers.
Whereas conversion laboratories have been a feature of 
synthetic drug production in the Netherlands and Belgium 
for a number of years, Dutch and Belgian OCGs have 
recently begun to collaborate more closely with Polish 
criminals, and/or legitimate businesses based mainly 
Figure 6.6 
Timeline: alternative chemicals for the production of BMK
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in Poland, that can supply chemicals. Law enforcement 
intelligence suggests that some Polish OCGs that were 
previously involved in the production of amphetamine in 
Poland are now instead increasingly involved in the supply 
of chemicals for the production of synthetic drugs in other 
countries. These OCGs may then receive payment in the 
form of an agreed quantity of the manufactured drugs.
In the last report, APAAN (a pre-precursor) was highlighted 
as the chemical used in Europe to make BMK. However, 
its scheduling at international level in 2014 led to the 
development of alternatives: first, glycidic derivatives of 
BMK, then APAA and then MAPA. Although the market 
is dynamic and rapidly changing, the most frequently 
encountered non-scheduled precursor used in illicit 
drug production in Europe at present is APAA for making 
amphetamine. However, MAPA is increasingly detected. 
PMK glycidate appears to be the most favoured precursor 
for MDMA production. Producers do not seem to be 
concerned about the precise identity of the chemical 
used for producing BMK or PMK, as long as it works and 
they know how to do the conversion. Rather than being 
chemically accurate, they simply refer to these compounds 
as BMK-intermediate or PMK-intermediate.
The synthesis (‘cooking’) process
The synthesis step is the most important stage of synthetic 
drug production; it is often called ‘cooking’. In general 
terms, this involves synthesis, separation and crystallisation 
(see Figure 6.7). In recent times, it has emerged that 
synthetic drug producers may make use of ad hoc 
contacts to oversee this part of the production process; 
for example, members of outlaw motorcycle gangs may 
be used. Less-experienced operators may be expected 
to perform the drug synthesis under the supervision of 
a ‘chef’ chemist. The dangerous nature of the process may 
expose them to significant harm, as was highlighted in 
January 2019 when three men were found dead in such 
a laboratory in Belgium after apparently breathing toxic 
fumes (Belgian Federal Police, personal communication). 
The inhalation of methanol vapour has been highlighted as 
a particular hazard for those working in illicit synthetic drug 
laboratories (Wijnands-Kleukers et al., 2019). Such health 
harms are not well documented, and additional monitoring 
of this phenomenon would be valuable to assess them.
In recent years, trafficking amphetamine base oil from the 
Netherlands for conversion to amphetamine sulfate in other 
EU countries has been observed. The practice appears to 
be continuing, and outlaw motorcycle gangs appear to play 
a prominent role in it.
Figure 6.7 
Simplified general schema of synthetic drug 
production
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The equipment for the cooking stage of synthetic drug 
production is largely custom made. For this reason, the 
characteristic appearance of such equipment, when 
recovered from a dismantled laboratory, provides valuable 
clues about the criminal groups involved. In contrast, the 
equipment used for tableting is commercially produced 
and can be easily sourced online. In addition, the machines 
are relatively inexpensive, for example EUR 8 000 for 
a machine with capacity to produce 10 000-15 000 tablets 
per hour or EUR 23 000 for one that can produce 100 000 
tablets per hour.
In Czechia, methamphetamine is produced mainly from 
ephedrine or pseudoephedrine, which is extracted from 
medicinal products originating mainly in European 
countries and trafficked by land. Up until fairly recently, 
Turkey was reported to be the source of such tablets, 
which were trafficked by land transiting countries including 
Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Slovakia. However, 
the INCB reports that Turkey is less commonly identified as 
a source, and controls implemented to tackle the issue are 
having the desired effect (INCB, 2019). The National Police 
in Czechia now report that Poland is a key transit country 
or source of such medicines (Police of the Czech Republic, 
2018).
Tableting
Processing MDMA into ecstasy tablets is the last step in 
the production process for this important nightlife drug. 
This work demands some skill and is done by specialists, 
usually in an isolated or well-insulated location in order 
to avoid attracting attention, as tableting equipment 
makes a lot of noise. Although tableting and synthesis 
are sometimes co-located, tableting is often conducted 
at a dedicated site, for two main reasons. First, it reduces 
the risk of losing all important equipment and chemicals 
at the same time if the site is raided. Second, illicit drug 
laboratories tend to be humid environments, which can 
have a negative effect on the quality of the tablets. The 
‘tableteers’ can produce tablets of any colour or shape 
requested by the client. The correct pressing materials are 
needed, typically microcrystalline cellulose products and 
colouring agents to add to the mix, as well as custom-made 
punches fabricated with the desired shapes and logos.
Environmental impact of waste materials
As can be seen from Figure 6.2, specialists are also 
involved in disposing of the waste produced during 
synthetic drug production processes. The environmental 
impact of synthetic drug production in the EU was 
highlighted in the last edition of this report. Since then we 
have studied this phenomenon and have a much greater 
understanding of this part of the European synthetic drug 
chain.
It is estimated that producing 1 kg of amphetamine creates 
between 20 and 30 kg of waste, and producing 1 kg of 
MDMA creates between 6 and 10 kg of waste (Europol, 
Challenges in estimating synthetic drug production in the EU: the example of the Netherlands
Our estimate of the retail value of the market for 
amphetamine, methamphetamine and MDMA in the 
EU in 2017 was EUR 1.5 billion (range EUR 1.2 billion 
to EUR 1.9 billion) (EMCDDA, 2019a). However, a report 
commissioned by the Dutch police in 2018 concluded 
that the business model of Dutch OCGs engaged in 
synthetic drug production has been so successful that 
the estimated global revenue from amphetamine and 
MDMA produced in the Netherlands in 2017 was at 
least EUR 18.9 billion (Tops et al., 2018). This amount 
relates to the retail value on global markets of the total 
amount produced, including adulteration. This figure is 
based on retail prices in consumer countries; it does not 
appear to take into account costs and losses outside 
the EU, although it does account for precursor losses in 
the Netherlands. These amounts relate to sales and do 
not take account of costs incurred or the profits made 
by other groups along the supply chain. The authors 
estimated that the proportion of the global revenue 
realised by the Dutch production and distribution level 
is between EUR 3 billion and EUR 5 billion.
The EU market size estimate and the global retail revenue 
estimate figures are not directly comparable. However, 
we do know that the EU markets for these drugs are small 
compared with the markets elsewhere, in particular in 
Asia, and that the Netherlands is a key global producer of 
synthetic drugs, so the figure of EUR 18.9 billion for the 
value of that part of the global retail market supplied by 
production in the Netherlands seems possible. The topic of 
study is by its very nature a hidden phenomenon. Estimates 
such as these are difficult to produce and are, by necessity, 
based on a number of assumptions. Tops and colleagues 
have been transparent in their approach and careful to use 
figures that produce conservative estimates. The findings 
confirm what we already knew: that the Netherlands is an 
important global hub for synthetic drug production.
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2019b). The production of BMK and PMK precursors from 
alternative chemicals also produces a significant amount of 
waste, even before the synthetic drug production process 
takes place.
Based on the estimated amount of synthetic drugs 
consumed in the EU, calculated as part of the market size 
estimates, between 1 293 and 1 948 tonnes of synthetic 
drug production waste is generated each year (Table 6.1). 
It must be stressed, however, that these estimates do not 
take account of the portion of production that is seized by 
law enforcement agencies, or the portion that is produced 
in the EU for export. Using the figures produced by Tops 
and colleagues in 2018, although they were somewhat 
controversial when published, the total amount of waste 
produced is between 7 000 and 11 000 tonnes. Neither of 
these estimates factors in the amount of waste generated 
at precursor conversion labs.
The waste may be disposed of by simply pouring it down 
the sink or toilet, although this is likely to be rare, as it 
brings with it the risk of detection should smells or leaks 
occur. If this does occur, it may affect the quality of drinking 
water, block the sewage system or disturb the workings of 
municipal wastewater treatment plants. More commonly, 
members of the public report containers of waste dumped 
in the countryside but there have been instances where 
it has been found buried underground. Waste can also 
be left in abandoned residences or loaded in stolen vans 
or lorry trailers, which may then be set on fire to conceal 
forensic evidence. More elaborate methods have been 
found, including the use of modified vans that pump waste 
onto the road surface while driving in rainy conditions (see 
Figure 6.8). These discharges have a higher environmental 
impact than waste found dumped in containers, and are 
less likely to be discovered. When discharges are identified, 
however, they are not always registered by law enforcement 
officers (Schoenmaekers et al., 2016).
Waste contaminants dumped on land are broken down 
by the fauna and flora that live in the soil. The acidity/
alkalinity of synthetic drug production waste is harmful to 
the organisms living there, e.g. earthworms or millipedes, 
which need a neutral environment (Boerman et al., 2017; 
Schoenmakers et al., 2016). Waste discharged into surface 
water may cause aquatic life to die, can create hazards, 
such as the potential contamination of cattle affecting 
the human food chain, and risks the further spread of 
chemicals into the soil and waterways (Boerman et al., 
2017; Kates et al., 2014; Schoenmakers et al., 2016). 
Certain types of chemical waste cause water pH levels 
to rise, which can reduce oxygen levels, harming fish and 
plants (Schoenmakers et al., 2016; UNODCCP, 1999). 
These harms are likely to be more acute in the main 
production areas. Between 2015 and 2017, almost 660 
dump sites were notified to authorities in the Netherlands 
(591) and in Belgium, especially the part neighbouring the 
Netherlands (68) (see Figure 6.9).
Table 6.1 
Estimated amount of chemical waste generated in the production of the amphetamine, MDMA and methamphetamine 
consumed in the EU in 2017
Synthetic drug Estimated production in the EU 
(tonnes)
Waste output per tonne 
produced (tonnes)
Total waste (tonnes)
Amphetamine and 
methamphetamine
62 20-30 1 240-1 860 
MDMA 8.8 6-10 53-88 
Total 1 293-1 948 
Source: Europol (2019b).
Figure 6.8 
Van modified for illegal dumping of synthetic drug 
production waste
Photo: Federal Police, Belgium
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The cost of dismantling synthetic drug 
production sites
Apart from the damage to the environment, there is also 
the financial impact of cleaning up after the production 
of synthetic drugs and the waste that it generates. 
When synthetic drug laboratories or dump sites are 
discovered, they must be safely dismantled and/or cleaned 
up so that they do not cause harm. This is done by various 
specialists, which generates a number of direct costs to 
society. The EMCDDA commissioned a study to estimate 
the costs of dismantling and cleaning up synthetic drug 
production sites in Belgium and the Netherlands, because 
of the high incidence of synthetic drug production in those 
countries (Claessens et al., 2019).
The cost estimation was based on working hours, training 
hours and materials used by all the actors involved in the 
dismantling and cleaning up. The costs include the police, 
a separate specialised police synthetic drug lab dismantling 
team, the fire department, civil protection services and 
private companies involved. Environmental services were 
also involved in both countries, but no cost data were 
available for those. The estimated cost can be considered 
a minimum, as it became clear during the information-
gathering process that there were no standardised recorded 
data and the costs that were retrieved were a minimum 
estimate by the bodies involved. The minimum estimate 
for these countries for one year is almost EUR 6 million 
(Table 6.2).
Trafficking and supply
The amphetamines and MDMA consumed within the EU 
are largely supplied from EU sources and therefore supplied 
by intra-EU trafficking. However, as discussed above, EU 
OCGs are also important producers for the global market, so 
trafficking from the EU to these external markets also needs 
to be considered.
Trafficking within the EU
Trafficking within the EU is complex and dynamic, with 
many criminal groups and individuals involved. Whereas 
synthetic drug production processes are well understood, 
thanks to extensive forensic investigation of dismantled illicit 
laboratories, trafficking is less so. The most useful information 
is derived from police investigations. Concerted efforts at EU 
level to improve data collections are starting to address this 
information gap around trafficking of synthetic drugs but they 
will take some time to be fully established.
The trafficking of synthetic drugs within the EU is primarily 
carried out using land transportation, as well as post and 
parcel services. Trafficking by post and parcel services 
is believed to be primarily linked to the online supply of 
relatively small quantities of synthetic drugs from both 
EU- and non-EU-based vendors.
The free movement of goods within the Schengen Area 
coupled with the EU-based production model for synthetic 
drugs means that the opportunities for controlling shipments 
at the external border of the EU are limited in comparison 
with cocaine and heroin, for example. When they do 
occur, large seizures made at borders tend to result from 
coordinated law enforcement operations. Furthermore, action 
against street dealers and users may result in a large number 
of smaller retail-level seizures. This variability complicates the 
interpretation of the data although, clearly, both the number 
of seizures and the amount seized give an indication of the 
importance of the market for these drugs in the EU.
Figure 6.9 
Location of dump sites of waste from synthetic drug 
production in the Netherlands and Belgium, 2015-17
Netherlands
Belgium
Germany
France
Table 6.2 
Minimum estimated cost of dismantling illicit 
laboratories and cleaning up waste dump sites in 
Belgium and the Netherlands, 2016
Country Number of sites Total cost (EUR)
Belgium 42 1 401 634
Netherlands 322 4 368 294
Total 364 5 769 928
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Seizures of amphetamine in the EU have remained relatively 
stable for a number of years (see Figure 6.10), in terms of 
both the number of seizures (approximately 35 000 per 
year) and the amount seized (around 5 tonnes per year). 
However, two significant countries — the Netherlands and 
Poland — do not report the number of seizures, which limits 
the analysis.
In 2017, EU Member States reported 35 000 seizures of 
amphetamine, amounting to 6.4 tonnes. The estimated 
quantity of amphetamine seized in the EU has generally 
fluctuated around 5 to 6 tonnes each year since 2010, 
although there have been increases in each of the past 
2 years (Figure 6.10). Germany and the United Kingdom 
generally seize the largest amounts, often more than a tonne 
each.
There have been coordinated international law enforcement 
efforts to tackle synthetic drug production and trafficking, 
some of which are conducted under the banner of the 
European Multidisciplinary Platform Against Criminal 
Threats (EMPACT) (see section on the policy cycle, 
Chapter 8). Such operations tend to focus on drug 
precursors, on production labs or on trafficking in general, 
resulting in the dismantling of the criminal enterprise. 
Law enforcement operations of this type are complex and 
require a multidisciplinary response, but the results can be 
significant (see Case study 24).
The number of reported MDMA seizures in the EU has been 
on an upward trend since 2010 (Figure 6.11). This is linked 
to shortages of precursors in the preceding years and the 
subsequent switch to non-scheduled chemicals for making 
PMK. The quantity of MDMA seized is more often reported 
by number of tablets than by weight. The estimated 
6.6 million MDMA tablets reported seized in 2017 is the 
highest number reported seized in the EU in any year since 
2007. The trend, however, has been variable. In addition, 
some countries report seizures of MDMA powder. Reported 
seizures of MDMA powder in the EU increased from 
0.3 tonnes in 2016 to 1.7 tonnes in 2017. This increase is 
mainly in quantities reported by the Netherlands.
Figure 6.10 
Number of amphetamine seizures and quantities 
seized, 2007-17
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CASE STUDY 24
Intra-EU chemical trafficking for synthetic drug production
In April 2018, in a coordinated 
cross-border operation led by the 
Polish Police Central Bureau of 
Investigation and Dutch and German 
police, and supported by Europol, 
300 officers were deployed to tackle 
a major supplier of chemicals used 
for synthetic drug production in the 
Netherlands. Polish law enforcement 
agencies had been gathering 
information on the traffickers since 
2016 and, during the investigation, 
it was revealed that around 2 tonnes 
of chemicals were transported from 
Poland to addresses in the south of the 
Netherlands up to three times a week.
On the day of action, simultaneous 
raids were conducted in Poland, 
Germany and the Netherlands. In 
Poland, eight suspects were arrested 
and 17 tonnes of chemicals and 4 kg 
of amphetamine paste were seized. 
In Germany, a further 7 tonnes of 
chemicals was seized. Police in the 
Netherlands conducted 17 searches, 
arrested seven suspects and shut 
down three illicit synthetic drug 
production laboratories. Dutch law 
enforcement officers seized more 
than 100 kg of MDMA crystals and 
12 litres of MDMA base oil, more 
than 1 000 litres of drug precursors 
and more than 60 000 litres of other 
chemical substances, as well as four 
illegal firearms and ammunition. 
Encrypted phones used by the gang 
members were also confiscated by law 
enforcement during the action day.
Source: Europol (2018a).
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Methamphetamine seizures are far lower, with 9 000 
seizures reported in the EU in 2017, amounting to 
0.7 tonnes (Figure 6.12). France (122 kg), Germany 
(114 kg) and Czechia (93 kg) seized the largest amounts. 
The number of seizures of methamphetamine has shown 
an overall upward trend since 2002 but with signs of 
stabilisation in recent years; the quantity seized has been 
increasing, albeit with some fluctuation, since 2009.
It is important to note that synthetic drugs are frequently 
seized as part of multidrug shipments, which indicates that 
polydrug-trafficking activities remain a common feature 
of OCGs involved in the trafficking and distribution of 
synthetic drugs in the EU. Outlaw motorcycle gangs have 
traditionally been involved in the trafficking and distribution 
of synthetic drugs, particularly in Nordic and Baltic states. 
As noted above, these groups are also increasingly involved 
in orchestrating synthetic drug production.
Trafficking outside the EU
Outside the borders of the EU, two phenomena can be 
observed. First, there is the flow of drug precursors and 
the alternative chemicals that can be converted into them, 
which are predominantly imported to the EU from Asia. 
Second, there is the export of synthetic drugs, mainly MDMA 
and to a lesser degree methamphetamine, to important and 
often lucrative consumer markets in Asia and Australia.
The latest data from the INCB show that the low quantity of 
BMK seized globally (4 200 litres) in 2017, and reports of 
only ‘negligible’ aggregate seizures of PMK apart from one 
important seizure of approximately 5 000 litres in Europe, 
confirm that the diversion of these controlled precursors 
is becoming less significant. The alternative chemicals 
used to make BMK and PMK predominantly flow to the 
EU from Asia and are converted in laboratories in the EU. 
The INCB reports that, in relation to BMK, in 2017, the 
largest amounts of APAA were seized in the Netherlands 
(more than 10 tonnes), followed by France (more than 
600 kg) and Belgium (250 kg). Between 2017 and January 
2019, Europol was made aware of seizures of more than 
10 tonnes of MAPA globally. In relation to PMK, more than 
10 tonnes of glycidic derivatives have been seized each year 
since 2016 (INCB, 2019).
Synthetic drugs are trafficked from centres of production 
in the EU to consumer markets outside the EU, including 
important and lucrative markets in Asia and Australia. 
Methamphetamine produced in the Netherlands is thought 
to be mainly intended for export to these destinations, 
with small quantities often trafficked by couriers and 
large quantities by maritime transportation. As well as 
highlighting large shipments of EU-produced synthetic 
drugs detected in other regions of the world, open 
source information monitoring has also shown that other 
methods for smuggling smaller amounts, such as internal 
concealment, also occur. However, their frequency is 
difficult to assess. For example, in March 2019, authorities 
Figure 6.11 
Number of MDMA seizures (all forms) and quantities 
of tablets seized, 2007-17
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Figure 6.12 
Number of methamphetamine seizures and quantities 
seized, 2007-17
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at the international airport in Santiago de Chile arrested 
a Dutch citizen who had arrived from Amsterdam via Rome. 
On examination, 82 capsules containing ecstasy tablets or 
powder valued at almost EUR 60 000 were recovered from 
his stomach. This was the first case of this type recorded 
in Chile (Prensa Latina, 2019). It should also be noted that 
the smuggling of synthetic drugs to non-EU countries via 
postal parcels appears to be gaining momentum in Europe. 
For instance, 328 kg of MDMA was seized at European 
postal centres in 2018 and most of this was destined to 
markets in South and North America and in Asia. However, 
synthetic drugs may also be smuggled by mail within 
the EU. For instance, customs in Austria reported seizing 
numerous parcels and letters containing small amounts 
of methamphetamine sent from the Netherlands in 2018 
(Groupe Pompidou and RILO WE, 2019).
The Balkan route is a significant trafficking route for 
synthetic drugs produced in the EU heading to non-EU 
destinations, such as Turkey or countries in the Middle 
East along this route, while drug precursors and associated 
substances flow into the EU in the opposite direction.
In 2017, Turkey seized more amphetamine (6.6 tonnes) than 
the EU Member States combined (6.4 tonnes). Almost all of 
the amphetamine seized in Turkey was in the form of tablets 
(26.3 million tablets — over 99.5 % of the total estimated 
amount seized), including large quantities of captagon 
tablets containing amphetamine (see box ‘Captagon’). 
Large seizures of captagon amounting to millions of tablets 
also took place in Greece in the early part of 2019. Large 
quantities of MDMA tablets were also seized in Turkey in 
2017, more than double the amount in the previous year, 
amounting to 8.6 million tablets and exceeding the total 
amount seized in the EU (Figure 6.11). Turkey also seized an 
exceptionally large quantity of methamphetamine in 2017 
(658 kg), a similar amount to that reported for the entire EU 
(662 kg).
Captagon
Countries in the Middle East regularly report seizing 
millions of tablets of captagon, a common illicit 
stimulant drug used in the Arabian Peninsula, and, 
to a lesser extent, other Middle Eastern countries. 
Media reports have linked captagon to perpetrators 
of terrorist attacks in Europe and terrorist groups 
based in areas of conflict in the Middle East, leading 
to concerns about this drug, which prompted the 
EMCDDA to review the available evidence in a recent 
paper (EMCDDA, 2018d).
The drug now known as captagon takes its name from 
the medicinal product Captagon; however, nowadays 
amphetamine is the drug most frequently found in 
seized captagon tablets, although this could change 
in future.
Large quantities of captagon used to be 
manufactured illicitly in Balkan countries, chiefly 
Bulgaria, and in Turkey, and then exported to the 
consumer markets in the Arabian Peninsula. However, 
since the mid-2000s, captagon production has 
moved closer to the consumer markets. Clandestine 
facilities were dismantled in Lebanon and Jordan in 
2011, 2015 and 2018, and large amounts of BMK 
have been seized in these countries. Although no 
amphetamine laboratories have been reported as 
dismantled in Syria, the INCB recently expressed 
the concern that Syrian companies may be used to 
import BMK or its precursors, and added that ‘existing 
manufacturing facilities’ in Syria may be misused 
to produce amphetamine (INCB, 2018). There are 
indications that drugs, including captagon, may also 
be produced in Iraq, although a lack of hard data 
makes drawing any conclusions on this issue difficult.
There is evidence suggesting that European OCGs 
specialising in synthetic drug production, particularly 
amphetamine production specialists, are active in the 
Middle East. A Bulgarian and a Belgian were arrested in 
Lebanon in 2014 and 2015, respectively, in connection 
with drug production, and a large captagon laboratory 
dismantled in Lebanon in 2015 contained custom-made 
synthetic drug production equipment characteristic of 
the type found in the Netherlands and Belgium. The 
illicit manufacturing of captagon tablets has also been 
encountered in Europe over the last few years, particularly 
in the Netherlands.
Photo: Department of Identification and Forensic Science, Israel Police
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Methamphetamine produced in Mexico, West Africa and 
Iran is trafficked to the EU, but on a much less significant 
scale than intra-EU production and trafficking. Belgium, 
for example has reported that methamphetamine shipments 
have arrived there from Burkina Faso and Nigeria, and Spain 
has reported shipments from Mexico and Côte d’Ivoire. It is 
likely that these cases reflect the EU’s role as a transit hub for 
methamphetamine heading to East Asia and Australia.
Drug precursors and the alternative chemicals used to produce 
them are normally trafficked from outside the EU. Some 
chemical companies have been established in the EU for the 
sole purpose of trading in chemical substances that can be 
used in illicit synthetic drug production. All EU airports and 
seaports are potential entry points or transit areas for illicit 
goods, which are typically offloaded from containers for further 
transportation by road. OCGs involved in the trafficking of 
precursors target the main seaports close to synthetic drug 
production hubs such as Antwerp and Rotterdam, but also, 
increasingly, smaller seaports across the EU with less strict 
control measures in place. Shipments also enter the EU at 
border-crossing points along the EU’s external border among 
legal freight on trucks and trains.
Seizure reports from outside Europe, identified through the 
monitoring of open source information, and analysis of darknet 
market data illustrate the important role played by European 
producers in the global supply of MDMA. For example, darknet 
market monitoring data show that, as well as facilitating direct 
retail sales to consumers, these markets are used by dealers 
around the world to purchase larger quantities of MDMA 
produced in Europe. Analysis shows that transactions involving 
quantities of MDMA tablets indicative of the middle level of 
the market account for more than double the revenue of sales 
of retail-level quantities. In contrast, darknet cannabis and 
cocaine transactions are overwhelmingly at the retail level 
(EMCDDA and Europol, 2017).
Online distribution
Synthetic drugs are also distributed across the EU via darknet 
marketplaces (see Chapter 2). As well as the sale of small 
quantities of amphetamine, MDMA and methamphetamine, 
larger quantities of MDMA, often in multiples of 1 000 tablets 
for redistribution, are also sold. Such purchases tend to 
be delivered to the buyer using post and parcel services. 
Although the online trade in MDMA (and other drugs) remains 
marginal compared with the offline/traditional supply, it is 
important to understand its scope. Based on 2018 data from 
several major darknet markets (14), we detected a total of 
(14) For more information on the data source and its limitations see the 
section on darknet monitoring in Chapter 8.
15 874 MDMA listings (sale offers) that could be attributed 
to vendors that said that they would ship MDMA from an 
EU country. The equivalent figures for amphetamine and 
methamphetamine were much smaller by comparison (2 238 
and 1 146 respectively), so these drugs will not be examined 
in further detail. The MDMA offers were distributed across 
nine marketplaces, with three markets accounting for 99 % 
of all offers: Dream Market (14 242), Olympus Market (1 334) 
and Berlusconi Market (182). The available data suggest 
that the majority of sale offers originating from the EU during 
2018 were from the Netherlands (50 %) and Germany (31 %). 
Other reported EU Member States of origin included the 
United Kingdom (5 %) and Belgium (2 %). An additional 12 % 
of listings offered shipping from other EU countries (2 %) or 
multiple EU countries (10 %) (Figure 6.13).
Caution is needed in interpreting these data in respect of 
gauging the number of individual sellers offering synthetic 
drugs on these marketplaces or the number of transactions. 
Neither number can be extrapolated from the number of listings 
alone. Nonetheless, the number of listings has been used as 
a valid indicator of the scope of activity on darknet markets.
Retail supply and use
MDMA
Until recently, in many countries, MDMA prevalence had 
been on the decline from peak levels reached in the early 
Figure 6.13 
Darknet market offers: MDMA listings shipping from 
Europe, 2018
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to mid-2000s. In recent years, however, monitoring sources 
suggest a mixed picture with no clear trends. Among the 
countries that have produced new surveys since 2016 and 
reported confidence intervals, four reported higher estimates 
than in the previous comparable survey, six reported stable 
estimates and two reported lower estimates.
MDMA is often taken alongside other substances, including 
alcohol. Current indications suggest that, in higher-prevalence 
countries, MDMA is no longer a niche or subcultural drug 
limited to dance clubs and parties, but is used by a broad 
range of young people in mainstream nightlife settings, 
including bars and house parties. Marketing appears to play 
a role in retail sales, and new tablet designs in various colours, 
shapes and brand logos are constantly being introduced. 
The European Web Survey on Drugs found that, among people 
who had used MDMA in the previous year, the proportion 
reporting frequent use (more than 50 days in the past year) 
ranged from none at all in Cyprus to around 8 % in Croatia and 
Austria.
MDMA use is rarely cited as a reason for entering specialised 
drug treatment. In 2017, MDMA was reported by fewer than 
1 % (around 1 600 cases) of treatment entrants in Europe, with 
Turkey (616), the United Kingdom (230), France (168) and 
Hungary (111) accounting for 70 % of these.
The average MDMA content of tablets, in those countries 
that routinely report data, has been increasing since 2010. 
In 2017, a 10-year high of 167 mg per tablet was reported by 
the Netherlands (Trimbos Institute, 2019; see Figure 6.14). 
A drug-testing service in the United Kingdom also reported 
increased amounts of MDMA in ecstasy tablets, from 129 mg 
in 2016 to 156 mg in 2017 (Harm Reduction Wales, 2018). 
In a study conducted for the EMCDDA in seven Member States 
between January and July 2018, of 35 ecstasy tablet samples 
submitted for testing to nine onsite and offsite drug-checking 
services and confirmed to contain MDMA, 11 were found 
to contain caffeine. In the case of MDMA in crystal form, of 
44 positive samples, 19 contained an unknown adulterant and 
11 contained caffeine.
Wastewater analysis can detect fluctuations in weekly patterns 
of illicit use. The 2018 multi-city analysis found the highest 
mass loads of MDMA in the wastewater in cities in Belgium, 
Germany and the Netherlands. Of the 37 cities that have data 
for 2017 and 2018, 21 reported an increase, nine a stable 
situation and seven a decrease. Looking at longer-term trends, 
in most cities with data for both 2011 and 2018 (10 cities), 
wastewater MDMA loads were higher in 2018 than in 2011 
(EMCDDA, 2019b).
Amphetamine and methamphetamine
Compared with 2007, both the price and purity of 
amphetamine in Europe were higher in 2017, despite 
a slight fall compared with the previous year. Typically, 
both the average reported purity and the price are higher 
for methamphetamine than for amphetamine samples. 
Amphetamine is typically adulterated with caffeine. The 
drug-checking study conducted for the EMCDDA in 2018 
found that, of 488 samples containing amphetamine, 70 % 
contained caffeine. No samples of methamphetamine were 
identified in the study (EMCDDA, 2019b).
Analysis of municipal wastewater carried out in 2018 found 
that mass loads of amphetamine varied considerably across 
Europe, with the highest levels reported in cities in the north 
and east of Europe. Amphetamine was found at much lower 
levels in cities in the south of Europe. It must be noted that not 
all European Union Member States participate in this activity. 
Of the 38 cities reporting data for 2017 and 2018, 21 noted an 
increase, seven a stable situation and 10 a decrease. Overall, 
the data from cities with data from 2011 to 2018 showed 
a diverse picture, but with relatively stable trends in most cities 
for amphetamine (EMCDDA, 2019b).
Temporal fluctuations observed in wastewater data show 
that, whereas use of amphetamine used to be distributed 
more evenly over the whole week, increasing loads have been 
detected during the weekend more recently, probably related 
to increasing use in recreational settings.
Methamphetamine use, which is generally low, stable and 
historically concentrated in Czechia and Slovakia, now 
appears to be present also in other European countries, such 
as Cyprus, Germany, Spain and northern Europe (Figure 6.15). 
In 2017 and 2018, of the 40 cities that have data on 
Figure 6.14 
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methamphetamine in wastewater, five reported an increase, 
20 a stable situation and 15 a decrease.
Other important synthetic drugs on 
the EU drug market
This section considers ketamine and GHB/GBL, which seem 
to be growing in importance in the EU drug market, to the 
extent that some EU Member States are raising concerns 
about them. There are many other synthetic drugs available on 
the EU drug market, for example mephedrone, 2C-B and some 
niche substances with weak user demand, on which very little 
information is available. The data available for LSD show that, 
while the quantities seized fluctuate year to year, the number 
of seizures has doubled since 2007, to 2 200 seizures and 
74 000 units seized in 2017.
Ketamine
Although apparently used on a much more limited scale than 
the other drugs discussed in this chapter, ketamine is another 
synthetic drug that is worthy of some attention, not least 
because of its harmful effects on those who use it on a regular 
basis. Although most ketamine would appear to be imported 
into the EU generally from China or India (ACMD, 2013; KLPD 
Dienst Nationale Recherche, 2012), a ketamine production site 
was found in the Netherlands. In addition, a storage site found 
in Belgium in 2017 was reported to be connected to ketamine 
production in the Netherlands (see Chapter 7). Sixteen EU 
Member States reported around 2 000 seizures of ketamine 
in 2017, amounting to an estimated 194 kg and 5 litres of the 
drug, most of which was accounted for by Belgium, France and 
the United Kingdom. Complementary data were reported to the 
EU Early Warning System on new psychoactive substances in 
2017 amounting to 1 945 seizures from 19 countries: 947 kg 
of powder, with France and the Netherlands contributing 
most to the total; 13 litres of liquid, mainly reported by France; 
and 216 tablets. In addition, in the first half of 2018, the 
Netherlands reported seizures of approximately 1 tonne of 
ketamine, which may indicate increasing demand for the 
drug (see below). The United Kingdom reported the highest 
number of seizures (523) and quantities of ketamine seized 
(68 kg) in 2016/2017. In previous years, however, seizures 
were larger and more numerous: for example, in 2013/14 when 
1 650 seizures occurred, totalling 357 kg of powder.
In its annual report on the drug situation, the Dutch Trimbos 
Institute highlighted that, while ketamine use among the 
general population is low (1.1 % lifetime prevalence and 
0.5 % in the past year), it has now become a mainstream 
drug in the Netherlands among adolescents and young 
adults participating in the nightlife scene, with 17.3 % of this 
population ever having used it and 12.3 % in the past year 
(Trimbos Institute, 2019). There has also been an increase 
Figure 6.15 
Methamphetamine residues in wastewater in selected European cities: trends and most recent data
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in ketamine samples delivered to the Drug Information 
and Monitoring System (DIMS); they now account for 4 % 
of all drug samples. DIMS found that, in 2017, ketamine 
samples had an average purity of 63 %, with an average 
price of EUR 25 per gram (range from EUR 5 to EUR 60). 
The European Research Area Network on Illicit Drugs (ERANID) 
project survey reported slightly higher prices of between 
EUR 30 and EUR 40 per gram. A study of four of the largest 
darknet markets conducted between July 2017 and June 
2018 found that, in 1 251 ketamine listings, the amount most 
commonly offered was 1 g (209 listings), with a median price 
of EUR 23 per gram (Christin and Thomas, 2019). Caffeine is 
the most common adulterant of ketamine. The drug-checking 
study conducted for the EMCDDA between January and 
July 2018 showed that, of 48 ketamine samples, 25 of them 
contained caffeine (EMCDDA, 2019b).
Another reason for increasing seizures in some countries in 
Europe could be the sale of ketamine on darknet markets. 
While some ketamine appears to be offered for sale from 
vendors based in Europe, in the absence of sales data it is 
difficult to assess the extent of this phenomenon. A previous 
study identified 469 sales of ketamine shipping from the EU 
(EMCDDA and Europol, 2017). It will be important to closely 
monitor the diffusion of ketamine and related substances in 
the EU in the coming years.
GHB and GBL
GHB (gamma-hydroxybutyric acid) is also known as ‘liquid 
ecstasy’, ‘gamma’ or simply ‘G’. It is a synthetic drug that is 
usually consumed in recreational nightlife settings, where it 
is taken orally in liquid form for sought-after effects that are 
similar to those of alcohol. GHB has a steep dose-response 
curve: even a small increase in dose can cause serious toxic 
effects, including impaired consciousness and coma, so 
developments in this market are worthy of study.
GBL (gamma-butyrolactone) is the main precursor for GHB, 
and is increasingly being trafficked in the EU for the purpose 
of GHB production, or for direct consumption, as it is rapidly 
converted to GHB in the body. Whereas GHB was added to 
Schedule IV of the 1971 UN Convention on Psychotropic 
Substances in March 2001 and then moved to Schedule II in 
2014, GBL is not scheduled at global or EU level as a drug or 
as a precursor. That enables criminal groups to divert it from 
licit supplies. In some countries, such as Poland, control is 
possible because GBL is an ester of GHB. GBL has legitimate 
use as an industrial solvent, but, despite this, some Member 
States have imposed controls on the substance in their 
national drug legislation. As well as being diverted from licit 
supplies within the EU, GBL is also smuggled to the EU from 
China.
In 2017, seizures of GHB or GBL were reported to the EU in 
three ways: to the EU Early Warning System, to the EMCDDA 
through the standard seizure data collection or, as GBL is 
a precursor of GHB, to the European Commission. Analysis of 
the data from these sources is hampered by inconsistencies in 
reporting, such as a country reporting different numbers to two 
or three of the data collections.
What is clear, though, is that 19 EU Member States, Norway 
and Turkey have reported data to at least one of them. It 
appears that Belgium, Spain, the Netherlands and Norway 
are the countries that report the largest numbers of seizures, 
respectively. Taking the EU Early Warning System data into 
account, 13 EU Member States, Norway and Turkey reported 
over 1 000 seizures amounting to approximately 250 kg and 
almost 460 litres of the drug. According to reporting through 
the standard table, Belgium alone seized two hauls of GBL 
amounting to 305 litres and 2.28 kg and 444 hauls of GHB 
amounting to 1.5 kg and 2 litres, whereas Norway reported 
488 seizures (170 litres) of GHB and 75 seizures (190 litres) 
of GBL.
In 2016, Germany reported to the European Commission that 
it had stopped 29 suspicious orders of GBL, amounting to 
some 57 100 litres of the substance. However, in 2017 no EU 
Member States reported stopping any attempts to purchase 
GBL.
Synthetic drugs have been noted offered as a cocktail, for 
example ‘Blue-69’, purported to be a mixture of amphetamine, 
MDMA and GHB. Dutch vendors have placed such items 
for sale on darknet markets at a cost of EUR 27.50 for 5 ml 
of the liquid, although the exact contents are not known 
(Figure 6.16).
Figure 6.16 
Advert for ‘Blue-69’, a cocktail of synthetic drugs
Source: ‘Berlusconi’ a darknet market.
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Key points
Developments in new psychoactive 
substances in the EU
 Policies on NPS appear to be having some impact. 
Measures taken in the EU, especially those that have 
reduced the open trade, and in source countries, such 
as China, appear to have resulted in a slow-down in the 
number of first detections of NPS in European countries. 
Currently, around 50 new substances are reported annually, 
within a total of over 730 reported to the EU Early Warning 
System.
 Despite a slow-down in first-time detections, NPS 
continue to pose serious cross-border threats to health. 
This is evident from the number of potent synthetic opioids, 
synthetic cannabinoids and benzodiazepines appearing 
on the market and the associated reports of health 
emergencies and deaths.
 Globalised markets, the internet and other technologies 
drive the availability of NPS in the EU. The internet, both the 
surface web and darknet markets, is an important source of 
supply, particularly since in many EU countries open sales 
in shops have been reduced. However, there appear to be 
increasing sales of NPS on the illicit market.
Developments in production and 
trafficking
 China remains the major source country for NPS, from 
where they are exported and openly sold by chemical and 
pharmaceutical companies. To a lesser extent, India is 
also an important source of some NPS, particularly those 
sold as medicines. A small number of illicit laboratories 
have also been detected in European countries such as 
the Netherlands and Poland, usually producing synthetic 
cathinones.
 Interaction with the market for traditional illicit drugs 
is now greater. The NPS market continues to evolve and 
is characterised by a range of substances that are cheap, 
easily replaceable and potent. Interactions with the market 
in established controlled drugs have become stronger 
and influence the demand for and use of NPS, with NPS 
increasingly sold alongside illicit substances or in mixtures 
with them.
 Problems attributable to synthetic cannabinoids appear 
to be growing. The relatively low cost, easy availability and 
high potency of synthetic cannabinoids appear to have 
resulted in increased use among marginalised groups such 
as the homeless and prison populations. This development 
is associated with an increase in reports of serious negative 
consequences.
 New opioids are a growing cause for concern. There has 
been a rapid increase in the number of fentanyl derivatives, 
substances particularly associated with health problems, 
including fatal poisoning. Developments in this area are 
likely to be influenced by the prominent role played by this 
group of drugs in the current opioid epidemic in North 
America.
 Overlaps exist with the market for fake medicines. 
New benzodiazepines, often sold at very low prices, have 
appeared on illicit drug markets in some countries and have 
been associated with harm, including an increased risk of 
overdose. They are also used to make fake versions of these 
medicines, which are sold on the illicit drug market. A small 
number of new benzodiazepines may be sourced from 
companies in India, typically as finished medicinal products.
CHAPTER 7
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 HIV outbreaks have been linked to the injection of 
synthetic cathinones. This is likely to be because the 
injecting of stimulants is associated with high injecting 
frequency and more chaotic behaviours. The use of 
cathinones among some groups of men who have sex 
with men has also been associated with increased sexual 
risk-taking behaviours.
Implications for action for 
preparedness and response 
activities
To respond to the current and potential future threats 
posed by the synthetic drug market in Europe, the following 
actions are needed.
  Continue to support and develop the capacity of 
national and EU early warning systems to increase 
situational awareness and preparedness, and to 
support the development of responses.
  Develop effective models to rapidly identify and 
respond to outbreaks of mass poisoning linked to 
NPS use. These need to include, where relevant, the 
provision of opioid antagonists.
  Share intelligence, assess threats, monitor the situation 
and carry out research to improve the understanding of 
the production of NPS within Europe, the involvement 
of OCGs and interactions that may exist between the 
NPS market and the more established controlled drugs 
market.
  Raise awareness and develop appropriate guidance 
and training on the risks associated with occupational 
exposure to potent and highly toxic NPS and their 
adulterants and contaminants.
  Continue to support capacity-building activities, 
including training, sharing of best practices and 
provision of specialist equipment for law enforcement 
agencies, in particular customs, to increase the 
detection of shipments of NPS at European borders 
and within the postal and parcel services.
  Increase the ability of forensic science and toxicology 
laboratories to identify new substances as well as 
precursors and metabolites. This requires support for 
training, resources for testing, and a mechanism for 
production and sharing of analytical data, reference 
materials and expertise.
  Systematically monitor and disrupt online 
marketplaces, particularly those selling wholesale 
quantities, both on the surface web and on darknet 
markets, and to strengthen even further the 
partnerships with industry to restrict such sales.
  Support research into the pharmacology and toxicology 
of NPS identified by the EU Early Warning System.
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Introduction
New psychoactive substances make up a broad range 
of drugs that are not controlled by international drug 
laws (15). They include stimulants, synthetic cannabinoids, 
benzodiazepines, opioids, hallucinogens and dissociatives. 
Many of these substances are intended to mimic the effects 
of controlled drugs and are traded as legal replacements 
for them. They may be sold in a range of products under 
the guise of ‘legal highs’, ‘research chemicals’ or ‘dietary 
supplements’. They are also sold as drugs in their own 
right, and, unknown to users, as controlled drugs and fake 
medicines. An additional aspect of the market is the use 
of non-controlled psychoactive medicines that are either 
diverted from the regulated market in Europe or sourced 
from vendors in other countries.
In the EU, a legal framework exists to detect, assess and 
respond to the issues posed by these substances (see 
boxes ‘Responding to new psychoactive substances in the 
EU’ and ‘The data in this chapter’).
Global overview
Since around 2008, there has been a dramatic growth in 
the NPS market as globalisation and new technologies, 
such as the internet, have allowed them to be produced, 
sold and supplied on an industrial scale. Between 2009 
and 2018, 119 countries and territories reported the 
emergence of 892 different NPS to UNODC, through the 
UNODC Early Warning Advisory on NPS (UNODC, 2019b). 
In Europe, more than 730 NPS have appeared on the drug 
market since monitoring began in 1997, with around 90 % 
of these being detected between 2008 and 2018 (EMCDDA, 
2019b). The growth in the market has also been reflected 
in large increases in the number of seizures made by law 
enforcement agencies, and in reports of severe and fatal 
overdoses.
Many NPS are produced and sold openly by chemical and 
pharmaceutical companies in China. They are imported into 
Europe, processed into products and sold in shops, on the 
internet or through the illicit drug markets. To a lesser extent, 
India is also an important source of some NPS, particularly 
those sold as medicines (Evans-Brown and Sedefov, 2018). 
Illicit laboratories in China, India, and Europe also produce 
some types of NPS.
(15) Increasingly, some NPS are controlled or otherwise regulated at national 
level, irrespective of whether or not they are controlled under the UN 
conventions.
Much of the NPS market is highly dynamic and constantly 
changing. It is characterised by a high turnover of cheap, 
easily available and replaceable substances. One of the 
main reasons for this high turnover is that, as soon as 
national governments signal their intention to control 
a substance, producers can easily switch to a new, non-
controlled, replacement. Despite this, some NPS have 
remained on the market for a number of years. A few of 
these, such as ketamine, GBL and 2C-B (4-bromo-2,5-
dimethoxyphenethylamine), have become established drugs.
The broad range of substances and products, combined 
with the highly dynamic nature of the market and strong 
links with the market in established controlled drugs, gives 
rise to a complex picture across Europe. The situation 
differs widely over time and place. The ability to detect and 
report NPS also differs across Europe, meaning that there 
is both underdetection and under-reporting in some areas. 
Understanding the epidemiology of many NPS is also limited. 
Commonly used methods for studying drug use, including 
those for estimating prevalence, may not be suitable or 
appropriate for many NPS. This may especially be the case 
for those substances that have recently appeared on the 
market, have low levels of use or are passed off as other 
drugs. Together, these issues have left gaps in understanding 
the overall size, scale and impact of the market.
Responding to new psychoactive substances 
in the EU
A three-step legal framework of early warning, risk 
assessment and control measures allows the EU to 
rapidly detect, assess and respond to public health 
and social threats caused by NPS. The EMCDDA 
is responsible for the first two steps in this system, 
namely operating the EU Early Warning System 
with Europol and conducting risk assessments. The 
European Commission, the Council of the European 
Union and the European Parliament are responsible 
for control measures. The legislation comprises 
Regulation (EU) 2017/2101 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 15 November 
2017 amending Regulation (EC) No 1920/2006 
as regards information exchange on, and an early 
warning system and risk assessment procedure for, 
new psychoactive substances; and Directive (EU) 
2017/2103 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 15 November 2017 amending Council 
Framework Decision 2004/757/JHA in order to 
include new psychoactive substances in the definition 
of ‘drug’ and repealing Council Decision 2005/387/
JHA.
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Regarding the prevalence of use, data are limited, but 
what we do know is that, in most cases, the use of NPS 
in the general population tends to be lower than that of 
established controlled drugs. There are some important 
exceptions to this, such as ketamine, which has become 
an established drug in some places (see Chapter 6). In 
addition, the use of some types of NPS, such as stimulants, 
synthetic cannabinoids and opioids, may be relatively 
common in high-risk drug users and other marginalised 
groups in some areas. Despite what appear to be relatively 
low levels of use, some of these substances may cause high 
levels of harm. Adding to the complexity is that NPS are 
also used by dealers as replacements for established drugs, 
such as MDMA, amphetamine, cocaine, benzodiazepines 
and heroin, when they are in short supply. In these cases, 
people may be unaware that they are using an NPS. 
Standard data collection tools do not account for such 
instances.
In some cases, NPS pose a challenge as a group, such 
as the synthetic cannabinoids. Suppliers care less about 
a specific substance and more about mimicking, broadly 
speaking, the pharmacological effects of cannabis. In 
essence, each synthetic cannabinoid is disposable: as soon 
as a substance is controlled, or even before, manufacturers 
can have one or more replacement substances ready 
for sale, while suppliers and retailers can have legal 
replacement products on the shelves. In other cases, NPS 
may simply be used as a temporary replacement for an 
established drug, such as heroin or MDMA, that is in short 
supply. In still other cases, they are used to make fake 
medicines (Evans-Brown and Sedefov, 2018).
Since the last edition of this report there have been some 
encouraging developments in the NPS market in Europe. 
The number of new substances reported for the first time 
each year has dropped from a high of around 100 in 2014 
and 2015 to around 50 since then. This is thought to partly 
reflect recent policy responses in Europe, including efforts 
to control NPS and their open sale. It may also reflect control 
measures and law enforcement activity in source countries, 
such as China (EMCDDA, 2019b). Nonetheless, at least one 
new substance is still detected every week, increasing the 
overall number that need to be monitored.
Major new challenges have also emerged. They include 
what appears to be a general upward trend of more potent 
NPS appearing on the market, especially substances such 
as the synthetic cannabinoids and fentanyl derivatives, 
which can be highly potent. These types of substances 
pose a greater risk of life-threatening poisoning to 
users because their high potency makes it easier to 
unintentionally overdose. This risk may be especially acute 
when a substance first appears on the market because of 
a lack of experience with the substance, but also because, 
unknown to users, such substances may be sold as the 
established drug they wanted. As a result, these types of 
substances can also cause outbreaks of mass poisonings 
that can overwhelm local healthcare systems. Although the 
picture differs greatly across Europe, outbreaks involving 
a range of different types of NPS have occurred in recent 
years. In some circumstances, personnel may also be at risk 
of occupational exposure to such substances (Europol and 
EMCDDA, 2017).
Potent substances are also easier to conceal and smuggle, 
making them an attractive option for traffickers. A few 
grams of a substance, easily hidden in an envelope, can be 
sufficient to make many thousands of doses for the drug 
market. It is also concerning that synthetic cannabinoids 
(known as ‘spice’) are now sought after by some vulnerable 
groups because they are cheap, easily available and 
powerful, capable of causing mind-numbing effects 
(EMCDDA, 2018e).
Globalised markets also increase the opportunity for NPS, 
and a whole range of toxic chemicals, to be sold either 
deliberately or accidentally as other drugs, which can have 
disastrous consequences. An example of this is carfentanil, 
which was sold as heroin in parts of Europe during 2017.
The data in this chapter
The seizure data reported in this chapter are from 
2007 to 2017. Data on formal notifications are from 
2007 to 2018. It is important to note that, when 
interpreting the seizures of NPS reported to the EU 
Early Warning System, they must be understood as 
minimum values. This is because data are drawn 
from case reports rather than monitoring systems. 
Reports are influenced by a range of factors such 
as increasing awareness of new substances, their 
changing legal status, law enforcement capacities 
and priorities, and the reporting practices of law 
enforcement agencies. The data are not directly 
comparable to the data on established controlled 
drugs. Quantitative data on the amount of NPS 
present in the seizures is not available, as this type 
of analysis is not routinely performed. The data 
also include a number of former NPS that have 
subsequently been controlled internationally under 
the UN conventions. These include 2C-B, GHB and 
some synthetic cathinones, synthetic cannabinoids 
and opioids. Although it has been used for a number 
of years now, ketamine is also classed as an NPS as it 
is not under international control.
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Strong links also exist between the trade in NPS and 
markets in established controlled drugs. The increasing use 
of new benzodiazepines to make fake versions of common 
anti-anxiety medications, such as fake alprazolam and 
diazepam, provides some indication of this. The use of 
NPS by high-risk drug users and other marginalised and 
vulnerable populations also appears to have increased in 
some places.
Production
Most NPS are produced in China, and to a lesser degree 
India and Europe. The growth in the market observed in 
recent years is due to the involvement of chemical and 
pharmaceutical companies operating predominantly in 
China, which are capable of making a large number of 
substances on an industrial scale. This has been driven by 
increasing expertise and capacity in the Chinese science 
and technology economy, low labour costs, the internet, 
and cheap and efficient shipping (Levinson, 2016; Morris, 
2012; Smil, 2010; Stearns, 2011). The companies use 
the internet, including online marketplaces, to advertise 
and sell a diverse range of substances. Typically, they are 
supplied in powder form, in quantities that range from a few 
milligrams to tens or even hundreds of kilograms. Some 
of the companies also offer a custom synthesis service 
for customers looking to obtain a specific NPS that is not 
currently available on the market. Some NPS, including 
ketamine, are also produced in illicit laboratories.
The substances are shipped to wholesalers, retailers and 
dealers in Europe by express mail and courier services; 
larger quantities ship by air and sea cargo. Consignments 
may be mislabelled and declared as common goods of 
low value, including foodstuffs, cosmetics and chemical 
products, in order to conceal their true nature and avoid 
interception by customs and border forces. More rarely, 
they are concealed using similar methods to those used for 
trafficking controlled drugs. Suppliers and importers may 
also deliberately route NPS to specific air and sea ports in 
Europe where the substances are not controlled, in order to 
reduce the chance of interception.
Companies based in India are also important producers 
of some NPS, particularly those that are also used as 
medicines. These include modafinil, tramadol and etizolam. 
Unlike many of the NPS from China, the substances from 
India are typically supplied as finished products ready for 
use. These may be medicines that are licensed in India and 
appear to be diverted from the legitimate supply chain; 
these are classed as unlicensed and falsified medicines 
in the EU. In other cases, they appear to be unlicensed 
products. At least historically, India was also an important 
source of ketamine for Europe. In the last few years, illicit 
laboratories producing synthetic cathinones have also 
been seized in India, and the country has been named as 
a source for several large consignments of them that were 
seized at ports in Europe.
The processing stage of NPS production is fairly common 
in the EU. For example 2017, a site where the synthetic 
cannabinoids were sprayed on herbal mix and packaged for 
distribution was dismantled in Belgium. As well as synthetic 
cannabinoid products, other types of substances can also 
be found, (see box ‘Production of fake diazepam tablets 
from etizolam, Scotland, UK, 2017’, page 188). The chemical 
synthesis stage also takes place in Europe, although to 
a limited extent. Stimulants, such as the phenethylamines 
and synthetic cathinones, have been produced in illicit 
laboratories in bulk quantities. Some of these laboratories 
were operated by criminal groups that were also involved in 
the production of MDMA and amphetamine. Two attempts 
to produce ketamine, apparently on a large scale, were also 
reported in 2016 and 2017.
Details of the NPS production sites reported as dismantled 
in the EU and their locations are shown in Table 7.1. 
The data have been reported systematically at EU level 
Table 7.1 
Sites related to NPS production in the EU, 2007-17
Year Country Number 
of sites
NPS produced
2009 Netherlands 1 4-MAR
2010 Netherlands 4 4-MA
2011 Netherlands 1 4-MA
2013 Netherlands 2 PMMA
Poland 2 4-BMC/alpha-PVP, FU-
F/4F-BF
Romania 1 PMA
Slovakia 1 3-MMC
2014 Estonia 1 4-MMC
Poland 1 4-BMC/alpha-PVP/NEB
2015 Italy 1 4-MMC
Netherlands 2 4-MEC, 4-MMC
Poland 2 4-MMC
2016 Netherlands 1 Ketamine
Poland 2 4-MMC, 4-CMC
Slovakia 1 3-CMC
2017 Belgium 1 Ketamine
Netherlands 2 4-CMC, 3-MMC
Poland 2 4-CMC
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since the EMCDDA and Europol introduced ERISSP in 
2015. Previous to 2015, the data were largely actively 
sought from Member States by the EMCDDA.
Between 2007 and 2017, 28 sites in the EU related to 
the manufacturing of NPS were notified to the EMCDDA 
or Europol. Of the 28 sites, most were found in the 
Netherlands (13) or Poland (nine), with Slovakia reporting 
two and Belgium, Estonia, Italy and Romania each 
reporting one. Before 2014, most sites were located in the 
Netherlands and producing phenethylamine stimulants 
(e.g. 4-methylamphetamine, paramethoxyamphetamine/
paramethoxymethamphetamine). The use of substitute 
precursor chemicals led to the production of these 
amphetamine-related substances; for example, in 2010, 
the 4-methylamphetamine produced in the Netherlands 
was due to the use of the precursor 4-methyl-BMK instead 
of BMK. Synthetic cathinones have predominantly been 
produced in recent years, mainly in the Netherlands or 
in Poland. There was an isolated case of production of 
fentanyl derivatives in Poland in 2013, when butyrfentanyl 
and 4-fluoro-butyrfentanyl were produced (EMCDDA, 
2017b). Ketamine production has been reported by the 
Netherlands in 2016 and Belgium in 2017.
Laboratories producing synthetic cathinones first emerged 
in 2013, with labs found in Poland and Slovakia. In Poland, 
a production site was dismantled where alpha-PVP and 
4-bromomethcathinone were produced; approximately 
50 kg of alpha-PVP was seized. In the Slovakian case, 15 kg 
of 3-methylmethcathinone crystals was seized.
In 2014, two cathinone-producing laboratories were 
dismantled, one in Estonia and one in Poland. The 
Estonian site produced 4-methylmethcathinone — 
274 g of which was recovered from the site — with 
2-bromo-4-methylpropiophenone used as a precursor. In 
the Polish case, alpha-PVP, 4-bromomethcathinone and 
N-ethylbuphedrone were produced; the total amount of 
material seized there was 4.5 kg.
In 2015, five cathinone production sites were detected, 
one in Italy, two in the Netherlands and two in Poland. The 
Italian case was small-scale and two Polish suspects were 
arrested at the site. In the Dutch cases, which were linked, 
26 kg of 4-methylmethcathinone crystals was seized at one 
site and, although no final product was found at the second 
site, similar equipment was seized and the production of 
4-methylethcathinone was confirmed. Importantly, the 
production of MDMA on a large scale was also ongoing 
at the second site and 160 kg of MDMA crystals was 
seized. Finally, the two labs in Poland were producing 
4-methymethcathinone from the precursor 2-bromo-4-
methylpropiophenone.
In 2016, four NPS production sites were reported, one 
in the Netherlands, two in Poland and one in Slovakia. 
The Dutch case involved production of ketamine from 
the precursor 1-[(2-chlorophenyl)-N-(methylimino)
methyl]cyclopentanol hydrochloride. In the first 
Polish case, a sophisticated laboratory producing 
4-methylmethcathinone was dismantled and 14 kg of 
the drug was seized. In the second, four people were 
detained for the production of 4-chloromethcathinone 
at a site where 8 kg of the substance was seized. In 
Slovakia, a large laboratory with links to Polish organised 
crime was dismantled; 3-chloromethcathinone and 
N-ethylnorpentedrone were being produced.
In 2017, five sites related to NPS production were reported: 
one in Belgium, two in the Netherlands and two in Poland. 
As already mentioned, the site in Belgium was related 
to ketamine. Specifically, a chemical storage site was 
located and 880 litres of bromocyclopentane, a precursor 
CASE STUDY 25
Production of clephedrone, a synthetic cathinone, in Poland, 2017
In 2017, police in Poland dismantled 
an NPS production laboratory where 
135 kg of 4-CMC, also known as 
clephedrone, with a value of over 
PLN 7 million, was seized. The location 
was found after officers had stopped 
a car and detained a man who was 
transporting more than 14 kg of the 
substance. From the total quantity 
seized, 900 000 finished units of 
NPS products could have been 
manufactured.
According to the police, the 
concentration of chemicals in the 
laboratory and its surroundings was 
so strong that it was safe to enter only 
after 2 days. The dismantling operation 
and the transporting of dangerous 
chemicals took several more days. 
Furthermore, the location of the lab 
meant that the water supply for the 
inhabitants of two towns had to be cut 
off, in case of contamination.
Source: Policja (2017).
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for ketamine production, was recovered. In one Dutch 
case, 3-methylmethcathinone was being produced, and 
4-chloromethcathinone (4-CMC) in the other. At each of the 
Polish sites, 4-chloromethcathinone was being produced, 
at one of them on a relatively large scale, with 135 kg of 
material seized from the site (see Case study 25).
As is the case with other synthetic drugs produced in the 
EU, the drug precursors needed may be sourced from 
China. In order to avoid interception, they may be shipped 
in mislabelled consignments or concealed using similar 
methods to those used for trafficking controlled drugs. 
Production may be carried out in Europe for a number 
of reasons: existing knowledge of, equipment for and 
experience in synthetic drug production; sufficient demand 
for a substance, making it economically attractive; control 
measures and law enforcement operations targeting 
laboratories in China and India that reduce availability at 
source; the potential to make greater profits; diversifying 
risk and building greater resilience into the supply chains; 
and reducing the risks of detection by law enforcement 
agencies.
Depending on the type of substance and market, some 
NPS are processed into branded products. These are sold 
openly or under the counter in shops as well as online. 
At least initially, it was these products that characterised 
the growth in the market from around 2008 onwards. The 
three main product categories were ‘legal highs’, ‘research 
chemicals’ and ‘dietary supplements’. The products were 
designed to be attractive to consumers, avoid the attention 
of regulators and get round consumer protection laws. 
‘Legal highs’ were marketed in colourful packaging, with 
names often suggestive of controlled drugs or psychoactive 
effects, while ‘research chemicals’ were labelled as if they 
were chemical reagents for laboratory use. Some of the 
‘dietary supplements’ were advertised as natural products 
in order to avoid regulatory scrutiny and promote them 
as safe and healthy options — a technique also widely 
used to sell unlicensed and fake medicines, particularly 
performance- and image-enhancing supplements. More 
recently, with vaping on the rise, e-liquids containing 
synthetic cannabinoids and fentanyl derivatives have 
appeared on the market; ready-to-use nasal sprays 
containing fentanyl derivatives have also been marketed in 
some areas.
NPS can also be packaged to look like drugs sold on 
the illicit drug market (sometimes called ‘designer 
drugs’). They can be sold under their own names or 
as an established controlled drug such as heroin, 
cocaine, amphetamine or ecstasy. In the latter case, new 
benzodiazepines and, less commonly, new synthetic 
opioids have been used to make fake versions of commonly 
prescribed benzodiazepine and opioid analgesic medicines, 
which are also sold on the illicit market. Sales are via 
existing street-level drug markets as well as online markets, 
including darknet markets (see Case study 26).
CASE STUDY 26
Operation Dryer: NPS darknet market sales network dismantled
In 2018, Spanish and Austrian police, 
supported by Europol, dismantled 
a criminal network producing and 
distributing NPS worldwide via darknet 
markets. The operation resulted in the 
seizure of more than EUR 4 500 000 in 
cryptocurrencies.
The OCG had been operating in 
Spain since 2012 and imported 
the raw material to make the NPS 
products mainly from China. The 
group also established a laboratory in 
the Netherlands, where it produced 
substances that were then shipped to 
Spain for packaging and distribution to 
the final consumers. At two locations 
in the provinces of Granada and 
Valencia, over 100 different NPS 
were seized, including synthetic 
cannabinoids, benzodiazepines, 
dissociatives, cathinone stimulants, 
hallucinogens and synthetic opioids, 
whose market value exceeded 
EUR 12 000 000. Nearly 800 000 
doses of an NPS similar to LSD were 
confiscated, making it the biggest ever 
haul of this type of substance in the 
EU.
The OCG offered the synthetic drugs 
exclusively through darknet markets, 
where access was restricted to 
previously invited users redirected 
from forums.
During the investigation, it was 
discovered that postal packages 
had been sent to more than 100 
countries, sometimes mislabelled as 
legal products, such as additives for 
cement. As well as the seizures of NPS 
and cryptocurrencies, eight people 
were arrested (Spanish, Austrian and 
French nationals), accused of drug 
trafficking, money laundering and 
membership of a criminal organisation. 
Three properties were seized, with 
a value close to EUR 1 million, and 
10 luxury vehicles were confiscated.
Source: Europol (2018e); Guardia Civil (2018).
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Other ingredients are needed to make consumer doses of 
NPS products, such as herbal material for making smoking 
mixtures, and microcrystalline cellulose for making tablets. 
Equipment such as tableting and packaging machines 
is also needed, as well as the packaging materials. All of 
these additional materials can be readily sourced from 
companies based in the EU, China and elsewhere.
Distribution and supply in Europe
By the end of 2018, the EMCDDA was monitoring more 
than 730 new psychoactive substances that have appeared 
on Europe’s drug market since 1997. More than 90 % (652) 
of these were notified between 2008 and 2018, including 
55 substances that were notified for the first time in 2018 
(Figure 7.1).
During 2017, approximately 64 160 seizures of NPS 
were reported to the EU Early Warning System by law 
enforcement agencies from across Europe. Like in recent 
previous years, the seizures were dominated by synthetic 
cannabinoids and synthetic cathinones, which, together, 
accounted for around 75 % of the total number of seizures 
reported during the year in the EU, Norway and Turkey 
(Figure 7.2). Large increases have been reported in other 
categories such as synthetic opioids and benzodiazepines 
(discussed later in this section).
In 2017, NPS were most commonly reported as powders, 
which amounted to 2.8 tonnes, across all categories. 
This is broadly comparable to the figures from previous 
years. In addition, just under 240 kg of herbal material was 
reported, two thirds of which was in the form of smoking 
mixtures containing synthetic cannabinoids. NPS were 
also found in tablets (6 770 cases, 2.8 million units), 
blotters (980 cases, 23 000 units) and liquids (1 430 cases, 
490 litres). Some of these liquids were sold as ready-to-use 
nasal sprays or as e-liquids for vaping in e-cigarettes.
Although a broad range of NPS are monitored by the EU 
Early Warning System, the rest of this section is limited 
to a discussion of synthetic cannabinoids, synthetic 
cathinones, opioids and benzodiazepines. It must be noted, 
however, that dissociative substances, largely mimicking 
the effects of ketamine, and hallucinogens, mimicking the 
effects of LSD, are also important NPS categories.
Figure 7.1 
Number of new psychoactive substances notified for 
the first time in the EU, Norway and Turkey, 2007-18
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Figure 7.2 
Seizures reported to the EU Early Warning System: 
trends in total number of seizures and number of 
seizures by category, 2017
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Synthetic cannabinoids
When synthetic cannabinoids first appeared on the 
market in Europe around 2006, they were sold as legal 
replacements for cannabis. That is still the case, but 
they have also gained a reputation for having powerful 
intoxicating effects, and, as a result, some users specifically 
use these substances for their effects. Typically, the 
cannabinoids are sprayed on to or mixed with herbal 
plant material and smoked as a joint. Although synthetic 
cannabinoids are used recreationally, in some places they 
are also used by prisoners, homeless people and other 
vulnerable groups because of the profound intoxication 
they can cause. Because of their high potency, synthetic 
cannabinoids can pose a high risk of severe poisoning, 
which in some cases can be fatal (EMCDDA, 2018e).
The EMCDDA currently monitors 190 synthetic 
cannabinoids. This includes 11 reported for the first time in 
2018. Whereas an average of 27 cannabinoids appeared 
each year in Europe between 2011 and 2015, since 2016 
the number has dropped to around 10 (Figure 7.3). The 
most frequently seized synthetic cannabinoid in 2017 was 
5F-MDMB-PINACA/5F-ADB (Table 7.2).
In 2017, just over 32 610 seizures of cannabinoids were 
reported to the EU Early Warning System, which represents 
just over 50 % of the total number of seizures reported 
during the year (Figure 7.4).
Most of these detections were in the form of herbal plant 
material (4 870 cases, 159 kg), and in powders (950 cases, 
84 kg). Since 2013, there has been a drop in the number 
and quantity of seizures of powders containing synthetic 
cannabinoids. Since 2015, there has been a drop in the 
quantity of seizures of herbal material containing synthetic 
cannabinoids.
Since 2016, the EMCDDA has conducted five joint 
investigations with Europol on synthetic cannabinoids that 
have caused serious concern at the European level. These 
are MDMB-CHMICA in 2016, and AB-CHMINACA, ADB-
CHMINACA, 5F-MDMB-PINACA and CUMYL-4CN-BINACA 
during 2017. Together, these substances have been 
involved in more than 100 deaths, many of which were 
attributed directly to these substances. All five of these 
substances were formally risk assessed by the EMCDDA 
during 2016-17.
Figure 7.3 
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Figure 7.4 
Seizures of synthetic cannabinoids reported to the EU 
Early Warning System: trends in number of seizures 
and quantity of powders and herbal mixtures, 2007-17
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Table 7.2 
The most seized cannabinoids in the EU, Norway and 
Turkey, numbers and quantities, 2017
Substance Number of 
seizures
Powder 
(kg)
Herbal 
(kg)
5F-MDMB-PINACA/5F-ADB 2 295 41.7 33
MDMB-CHMICA 1 438 0.6 10
AMB-FUBINACA 1 400 13.6 42
AB-CHMINACA 691 0.1 7
ADB-FUBINACA 542 0.4 3
CUMYL-PeGACLONE 303 5.0 7
CUMYL-4CN-BINACA 31 5.0 1
JWH-018 21 < 0.1 36
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Synthetic cathinones
Synthetic cathinones first appeared in 2004 and, since 
then, have typically been sold as legal replacements for 
controlled stimulants such as amphetamine, cocaine and 
MDMA. Unknown to users, they are also sold as controlled 
stimulants. The cathinones are used recreationally, but in 
some places they are also used by high-risk drug users, 
including people who inject stimulants and/or heroin and 
other opioids.
The EMCDDA currently monitors 138 synthetic cathinones. 
These include eight reported for the first time in 2018. 
Like the synthetic cannabinoids, in the past few years 
there has been a drop in the number of new cathinones 
appearing each year (Figure 7.5). The most frequently 
seized synthetic cathinone in 2017 was N-ethylhexedrone 
(Table 7.3). This substance was one of the three most 
frequently seized cathinones, along with 3-CMC and 
4-CMC, in postal centres in 19 EU Member States in 2018 
(Groupe Pompidou and RILO WE, 2019).
In 2017, approximately 15 200 seizures of cathinones 
were reported in the EU, Norway and Turkey (Figure 7.6), 
which represents just over 20 % of the total number of NPS 
seizures reported during the year. In addition to powders 
(14 400 seizures, 1.27 tonnes), cathinones were also 
detected in tablets (300 seizures, 48 170 units), herbal 
material (140 seizures, 1.2 kg) and liquids (40 seizures, 
2.8 litres). Other forms were also reported. In 2017, the 
large majority (95 %) of seizures of cathinones were in 
powder form (14 400 seizures). This represents 69 % of all 
NPS seizures in powder form (14 400 out of 20 900). This 
figure is comparable to the value in 2015 (14 000 seizures), 
and a decrease of around 35 % compared with the previous 
year (22 020 seizures).
Figure 7.5 
Number of synthetic cathinones notified for the first 
time in the EU, Norway and Turkey, 2007-18
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Figure 7.6 
Seizures of synthetic cathinones reported to the EU 
Early Warning System: trends in number of seizures, 
quantity of powders and number of tablets, 2007-17
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Table 7.3 
The most seized cathinones in the EU, Norway and 
Turkey, numbers and quantities, 2017
Substance Seizures Powder 
(kg)
Tablets
N-ethylhexedrone 2 653 224 13
4-CMC/clephedrone 1 769 443 4
4-CEC 1 638 137 92
3-CMC 1 085 29 0
3-CEC 926 1 3
Ephylone 445 39 38 991
Dibutylone/bk-MMBDB 262 7 6 723
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Synthetic opioids
Since 2015, there has been a large increase in the 
number of new synthetic opioids detected in Europe. 
These substances are sold as legal replacements for 
controlled opioids, such as heroin. Unknown to users, 
they are also mixed with or sold as controlled opioids, 
particularly heroin. They are also sometimes used to make 
fake benzodiazepine and analgesic medicines. Some 
people use new opioids recreationally, but they are also 
used by high-risk drug users, including those who inject 
heroin and other opioids. Although they play a small role 
in Europe’s drug market, many of the opioids (particularly 
fentanyl derivatives) are highly potent substances that 
pose a severe risk of life-threatening poisoning, as they can 
cause severe respiratory depression. This can be reversed 
by the timely administration of naloxone (Kim and Nelson, 
2015). Some countries have been disproportionately 
affected, such as Sweden (see box ‘Responding to the 
situation of new synthetic opioids in Sweden’, page 217). 
As well as presenting a risk of harm, these substances are 
easier to conceal and smuggle, with a few grams sufficient 
to make many thousands of doses for the drug market. This 
makes them easier to import undetected into Europe and, 
from there, move them across the rest of Europe, as small 
letters and packages can easily be disguised.
The EMCDDA currently monitors 49 new synthetic opioids 
(Figure 7.7). These include 11 reported for the first time 
in 2018. Overall, more than 80 % (41) of the opioids have 
been detected for the first time during the last five years. 
Almost 70 % (34) of the opioids are fentanyl derivatives. 
The most frequently seized new synthetic opioid in 2017 
was carfentanil (Table 7.4).
In 2017, approximately 1 300 seizures of opioids were 
reported to the EU Early Warning System, which represents 
around 2 % of the total number of seizures reported during 
the year (Figure 7.8). Most of these cases (70 %) were 
fentanyl derivatives. A number of other types of opioids 
were also reported, including U-47700. The total quantity 
of opioids reported as powders and tablets has seen 
a continued increase since 2012 (Figure 7.8). Overall, the 
quantities seized in 2017 amounted to approximately 17 kg 
of powders, 1.8 litres of liquids and over 29 200 tablets.
Less commonly, new opioids have also been found in 
blotters and in herbal smoking mixtures; in these cases, 
there may be no indication that they contain potent 
opioids, which could pose a high risk of poisoning to 
people who use them, particularly if they have never 
used opioids or have not used them recently. In addition, 
opioids may be found in fake medicines. For example, 
between mid-November 2017 and mid-January 2018, 
Figure 7.7 
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Figure 7.8 
Seizures of new opioids reported to the EU Early 
Warning System (excluding tramadol): trends in 
number of seizures, quantity of powders and number 
of tablets, 2007-17
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Table 7.4 
The most seized new synthetic opioids in the EU, 
Norway and Turkey, numbers and quantities, 2017 
(excludes tramadol)
Opioid Seizures Powder 
(kg)
Tablets
Carfentanil 318 4.1 0
Furanylfentanyl 183 0.8 3 225
Cyclopropylfentanyl 131 2.8 329
U-47700 110 5.0 238
Ocfentanil (A-3217) 55 0.7 0
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Swedish police made at least 10 seizures of fake Xanax 
(alprazolam) tablets (‘2 mg Xanax bars’) that contained 
cyclopropylfentanyl or cyclopentylfentanyl. In addition, 
a seizure of 48 fake OxyContin (‘OP 80’) tablets that 
contained cyclopropylfentanyl instead of oxycodone 
(an opioid) was also made during December 2017. The 
tablets are visually indistinguishable from the legitimate 
medicines. The prevalence of fake tablets containing 
fentanyl derivatives in Europe is unknown but, given the 
international supply chains for such fake medicines, 
availability elsewhere is likely. Similar tablets to those 
reported by Sweden have caused severe and fatal 
poisoning, including mass poisonings, in the United States 
and Canada in the past few years (Arens et al., 2016; Sutter 
et al., 2017). The risk of poisoning may be especially high 
when tablets are sold as benzodiazepines (such as Xanax), 
as they may be used by non-opioid users who have no 
tolerance to opioids.
Since late 2015, the EMCDDA has conducted eight 
joint investigations with Europol on fentanyl derivatives 
that have caused serious concern at the European 
level. The two agencies investigated acetylfentanyl 
in 2015, acryloylfentanyl and furanylfentanyl in 
2016, and 4-fluoroisobutyrylfentanyl (4F-iBF), 
tetrahydrofuranylfentanyl (THF-F), carfentanil 
(see box ‘Carfentanil in Europe’), methoxyacetylfentanyl 
and cyclopropylfentanyl during 2017. Together, these 
substances have been involved in more than 250 deaths, 
many of which were attributed directly to these substances. 
Subsequently, seven of these substances were formally risk 
assessed by the EMCDDA.
Benzodiazepines
Like that of the synthetic opioids, there has also 
been a significant increase in the availability of new 
benzodiazepines over the last few years in Europe. Most 
are sourced from China as bulk powders. In Europe they are 
processed into tablets and other products and sold as legal 
replacements for commonly prescribed benzodiazepine 
medicines, such as alprazolam and diazepam. They are also 
used to make fake versions of these medicines, which are 
then sold on the illicit drug market (see box ‘Production of 
fake diazepam tablets from etizolam, Scotland, UK, 2017’). 
A small number of new benzodiazepines may be sourced 
from companies in India, typically as finished medicinal 
products.
The EMCDDA currently monitors 28 new benzodiazepines. 
These include five reported for the first time in 2018. 
Overall, more than 80 % (23) were detected for the first 
time between 2014 and 2018 (Figure 7.9). The most 
frequently seized NPS benzodiazepine in 2017 was 
etizolam (Table 7.5).
In 2017, close to 3 500 seizures of new benzodiazepines 
were reported to the EU Early Warning System, 
representing around 5 % of the total number of seizures 
reported during the year. Most of these were of tablets, 
amounting to more than 2.4 million units, which represents 
an increase from around 0.5 million tablets reported 
in 2016. This increase is due to a single large seizure 
of 1.67 million tablets in Scotland, United Kingdom 
(see box ‘Production of fake diazepam tablets from 
Figure 7.9 
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Table 7.5 
The most seized new benzodiazepines reported in the 
EU, Norway and Turkey, numbers and quantities, 2017
Benzodiazepines Seizures Powder 
(kg)
Tablets
Etizolam 1 634 25.06 2 218 797
Clonazolam/clonitrazolam 741 0.03 48 037
Norfludiazepam 365 0.25 28 234
Diclazepam 274 1.09 17 960
Phenazepam 102 0.05 13 757
Carfentanil in Europe
Carfentanil is one of the most potent known opioids. 
It was first detected in Europe in 2012, and its 
availability sharply increased during 2016 and 
2017. This appeared to have been driven by its bulk 
manufacture in China (where it was not controlled 
at the time) and its sale on darknet markets. In 2017 
alone, over 300 seizures of carfentanil were reported. 
These seizures amounted to just over 4 kg of powder 
and 250 ml of liquid. Unknown to users, the drug 
was being mixed with heroin, which led to a spike in 
deaths. By mid-2017, 61 deaths involving carfentanil 
had been reported. The substance was formally risk 
assessed by the EMCDDA during 2017. Carfentanil 
was controlled internationally in 2018.
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etizolam, Scotland, UK, 2017’). In addition, around 27 kg of 
powders, 1.4 litres of liquids and 2 400 blotters containing 
new benzodiazepines were also seized in 2017.
Use of new psychoactive 
substances
The use of NPS in the general population tends to be at 
a lower level than that of established controlled drugs. 
There are some important exceptions to this, such as 
ketamine, which has become an established drug in some 
places. In addition, the use of some types of NPS, such 
as stimulants, synthetic cannabinoids and opioids, may 
be relatively common in high-risk drug users and other 
marginalised groups in some areas. Despite what appear 
to be relatively low levels of use, some of these substances 
may cause high levels of harm. Adding to the complexity 
is that NPS are also used by dealers as replacements for 
established drugs such as MDMA, amphetamine, cocaine, 
benzodiazepines and heroin, when they are in short supply. 
In these cases, people may be unaware that they are using 
an NPS.
Since 2011, more than half of the countries reporting 
to the EMCDDA have national estimates of the use of 
NPS (not including ketamine and GHB) in their general 
population surveys, although differences in methods and 
survey questions limit comparability between countries. 
Among young adults (aged 15-34), in the most recent 
findings, last year prevalence of use of these substances 
ranged from 0.1 % in Norway to 3.2 % in the Netherlands, 
with 4-fluoroamphetamine (4-FA) being the most 
commonly used. Survey data on the use of mephedrone 
(now an internationally controlled drug) are available for 
the United Kingdom (England and Wales). In the most 
recent survey (2017), last year use of this drug among 
16- to 34-year-olds was estimated at 0.2 %, down from 
1.1 % in 2014/15. In their most recent surveys, last year 
estimates of the use of synthetic cannabinoids among 
15- to 34-year-olds ranged from 0.1 % in the Netherlands 
to 1.5 % in Latvia. While consumption levels of NPS are 
low overall in Europe, in a 2016 EMCDDA study, over two 
thirds of countries reported that their use by high-risk drug 
users resulted in health concerns. In particular, the use 
of synthetic cathinones by opioid and stimulant injectors 
has been linked to health and social problems. In addition, 
the smoking of synthetic cannabinoids in marginalised 
populations, including homeless people and prisoners, 
has been identified as a problem in a number of European 
countries. Overall, few people currently enter treatment in 
Europe for problems associated with use of NPS. For some 
countries, however, these substances are significant. In 
the most recent data, the use of synthetic cannabinoids 
was reported as the main reason for entering specialised 
drug treatment for 19 % of clients in Turkey and for 5.5 % in 
Hungary. Problems related to the primary use of synthetic 
cathinones were cited by 0.2 % of treatment entrants in 
the United Kingdom. All three countries, however, have 
reported a recent decrease in treatment entries related to 
NPS in the most recent data.
Production of fake diazepam tablets from etizolam, Scotland, UK, 2017
In Scotland, criminal groups are known to be involved 
in the large-scale illicit manufacture and distribution 
of fake benzodiazepine medicines. Typically made 
to look like 10 mg diazepam tablets, and known as 
‘street valium’, these fakes often contain new or 
uncontrolled benzodiazepines. During 2016 and 
2017, one such benzodiazepine, etizolam, was 
reported to have become the predominant substance 
within the illicit market for benzodiazepines; 65 % of 
tablets found contained it.
During 2017, police seized 1.67 million tablets 
containing etizolam at one such production site. 
Their estimated street value was EUR 1.9 million. 
The etizolam was sourced as a bulk powder from 
China, diluted, mixed with blue dye and then pressed 
into tablets using an industrial tablet press. The 
dose of etizolam in each tablet was around 0.8 mg, 
meaning that the amount of active ingredient needed 
to produce the number of tablets seized at the time of 
the police raid was less than 1.5 kg.
Photo: Police Scotland
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CHAPTER 8 
Policy instruments and structures
CHAPTER 9 
Targeting operational responses to drug 
markets and associated criminality
In Part III we look at the policy, structural, strategic 
and operational responses to all these different 
aspects of drug markets, mainly at the European 
level, but also at the national level. Rather than 
attempt to present a comprehensive library 
of responses, this part provides a selection of 
examples that illustrate the variety of measures 
employed to directly target the illicit drug supply 
chain as well as those that tackle drug market 
ramifications and drivers. An important feature of 
the EU drugs strategy is the link between supply 
and demand interventions. The latter are reviewed in 
other EMCDDA reports such as the European Drug 
Report and ‘Health and social responses to drug 
problems: a European guide’.
PART III
Responding to drug markets
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EU drug supply reduction policy
Drug supply reduction is part of several policy areas at the 
EU level and a core component of the drug strategies and 
responses of Member States. This chapter looks at the 
main EU policies and strategies addressing drug supply 
reduction, the supporting institutional arrangements and 
some key policy tools.
EU drug policy context
The production, trafficking, distribution and use of illicit 
drugs create a range of security and public health 
challenges, spanning many levels and areas of public 
policy. The illicit drug trade has a global impact and the 
harms it gives rise to know no boundaries. Responding 
to the trade in illicit drugs requires an equally extensive 
approach, and the EU’s drug policy reflects this reality. 
It has been designed to be coherent with drug policy at 
various levels. These include the international level, through 
the United Nations and regional organisations such as the 
Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission, as well 
as complementing the policies of the EU Member States 
at the national level (Figure 8.1). At the same time, EU drug 
policy is situated within and connects to other areas of 
EU policy where drug market-related issues arise. In this 
way, the EU has developed an integrated, balanced and 
evidence-based approach to drug policy.
The EU drugs strategy (2013-20) and action plan on drugs 
(2017-20) (16) are key components of the framework for 
responding to illicit drugs. Drug supply reduction is one 
of the core elements in them. These strategic documents 
elaborate a set of measures developed with the Member 
States to target the health and security issues raised 
by the illicit drug trade. One of the strategy’s objectives 
is to reduce the availability of illicit drugs by disrupting 
(16) The EU drugs strategy (2013-20) and action plan on drugs (2017-20) are 
going to be evaluated by the European Commission in 2019/20.
trafficking, dismantling the OCGs involved, utilising the 
criminal justice system and intelligence-led policing, and 
targeting large-scale cross-border organised drug-related 
crime (Council of the European Union, 2012, 2017).
To ensure a high level of internal security and protection 
against organised crime, terrorism and cybercrime, the 
EU has put in place a range of legal, practical and support 
tools, notably the European Agenda on Security (European 
Commission, 2015). The European Agenda on Security 
is a shared agenda, between Member States and EU 
institutions, and serves as the basis for cooperation and 
joint action by the EU. It highlights a number of actions 
and instruments, including but not limited to the Schengen 
Information System, the European Criminal Records 
Information System and the EU Passenger Name Record  
(PNR) system for airline passengers. Some of them are 
elaborated on in this part of the report.
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Drug supply reduction strategies linked to the EU 
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The policy cycle
The EU policy cycle for organised and serious international 
crime (the policy cycle) is an important strategic approach 
that ensures effective cooperation between national 
law enforcement agencies, EU institutions, EU agencies 
and other relevant partners in the fight against serious 
and organised crime. It calls for robust action to target 
the most pressing criminal threats facing the EU. There 
are four phases in the policy cycle that facilitate the 
implementation of policy objectives in law enforcement 
responses: (1) policy development, (2) priority setting, 
(3) implementation and monitoring, and (4) evaluation 
of the current policy cycle and definition of the next one 
(Figure 8.2).
The starting point of this EU policy cycle is the SOCTA, 
by which Europol delivers a set of recommendations 
based on an in-depth analysis of the major crime threats 
facing the EU (Europol, 2017b). The SOCTA is the most 
comprehensive criminal intelligence picture in the EU. 
Informed by its analysis of the prevailing threat, the SOCTA 
identifies a number of key priorities, which, in Europol’s 
view, require the greatest concerted action by Member 
States and other actors to ensure the most effective 
impact. The SOCTA 2017 is the outcome of the work of 
many contributors from law enforcement authorities in 
the Member States and in countries with strategic and 
operational agreements with Europol, institutional partners 
in the EU and Europol. The EU Council of Justice and 
Home Affairs Ministers uses these recommendations to 
define its priorities for the next four years. For each of 
the priorities, an ad hoc expert group drafts a four-year 
multiannual strategic plan (MASP) under the coordination 
of the Commission, setting out the strategy to achieve 
a multidisciplinary, integrated approach to address the 
prioritised threats of crime, and defining key performance 
indicators. The MASP contains a list of objectives (‘strategic 
goals’) that should be achieved during the cycle. These 
MASPs are approved by the Standing Committee on 
Operational Cooperation on Internal Security (COSI).
Representatives of the Member States, and of the EU 
institutions and agencies, convert each MASP into an 
annual operational action plan (OAP) for each priority and 
Figure 8.2 
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year. These OAPs detail the actions for each strategic goal. 
The OAPs are approved by COSI. Relevant Member States, 
EU institutions and agencies, and third partners, using the 
EMPACT framework, then develop their joint activities as 
outlined in the OAPs.
Ten crime priorities were set for the period 2018-21 
(Figure 8.3), one of which addresses drug trafficking with 
a focus on (1) disrupting the activities of OCGs involved in 
the wholesale trafficking of cannabis, cocaine and heroin 
to the EU, (2) tackling the criminal networks involved in the 
trafficking and distribution of multiple types of drugs on EU 
markets and (3) reducing the production of synthetic drugs 
and NPS in the EU and dismantling OCGs involved in their 
production, trafficking and distribution.
In addition, many of the other 2018-21 crime priorities have 
connections to the illicit drugs area. Europol’s 2017 SOCTA 
showed that, while illicit drugs represent the most valuable 
market for criminals, with more than one third of the 5 000 
OCGs reported in the SOCTA involved in it, many OCGs 
engage in polycriminality. Of those engaged in illicit drug 
trafficking, 75 % traffic more than one type of drug, and 65 % 
of those engaged in the drug trade are also involved in other 
criminal activities, such as the trade in counterfeit goods, 
migrant smuggling and trafficking in human beings. As 
discussed in Part I of this report, these different crimes utilise 
common techniques, technologies and trafficking routes. 
Action 48 of the EU action plan on drugs (2017-20) seeks to 
enhance analysis and information sharing on drug trafficking 
and terrorist financing, migrant smuggling — including 
exploitation of vulnerable migrants — and trafficking in 
human beings. This builds synergies between drug policy and 
other areas to develop work across crime priorities.
EU structures developing and 
supporting drug policy
Drug markets are complex and have a multifaceted impact 
on society. Several EU institutions, bodies, other structures 
and the Member States play various roles in designing and 
implementing different aspects of the EU’s drug policy 
(Figure 8.4).
EU institutions
Alongside the Member States, several EU institutions (17) 
are tasked with designing and implementing different 
aspects of the EU’s drug policy through the different 
priorities and actions set out in strategic planning 
documents.
The EU institutions have different roles with respect to 
policy-making and implementation, and establishing any 
necessary legislation to implement policies. The European 
Parliament’s functions include passing laws, approving the 
EU budget and discussing EU policies. Drug issues arise in 
different areas of the Parliament’s work when, for example, 
it considers internal security matters or relations with 
non-EU countries (third countries).
The Council of the EU (the Council) adopts legislation 
in conjunction with the European Parliament, plays 
a policy coordination role for the Member States, devises 
the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy, signs off 
on agreements between the EU and third countries, 
and adopts the EU’s annual budget (Council of the 
European Union, 2019b). The Council also has a number 
of committees and working groups that are involved in 
drug policy implementation, in particular COSI and the 
Horizontal Working Party on Drugs (HDG). COSI plays 
a leading role in defining, implementing, monitoring and 
evaluating EU activities in the policy cycle (Council of the 
European Union, 2010). The HDG plays a central role in the 
development of EU drug strategies and action plans, and its 
(17) These include the European Parliament, the European Council, the 
Council of the European Union, the European Commission and the Court 
of Justice of the European Union.
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remit covers all areas of drug demand reduction and drug 
supply reduction (Council of the European Union, 1999). 
Other Council working groups also play an important role in 
drug policy, for example the Customs Cooperation Working 
Party (CCWP), the Working Party on Customs Union and 
the Coordinating Committee in the area of police and 
judicial cooperation in criminal matters (CATS).
The European Commission proposes new legislation, 
conducts evaluations and is responsible for ensuring 
that Member States correctly implement EU laws 
(European Commission, 2019a). Alongside drafting the 
EU’s annual budget and overseeing how funds are used, 
it undertakes international negotiations on behalf of the 
EU. Because of their cross-cutting nature, drug supply 
reduction issues arise in a number of different areas of 
its work, including DG Migration and Home Affairs, DG 
Justice and Consumers, DG Health and Food Safety, DG 
Taxation and Customs Union, DG Internal Market, Industry, 
Entrepreneurship and SMEs and the European Anti-Fraud 
Office. The Commission addresses all aspects of drug 
control policy, including the reduction of drug use and the 
prevention of drug-related crime and drug trafficking. It 
proposes measures for the control of NPS and ensures 
the implementation of EU laws designed to prevent the 
diversion of chemical precursors for illicit drug production. 
It also promotes European cooperation in addressing drug 
problems through the provision of financial assistance and 
cooperation programmes.
The EU is actively engaged in ongoing political dialogues 
with third countries in its immediate geographical 
neighbourhood and other parts of the world through EU 
delegations and the European External Action Service 
(EEAS). This process involves working with other regions 
and countries to achieve common goals, such as 
strengthening democracy and the rule of law, supporting 
trade, and promoting sustainable and alternative 
development. Drug issues often feature in these dialogues 
and various EU-level policy documents, including drug-
specific and broader strategies, cooperation programmes 
worldwide, and political declarations and agreements. 
The approach taken in these documents reflects the 
principles and objectives of EU drug policy set out in the 
EU drugs strategy (2013-20) and other key documents 
addressing drug problems. Action 38 of the action plan on 
drugs  (2017-20) seeks to reinforce and conduct dialogue 
with partners globally (Figure 8.5).
Figure 8.4 
Main EU structures addressing drug supply issues
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Figure 8.5 
EU engagements on drugs with key partners
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The EU’s approach on cooperation with third countries on 
drugs focuses on specific drug-trafficking routes, involving 
producer, transit and consumer markets. The EU conducts 
regular experts’ Dialogues on Drugs with Latin America and 
the Caribbean (CELAC), Central Asia, Eastern Partnership 
countries, Russia, the US and the Western Balkans.
The EU has also agreed on action plans which addressed 
drugs with a number of countries/regions and funds and 
provides assistance for a wide range of major drugs-
related cooperation programmes in third countries, 
through EU bilateral, sub-regional or regional cooperation 
programmes: for example in Latin America, the Caribbean 
and West Africa along the cocaine-trafficking route, and in 
Afghanistan and Central Asia along the heroin route.
The EU closely cooperates with other international 
organisations working in the field, among others the UN: 
for example UNODC, the Commission on Narcotic Drugs 
(CND), INCB, UNAIDS and the WHO.
EU agencies
Several EU agencies assist the European Commission 
and the Member States in implementing EU drug 
policy (Figure 8.4). These agencies provide support to 
the drug policy process through aspects of their work 
encompassing:
  development of policy-relevant information systems, 
networks and centres
  cooperation and coordination
  threat and risk assessment and analysis
  specialised technical services
  training
  operational actions
Understanding vulnerabilities in the economic, 
administrative and logistical infrastructure of the EU and 
the dangers presented by OCGs exploiting them is a key 
drug policy issue. Several agencies address this policy 
concern through their work. This includes the analytical, 
threat and risk assessments undertaken by the EMCDDA, 
Europol and Frontex. These assessments consider issues 
ranging from the challenges arising from NPS, cybercrime 
and terrorism to illegal border crossings and migratory 
flows (Figure 8.6).
Responding to the cross-border multijurisdiction reality 
of organised crimes such as drug production and 
trafficking requires the involvement of several EU Member 
States. Therefore, all of the EU agencies are involved in 
coordinating networks and facilitating tasks that support 
actions against drug production and trafficking. In addition, 
several agencies are actively involved in operational 
measures and judicial response. Europol and Frontex take 
part in various operations with the Member States. This 
includes initiatives such as joint action days implemented 
to target the 10 crime priorities of the policy cycle. In 
addition, Eurojust facilitates judicial cooperation by 
organising coordination meetings and coordination centres 
for joint actions and assists the Member States in the use 
of mutual legal assistance and mutual recognition tools 
such as the European Arrest Warrant and the European 
Investigation Order. Both Eurojust and Europol assist 
Figure 8.6 
EU agencies’ analytical, threat and risk assessments
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the Member States in the establishment and funding 
of joint investigation teams (JITs). Member States can 
also receive assistance from Eurojust and Europol for 
planning operational work such as the controlled delivery 
of shipments of illicit drugs and money-laundering cases. 
Eurojust can also ask Member States to investigate or 
prosecute a crime, to coordinate their work and to establish 
a JIT. Eurojust works closely with the European Judicial 
Network and Europol (Eurojust, 2019; Europol, 2019c; 
Frontex, 2019).
When facilities for the production of illicit drugs are 
detected, a range of specialised supports can be needed 
to process evidence and make the locations hazard-free. 
Europol assists Member States by providing services in 
this area. These include technical and forensic expertise, 
on-the-spot support including dismantling of laboratories 
or cultivation sites, and technical and comparison reports 
on chemicals and equipment seized in illicit synthetic 
drug production/storage locations and waste dump sites 
(Europol, 2019b).
The timely provision of strategic information and analysis 
is a critical component of the policy and operational 
processes in the drugs area. In order to operate a system 
that yields information effectively, EU agencies run various 
information systems, networks and centres (Figure 8.7). 
The EMCDDA works with its network of Reitox national 
focal points to monitor and provide factual, objective, 
reliable and comparable information and analysis on the 
drugs phenomenon in Europe. This includes information 
about drug law offences, drug seizures, drug purity and 
potency, and retail prices for drugs.
Europol supports and strengthens Member States’ actions 
and their cooperation in preventing and combating serious 
crime. Europol works with EU Member States through 
Europol national units and provides a range of services, 
including the collection, storage, processing, analysis and 
exchange of information, including criminal intelligence, 
forensic and technical support, networking and cooperation 
with Member States, third countries and international 
organisations, and provides a source of law enforcement 
expertise and training. This allows Europol to provide 
operational support throughout the EU and beyond. It 
operates the Europol Analysis System, which contains 
analysis projects on key crime areas, and runs the Europol 
Criminal Assets Bureau and the Europol Cybercrime 
Centre. Europol provides secretariat services for the 
Camden Asset Recovery Inter-Agency Network. It facilitates 
action under the EU policy cycle through its specialised 
information services, and supports EMPACT, through which 
coordinated operational actions are implemented (Europol, 
2019c).
Frontex develops and operates information systems 
enabling the exchange of information, including the 
European Border Surveillance System (Eurosur) and 
provision of Eurosur Fusion services. Joint operations 
coordinated by Frontex have a multipurpose character, 
and in addition to tackling irregular migration they aim to 
prevent and counteract cross-border crime, including drug 
trafficking. eu-LISA is the European Union Agency for the 
Operational Management of Large-Scale IT Systems in 
the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice. This includes 
security and border information systems such as the 
Schengen Information System (SIS II), the Visa Information 
System (VIS) operational in Schengen countries, and the 
Eurodac asylum fingerprint database. These systems can 
be consulted by national police, customs and border guard 
agencies to assist their operational work (eu-LISA, 2019; 
Frontex, 2019).
Allowing the information and knowledge accumulated from 
operational actions to flow into the work of training Member 
States’ police and other personnel is critical for keeping 
responses up to date. A number of EU agencies facilitate 
this by developing training materials and providing various 
courses. The European Union Agency for Law Enforcement 
Training (CEPOL), also known as the European Police 
College, helps build police cooperation across the EU. 
CEPOL brings together law enforcement professionals to 
offer them opportunities to grow professionally through 
training, learn to solve issues related to EU security and 
establish networks of training institutes and professionals. 
It provides a wide range of training courses relevant to 
different aspects of drug supply reduction and security 
activities. In cooperation with Europol and the EMCDDA, 
Figure 8.7 
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it provides training to national law enforcement officers 
on a range of topics, influenced by the findings of the 
previous EU drug markets reports. The joint CEPOL-
EMCDDA training course ‘Drug crime and markets – 
strategic analysis’ has been organised annually since 
2017 and it brings together law enforcement managers 
and prosecutors. The course aims to improve the use of 
strategic analysis of drug markets for decision-making 
with the view to enhancing the impact of law enforcement 
responses on organised crime and consequently the 
security of EU citizens. The activity is certified by ISO 
29993:2017 ‘Learning services outside formal education’.
Frontex develops training standards that facilitate the 
development of common ground among EU Member States 
that have different land, sea and air border agencies and 
needs. It seeks to build capacity in the areas of educational 
standards, European border guard team training, thematic 
training support, and training infrastructures and networks. 
eu-LISA supports Member States by providing technical 
training for personnel who operate the security and border 
information systems SIS II, VIS and Eurodac (CEPOL, 2019; 
eu-LISA, 2019; Europol, 2019c; Frontex, 2019).
Key legislation
A comprehensive set of legal instruments has been by 
developed by the EU to address drug supply reduction 
issues and respond to the rapidly developing illicit drug 
production and distribution systems highlighted earlier in 
the report. To effectively counter the threats this represents, 
the EU develops laws in a variety of areas that are related to 
drug trafficking (Figure 8.8 and Annex).
Revised legislation to address the health and security 
challenges presented by NPS was adopted in 2017. 
It provides for early warning, risk assessment and control 
measures and a streamlined reporting and assessment 
process. The chemicals required to produce illicit 
drugs have legitimate uses in many industries. Two EU 
regulations facilitate the control and monitoring of the trade 
between EU Member States and between the EU and third 
countries, and seek to prevent diversion of these chemicals 
to criminals (see box ‘Drug precursor control in the EU’).
Drug precursor control in the EU
Drug precursors, chemicals needed to manufacture 
illicit drugs, primarily have wide and varied legitimate 
uses such as in the production of plastics, medicinal 
products, cosmetics, detergents and scents. Because 
many uses are legitimate, trade in drug precursors 
cannot be prohibited. Instead, licit trade in them 
needs to be monitored to ensure they are not diverted 
to illicit uses. Preventing the diversion of drug 
precursors can be an effective and efficient way of 
limiting the supply of illicit drugs and is therefore an 
important part of the EU drugs strategy.
The EU legislation on drug precursors implements Article 
12 of the 1988 United Nations Convention against 
the Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic 
Substances by means of two basic regulations:
  Regulation (EC) No 111/2005 on trade in drug 
precursors between EU and third countries, 
amended by Regulation (EU) No 1259/2013;
  Regulation (EC) No 273/2004, on trade in drug 
precursors within the EU, amended by Regulation 
(EU) No 1258/2013.
The amendments to both regulations in 2013 
significantly strengthened powers to control the 
export of medicinal products containing ephedrine or 
pseudoephedrine (precursors for methamphetamine), 
and the use of acetic anhydride (precursor for heroin) 
in the EU and of so-called non-scheduled substances 
in illegal drug manufacture. It is also now possible to 
react more quickly to new diversion trends and add 
new chemicals to the lists of scheduled substances 
through a fast-track procedure.
At the time of drafting the European Commission is 
carrying out an in-depth evaluation of the EU drug 
precursor regulations. This evaluation is expected to 
be finalised by the end of 2019.
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Effective coordination and cooperation lie at the core 
of responding to cross-border organised crimes such 
as drug trafficking. A number of legal instruments 
facilitate collaboration between EU Member States 
on multijurisdiction cases. These include mutual legal 
assistance and mutual legal recognition tools such as JITs 
(see, for example, Case studies 12 and 13), the European 
Evidence Warrant and the European Arrest Warrant. Legal 
provision is also made for facilitating the processes that 
underpin forensic and criminal investigations, such as 
those into the movement of controlled drugs. The critical 
information flows that support operational measures 
against drug trafficking are also provided for in EU laws. 
These includes Council decisions ensuring that EU 
information exchange standards are no more constraining 
than national ones, and provision for automated exchange 
of information such as DNA, fingerprints and vehicle 
registrations.
Since OCGs may be involved in multiple forms of crime 
that utilise similar tools and techniques, legislation, such 
as on firearms control, money laundering and document 
fraud, often addresses several criminal activities at the 
same time, including drug smuggling. For example, in 
response to the threats posed by globalisation and the 
increased movement of people around the globe, which 
facilitates both terrorism and other serious crime such as 
drugs trafficking, as discussed in Chapter 2, the European 
Parliament and the Council (2016) adopted a directive on 
the use of PNR data (the PNR Directive). The PNR Directive 
obliges air carriers to send to Member States the PNR data 
they have collected in the normal course of their business. 
These data include each passenger’s travel requirements 
held in carriers’ reservation and departure control systems. 
The collection and processing of PNR data are an important 
law enforcement tool. At the same time, the use of PNR 
data for law enforcement purposes involves the processing 
of personal data, which raises important issues with 
respect to the fundamental rights to the protection of 
private life and to the protection of personal data.
Each Member State is required to establish/designate 
a special entity (Passenger Information Unit) to collect, 
store and process the PNR data received from air carriers. 
At the time of writing, a first cluster of nine Member 
States are at an advanced stage of the implementation 
process (Council of the European Union, 2018b; European 
Commission, 2018b). For example, in Finland, the PNR 
Directive has led to the development of the Passenger Data 
System, a technical tool for the collection of passenger 
information. It is used by the police, customs and border 
guard in the management of their statutory duties and 
provides a one-stop shop for all information collected 
under the PNR Directive. The system primarily supports 
the prevention of terrorist offences and serious crime, 
by making the data available in a timely fashion and 
allowing the authorities to apply preset selection criteria 
to flag up high-risk passengers. It also serves a role in the 
coordination of law enforcement activities by allowing 
overlapping requests to be observed. It is worth noting that 
private general aviation is not subject to the directive.
Another example of legislative approaches to tackle 
the tools that facilitate the activities of OCGs relates to 
document fraud. This activity is related to various smuggling 
activities including drug trafficking, money laundering and 
trafficking in human beings. An EU regulation that simplifies 
the authentication of identification documents addresses 
this by facilitating cooperation between the Member States 
through the Internal Market Information system. Firearms 
can be traded as a commodity by OCGs and can be used 
in violent crimes related to drug trafficking and other crime 
areas. The European Firearms Directive was recently 
revised to make it more difficult to acquire and possess 
firearms, as well as addressing their trafficking (European 
Parliament and the Council, 2017).
Tackling criminal finances is seen as a key way of 
undermining the operations of OCGs, and a range of 
legislative tools have been put in place at both the EU and 
national levels. These include EU legislation to facilitate 
coordinated action between Member States involved in 
cross-border money-laundering cases. Several pieces 
of legislation allow national authorities to cooperate 
in targeting the proceeds of crime at all stages of their 
movement (identification, tracking, freezing, seizing and 
confiscation) and to protect their financial systems.
The EU Anti-Money Laundering (AML) Directive was 
adopted in 1990 in order to prevent the misuse of the 
financial system for the purpose of money laundering. 
It has been continuously updated, most recently 
with the Fifth AML Directive, adopted in April 2018, 
partly as a response to the Panama Papers leaks. This 
includes, among other measures, close regulation of 
cryptocurrencies, such as bitcoin, to prevent them from 
being used for money laundering and financing of terrorism 
(European Parliament and the Council, 2018).
EU-wide initiatives are backed up by a variety of policy 
tools at the national level. One example of these is the 
Unexplained Wealth Order (UWO). This was introduced by 
the United Kingdom in the Criminal Finances Act 2017, 
and came into force at the end of January 2018. It is a civil 
investigative power aimed at strengthening the United 
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Kingdom’s AML and asset recovery regime (Sproat, 2018). 
A UWO can be applied for if three criteria are met:
1. there are reasonable grounds to suspect that a person 
has been involved in serious crime;
2. there is reasonable cause to believe that the person 
owns property with a value greater than GBP 50 000;
3. there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the 
known sources of the respondent’s lawfully obtained 
income would have been insufficient for the purposes 
of enabling the respondent to obtain the property.
If granted, the UWO requires the recipient to disclose 
their interest in the identified property and to explain its 
funding. If the recipient fails to respond by the deadline 
or the answer to the UWO is unsatisfactory, the money 
is presumed to have been acquired illegally and the 
information can be used to apply for a civil recovery order.
It is hoped that UWOs will bolster AML efforts, as it 
represents a shifting of the burden of proof away from the 
authorities, who previously had to prove that the money 
used to purchase a property was acquired illegally before 
asset recovery procedures could be initiated. A UWO places 
the responsibility on the recipient to demonstrate that 
the money used to fund the purchase of the property was 
obtained legally (see Case study 27).
The legislation used to combat cybercrime is also relevant 
to targeting the proceeds of crime. Proposed legislation 
in this area includes the European Production and 
Preservation Order for electronic evidence.
Suspicious transaction reports, also called suspicious 
activity reports, are reports that financial institutions 
must submit to alert law enforcement agencies of any 
unusual financial transactions that might be consistent 
with money laundering or other criminal activity (Europol, 
2017a). Suspicious transaction reports must be submitted 
to the country’s financial intelligence unit (FIU), the 
state authority tasked with the ‘receipt, analysis and 
transmitting of reports of suspicions identified and filed 
by the private sector’ (Council of Europe, n.d.). FIUs form 
the backbone of the AML framework set out in the AML 
Directive.
Since money laundering can be a cross-border enterprise, 
international cooperation among FIUs is vital (European 
Commission, n.d.). The sharing of suspicious transaction 
reports and other intelligence is facilitated through an 
online network hosted at Europol, FIU.net (Europol, n.d.). 
FIU.net became operational in 2012 as a decentralised 
intelligence-sharing network for FIUs. In 2016 it was 
incorporated into Europol, enabling the intelligence 
shared to be combined with other Europol products and 
services.
In 2016, Ireland made amendments to asset recovery 
legislation, including lowering the threshold value of an 
asset that can be seized from EUR 13 000 to EUR 5 000. 
This change allows the Criminal Assets Bureau, in certain 
circumstances, to seize an asset worth EUR 5 000 or more 
without court order, for an initial period of 24 hours. The 
period can be extended to 21 days. In the first two years 
after the change, the power was invoked 10 times — 
typically related to the seizure of vehicles, although 
cryptocurrency has also been seized (English, 2018).
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First UK Unexplained Wealth Order issued
A politician from central Asia with 
a multimillion-pound property portfolio 
became the first person in the United 
Kingdom to be subject to a UWO as 
authorities attempted to stop the 
flow of dirty money through London. 
In early 2018, the National Crime 
Agency was granted the power to 
enforce a UWO worth GBP 22 million 
(EUR 25 million) and freeze the assets 
of the owner. The order related to two 
properties, one in London and one in 
the south-east of England.
The new measures were introduced 
in response to the mounting evidence 
that British properties are being used 
as vehicles to launder illicit foreign 
money. 
Source: Busby (2018).
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Financial instruments
As part of its comprehensive drug supply reduction 
approach, the EU finances a wide range of activities 
within and outside the EU. Financial instruments with 
a broad focus are used to implement the drug supply 
reduction, international cooperation and other objectives 
of the EU drugs strategy (2013-20) and action plan on 
drugs (2017-20) (Table 8.1). These instruments fall into 
four categories: framework programmes (e.g. the Internal 
Security Fund), programmes for EU candidate and potential 
candidate countries (e.g. Instrument for Pre-accession 
Assistance II), geographical or regional programmes 
(e.g. European Neighbourhood Policy), and thematic 
programmes that complement geographical ones (e.g. 
Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace). The tools 
are funded through the EU budget and in cooperation with 
consortiums of Member States and international partners.
Both the EU drugs strategy (2013-20) and action plan on 
drugs (2017-20) emphasise the importance of alternative 
development (see Chapter 1, section on impact on 
development and governance) for countries affected by 
the production and trafficking of drugs. In supporting the 
implementation of this approach, the Council Conclusions 
on alternative development (Council of the European 
Union, 2019a) propose a range of measures in combination 
to address the underlying conditions that facilitate illicit 
drug economies (see Figure 8.9). The Council has called on 
the EU Member States and the EU institutions to continue 
to engage with affected countries and international 
partners to address the cultivation of illicit crops and 
other related challenges. In this way, the Council seeks to 
support the EU’s contribution to implementing the outcome 
document of the United Nations General Assembly Special 
Session on the world drug problem, and the United Nations 
Sustainable Development Goals (Council of the European 
Union, 2019a).
Various financing tools and programmes are used by 
the EU to translate these policy objectives into concrete 
actions (see Table 8.1). For example, the European 
Commission and the EEAS operate funding instruments 
that finance projects in different countries. This includes 
the EU’s involvement in helping Afghanistan recover 
from conflict through the provision of financial support 
through the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI). 
Similarly, the EU supports alternative development 
in Bolivia, Colombia and Peru, where most cocaine is 
produced, and in Latin America generally, through the 
European Union and Community of Latin American and 
Caribbean States Action Plan and supporting declarations. 
The EU also contributes to action against the production 
and trafficking of drugs through its financial support for the 
UNODC, provided by the European Commission. The EU 
funds major drug-related projects and programmes in third 
countries, through EU bilateral, sub-regional or regional 
cooperation programmes and closely cooperates with other 
international organisations working in the field, including 
the UNODC.
Figure 8.9 
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Table 8.1 
EU financial instruments supporting drug supply 
reduction
EU internal action EU external action
Internal Security Fund (ISF) Instrument contributing to 
Stability and Peace (IcSP)
ISF Borders and Visa Instrument for Pre-accession 
Assistance (IPA) II
ISF Police European Neighbourhood 
Policy (ENP)
European Neighbourhood 
Instrument (ENI)
TAIEX (Technical Assistance 
and Information Exchange)
The Justice Programme Development and Cooperation 
Instrument (DCI)
The EU Health Programme European Development Fund 
(EDF)
Horizon 2020 European Instrument for 
Democracy and Human Rights 
(EIDHR)
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Partners, platforms and 
programmes
Countering the chain of negative effects arising from 
drug production and trafficking around the world requires 
targeted responses where different aspects of these 
problems are present. To achieve the external aspects of its 
drug and security polices, the EU cooperates with a range 
of partner organisations working at the international, 
regional and national levels. Several operational 
coordination platforms support interdiction activities, and 
other programmes facilitate cooperation with partners 
(Figure 8.10).
EMPACT and the Maritime Analysis and Operations 
Centre — Narcotics (MAOC (N)) are both key platforms 
for coordinating interdiction operations between EU 
Member States and international partners. Through these 
mechanisms, shipments of illicit drugs and the complex 
multijurisdiction crimes that enable the operation of drug 
trafficking and drug markets can be targeted.
MAOC (N) is an operational platform established by and 
consisting of seven Member States of the EU (France, 
Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain, the Netherlands) with 
financial support from the Internal Security Fund of the 
EU, to provide the basis for engagement in multilateral 
cooperation to suppress illicit drug trafficking by sea and 
by air. Along with its own staff, the headquarters in Lisbon 
are operated by country liaison officers (CLOs) representing 
the police, customs, military and maritime authorities of 
the participating Member States, as well as by permanent 
observers from the United States through the US Drug 
Enforcement Administration’s Lisbon Country Office and 
the Joint Interagency Task Force — South.
The European Commission, several EU agencies (including 
the EMCDDA, Europol and Frontex) and UNODC are all 
observers of MAOC (N). From its inception in 2007 to 
May 2019, MAOC (N) supported the coordination and 
seizure of over 173 tonnes of cocaine and over 445 tonnes 
of cannabis (MAOC-N, 2019). In addition, a range of 
programmes have been established to counter the efforts 
of OCGs seeking to exploit vulnerabilities in the logistics, 
border and customs infrastructure of various countries, 
and areas where conflicts and other challenges enable 
Figure 8.10 
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Note: EU-ACT, EU Action against Drugs and Organised Crime; CADAP, Central Asian Drug Action Programme COPOLAD, Cooperation Programme between Latin 
America, the Caribbean and the European Union on Drugs Policies; EU DCI, Development Cooperation Instrument; OECD, Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development; OSCE, Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe; WCO, World Customs Organization.
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drug production and trafficking. Much of this work involves 
capacity building and better coordination of actions. Both 
the cocaine route programme and EU ACT (EU Action 
against Drugs and Organised Crime; formerly the heroin 
route programme) seek to disrupt key shipment channels 
by strengthening various aspects of the airports, seaports, 
land border-crossing points and routes that OCGs can 
target. The Border Management Programme in Central Asia 
continues this cascade approach to capacity building and 
focus on enhancing the national-level barriers to trafficking 
illicit drugs along the Balkan route. In the Paris Pact 
Initiative, the EU works with over 70 international partners 
on a capacity-building programme to stop the international 
heroin trade. Enhancing the capacity of national authorities 
that address drug supply reduction is a key objective of 
the Cooperation Programme between Latin America, the 
Caribbean and the European Union on Drugs Policies.
The EU is also involved in building monitoring capacity 
through work coordinated by the UNODC to address the 
international problems of synthetic drugs through the 
Global SMART (Synthetics Monitoring: Analyses, Reporting 
and Trends) Programme. The EMCDDA, which operates the 
EU Early Warning System on new psychoactive substances 
(see Chapter 9), is the single largest contributor to 
the UNODC Early Warning Advisory system on new 
psychoactive substances. Under the EU’s Pan-African 
Programme, the project Enhancing Africa’s Response to 
Transnational Organised Crime (ENACT) aims to strengthen 
the assessment of and responses to crimes such as drug 
trafficking. The project supports the development of threat 
assessments that are based on indexes of the presence of 
organised crime, the risk it presents and a country’s ability 
to respond. This project complements the approach of the 
EU policy. ENACT also reflects the aims of action 37 of the 
EU action plan on drugs (2017-20), which seeks to support 
third countries to address drug-related organised crime.
In line with the action plan to enhance drug crime 
investigations, Europol’s Serious and Organised Crime 
Centre supports the operational activities on selected 
high-value targets within the framework of the established 
operational task forces targeting OCGs involved in drug 
trafficking affecting two or more EU Member States and 
specified Western Balkan countries.
The Western Balkan region is a key transit region for drugs 
and precursors flowing from and to the EU. This is reflected 
in Europol’s overall policy and operational framework with 
regard to the Western Balkans, more specifically Albania, 
Serbia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina, and is designed to 
enhance operational cooperation with the countries in the 
specified region in investigating serious and organised 
crime affecting two or more EU Member States.
Monitoring drug markets
To target responses, it is important to collect monitoring 
data to improve our understanding of the illicit drug 
markets and how they and the criminals involved in them 
operate. It is also necessary for monitoring the impact 
of these responses. For that purpose, the European 
Commission has established an expert group on policy 
needs for data on crime (in DG Home) and a working group 
on statistics on crime and criminal justice (in Eurostat).
The EMCDDA operates a number of key indicators of drug 
markets and law enforcement activities, which have been 
used throughout this report: drug seizures, drug prices 
and purity, and drug law offences. In recent years these 
have been revised and improved, and new ones have been 
added, to create a more comprehensive suite of monitoring 
tools and data sources — to inform three linked thematic 
areas: drug markets, drivers and facilitators; drug-related 
crime, harms and other consequences; and drug supply 
reduction and responses. Additions to the core monitoring 
data include information on production and estimates 
of market size (EMCDDA, 2017d) (Figure 8.11). New 
analytical tools are being developed, such as the drug 
affordability measure for comparative cross-border market 
analysis (Groshkova et al., 2018).
In addition, a range of new information sources are being 
explored and tested. Examples of these include wastewater 
data, the use of open source information to collect 
information on drug seizures and the monitoring of drug 
sales on darknet markets, which are described below.
Wastewater data
Wastewater-based drug epidemiology involves sampling 
a source of wastewater, such as a sewage influent to 
a wastewater treatment plant, and allows scientists to 
estimate the quantity of drugs consumed by a community 
(Zuccato et al., 2008). Although these data are primarily 
used to infer drug consumption patterns in a given 
geographical location (EMCDDA, 2016b), they are 
increasingly being used to indicate drug supply changes in 
a given region (EMCDDA, 2018c).
In recent years, new approaches in analytical chemistry, 
such as enantiomeric profiling (18), have been developed to 
distinguish between drug loads in wastewater that result 
(18) Enantiomeric profiling is based on the fact that chiral molecules (if only 
one chiral centre is present) exist as two enantiomers (opposite forms), 
which are non-superimposable mirror images of each other. As the 
enantiomeric ratio will change after the substance passes through the 
human metabolism, the enantiomeric fraction can be used to determine if 
the studied drugs in wastewater originate from consumption.
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from consumption and those that result from the direct 
disposal of unused drugs (Emke et al., 2014). They provide 
new opportunities to acquire information on drug markets, 
particularly concerning drug production. Wastewater data 
are also being used in some places to improve estimates 
of the market for some particular drug types, for example 
cocaine in the canton of Lausanne in Switzerland (Zobel 
et al., 2018) and in Australia (ACIC, 2019). However, there 
is insufficient geographical coverage for it to be used to 
provide European estimates at present, and the use of some 
drugs cannot yet be estimated using wastewater analysis.
Open source information
The concept of open source information is related to 
the intelligence discipline of open source intelligence 
(OSINT). OSINT has been defined as ‘publicly available 
information that is collected, exploited, and disseminated 
in a timely manner to an appropriate audience for 
the purpose of addressing a specific intelligence and 
information requirement’ (Williams and Blum, 2018). 
Many law enforcement and security agencies use OSINT 
for the additional breadth and depth of information it 
yields, providing a more complete picture of activities, 
entities and individuals, which can reinforce and help 
validate contextual knowledge (Hobbs, 2014; Ramwell et 
al., 2016; Tabatabaei and Wells, 2016). Openly available 
online information can complement routinely collected 
data on drug seizures in Europe by addressing some of 
their shortcomings, notably in timeliness, and by providing 
additional context that enriches our understanding of drug 
supply, for example by providing information on emerging 
routes and concealment methods.
Figure 8.11 
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The EMCDDA, in collaboration with the European 
Commission Joint Research Centre, applies the European 
Media Monitoring tool (EMM, an automated multilingual 
internet-monitoring system), for the purposes of identifying 
large seizures of heroin and cocaine. In addition to the 
standard information sources, the system is also configured 
to retrieve data from national and regional law enforcement 
authorities across Europe. To target the monitoring, sets of 
keywords are applied, defining two categories: large heroin 
seizures and large cocaine seizures. Records containing 
the appropriate keywords are automatically identified 
by the EMM categorisation system and placed into the 
appropriate category. The records are manually screened 
for relevance, established on the basis of two criteria: 
(1) explicit connection to Europe (i.e. seizure performed 
within or allegedly destined for Europe) and (2) seizure size 
(100 kg) (EMCDDA, 2019g).
Darknet monitoring
There are concerns that the distribution of illicit drugs and 
other commodities via darknet markets is increasing. This 
poses a number of challenges to responding to online-
facilitated drug distribution (EMCDDA and Europol, 2017). 
Systematic monitoring of and research into drug-related 
activity on these markets provides an opportunity to 
understand the scope and nature of the phenomenon. That 
can inform future policy and operational responses and 
support interventions addressing the security and health-
related threats stemming from the online supply of drugs 
and other illicit commodities.
Studies to date have illuminated darknet market activity 
with varying degree of success. A number of different tools 
to collect and analyse data captured from these platforms 
have been developed along the way. Similarly, a wide range 
of units of analysis has been applied, including listings 
(sales offers), sales or vendors.
Darknet markets analysis and findings in this report are 
informed by two principal data sources, both relying on 
‘web crawlers’ that systematically gather and process 
information from darknet markets, although there are some 
differences.
1. The analysis in Chapter 2 is based on the following 
data collected by crawlers from major darknet markets: 
vendors, drug listing description (including shipping 
origin), quantity, price, feedback left by buyers (and 
its associated timestamp). These data are analysed 
to derive more complex metrics, such as the revenue 
generated and the associated sales volumes (see 
Chapter 2). More extensive technical details are 
available from Christin and Thomas (2019) and Soska 
and Christin (2015).
2. The analysis in Part II (Chapters 3-6) is informed by 
a data source, originally developed for operational 
purposes, which is currently being piloted by the 
EMCDDA to support strategic analysis. Data are 
collected from major darknet markets and currently 
include drug listing description (including shipping 
origin), quantity and price. Although the number 
of listings (sales offers) has been used as a valid 
indicator of activity on darknet markets, it is not without 
limitations. For example, whereas only unique sale 
offers in the category ‘drugs and chemicals’ were 
extracted, it is not uncommon for an individual sale 
offer to include two or more items (differing only in the 
quantities advertised for sale). Each of these items 
was counted as a separate entity, therefore creating 
a possibility that the number of listings reported 
was overestimated. In addition, caution is needed 
in interpreting these data to gauge the number of 
individual sellers offering different drugs on these 
markets or the number of transactions. Neither of these 
can be extrapolated from the number of listings alone.
CHAPTER 8 I Policy instruments and structures
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As the production, trafficking, distribution and use of illicit 
drugs continue to evolve, so too does the EU’s response 
to it. This chapter provides some examples of how key 
problems associated with drug markets that have been 
highlighted earlier in the report are being addressed at an 
operational level.
Europol’s role in drug-related 
operational activity
Countering the production, trafficking and distribution 
of drugs is a key priority for the EU and Member States 
in the fight against serious and organised crime. As the 
EU’s Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation, Europol 
supports the Member States with a wide range of services 
and acts as the information hub for the exchange of 
intelligence on serious and organised crime, cybercrime 
and terrorism in the EU.
Europol supports drug investigations across the EU 
working with a multitude of agencies in the Member States 
and non-EU partners such as law enforcement agencies 
in Australia, Canada, Colombia, the United States and 
elsewhere. A dedicated team of analysts and specialists 
support investigators in their investigations into cannabis, 
cocaine, heroin, new psychoactive substances, synthetic 
drugs and other illicit drugs. Europol is the key intelligence-
sharing platform for criminal intelligence at the European 
level and its sophisticated databases regularly deliver vital 
leads to support drug investigations in the Member States.
In addition to the regular support delivered to the Member 
States by Europol in drug investigations, a number of 
operational activities and innovations highlight how joint 
international responses to drug-related criminality are 
aimed at disrupting drug markets and those OCGs and 
other criminals that sustain these markets.
Europol’s bold response and Programme 
Board
In December 2016, the European Commission published 
a mid-term assessment of the EU drugs strategy 2013-20 
and a final evaluation of the drug action plan 2013-16. 
A general conclusion was that law enforcement cooperation 
appears to be improving but with no strong impact on the 
problem. There are no signs of reduction in the supply of 
drugs, seizures are not increasing and the number of drug-
related offences is growing.
As a result, the Executive Director of Europol tasked its 
Serious and Organised Crime Centre with drawing up 
ideas for how to significantly improve the strategic and 
operational approach of the Member State community, 
Europol and the EU policy cycle in this area. A team of 
experts from various Europol directorates conducted 
an assessment and produced the report ‘Toward a bold 
Europol response to drugs in Europe’, which contained 
a number of recommendations. The report was endorsed 
by the Executive Director, who asked for a plan to be drawn 
up for implementing the recommendations. A key role 
for the implementation process is expected to be played 
by a Drugs Programme Board, in order to achieve the 
objectives of the whole exercise.
Europol is increasingly called upon by Member States to 
provide operational support in complex high-profile and 
polycriminal investigations, which are resource-intensive 
and require specialised skills in a number of domains. This 
includes tactical, technical and financial support provided 
both from headquarters and on the spot.
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Operational task force and high-value 
target mechanism
In 2018, as a response to the increasing demand for such 
operational services, Europol in cooperation with Member 
States developed a standardised high-value target (HVT)
and operational task force concept, which is now applied 
to assist complex investigations against individuals and 
organisations that constitute the highest serious and 
organised crime risks to more than one Member State. 
The concept is also designed to intensify asset tracing 
and increase the rate of confiscation of criminal proceeds. 
For example, the 2019 OAP on cannabis, cocaine and 
heroin includes a strategic goal with focus on financial 
investigations, aimed at identifying synergies with the 2019 
OAP on criminal finances, money laundering and asset 
recovery. The goal is to promote cross-cutting opportunities 
and joint investigations for the identification and seizure of 
criminal assets.
Since 2018 the EU Member States have applied this 
standardised concept and jointly with Europol selected 
a high number of HVTs and established operational 
task forces. Most of these demanding investigations 
are ongoing. Initial results led to the arrest of more than 
400 suspects, including HVTs and the seizure of a variety 
of assets worth more than EUR 60 million. The successfully 
targeted investigations proved to have a broad security 
impact well beyond specific crime areas.
Addressing drug market-
associated criminality
A number of measures and initiatives have been 
introduced, addressing drug markets and their relationship 
with other types of criminality.
Counter-terrorism measures
It is often stated that drug trafficking may in one way or 
another provide financing for terrorist activities. To a limited 
extent, this has been borne out by a few cases in which 
the small amounts of money needed to finance a lone 
actor plot have been raised through small-scale drug 
dealing (Basra, 2019). In addition to international sanctions 
and asset freezing to target high-level terrorist finances 
and their networks, some have suggested that greater 
emphasis should be placed on complementary strategies 
that use financial intelligence to understand how terrorist 
networks operate (Keatinge et al., 2018).
To that end, a number of measures have been developed. 
In 2004, the EU leaders adopted a declaration on 
combating terrorism. As part of the measures set out in 
the declaration, the EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator 
was established (European Council and Council of the 
European Union, 2019). The Coordinator’s responsibilities 
include:
  coordinating the work of the Council of the EU on 
combating terrorism;
  presenting policy recommendations and proposing 
priority areas for action to the Council;
  monitoring the implementation of the EU counter-
terrorism strategy;
  maintaining an overview of all EU instruments, 
reporting to the Council and following up Council 
decisions;
  coordinating with the relevant preparatory bodies of 
the Council, the Commission and the EEAS;
  ensuring the EU plays an active role in the fight against 
terrorism;
  improving communication between the EU and third 
countries.
There are a number of examples of responses in this 
area. Sometimes, these have taken a holistic approach 
to tackling terrorism as well as addressing the context 
in which it tends to occur, i.e. state instability, weak 
governance and corruption. It should be noted that these 
contextual factors and vulnerabilities equally apply to the 
illicit drug trade (see box ‘Counter-terrorism responses in 
the EU’).
Countering trafficking in human beings
The legal framework for tackling the trafficking in human 
beings in the EU is provided by Directive 2011/36/EU of 
the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 April 2011 
on preventing and combating trafficking in human beings 
and protecting its victims (19). On 4 December 2017 the 
European Commission adopted a new Communication 
addressing trafficking in human beings and committed 
itself to a new set of priorities in three broad areas: 
increased action against organised criminal networks 
by disrupting the business model and untangling the 
trafficking chain; providing victims of trafficking with better 
access to their rights and realising those rights; intensifying 
a coordinated and consolidated response, both within 
(19) OJ L 101, 15.4.2011, p. 1–11, http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2011/36/oj
CHAPTER 9 I Targeting operational responses to drug markets and associated criminality
212
and outside the EU. One of the priority actions highlighted 
in this Communication is to make use of a range of EU 
funding programmes, such as the Asylum, Migration and 
Integration Fund, the Internal Security Fund, Horizon 2020, 
the Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance, the European 
Development Fund and the EU Emergency Trust Fund for 
Africa, to support anti-trafficking objectives and priorities 
(European Commission, 2017d).
As traffickers’ modi operandi are constantly evolving, the 
EU needs to tackle the linkages between multiple crimes. 
According to the European Commission (2018d), many 
Member States note that trafficking in human beings is 
linked to other crimes, including drug trafficking. When 
evaluating the EU action plan on trafficking in human 
beings 2012-16, Eurojust also stressed that drug trafficking 
was one of multiple crimes linked to trafficking in human 
beings. Multiple links between drugs and human trafficking 
have been identified (see Chapter 1), such as victims 
being forced to work in cannabis cultivation sites or to 
carry drugs across borders. Some Member States (e.g. 
Austria, Bulgaria, France, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, 
the Netherlands, Poland and Slovakia) have reported 
that traffickers increasingly target vulnerable people with 
physical or mental disabilities, and people with substance 
use disorders. In addition, victims of human trafficking may 
be forced to use drugs as a means of coercion in order to 
ensure their obedience.
In response to this issue, the EU action plan on drugs 
2017-20 calls for the gathering of evidence on the potential 
connection between drug trafficking and trafficking in 
human beings. In addition, there is the EU Anti-Trafficking 
Coordinator, who is responsible for improving coordination 
and coherence among EU institutions, EU agencies, 
Member States and international organisations, and for 
developing existing and new EU policies to address the 
trafficking in human beings. In June 2018, the heads of 
10 EU agencies, including the EMCDDA and Europol, 
signed a joint statement of commitment to working 
together to address trafficking in human beings (European 
Commission, 2018a,c) (20).
In April 2019 the Council of the EU approved the 
reinforcement of Frontex, enabling it to respond better 
to the common challenges Europe is facing in managing 
migration and borders. The reinforcement will consist of 
a standing corps of up to 10 000 border guards ready to 
support EU Member States at any time. The agency will 
also have a stronger mandate on returns and will cooperate 
more closely with non-EU countries, including those 
beyond the EU’s immediate neighbourhood (European 
Commission, 2019b).
Tackling drug market violence and 
intimidation
There appears to be a growing recognition of the value of 
applying harm reduction measures and principles to drug 
markets (Bacon, 2016; Spicer, 2018). Fundamental to such 
an approach is the recognition that the level of harm in 
a drug market is more important than its overall size, and 
therefore law enforcement should prioritise crimes that 
represent the most significant harms to society (UKDPC, 
2009).
In the United Kingdom, the application of harm reduction 
principles to drug market violence includes an emphasis 
on a comprehensive approach with a focus on the role of 
partnerships across a range of sectors, such as education, 
health, social services, housing, youth and victim services, 
working alongside law enforcement. Such multiagency 
approaches ensure the safeguarding of those who 
(20) The other signatories were the European Asylum Support Office, eu-LISA, 
Eurojust, the European Institute for Gender Equality, Frontex, the EU 
Agency for Fundamental Rights, CEPOL and the European Foundation for 
the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions (Eurofound).
Counter-terrorism responses in the EU
In 2005, the Council adopted the EU counter-
terrorism strategy. The strategy focuses on four pillars:
  prevent: to stop people becoming terrorists or 
supporting terrorism, which can be referred to as 
the ‘countering violent extremism’ or ‘preventing 
violent extremism’ component of counter-
terrorism;
  protect: to strengthen our protection against 
a terrorist attack, which includes both physical 
and online components;
  pursue: to stop terrorist attacks, which primarily 
involves law enforcement, intelligence and justice 
authorities;
  respond: to mitigate the impact of a terrorist 
attack, whereby first responders and critical 
infrastructure providers take on an important 
role, with regard to both physical injuries and 
psychological trauma.
Across these pillars, the strategy recognises the 
importance of cooperation with third countries and 
international institutions.
Source: European Council and Council of the European Union (2018).
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are exploited as well as tackling organised crime. The 
authorities have invested in prevention and early response, 
including education and risk assessment (e.g. Home Office, 
2018); disruption and intervention (e.g. Drug Dealing 
Telecommunications Restriction Orders Regulation, 
2017) (21). Furthermore, there is a recognition of the 
trafficking and slavery context (Anti-Trafficking Monitoring 
Group, 2018), in particular with a focus on the use and 
exploitation of children (e.g. Home Office, 2018). Finally, 
targeted law enforcement is essential to disrupt criminal 
activity and take away its proceeds (NCA, 2019).
In Ireland, drug distribution networks have a three-tier 
hierarchical structure. Based on that, a number of 
responses to tackle intimidation can be designed and 
applied that differ in (1) their approach, whether based on 
a criminal justice or social inclusion perspective, (2) their 
target, whether they aim to prevent recruitment into gangs, 
prevent escalation of gang involvement, intervene to 
promote leaving gangs, or deter or suppress gang activity, 
and (3) the time horizon of their impact, whether short or 
long term (Murphy et al., 2017).
Addressing money laundering
As highlighted in the section on legislative responses in 
Chapter 8, targeting the profits from the illicit drug trade 
and the financial resources of OCGs is a complex task 
on a global scale. The EU action plan on drugs (2017-20) 
and the European agenda on security prioritise responses 
in this area in order to restrict the ability of criminals to 
infiltrate the legitimate economy and exploit vulnerabilities 
in financial systems. Enacting legislation at the EU level that 
(21) UK Statutory Instruments 2017, https://www.legislation.gov.uk/
uksi/2017/1240/contents/made
keeps pace with financial and technological developments 
is a key part of this response. This approach is supported by 
various EU structures that address the operational aspects 
of financial crimes linked to the trade in illicit drugs. Given 
the interconnectedness of today’s global financial system, 
the EU also works with a range of organisations in different 
regions of the world that are involved in addressing money 
laundering (see Chapter 1 and Table 9.1).
A crucial question for research and policy is how effective 
and efficient an existing AML regime is. National risk 
assessments for money laundering, required from all 
members of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), are 
designed to determine if AML resources are sufficient 
and can reduce overall money laundering in the country. 
Ferwerda and Reuter (2018), based on analysis of 
Italy and Switzerland, provide a general judgement 
and recommendations to strengthen forthcoming 
national risk assessments across all FATF countries. 
The recommendations include, among others, using risk 
assessment standards from other fields and integrating 
a measure of uncertainty into the risk assessment process 
and analysis.
Tackling corruption at ports
In Chapter 1 we highlighted the problem of major European 
ports being targeted by organised crime groups to exploit 
vulnerabilities in port security in order to facilitate drug-
smuggling activities. These groups often target port 
workers, by threatening the worker or their family or simply 
offering money as an incentive. In many cases, the money 
may be to finance a drug habit or other addiction.
Table 9.1 
Entities addressing money laundering
International European Regional
Financial Action Task Force (FATF) EU Expert Group on Money Laundering and 
Terrorist Financing
Caribbean Financial Action Task Force
Egmont Group EU Committee on the Prevention of Money 
Laundering and Terrorist Financing
Financial Action Task Force against Money 
Laundering in South America
International Money Laundering Information 
Network (IMoLIN)
EU informal network of Financial Intelligence 
Units (the EU FIUs Platform)
Inter-Governmental Action Group against 
Money Laundering in West Africa (GIABA)
Camden Asset Recovery lnteragency Network 
(CARIN)
Council of Europe’s Committee of Experts 
on the Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering 
Measures and the Financing of Terrorism 
(MONEYVAL)
Middle East and North Africa Financial Action 
Task Force
Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money 
Laundering Group
Eurasian Group on Combating Money 
Laundering and Financing of Terrorism
Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering
CHAPTER 9 I Targeting operational responses to drug markets and associated criminality
214
The Stroomplan Initiative has a specific component 
focused on anti-corruption and integrity (see the box on 
the Stroomplan Initiative, page 219). Other major points 
of entry for drugs have also introduced measures to 
counter corruption. The port of Rotterdam has introduced 
a mechanism to rotate staff among roles to help prevent 
cases of corruption occurring.
Responding to drug distribution via online 
markets and social networks
In Chapter 2 we discussed the fact that one of the 
issues driving the accessibility of drugs is the range of 
comparatively new options to source them.
Europol’s Dark Web Team and Cyber Patrol
Criminality on the darknet has been identified as a cross-
cutting crime threat with significant impacts across the 
spectrum of serious and organised crime. It is no longer 
merely a modus operandi, but an established, highly 
dynamic and substantial criminal underground economy, 
which has been expanding steadily over recent years and is 
expected to grow further. The thriving online trade in a wide 
range of illicit goods and services on darknet markets has 
become one of the main engines of organised crime in the 
EU. The competitive nature of the service-based model 
underpinning criminality on the darknet has expanded 
the opportunities to commit crimes facilitated, enabled or 
amplified by technology. In addition, darknet markets pose 
significant investigative and prosecution challenges for law 
enforcement. The main obstacles to effective action by the 
competent authorities are technological and legislative, 
further exacerbated by limited resources. The Member 
States and other law enforcement partners have made 
increasing requests to Europol for operational support. Its 
response has been the establishment of a dedicated team 
to tackle criminality on the darknet. This team delivers 
a range of services in support of operational activities, 
including the following.
  Providing an enhanced intelligence picture and 
continuous monitoring of the threats, trends and 
developments related to criminality on the darknet: 
successful operations on the darknet require in-depth 
knowledge, expertise and understanding, as well as 
a mix of new and traditional investigative techniques.
  Delivering operational support and expertise in 
different crime areas: the cross-crime nature of 
criminality on the darknet can be addressed only 
in a multidisciplinary manner, by engaging with the 
cybercrime experts alongside those responsible 
for child sexual exploitation, illicit trade in drugs 
and firearms, trafficking in human beings, currency 
and document counterfeiting, etc. The complexity 
of the threats emanating from the darknet calls for 
coordinated operational action that draws upon the 
expertise held by the various competent authorities in 
different crime areas.
  Developing tools, tactics and techniques to conduct 
darknet investigations: the wide range of offences 
facilitated by the darknet, combined with rapidly 
changing modi operandi, has proven that there 
cannot be one specific investigative method. Each 
investigation and approach depends on the specific 
circumstances, and the investigative tools, tactics and 
techniques must be tailored to the particular case 
and adapted to broader trends and changes in modi 
operandi.
  Prioritising top threats and/or targets: an improved 
intelligence picture should form the basis for the 
selection and prioritisation of those investigations that 
will have the biggest impact.
  Deconflicting among the different entities involved: 
with multiple actors involved in such complex 
operations, there is a clear need for central 
coordination of, and deconfliction in, investigations 
related to the darknet. At present, many of these 
investigations are carried out on the basis of bilateral 
collaboration and case by case, which can jeopardise 
the actions planned by other law enforcement 
agencies and the overall success of the operation.
  Supporting joint technical and investigative actions: 
experience to date indicates that the law enforcement 
actions with the greatest impact on the darknet have 
been those executed jointly (see Case study 28).
  Engaging in training and capacity building: as 
criminality on the darknet is a cross-cutting problem 
that requires support from specialists in multiple types 
of crime, it is not feasible or practical for cybercrime 
units to deal with all such crime when the predicate 
crime is related to drugs, firearms or some other illicit 
commodity. It is essential, therefore, that appropriate 
training and capacity building be extended to those 
working in these areas to provide them with the 
required knowledge and expertise.
  Carrying out prevention and awareness raising: in the 
light of the growth in cyber juvenile delinquency and 
the proliferation of threat actors (individuals or groups 
responsible for events or incidents that impact, or have 
the potential to impact, the safety or security of others) 
active on the darknet, prevention and awareness 
activities could play a crucial role in deterring 
individuals from pursuing a pathway into cybercrime 
or cyber-facilitated crime. Such endeavours can have 
a strong deterrent effect.
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Cooperation with the private sector
Social media platforms, instant messaging apps and 
e-commerce sites are increasingly being exploited to 
advertise and distribute drugs or precursors. An initiative 
that may be useful to respond to this is the EU Internet 
Forum. The forum, established under the European Agenda 
on Security and launched in December 2015 by the 
European Commission, brings together EU home affairs 
ministers, the internet industry and other stakeholders 
to work together in a voluntary partnership to address 
the misuse of the internet by terrorist groups. The forum 
has two key objectives: to reduce the availability and 
accessibility of terrorist content online; and to empower 
civil society partners to increase the volume of effective 
alternative narratives online. This model may be equally 
applicable to reducing the availability and accessibility 
of drug-related content on the internet, in particular the 
advertising and sale of drugs and precursors.
Targeting drug supply chains
EMPACT operational action plans
EMPACT is the coordination platform for the EU Member 
States and institutions to develop and manage actions 
supporting the policy cycle (see section on the policy cycle 
in Chapter 8). Of the 10 crime priorities defined in the 
2018-21 policy cycle, one concerns drugs. It is addressed 
through two distinct OAPs: one on cannabis, cocaine 
and heroin, and the other on synthetic drugs and new 
psychoactive substances.
Each OAP is structured around seven strategic goals, with 
specific operational actions listed under each goal. The 
strategic goals of the two OAPs on drugs in the 2018-21 
policy cycle are as follows:
  intelligence picture
  operational activities
  prevention and capacity building
  cooperation with non-EU partners (third countries, 
international organisations and partners)
  document fraud
  financial investigations
  online trade in illicit goods and services
Each OAP is supported by a dedicated Europol team and 
OAP meetings often take place at Europol’s headquarters in 
The Hague. Participation in the OAPs is optional and open 
to all EU Member States and third countries, alongside 
the European Commission, the European Council, 
several EU agencies including the EMCDDA, platforms 
such as MAOC (N) and projects such as the EU Action 
Against Drugs and Organised Crime (EU-ACT). Similarly, 
participation in individual operational actions is open to all 
those participating in an OAP but is optional.
CASE STUDY 28
Global actions coordinated by Europol to tackle online criminality
Law enforcement agencies from the 
EU, Canada and the United States 
joined forces in early 2019 to target 
vendors and buyers of illicit goods on 
darknet markets. During the course 
of this operation, international law 
enforcement agencies made 61 
arrests and shut down 50 darknet 
accounts used for illicit activity. They 
executed 65 search warrants, seizing 
299.5 kg illicit drugs, 51 firearms 
and over EUR 6.2 million (almost 
EUR 4 million in cryptocurrency, 
EUR 2.2 million in cash and 
EUR 35 000 in gold). They also 
conducted 122 interviews.
These global actions followed on from 
the second annual Cyber Patrol Action 
Week, held at Europol’s headquarters 
in The Hague in July 2018. The Cyber 
Patrol Action Week brought together 
60 online investigators and subject 
matter experts from 19 countries, 
Eurojust and Europol. The experts 
detected 247 high-value targets, and 
developed intelligence packages that 
were disseminated to the concerned 
countries to inform subsequent 
investigations.
This international coordination 
approach demonstrates law 
enforcement agencies’ determination 
to tackle the criminal use of darknet 
markets.
Source: Europol (2019d).
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Cannabis
An example of the activities carried out under EMPACT 
are activities targeting the OCGs and facilitators involved 
in wholesale trafficking of cannabis resin across the 
Mediterranean Sea, particularly departures from Morocco, 
Libya and Lebanon, with direct or indirect impacts on the 
EU. It encourages participants to appropriately pursue 
other serious forms of criminality perpetrated by those 
OCGs.
As discussed in Chapter 3, the main source of cannabis 
resin for the European drug market is Morocco, and huge 
quantities are trafficked to Europe each year (see box ‘Rose 
of the Winds’). Many methods have been documented for 
smuggling resin from Morocco to southern Spain. However, 
of particular concern to Spanish authorities are boats that 
can carry loads of 2.5 tonnes at high speed, allowing them 
to evade detection. As well as drugs, such vessels have also 
been used to smuggle migrants from the shores of North 
Africa into Europe.
The Spanish Ministry of the Interior supported a law to 
restrict certain types of vessels. It was then introduced in 
October 2018 (22). The law applies to all rigid inflatable 
boats and high-speed boats that are more than 8 m in 
length, or those of equal or lower length that have 
a maximum power of more than 150 kilowatts. Also 
included are any other such vessels, regardless of size and 
power, if there are signs (specified in the regulation itself) 
that they can be used to commit or facilitate the smuggling 
of contraband. The law allows police to seize such vessels 
on land, even if they contain no illicit cargo. To support the 
implementation of the law, the Spanish Tax Agency created 
a special register for rigid inflatable boats and high-speed 
boats, accessible by public agencies. Anyone who owns 
a rigid inflatable boat or high-speed boat must register it, 
declaring its length, the power of its engines, the activity for 
which it is intended and the geographical area where it will 
be used.
Heroin and other opioids: EU-ACT
EU-ACT aims to build capacities to increase regional 
and transregional law enforcement cooperation and 
coordination in the fight against organised crime and 
trafficking activities along the heroin route. It also supports 
the development of drug policy and drug demand 
reduction activities. The project has been effective in 
(22) Real Decreto-ley 16/2018, de 26 de octubre, por el que se adoptan 
determinadas medidas de lucha contra el tráfico ilícito de personas 
y mercancías en relación con las embarcaciones utilizadas. Boletín 
Oficial Del Estado 260 (https://www.boe.es/diario_boe/txt.
php?id=BOE-A-2018-14747).
facilitating international meetings on heroin investigations. 
In particular, it has funded several operational and 
coordination meetings for field investigators and judicial 
authorities. The project provides intelligence on various 
activities concerning heroin interceptions along several 
Rose of the Winds
In response to the threat posed by large-scale 
trafficking of cannabis resin in the Mediterranean 
Sea, a joint operations team called Rose of the 
Winds (RoW) was established. This multilateral and 
multidisciplinary European law enforcement initiative 
involves several permanent partners, including France’s 
Office central pour la repression du traffic illicite des 
stupéfiants, Greece’s Hellenic Coast Guard, Italy’s 
Guardia di Finanza and Direzione Centrale per i Servizi 
Antidroga, Spain’s Guardia Civil and Europol. The 
stable engagement of these competent authorities of 
Member States with Mediterranean coastline serves as 
a task force safeguarding the interests of the EU and 
the international community. Various other authorities 
from EU Member States and third countries also 
have been engaged as needed. The joint operations 
team pools and synergises resources and expertise 
from law enforcement and other organisations in 
the participating Member States and Europol. Thus 
RoW shares new developments in real time and, 
when required, convenes at short notice and on the 
crime scene. In addition, RoW conducts strategic 
analysis based on the operations carried out by its 
Member States and other information. RoW has been 
a key source of intelligence and awareness raising in 
Europe concerning the new role played by Libya as 
a major drug storage and distribution platform in the 
Mediterranean region, especially for cannabis resin.
Operations carried out by the RoW partners, or 
supported with intelligence provided by them, since 
2015 have resulted in the seizure in the EU, in 
international waters and in third countries of hundreds 
of tonnes of cannabis resin produced in Lebanon and 
Morocco, multitonne amounts of cocaine from South 
America and millions of captagon tablets from the 
Middle East. It has also led to the arrest of a major 
cannabis resin trafficker in Morocco. Above all, the work 
model in place continues to collect valuable insight 
into evolving trends and modi operandi regarding 
cannabis resin trafficking and polycriminality in the 
Mediterranean basin, thereby revealing the dynamics 
of transnational organised crime affecting the region 
(Europol, 2016).
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heroin-trafficking routes, especially within the Indian 
Ocean, East Africa, Central Asia and the Black Sea corridor.
Various actions are taking place at Member State level. An 
example from Sweden is presented in the box ‘Responding 
to the situation of new synthetic opioids in Sweden’.
Cocaine
The Cocaine Route Programme represents a concerted 
effort by the EU and its partners to focus on transnational 
organised crime and the flow of illicit drugs to Europe. 
It does this mainly by facilitating communication and 
cooperation between law enforcement officials and the 
judiciary. Since 2009, under the Instrument contributing 
Responding to the situation of new synthetic opioids in Sweden
The presence of fentanyl and its derivatives on the 
Swedish drug market since 2014 is considered to 
be among the most serious developments that have 
affected Sweden’s drug-using population. Since 
2015, these synthetic opioids have surpassed heroin 
in the number of drug-related deaths they cause.
In order to tackle this issue, the Swedish authorities 
introduced a raft of measures using a multiagency 
approach. The initiatives included prioritising 
investigation of fentanyl derivatives by the Public 
Health Agency of Sweden and proposals for fentanyl 
derivatives to be considered as goods dangerous to 
health or as narcotics. As a result, control measures 
were adopted on two occasions in 2017 and again 
in 2018. The National Forensic Centre developed 
procedures for safe handling of the substances and 
a multidisciplinary team was established to reduce 
drug-related mortality by making naloxone available. 
Other measures included a new provision enabling 
the Public Health Agency of Sweden and the Medical 
Product Agency to purchase samples of substances 
under consideration for regulation in order to analyse 
and chemically identify those substances.
In terms of the law enforcement response, the 
strategy included knowledge support, international 
and interagency cooperation, crime prevention 
measures, informing regulatory responses and 
initiating investigations. Such investigations mainly 
targeted the sale and distribution of fentanyl and 
derivatives online. In Sweden, the sale of fentanyl 
derivatives takes place almost exclusively on the 
internet. Based on police information gathered since 
2014, an estimated 300 of the 370 deaths related to 
fentanyl or its derivatives in Sweden can be traced 
back to internet purchases. The limited number 
of Swedish vendors implies that a small number 
of vendors appear to be behind the availability of 
fentanyl and its derivatives. Such vendors became 
the focus of investigations. In a judgment in such 
a case in May 2018, two vendors who had sold 
fentanyl derivatives were convicted of eight counts of 
involuntary manslaughter; the judgment was referred 
to the Court of Appeal and in April 2019 the vendors 
were convicted of involuntary manslaughter and 
each received a prison sentence of four and six years 
respectively.
The trade may move to darknet markets as a result 
of intensive repressive measures against open sale 
online. However, the Swedish police consider that 
such a move would limit public exposure by reducing 
accessibility to these substances (Polisen, 2018).
The combination of these measures seems to have 
been effective, as can be seen in the falling numbers 
of calls to the poison information centre and of the 
occurrence of fentanyl or its derivatives in post-
mortem toxicology cases over the course of 2018 
(see figure below).
Data related to fentanyl and its derivatives in Sweden: 
seizures, calls to the poison information centre and 
mentions in post-mortem toxicology cases (per 
month), January 2017 to October 2018
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to Stability and Peace, the EU has committed more than 
EUR 50 million in 40 countries along the recognised 
trafficking routes for cocaine in Latin America, the 
Caribbean and Africa. Current components of the Cocaine 
Route Programme are AIRCOP, SEACOP, CRIMJUST and 
COLIBRI.
The AIRCOP component increases the resilience of 
interdiction efforts by building Joint Airport Interdiction 
Task Forces at selected airports in Africa, Latin America and 
the Caribbean. These are connected to secure international 
databases and systems for transmission of operational 
information. International operations supported through the 
project have led to significant seizures of drugs, cash and 
other illicit goods.
The SEACOP element builds capacity by establishing 
Maritime Intelligence Units and Joint Maritime Control 
Units, first to detect and then to search suspect vessels 
and shipments in selected countries in West Africa, Latin 
America and the Caribbean. This project also strengthens 
national and regional maritime information systems, 
increasing the effectiveness of interdiction efforts.
CRIMJUST focuses on criminal justice cooperation and 
investigations and is designed to complement the other 
projects of the Cocaine Route Programme. This component 
aims to achieve a stronger focus on criminal investigation 
and criminal justice cooperation between countries in Latin 
America, the Caribbean and West Africa to enhance their 
capacity to counter organised crime along the cocaine 
routes.
The COLIBRI component is being implemented as part of 
the WCO Strategic Plan: ’Protect society, public health and 
safety, and contribute to combating crime and terrorism’, 
and in line with the role of customs in achieving the 
Sustainable Development Goals adopted by the United 
Nations in 2015, in particular SDG 16: Peace, Justice and 
Strong Institutions.
The use of containers for the trafficking of illicit drugs has 
led to the development of specific responses such as the 
UNODC-WCO Container Control Programme (UNODC, 
n.d.) for capacity building and responses such as the 
Stroomplan Initiative (see box ‘Stroomplan Initiative: 
targeting cocaine trafficking through Antwerp’).
In Chapter 5 we presented recent findings from the forensic 
profiling of samples of cocaine seized in Europe. This 
initiative is being carried out under EMPACT and is an 
important aspect of the EU’s coordinated response to the 
threat posed by cocaine.
Synthetic drugs: EU training on dismantling illicit 
labs
In the EU, Member States work in a coordinated manner to 
provide training to law enforcement agencies on the topic 
of dismantling illicit synthetic drug laboratories. There is 
a now well-established yearly training programme, which 
has three components: online basic training, a 2-week 
residential advanced training course and then a further 
1-week follow-up course.
The basic course is an online module that teaches 
the student some theoretical knowledge about illicit 
synthetic drug production and precursors, back-tracking 
investigations, forensic aspects and safety regimes. 
The basic course is a prerequisite for proceeding to the 
advanced course.
The advanced joint CEPOL-Europol illicit synthetic drugs 
laboratory dismantling course is run once a year at the 
international training facility of the Central Bureau of 
Investigation in Warsaw, Poland. The follow-up training 
is held in Belgium at the facility in Emblem — offered 
to graduates of the advanced course, two years after 
graduation, provided that they are still working in the same 
function. Experts from Belgium, the Netherlands and 
Poland support these courses, and technicians from the 
suppliers of portable electronic detection equipment also 
provide assistance. The EMCDDA provides expertise during 
the theoretical parts of the course.
These courses are available to law enforcement officers in 
EU Member States, and occasionally officers from non-EU 
countries will be accepted by special request. For example, 
officers from Colombia and Serbia have participated in the 
advanced course.
New psychoactive substances: EU Early Warning 
System
Operated and financed by the EMCDDA, in close cooperation 
with Europol, the EU Early Warning System on new 
psychoactive substances (EWS) is the first step in a three-
step legal framework designed to allow the EU to rapidly 
detect, assess and respond to health and social threats 
caused by NPS. The work of the EWS aims to build, maintain 
and strengthen situational awareness, preparedness and 
responses to NPS at national and EU levels.
The EWS was first set up in 1997 under Joint Action 
97/396/JHA (23). It was strengthened in 2005 by Council 
(23) https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/
TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A31997F0396
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Decision 2005/387/JHA (24). As of 23 November 2018, it 
operates under Regulation (EC) 1920/2006 (as amended 
by Regulation (EU) 2017/2101) (25) (Figure 9.1).
The EWS is composed of a multiagency and 
multidisciplinary network, which includes the EMCDDA, 
30 national early warning systems (the 28 EU Member 
States, Norway and Turkey), Europol and its law 
enforcement networks, the European Medicines Agency, 
the European Commission and other partners. The 
EMCDDA, in cooperation with Europol, is responsible 
for collecting, collating, analysing, assessing and 
communicating the information reported by the network 
in order to provide them with any information required for 
(24) https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dec/2005/387/oj
(25) https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/
TXT/?uri=CELEX:32017R2101
the purposes of early warning and to allow the EMCDDA to 
draw up an initial report on a new psychoactive substance 
that may pose health or social risks at EU level or 
a combined initial report on several similar NPS.
Underpinning each of the national early warning systems, 
and in turn the EWS, is the exchange of information on the 
chemical identification of NPS from forensic and toxicology 
laboratories. Principally, these laboratories handle casework 
related to seizures of NPS by law enforcement agencies 
(such as police, customs and border forces), poisonings 
(such as those from hospital emergency departments and 
medico-legal death investigations) and samples collected 
from people who use NPS and from test purchases 
(e.g. from online marketplaces). This approach allows the 
collection and rapid reporting of event-based information 
on the appearance of, and harms caused by, NPS at 
Stroomplan Initiative: targeting cocaine trafficking through Antwerp
In Chapter 5 we described how Antwerp has 
emerged as one of the key ports of entry for cocaine 
into Europe. In 2017 almost 40 tonnes of the drug 
was intercepted, and in 2018 the amount seized 
was just under 50 tonnes. Furthermore, over 
50 tonnes of cocaine was intercepted outside the 
EU, allegedly en route to Antwerp. In addition, this 
increased trade has brought associated problems 
of violence and intimidation, as discussed in 
Chapter 1. Recognising this, the Belgian authorities 
developed a comprehensive plan to respond to 
this phenomenon, called the Stroomplan Initiative 
(Stream plan).
The plan focuses on four main priorities.
(1) Intensified controls in the port of Antwerp: large-
scale scanning of containers, use of cameras placed 
directly at the terminals so that verifications can be 
done immediately, use of automatic number plate 
recognition on connecting roads to the port terminals, 
smart seals on containers to monitor deviations 
before scanning and an anonymous whistleblowing 
system for reporting suspicious activity by co-workers.
(2) The creation of a multidisciplinary taskforce, 
known as the ‘Kali-team’, perhaps a reference to 
both the goddess Kali and the Cali cartel: this joint 
taskforce focuses on tackling drug-related crime 
linked to the cocaine trade. The multidisciplinary 
team comprises officers from a number of agencies, 
such as the federal and local police, maritime police, 
customs and the public prosecutor’s office.
(3) Increased action against money laundering 
and the link between the legitimate and the illegal 
economy: cooperation with the prosecutor’s office 
has intensified (port prosecutors, dedicated to 
port-related cases only, have been appointed) and 
international cooperation is more thorough, as many 
of the crime flows are across borders.
(4) An enhanced integrity and anti-corruption policy: 
the pressure that organised crime groups exert on 
public servants has intensified over the years. Not 
only bribes but also threats of violence are now more 
common. Even criminal infiltration in government 
institutions can no longer be ruled out.
Currently about 1 % of the containers arriving at 
the port are inspected. Checks are intensifying 
considerably under the ‘Stroomplan’. Meanwhile 
cases of serious violence, including abduction and 
shootings, have been reported around Antwerp. 
As part of the plan, government institutions and the 
private sector are also joining efforts to tackle the 
unprecedented rise of cocaine trafficking at Antwerp 
port.
Sources: EMCDDA open source information database; Schneider 
(2018).
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national level to the EMCDDA. The Joint Research Centre 
is providing support to the European network of customs 
laboratories and the EWS through the provision of advanced 
analytical testing capability and expertise. These data 
are complemented by reports twice a year, which include 
aggregated data on seizures by law enforcement agencies 
and from poisonings. The organisation and functioning 
of the national early warning systems is a national 
responsibility. Although these systems have developed 
to meet national needs, they draw on a common format, 
guidelines and tools to report information to the EMCDDA.
Perhaps the highest-level response applied by any Member 
State to any issue is to introduce legislation. The significant 
threats posed by NPS have prompted many EU Member 
States to adopt new laws to combat this problem.
Figure 9.1 
New accelerated EU procedure to identify and respond to new psychoactive substances appearing in the EU
New legislative package Shorter deadlines
Unchanged three-step approach
Regulation
Directive
Regulation (EU) 2017/2101 of the
European Parliament and of the Council
of 15 November 2017 amending Regulation
(EC) No 1920/2006 as regards information
exchange on, and an early warning system
and risk assessment procedure for, 
new psychoactive substances     
Directive (EU) 2017/2103 of the European
Parliament and of the Council of 15 November 
2017 amending Council Framework Decision 
2004/757/JHA in order to include new 
psychoactive substances in the definition of 
‘drug’ and repealing Council Decision 
2005/387/JHA     
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Annex: Principal areas of EU legislation 
linked to drug supply reduction
Drug precursors
Regulation (EC) No 111/2005 on trade in drug precursors between EU and third countries, amended by Regulation (EU) No 1259/2013.
Regulation (EC) No 273/2004, on trade in drug precursors within the EU, amended by Regulation (EU) No 1258/2013.
EU agencies addressing drug supply issues
Regulation (EC) No 1920/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2006 on the European Monitoring Centre for 
Drugs and Drug Addiction (recast) as amended.
Regulation (EU) 2016/794 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 May 2016 on the European Union Agency for Law 
Enforcement Cooperation (Europol) and replacing and repealing Council Decisions 2009/371/JHA, 2009/934/JHA, 2009/935/JHA, 
2009/936/JHA and 2009/968/JHA.
Regulation (EU) 2018/1727 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 November 2018 on the European Union Agency for Criminal 
Justice Cooperation (Eurojust), and replacing and repealing Council Decision 2002/187/JHA.
Regulation (EU) 2015/2219 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2015 on the European Union Agency for Law 
Enforcement Training (CEPOL) and replacing and repealing Council Decision 2005/681/JHA.
Regulation (EU) 2016/1624 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 September 2016 on the European Border and Coast Guard 
and amending Regulation (EU) 2016/399 of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Regulation (EC) No 863/2007 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council, Council Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004 and Council Decision 2005/267/EC.
Risk assessment and control of new psychoactive substances
Regulation (EU) 2017/2101 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 November 2017 amending Regulation (EC) No 1920/2006 
as regards information exchange on, and an early warning system and risk assessment procedure for, new psychoactive substances.
Directive (EU) 2017/2103 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 November 2017 amending Council Framework Decision 
2004/757/JHA in order to include new psychoactive substances in the definition of ‘drug’ and repealing Council Decision 2005/387/JHA.
Counterfeiting of medical products
Council of Europe Convention on the counterfeiting of medical products and similar crimes involving threats to public health (Council of 
Europe Treaty Series – No. 211).
Judicial and police cooperation in criminal matters
Council Act of 29 May 2000 establishing in accordance with Article 34 of the Treaty on European Union the Convention on Mutual Assistance 
in Criminal Matters between the Member States of the European Union (2000/C 197/01).
Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on joint investigation teams (2002/465/JHA).
Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures between Member States 
(2002/584/JHA).
Council Framework Decision 2004/757/JHA of 25 October 2004 laying down minimum provisions on the constituent elements of criminal 
acts and penalties in the field of illicit drug trafficking.
Council Framework Decision 2008/841/JHA of 24 October 2008 on the fight against organised crime.
Council Framework Decision 2008/978/JHA of 18 December 2008 on the European evidence warrant for the purpose of obtaining objects, 
documents and data for use in proceedings in criminal matters.
Cybercrime
Directive 2013/40/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 August 2013 on attacks against information systems and replacing 
Council Framework Decision 2005/222/JHA.
Council Framework Decision of 28 May 2001 combating fraud and counterfeiting of non-cash means of payment (2001/413/JHA).
Forensic analysis and criminal investigation
Council Decision of 28 May 2001 on the transmission of samples of controlled substances (2001/419/JHA).
Council Recommendation of 30 March 2004 regarding guidelines for taking samples of seized drugs (2004/C 86/04).
Information exchange
Council Framework Decision 2006/960/JHA of 18 December 2006 on simplifying the exchange of information and intelligence between law 
enforcement authorities of the Member States of the European Union.
Council Decision 2008/615/JHA of 23 June 2008 on the stepping up of cross-border cooperation, particularly in combating terrorism and 
cross-border crime.
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Firearms
Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Council Directive 91/477/EEC on control of the acquisition and possession 
of weapons.
Proceeds of crime
Council Decision of 17 October 2000 concerning arrangements for cooperation between financial intelligence units of the Member States in 
respect of exchanging information.
Council Framework Decision of 26 June 2001 on money laundering, the identification, tracing, freezing, seizing and confiscation of 
instrumentalities and the proceeds of crime (2001/500/JHA).
Council Framework Decision 2005/212/JHA of 24 February 2005 on confiscation of crime-related proceeds, instrumentalities and property.
Council Decision 2007/845/JHA of 6 December 2007 concerning cooperation between asset recovery offices of the Member States in the 
field of tracing and identification of proceeds from, or other property related to, crime.
Regulation (EU) 2015/847 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2015 on information accompanying transfers of funds 
and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1781/2006.
Directive (EU) 2015/849 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2015 on the prevention of the use of the financial system 
for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing.
Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on European Production and Preservation Orders for electronic 
evidence in criminal matters — COM/2018/225 final — 2018/0108 (COD).
Document fraud
Regulation (EU) 2016/1191 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 July 2016 on promoting the free movement of citizens by 
simplifying the requirements for presenting certain public documents in the European Union and amending Regulation (EU) No 1024/2012 
(OJ L 200, 26.7.2016, p. 1-136).
Trafficking in human beings
Directive 2011/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 April 2011 on preventing and combating trafficking in human beings 
and protecting its victims, and replacing Council Framework Decision 2002/629/JHA.
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GETTING IN TOUCH WITH THE EU
In person
All over the European Union there are hundreds of Europe 
Direct information centres. You can fi nd the address of the 
centre nearest you at: http://europa.eu/contact
On the phone or by e-mail
Europe Direct is a service that answers your questions about 
the European Union. You can contact this service 
•  by freephone: 00 800 6 7 8 9 10 11 
(certain operators may charge for these calls) 
•  at the following standard number: +32 22999696 or
•  by electronic mail via: http://europa.eu/contact
FINDING INFORMATION ABOUT THE EU
Online
Information about the European Union in all the offi  cial 
languages of the EU is available on the Europa website at: 
http://europa.eu  
EU publications
You can download or order free and priced EU publications 
from EU Bookshop at: http://bookshop.europa.eu. 
Multiple copies of free publications may be obtained by 
contacting Europe Direct or your local information centre 
(see http://europa.eu/contact)
EU law and related documents
For access to legal information from the EU, including all 
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